U.S. sanctions on Iran have long had a China problem. So long as China remains the principal purchaser of Iranian oil,Footnote 1 sanctions directed at Tehran cannot be effective unless they also reach the Chinese refiners, traders, shipping firms, ports, and financial intermediaries that sustain Iran’s oil revenues. This dynamic became especially visible during the current U.S.–Iran conflict, when Washington revived its “maximum pressure” campaignFootnote 2 and intensified designations of Chinese entities alleged to have purchased, transported, or otherwise facilitated trade in Iranian crude. The most important of these measures was the designation of Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., one of China’s largest independent refineries, for allegedly purchasing billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil.
Beijing’s response was unprecedented. On May 2, 2026, the Ministry of Commerce invoked China’s Blocking Rules for the first time since their promulgation in 2021, directing that U.S. sanctions imposed pursuant to Executive Orders 13846 and 13902 against Hengli and four other Chinese independent refineries should not be “recognized, enforced, or complied with.”Footnote 3 The Hengli case therefore marks a turning point. It shows how U.S. Iran sanctions have become the trigger for the operationalization of China’s counter-sanctions regime. What had previously existed largely as a legal arsenal in reserve was now put into actual use against U.S. secondary sanctions in the Iran oil trade.
The roots of this response, however, lie earlier. The arrest of Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver in December 2018 pursuant to a U.S. extradition request was the episode that alerted Xi Jinping and the Chinese leadership to the full risks posed by U.S. secondary sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction. Secondary sanctions differ from primary sanctions in that they do not merely prohibit U.S. persons from dealing with a sanctioned target. Rather, they penalize third-party persons, entities, or countries that conduct business with a sanctioned state or entity, such as Iran, even when the relevant transactions may have little or no direct connection to the United States. In Meng’s case, the United States alleged that she had misled HSBC about Huawei’s relationship with Skycom Tech Co., thereby exposing the bank to transactions that allegedly violated U.S. sanctions against Iran. From Beijing’s perspective, the case demonstrated that U.S. secondary sanctions were not merely abstract legal doctrines but concrete instruments capable of targeting China’s flagship technology companies and their senior executives.
Xi’s response was to call for a comprehensive legal counteroffensive. In February 2019, while presiding over the second meeting of the Central Commission for Comprehensive Law-Based Governance, he criticized the abuse of “long-arm jurisdiction” by certain Western countries and instructed China to respond with political, economic, diplomatic, and legal measures. The Meng case thus served as the warning signal: it revealed the vulnerability of Chinese firms and executives to U.S. secondary sanctions and set in motion the regulatory and legislative build-up that followed.
Between 2020 and 2026, China constructed an increasingly comprehensive counter-sanctions architecture. This included the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List, the Rules on Blocking Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures, the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law, the Foreign Relations Law, and new regulations on industrial-chain and supply-chain security and improper foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction. Together, these measures created both a “sword” and a “shield”: tools to retaliate against foreign entities involved in sanctions against China, and mechanisms to protect Chinese firms from the extraterritorial application of foreign law.
This Essay examines that trajectory from Meng to Hengli. It does not address the broader legality of U.S. secondary sanctions under international law, which has been discussed extensively in the literature.Footnote 4 Instead, it focuses on how U.S. Iran sanctions, first through the Meng prosecution and later through the Hengli designation, transformed China’s approach from diplomatic objection to legal confrontation. The central argument is that the Hengli case represents the culmination of a counter-sanctions regime years in the making. Meng warned Beijing of the risks and led to the counter-sanctions legislative drive; Hengli prompted Beijing to put its new laws into operation. The result is a new phase in global economic statecraft, in which U.S. sanctions against Iran increasingly generate not only pressure on Tehran, but also direct legal conflict between Washington and Beijing.
China’s Changing Response to U.S. Sanctions
China has been subject to various forms of U.S. sanctions for decades. Until recently, however, Beijing generally preferred to resolve such disputes through quiet diplomacy rather than public confrontation.Footnote 5 Even when objecting to U.S. sanctions, its response usually consisted of diplomatic protests, official statements, or symbolic retaliatory measures rather than formal legal countermeasures. Chinese policymakers were reluctant to escalate disputes that could further damage bilateral economic relations or expose Chinese firms to even greater risks.
This asymmetry became increasingly untenable. For Chinese firms, non-compliance with U.S. secondary sanctions often meant frozen assets, termination of commercial contracts, exclusion from the U.S. financial system, loss of banking relationships, and, in some cases, criminal prosecution of corporate executives. By contrast, the costs imposed by China’s diplomatic protests were largely reputational and therefore easily absorbed by foreign governments and companies. As a result, many multinational firms viewed China’s objections as manageable political costs while treating U.S. sanctions as unavoidable commercial realities to which they had to submit.
