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Simulating Market Entry Rewards for Antibiotics Development

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

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We design an agent based Monte Carlo model of antibiotics research and development (R&D) to explore the effects of the policy intervention known as Market Entry Reward (MER) on the likelihood that an antibiotic entering pre-clinical development reaches the market. By means of sensitivity analysis we explore the interaction between the MER and four key parameters: projected net revenues, R&D costs, venture capitalists discount rates, and large pharmaceutical organizations' financial thresholds. We show that improving revenues may be more efficient than reducing costs, and thus confirm that this pull-based policy intervention effectively stimulates antibiotics R&D.

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Figure 1Depiction of a partially (left) and fully (right) delinked market entry reward in the context of our simulated development costs and global net revenues. Lines show the full range of input data for every cash flow.

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Figure 2Project states and transitions used in the simulation

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Table 1The list of parameters and values used as input data in the simulation

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Table 2Variance in Likelihood of Market Approval (LOMA) explained by different input parameters

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Figure 3The effect of projected total global net revenues on the likelihood of market approval, grouped by market entry reward size (left = fully delinked, right = partially delinked)

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Figure 4The effect of venture capitalists discount rate on the likelihood of market approval, grouped by market entry reward size (left = fully delinked, right = partially delinked)

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Figure 5The effect of profitability thresholds of large pharmaceutical organizations on the likelihood of market approval, grouped by market entry reward size (left = fully delinked, right = partially delinked)

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Figure 6The effect of total projected r&d costs on the likelihood of market approval, grouped by market entry reward size (left = fully delinked, right = partially delinked)

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Figure 7Changes in likelihood of market approval under different sizes of fully delinked (light) and partially delinked (dark) market entry rewards. Upper outliers truncated.