The turning point came under President Xi Jinping. Even before assuming China’s highest office, President Xi had demonstrated his deep dissatisfaction with what he regarded as Western interference in China’s affairs. During a visit to Mexico in 2009, then-Vice-President Xi remarked that “[t]here are a few foreigners, with full bellies, who have nothing better to do than try to point fingers at [us],” stressing that “China does not export revolution, hunger or poverty.”Footnote 6
The event that fundamentally reshaped Beijing’s thinking, however, was the arrest of Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver in December 2018 pursuant to a U.S. extradition request.Footnote 7 Meng was accused of misleading the HSBC bank regarding Huawei’s relationship with Skycom Tech Co., thereby exposing the bank to transactions allegedly violating U.S. sanctions against Iran.Footnote 8 From Beijing’s perspective, the case demonstrated that U.S. sanctions and extraterritorial jurisdiction were no longer abstract legal doctrines but concrete instruments capable of targeting China’s flagship technology companies and their senior executives.
Only two months later, while presiding over the second meeting of the Central Commission for Comprehensive Law-Based Governance in February 2019, President Xi directly addressed what he described as the abuse of “long-arm jurisdiction”:Footnote 9
Some Western countries have, under the guise of their domestic laws, imposed so-called “long-arm jurisdiction” on Chinese citizens and legal persons. Such actions are untenable under international law, yet they persist in doing so. We must therefore respond by employing a comprehensive range of political, economic, diplomatic, and legal measures.Footnote 10
He further instructed:
In response to the hegemonic practices of certain Western countries carried out under the banner of the “rule of law,” we should strengthen both theoretical and practical research on countermeasures, establish a blocking mechanism, and make it clear through legislation that China does not recognize or accept the exercise of any foreign state’s long-arm jurisdiction. At the same time, we should accelerate the development of China’s legal framework governing the extraterritorial application of its laws, so as to provide a sound legal basis for China’s overseas law enforcement and judicial activities.Footnote 11
These remarks were significant for two reasons. First, they elevated opposition to U.S. secondary sanctions from a foreign policy issue to a central component of President Xi’s broader vision of “law-based governance” (依法治国). Second, they explicitly linked China’s domestic legal reforms with the country’s geopolitical competition with the United States. Rather than relying primarily on diplomacy, China would increasingly respond through legislation and legal institutions.
President Xi’s instructions were rapidly translated into Party policy. The Fourth Plenum of the Nineteenth Central Committee, held in October 2019, called for strengthening the rule of law in foreign affairs by “establishing a legal system for foreign-related work, strengthening the study and application of international law, and improving the rule of law in foreign-related affairs.”Footnote 12 Although framed in general language, the message was unmistakable: foreign-related legislation would become a strategic instrument of national security.
The legislative response followed accordingly, first through departmental rules and later through formal legislations. In its 2021 Work Report, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress—China’s top legislature—identified foreign-related legislation as one of its highest priorities, calling for accelerated legislation on “anti-sanctions, anti-interference, and countering long-arm jurisdiction” in order to enrich China’s legal “toolbox” for responding to external risks. This represented a remarkable shift in legislative priorities. Whereas foreign-related legislation had traditionally focused on facilitating trade and investment, it was now increasingly designed to provide legal instruments for strategic competition.Footnote 13
Within a matter of months, Beijing unveiled the core pillars of what has since become one of the world’s most comprehensive counter-sanctions regimes. Collectively, these measures transformed China’s approach from passive resistance to active legal retaliation, creating a comprehensive framework that seeks not merely to shield Chinese firms from foreign sanctions but also to deter foreign governments and companies from imposing or complying with sanctions that Beijing considers contrary to its interests.
Ironically, therefore, the U.S. sanctions measures against Iran achieved much more than increasing pressure on Tehran. It also accelerated the emergence of an entirely new branch of Chinese law—the law of economic countermeasures—which is rapidly becoming a central feature of China’s foreign economic governance.
The Sword and the Shield
The comprehensive legal framework to counter foreign sanctions, broadly speaking, consists of two complementary components: a sword that retaliates against foreign entities imposing or complying with sanctions against China and a shield that protects Chinese firms from the extraterritorial application of foreign laws. Because formal legislative process is time-consuming, these measures were first implemented through departmental rules before being elevated into formal legislation.
The first component—the sword—was initially introduced through the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (the Provisions), promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in September 2020.Footnote 14 Modeled in part on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Entity List and the U.S. Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, the Provisions are drafted in deliberately expansive terms. Article 1 states that its purpose is to safeguard “China’s national sovereignty, security, and development interests.”Footnote 15 While the first two objectives are familiar in national security legislation, the inclusion of “development interests” is particularly noteworthy. Unlike traditional national security concepts, “development interests” have never been clearly defined in Chinese law and are capable of encompassing virtually any foreign measure perceived to impede China’s economic or technological development. Measures such as export controls on advanced semiconductors or restrictions on Chinese technology companies could therefore readily fall within the scope of the Provisions.
Article 2 authorizes China to designate foreign entities that either (1) endanger China’s national sovereignty, security, or development interests, or (2) violate normal market principles by interrupting commercial transactions with, or adopting discriminatory measures against, Chinese enterprises, organizations, or individuals, thereby seriously harming their legitimate rights and interests. Once designated, an entity may be prohibited or restricted from engaging in import and export activities with China, making new investments in China, or conducting other business activities deemed necessary by the authorities.Footnote 16 Individuals associated with listed entities may also face restrictions on entry, work permits, or residence in China. Like their U.S. counterparts, the Provisions retain considerable administrative flexibility. Chinese firms may apply for permission to continue transactions with listed entities where special circumstances justify an exemption,Footnote 17 while designated entities may be removed from the list if they rectify their conduct and eliminate its adverse consequences within the prescribed period.Footnote 18 However, given how political the sanctions and anti-sanctions regime in China is, it is highly unlikely that most firms could make use of such flexibility in practice.
If the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List serves as China’s sword, the Rules on Blocking Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures (the Blocking Rules), issued in January 2021,Footnote 19 constitute its shield. Heavily inspired by the European Union’s Blocking Statute,Footnote 20 the Blocking Rules go considerably further in mobilizing domestic actors to resist foreign sanctions.
Article 2 defines the scope of the Blocking Rules by targeting the extraterritorial application of foreign legislation or other measures that, “in violation of international law and the basic principles of international relations,” unjustifiably prohibit or restrict Chinese citizens, legal persons, or other organizations from engaging in normal economic and commercial activities with a third country or region.Footnote 21 Although the provision is drafted in general terms, its principal target is unmistakably U.S. secondary sanctions.
The most distinctive feature of the Blocking Rules is that they effectively transfer the decision whether to comply with foreign sanctions from individual firms to the Chinese state. Article 5 requires Chinese citizens and companies to report to MOFCOM whenever foreign laws prohibit or restrict their dealings with third countries. After assessment by an inter-agency working mechanism, MOFCOM may issue a prohibition order declaring that the relevant foreign legislation or measure shall not be recognized, complied with, or enforced within China.
Compliance with such prohibition orders is backed by both sticks and carrots. On the one hand, Article 13 authorizes MOFCOM to issue warnings, order rectification, and impose administrative fines on Chinese entities that fail either to report relevant foreign measures or to comply with a prohibition order. More significantly, Article 9 creates a private cause of action by allowing Chinese parties injured by another person’s compliance with a prohibited foreign measure to seek compensation before Chinese courts. The same provision also permits lawsuits against persons who benefit from foreign judgments or decisions based on prohibited legislation. In effect, the Blocking Rules transform compliance with U.S. secondary sanctions into a potential source of civil liability under Chinese law.
On the other hand, the Blocking Rules also recognize that refusing to comply with foreign sanctions may expose Chinese firms to substantial commercial losses. Accordingly, Article 11 authorizes relevant government agencies to provide “necessary support” to entities that suffer significant losses as a result of complying with a prohibition order. While the provision leaves the nature of such support deliberately unspecified, it underscores the central premise of the Blocking Rules: decisions regarding compliance with foreign sanctions are no longer purely commercial judgments made by individual firms but matters of national policy to be coordinated by the Chinese government.
Together, the Provisions on Unreliable Entity List and the Blocking Rules established the basic architecture of China’s counter-sanctions regime. The former provides Beijing with offensive tools to impose costs on foreign firms, while the latter seeks to insulate Chinese companies from the coercive effects of foreign secondary sanctions.
The Legislative Drive
Although the two MOFCOM rules significantly expanded China’s counter-sanctions toolkit, they occupied the lowest rung of China’s legislative hierarchy as departmental rules.Footnote 22 Their legal authority was therefore limited, both domestically and internationally. Beijing quickly moved to remedy this perceived weakness by elevating its counter-sanctions regime to the statutory level.
The result was the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL), adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in June 2021.Footnote 23 The Law transformed the departmental rules into national legislation and, more importantly, provided a broad statutory basis for China’s countermeasures against foreign sanctions.
The AFSL is drafted in deliberately expansive terms. with Article 1 repeating the same vague legislative purpose of safeguarding “China’s development interests” along with sovereignty and national security as in the Provisions on Unreliable Entity List and the Blocking Rules. The breadth of the Law is equally apparent in the categories of persons subject to countermeasures. Article 4 authorizes sanctions not only against those directly responsible for adopting or implementing discriminatory measures against Chinese citizens or organizations, but also against individuals and entities “directly or indirectly” involved in their formulation, decision-making, or implementation. This potentially reaches a remarkably wide range of actors, including legislators, government officials, regulators, judges, financial institutions, and even private companies that merely comply with foreign sanctions regimes.
The countermeasures themselves are similarly broad. They largely mirror those available under the Provisions on Unreliable Entity List, including visa restrictions and prohibitions on conducting transactions with China, but go further, in Article 6, by expressly authorizing the seizure, attachment, or freezing of property located within China. Moreover, the list is expressly non-exhaustive, ending with the catch-all phrase “other necessary measures.” Article 13 expands the government’s discretion even further by providing that countermeasures under the AFSL are without prejudice to any additional measures authorized under other laws and regulations. In effect, the Law creates an open-ended statutory basis for future retaliatory measures.
The AFSL is also deliberately ambiguous regarding who bears responsibility for implementing China’s countermeasures. Article 11 provides that organizations and individuals within China “shall implement” the countermeasures adopted by the State Council, while Article 14 imposes legal liability on those who fail to implement or cooperate with such measures. At the same time, Article 12 prohibits any organization or individual—not merely Chinese entities—from implementing or assisting in the implementation of discriminatory measures against Chinese citizens or organizations. Where such conduct infringes the lawful rights and interests of Chinese parties, those parties may bring civil actions before Chinese courts seeking injunctions and damages. Article 15 extends the Law still further by authorizing countermeasures against foreign states, organizations, and individuals that implement, cooperate with, or support actions deemed harmful to China’s sovereignty, security, or development interests.
Taken together, these provisions demonstrate that the AFSL is not merely a sanctions statute. Rather, it establishes a comprehensive legal framework through which China can retaliate against foreign governments, multinational corporations, financial institutions, and even private actors involved in implementing foreign sanctions.
Perhaps the AFSL’s most controversial provision is Article 7, which provides that decisions made by the competent departments of the State Council under Articles 4 to 6 “shall be final.” Under Chinese administrative law, this means that such decisions are immune from judicial review. The point is reinforced by Article 13 of the Administrative Litigation Law, which excludes from judicial review administrative decisions that another law expressly declares to be final.Footnote 24
From the perspective of China’s obligations under the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO), this provision raises serious questions. Section 2(D)(1) of China’s WTO Accession ProtocolFootnote 25 explicitly requires China to establish judicial review procedures for all administrative actions relating to the implementation of laws, regulations, judicial decisions, and administrative rulings of general application affecting trade. Similar obligations are found in Article X:3(b) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994Footnote 26 and Article VI:2(a) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).Footnote 27 Nor can China avoid these obligations simply by declaring such decisions “final” as a matter of domestic law, as domestic law cannot be invoked as an excuse for non-compliance with international legal obligations. This principle is reflected in Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,Footnote 28 which provides that “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty,” and is reinforced in the WTO context by Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement,Footnote 29 which requires that “[e]ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.”Footnote 30 By insulating counter-sanctions decisions from judicial scrutiny, Article 7 appears difficult to reconcile with these transparency and due process commitments.
China could seek to justify the provision by invoking the national security exceptions under Article XXI of the GATT or Article XIV bis of the GATS. Such a defense, however, is far from certain. The first question is whether the GATT and GATS security exceptions apply at all to obligations contained in China’s Accession Protocol. As the Appellate Body has made clear in several cases, the availability of general exceptions for accession commitments depends on the text and structure of the specific commitment and therefore cannot simply be assumed. In China–Publications and Audiovisual Products,Footnote 31 the Appellate Body permitted China to invoke GATT Article XX because the relevant trading-rights commitment was expressly made “without prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement.”Footnote 32 By contrast, in China–Raw Materials Footnote 33 and China–Rare Earths,Footnote 34 the Appellate Body held that China could not invoke Article XX to justify violations of its export-duty commitments under paragraph 11.3 of the Accession Protocol, because that provision contained no comparable textual link to the GATT exceptions, and the fact that the Protocol forms an integral part of the WTO Agreement was insufficient, by itself, to import Article XX. By analogy, China’s ability to rely on GATT Article XXI or GATS Article XIV bis to justify non-compliance with Section 2(D)(1) of its Accession Protocol cannot be presumed. Second, even if China may invoke the national security exception, it cannot insulate itself from WTO review by simply claiming that the exception is self-judging. Although the WTO panels in Russia–Traffic in Transit Footnote 35 and US–Origin Marking (Hong Kong, China) Footnote 36 recognized members’ discretion to define their essential security interests, they also made clear that the security exceptions are not entirely self-judging and remain subject to objective review, especially the requirement of “taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.” Based on the Panels’ reasoning, unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that even a “trade war” could constitute “a situation of breakdown or near-breakdown in the relations between states” necessary to satisfy the requirement.Footnote 37
The legislative momentum did not end with the AFSL. In 2023, China enacted the Foreign Relations Law,Footnote 38 which further entrenched the country’s countermeasures regime. Article 33 authorizes the adoption of “countermeasures and restrictive measures” against actions that violate international law or threaten China’s sovereignty, security, or development interests. Like the AFSL, the implementation of such measures is entrusted to the executive, with no meaningful avenue for judicial review. The Foreign Relations Law thus confirms that counter-sanctions have become a permanent feature of China’s foreign relations legislation rather than an ad hoc response to specific disputes.
The All-of-Government Counter-sanctions Framework
Despite the flurry of legislation enacted between 2020 and 2023, China’s counter-sanctions regime remained, until early 2026, largely the preserve of two ministries: the MOFCOM, responsible for trade and investment matters, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), responsible for foreign policy more generally. The return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025, however, appears to have prompted a fundamental rethink. Rather than treating counter-sanctions as the responsibility of a handful of agencies, Beijing has adopted what may be described as an all-of-government approach, integrating economic security into virtually every aspect of state administration.
The shift is clearly reflected in the Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Twentieth Central Committee on 23 October 2025.Footnote 39 The Recommendations call for China to:
Implement the national security responsibility system, promote coordination across the entire chain of national security work, and form systematic synergy. Improve the foreign-related national security mechanism, build an overseas security protection system, and strengthen the struggle against sanctions, interference, and “long-arm jurisdiction.”Footnote 40
The language is significant. Whereas earlier Party documents focused primarily on building a legal framework to respond to foreign sanctions, the 15th Five-Year Plan elevates counter-sanctions to a component of the broader national security system. In other words, sanctions are no longer viewed merely as a trade or foreign affairs issue, but as a whole-of-state challenge requiring coordinated responses across the Party-state apparatus.
The first major legislative manifestation of this shift was the Regulations on Industrial Chain and Supply Chain Security, promulgated by the State Council on March 31, 2026.Footnote 41 Although the Regulations continue the themes found in earlier counter-sanctions legislation, they introduce two important institutional innovations.
The first is the unprecedented breadth of bureaucratic participation. Rather than leaving implementation primarily to MOFCOM and the MFA, Article 3 establishes an inter-agency coordination mechanism involving virtually every ministry with a tangential link to national security or economic issues, including those in charge of foreign affairs (MFA), development and reform (National Development and Reform Commission), industry and informatization (Ministry of Industry and Information Technology), public security (Ministry of Public Security), national security (Ministry of State Security), rule of law (Ministry of Justice), finance (Ministry of Finance), natural resources (Ministry of Natural Resources), transportation (Ministry of Transport), agriculture and rural affairs (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs), commerce (MOFCOM), financial management (National Financial Regulatory Administration; People’s Bank of China; China Securities Regulatory Commission), customs (General Administration of Customs), market supervision and management (State Administration for Market Regulation), internet information (Cyberspace Administration of China), together with other relevant departments under the State Council.
This institutional architecture reflects a profound conceptual shift. Counter-sanctions are no longer regarded as a matter of foreign economic policy alone but as an issue implicating finance, technology, logistics, cybersecurity, law enforcement, and industrial policy. In effect, the Regulations seek to embed sanctions resilience throughout the entire Chinese state.
The second innovation is the decentralization of implementation. The Regulations delegate substantial authority to provincial governments, which are empowered not only to conduct industrial chain and supply chain risk assessments but also to adopt preventive risk-control measures and emergency response measures within their jurisdictions. This reflects the reality that many of China’s strategic industrial and supply chains are highly concentrated geographically. At the same time, decentralization carries obvious risks. Given the long-standing problem of local protectionism in China, granting local governments broad discretion to invoke industrial security measures may increase the likelihood of inconsistent implementation and regulatory overreach by local officials eager to promote economic growth.
Perhaps even more significant than the institutional changes is the evolution of China’s strategic posture. Earlier legislation was primarily defensive, seeking to shield Chinese firms from the extraterritorial application of foreign sanctions or to retaliate against foreign sanctions already imposed. The latest legislative developments, however, suggest that Beijing is increasingly willing to exercise its own forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
This shift is most clearly reflected in the Regulations on Countering Improper Foreign Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, promulgated by the State Council on April 13, 2026.Footnote 42 Article 4 provides that, in accordance with Chinese law, applicable international treaties, or the principle of reciprocity, the Chinese government may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over conducts having appropriate connections with China in order to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests and to protect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens and organizations.
This represents an important departure from the earlier Blocking Rules. Whereas the 2021 Rules merely rejected the extraterritorial application of foreign laws, the new Regulations expressly assert China’s own authority to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction on a reciprocal basis. In doing so, Beijing has effectively moved from opposing long-arm jurisdiction in principle to claiming a comparable jurisdictional authority for itself.
The scope of the Regulations is also considerably broader than that of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. By targeting improper foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction, rather than sanctions alone, they potentially encompass a much wider range of foreign regulatory measures, including export controls, investment screening, competition investigations, foreign subsidy investigations, and other regulatory actions with extraterritorial effects.
China’s first invocation of the Regulations illustrates this broader ambition. Rather than using them against U.S. sanctions, Beijing invoked the new Regulations for the first time in May 2026 in response to the European Union’s investigation of Chinese security equipment manufacturer Nuctech under its Foreign Subsidies Regulation.Footnote 43 The choice of target is revealing. It suggests that China intends to challenge not only sanctions in the traditional sense but a growing range of foreign economic measures that it regards as discriminatory exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Institutionally, the Regulations also mark another significant innovation. Responsibility for their implementation is vested not in MOFCOM or the MFA but in the Ministry of Justice. This reflects the increasing juridification of China’s response to foreign economic coercion. Once a foreign measure is determined to constitute improper extraterritorial jurisdiction, the foreign organizations and individuals responsible for promoting or implementing it may be placed on a Malicious Entities ListFootnote 44 and become subject to various countermeasures.
Taken together, these developments suggest that China’s counter-sanctions regime has entered a new phase. The objective is no longer simply to defend Chinese firms against foreign sanctions. Rather, Beijing is constructing a comprehensive system of economic statecraft that mobilizes the entire government, empowers local authorities, and increasingly seeks to project Chinese jurisdiction beyond its borders on the basis of reciprocity. In this sense, China is gradually moving from being a target of long-arm jurisdiction to becoming an increasingly active practitioner of it.
Countermeasures in Practice
Despite the rapid expansion of China’s counter-sanctions legislation, Beijing was initially cautious in deploying these new legal tools. This restraint is consistent with China’s broader legislative practice. For example, although the Foreign Trade Law has contained provisions authorizing retaliatory measures against discriminatory foreign trade practicesFootnote 45 since its enactment in 1994, those provisions remained largely dormant for decades. It was only after China established the foreign trade barrier investigation mechanism that they began to acquire practical significance.Footnote 46 In much the same way, China’s counter-sanctions legislation appears to have been designed less for immediate use than as a strategic reserve whose value lies partly in its deterrent effect.
The first invocation of the AFSL came only one month after its enactment. In July 2021, China imposed countermeasures against seven U.S. individuals and entities, including former U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, in retaliation for U.S. sanctions on officials of the Chinese central government’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong.Footnote 47 While politically significant as the Law’s inaugural application, the practical consequences were limited, as most of the designated individuals had few commercial or personal ties with China.
The Rules on Unreliable Entity List was activated somewhat later. On February 16, 2023, MOFCOM applied the Rules for the first time by designating Lockheed Martin Corporation and Raytheon Missiles & Defense for their involvement in arms sales to Taiwan.Footnote 48 As with the earlier AFSL designations, the principal significance lay not in the immediate economic impact but in demonstrating that the previously dormant mechanism had become operational.
Perhaps the most important development occurred not in the executive branch but in the courts. According to the 2025 Work Report of the Supreme People’s Court,Footnote 49 Chinese courts applied the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law in civil litigation for the first time in 2024. As disclosed by Chief Justice Zhang Jun, the dispute arose from a shipbuilding contract between a Chinese company and a foreign purchaser that refused to make payment, citing compliance with third-country sanctions. Applying the AFSL, a Chinese court facilitated a settlement under which the foreign party agreed to pay 84 million Yuan to the Chinese company.
Although the Supreme People’s Court released only limited details of the case, its significance should not be underestimated. Until then, the AFSL had functioned primarily as an instrument of executive action. The shipbuilding dispute demonstrated that it could also operate as a basis for private litigation, enabling Chinese firms to invoke the statute in commercial disputes arising from foreign sanctions. In doing so, the case signaled that China’s counter-sanctions regime was beginning to evolve from a symbolic political instrument into a body of law capable of producing concrete legal and commercial consequences.
The pace of enforcement accelerated markedly following the return of the second Trump administration and the renewed use of U.S. secondary sanctions against Chinese firms involved in trade with Iran. What had previously been a largely dormant legal framework increasingly became an operational toolkit. As discussed in the following section, China’s response has expanded beyond symbolic sanctions against foreign officials to encompass a broader range of administrative, judicial, and regulatory measures directed at both governments and private actors that implement or facilitate foreign sanctions.
The Hengli Case
The true significance of China’s counter-sanctions framework did not become apparent until 2026, when Beijing invoked its Blocking Statute for the first time. The trigger was a renewed round of U.S. secondary sanctions targeting Chinese purchases of Iranian oil in the wake of the current U.S.–Iran conflict and the Trump administration’s revived “maximum pressure” campaign. The central target was Hengli Petrochemical (Dalian) Refinery Co., Ltd., one of China’s largest independent refineries and a major player in the country’s private refining sector.
Hengli’s importance lies not only in its size, but also in the role played by independent Chinese refineries in the Iran oil trade. These refineries, often referred to as “teapot” refineries, differ from China’s large state-owned oil companies in important respects. The large state-owned enterprises are more exposed to international capital markets, global banking relationships, overseas operations, and direct state-to-state diplomatic pressure. Independent refiners, by contrast, are more commercially flexible, more fragmented, and often more willing to purchase discounted crude from sanctioned or politically sensitive sources. Precisely because they operate outside the major state-owned oil companies, they have become important absorbers of Iranian crude that might otherwise struggle to find buyers under U.S. sanctions pressure.
For Iran, these buyers are not marginal. They are central to the resilience of its oil export system. U.S. sanctions on Iran’s petroleum sector aim to deprive Tehran of the revenues needed to finance the state, its military capabilities, and regional activities. But so long as Chinese independent refiners continue to purchase Iranian crude, the effectiveness of those sanctions is limited. Discounted Iranian oil can still be moved through opaque trading networks, ship-to-ship transfers, reflagged vessels, intermediaries, and the so-called “shadow fleet.”Footnote 50 In this system, refiners such as Hengli are not merely end-users of oil; they are critical nodes in the commercial infrastructure that sustains Iran’s access to revenue.
This explains the U.S. theory of the case. From Washington’s perspective, Chinese refiners, commodity traders, shipping companies, vessel managers, port operators, insurers, and related financial intermediaries are not incidental participants in the Iran oil trade. They are central enablers of Iran’s sanctions-resistant export system. The shadow fleet may move the oil, but without buyers, terminals, payments, processing capacity, and downstream demand, the system cannot function. Targeting Hengli and other Chinese independent refineries therefore matters because it strikes at the demand side of Iranian oil exports. It seeks not only to punish particular transactions, but also to deter the broader Chinese commercial ecosystem from absorbing sanctioned Iranian crude.
The legal basis for the U.S. measures reflects this broader strategy. On April 24, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Hengli for allegedly purchasing billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian crude oil.Footnote 51 OFAC simultaneously designated approximately forty shipping companies and vessels associated with Iran’s so-called “shadow fleet.” These actions were taken under the core authorities of the U.S. Iran sanctions regime, particularly Executive Orders 13846 and 13902. E.O. 13846 reimposed and consolidated a range of Iran-related sanctions after the United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. It authorizes sanctions against persons engaged in significant transactions involving Iranian petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemical products. E.O. 13902, issued in January 2020, further authorizes sanctions against persons operating in key sectors of the Iranian economy, including the petroleum and petrochemical sectors. Together, these orders provide the legal mechanism through which the United States can target non-U.S. persons involved in Iran’s oil trade.
The timing of the designations is important. The Hengli sanctions were not simply another routine enforcement action. They formed part of a wartime or crisis-driven effort to cut off Iran’s revenue streams during the renewed U.S.–Iran confrontation. In the logic of “maximum pressure,”Footnote 52 sanctions on Iran itself are insufficient if third-country actors continue to provide Tehran with access to markets, shipping, processing, and finance. The designation of Hengli therefore represented a direct attempt to close the China channel in Iran’s oil economy.
Beijing responded with unusual speed. On May 2, 2026, MOFCOM invoked the Blocking Rules for the very first time since its promulgation in 2021.Footnote 53 The Blocking Order directed that U.S. sanctions imposed pursuant to Executive Orders 13846 and 13902 against Hengli and four other Chinese independent refineries should not be “recognized, enforced, or complied with.”Footnote 54 This was a watershed moment. Until then, China’s Blocking Rules had existed largely as a latent deterrent. The Hengli case transformed them into an operational legal instrument.
The importance of the decision lies not merely in the fact that China finally activated its Blocking Rules after more than five years of legislative preparation, but also in the manner in which the Blocking Order was drafted. Consistent with the deliberately broad language employed throughout China’s counter-sanctions legislation, the Order does not specify the persons to whom it applies. Instead, it simply provides that the relevant U.S. sanctions cannot be “recognized, enforced, or complied with,” without identifying the subject of the obligation.Footnote 55
This omission appears deliberate rather than accidental. As discussed earlier, both the Blocking Rules and the AFSL frequently refer simply to “organizations and individuals,” without limiting those terms to Chinese nationals or entities established in China. The omission therefore leaves open the possibility that the Blocking Order extends beyond Chinese companies to encompass foreign corporations, financial institutions, shipping companies, insurers, and other market participants operating within China or maintaining significant China-related business.
The practical consequences are potentially far-reaching. A Chinese bank that refuses to process payments for Hengli out of fear of U.S. sanctions may face questions under Chinese law. A foreign insurer operating in China that terminates coverage connected to a sanctioned refinery may be accused of complying with a prohibited foreign measure. A shipowner, broker, or logistics company that avoids dealings with Hengli because of U.S. sanctions may find itself exposed to liability under China’s Blocking Rules or related counter-sanctions legislation. A commodity trader with operations in China may be forced to choose between maintaining access to the U.S. financial system and avoiding violation of Chinese law. The Order thus creates uncertainty not only for Chinese entities but also for multinational firms with China exposure.
This is the central conflict produced by Hengli. Compliance with U.S. sanctions may trigger Chinese liability, while compliance with China’s Blocking Order may trigger U.S. penalties. The firm caught between the two regimes cannot solve the problem simply by applying ordinary commercial risk assessment. U.S. law threatens exclusion from dollar clearing, asset freezes, secondary sanctions, and reputational harm. Chinese law threatens administrative penalties, civil liability, and possible inclusion in China’s own countermeasure mechanisms. The result is a direct collision of legal obligations, with private firms forced to absorb the geopolitical conflict between Washington and Beijing.
The Hengli case therefore represents much more than a dispute over one refinery. It is the culmination of countermeasures practice years in the making. Meng Wanzhou demonstrated the risk that U.S. secondary sanctions could reach Chinese national champions and their executives. Xi Jinping’s 2019 speech supplied the political instruction to resist long-arm jurisdiction through legal means. The 2020 Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List created the sword. The 2021 Blocking Rules created the shield. The 2021 Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law gave the framework statutory force. The 2023 Foreign Relations Law constitutionalized countermeasures as a permanent feature of China’s foreign relations law. The 2026 regulations on industrial-chain and supply-chain security and on improper foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction broadened the apparatus into an all-of-government system. Hengli finally activated that system in the specific context that had helped generate it in the first place: U.S. secondary sanctions on Iran.
For that reason, Hengli marks a new stage in the interaction between U.S. sanctions and Chinese countermeasures. Previously, China’s counter-sanctions regime was often understood as symbolic, retaliatory, or deterrent. After Hengli, it must be understood as operational. The case demonstrates that when U.S. sanctions touch what Beijing regards as core economic and strategic interests, especially the China–Iran energy relationship, China is prepared to use its own legal system to obstruct foreign sanctions compliance. The consequence is not merely a bilateral dispute between the United States and China. It is the emergence of a sanctions conflict in which firms, banks, ships, insurers, and traders across the global economy must navigate incompatible commands from two major powers.
Implications for Global Trade Governance
The escalating cycle of U.S. secondary sanctions and China’s countermeasures has implications far beyond the bilateral relationship. It not only intensifies strategic competition between the world’s two largest economies but also poses fundamental challenges to the legal architecture of the multilateral trading system.
The first concern is the increasing normalization of unilateral economic coercion. In many respects, both the U.S. sanctions regime and China’s counter-sanctions framework resemble the unilateral approach embodied in Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. As the WTO panel in US–Section 301 Trade Act Footnote 56 made clear, a member’s unilateral determination that another member has violated WTO rules before obtaining authorization through the WTO dispute settlement system constitutes “a prima facie violation” of Article 23.2(a) of the WTO’s Dispute Settlement UnderstandingFootnote 57 to “not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding.”Footnote 58 Although the factual and legal contexts differ, both U.S. secondary sanctions and China’s countermeasures are premised on unilateral determinations of legality and unilateral enforcement outside the WTO framework.
To be sure, the United States bears a greater share of responsibility for the current predicament. By continuing to block appointments to the Appellate Body,Footnote 59 Washington has effectively disabled the WTO’s dispute settlement system and thereby weakened the principal legal alternative to unilateral action. Yet this does not absolve China of responsibility. As the world’s two largest trading nations increasingly regulate their economic relationship through competing systems of unilateral sanctions and counter-sanctions, they are effectively replacing multilateral rules with reciprocal exercises of economic power. Such a development is difficult to reconcile with the WTO’s core objective of substituting law for power in the governance of international trade.
China’s own legislation also raises questions under WTO law. As discussed above, Article 7 of the AFSL excludes counter-sanctions decisions from judicial review. This appears difficult to reconcile with China’s accession commitments requiring independent judicial review of administrative measures affecting trade, as well as the broader obligations concerning the uniform, impartial, and reasonable administration of trade regulations under the GATT 1994 and the GATS. While China may seek to invoke the security exceptions under the WTO Agreements, the existing WTO jurisprudence in recent cases suggests that such provisions do not provide unlimited discretion to insulate governmental action from legal scrutiny.
The practical consequences may prove even more significant than the legal ones. Firms operating internationally are increasingly caught between mutually incompatible legal obligations. A firm complying with U.S. secondary sanctions risks violating Chinese counter-sanctions legislation; a firm complying with Chinese prohibition orders may, in turn, expose itself to severe penalties under U.S. law.
Nor is this dilemma confined to Chinese and U.S. companies. Third-country firms are increasingly finding themselves caught in the crossfire. As mentioned earlier, China’s first application of the Regulations on Countering Improper Foreign Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, for example, was directed not against the United States but against the European Union. The episode illustrates that China’s countermeasures are directed not merely at U.S. sanctions but at a much broader range of foreign regulatory measures perceived to have extraterritorial effects.
The problem is likely to become even more acute as U.S. allies deepen their economic security cooperation with Washington. Many of the United States’ recent trade arrangements and economic security partnerships—including the new Agreements on Reciprocal Trade recently concluded under the second Trump administrationFootnote 60 —contain commitments to cooperate on export controls, investment restrictions, and sanctions policy.Footnote 61 To the extent that these commitments require partner countries to align their measures with those of the United States, firms operating in those jurisdictions may simultaneously incur obligations under U.S. law and liabilities under China’s counter-sanctions regime. In this way, what began as a bilateral dispute between Washington and Beijing is increasingly evolving into a systemic challenge for the governance of international trade.
More fundamentally, the proliferation of sanctions and counter-sanctions reflects a broader transformation in the relationship between trade and national security. For much of the post-war period, the multilateral trading system sought to isolate commercial relations from geopolitical rivalry. Today, that separation is rapidly eroding. Trade, finance, technology, investment, and industrial policy have become integral components of strategic competition. As both the United States and China increasingly weaponize access to their respective markets and legal systems, the multilateral trading system risks evolving from a rules-based order into a fragmented landscape of competing spheres of economic influence. Whether the WTO can adapt to this new reality may well determine its relevance in the decades ahead.
