John Rawls has dominated political philosophy since the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971. One reason, perhaps, is that his arguments there and in subsequent books are notoriously ambiguous, and so there is plenty of room for interpretations and thus interpreters. To left-leaning critics, Rawls was an apologist for contemporary welfare capitalism; when Rawls restated his position in 1991, however, it turned out that he was not, but rather wanted a radical new “property-owning democracy” (POD). As the essays in this collection make clear, however, POD too is ambiguous. Rawls adopted the idea from the left-wing economist James Meade but, as Ben Jackson's chapter makes clear, POD was, and without the welfare provisions of welfare capitalism can still be, an idea of the Right. Many of the chapters in the book contrast the possibilities of POD with those of welfare-oriented state intervention under more traditional capitalist arrangements.

The late Rawls's objection to welfare capitalism is that vast inequalities in wealth and power do not allow for social justice. Unregulated capitalism leads to massive inequalities, rendering social justice impossible, even if a welfare state exists to redistribute some of those resources. Redistribution might ensure an end to poverty, but this will do little to stop the owners of capital from dominating politically. The early chapters in the book examine these claims philosophically.

Simone Chambers argues that Rawls's theory of justice is radical, requiring a revolution to bring it about. This sits uneasily with Rawls's process of public reason for overlapping consensus. After all, while capitalism might be criticized, it is surely not unreasonable to maintain the current dominant thesis that individuals should be personally responsible for their own welfare. In other words, it is not obvious that the difference principle would constitute an overlapping consensus. Several of the contributors suggest, therefore, that the difference principle needs to be hard-wired into a constitution. It cannot be up for grabs. Alan Thomas suggests so when defending Rawls against G.A. Cohen's criticism that the difference principle is incompatible with the egalitarian ethos underpinning justice as fairness. Stuart White suggests an ethos of republican citizenship of public duty and engagement is required rather than Rawls's liberal presuppositions. While both Thomas and White make a case for POD, it is not clear that their arguments really demonstrate that justice as fairness requires POD rather than welfare capitalism. Nien-hê Hsieh provides one reason, when he suggests that the existence of passive welfare recipients does not allow for equal self-respect. If everyone is a property-owner with the chance to take responsibility for oneself then equal respect is attainable. Like so many political philosophers today, Hsieh seems to assume that meaningful work is a necessary component of a good life. In reality, for many people, work is simply what brings home the bacon (of course, work conditions can be good or bad, and colleagues annoying or congenial), while meaning is provided by other aspects of life—family, sport, hobbies. It is not clear that respect and self-respect can come about only if one is a property-holder or has a job one considers worthwhile.

Cory Brettschneider looks to fundamental issues of the right to own property, arguing that private property can be just only if everyone is guaranteed a livelihood. In his chapter he does not fully engage with a radical version of POD, since he envisages a state where some will not own property but still have the basic elements of a right to welfare. More is required to justify a right for all to own a broadly equal amount of property. But again the emphasis is on self-reliance for self-respect.

Ingrid Robeyns takes a rather different line. She suggests that POD could increase gender inequality if it enables people to turn their assets into an indefinite income stream, allowing people to withdraw from the labor market. She argues that any defensible care regime will be costly and require a mix of labor market regulations, welfare provisions and state services. While her case does not undermine POD itself, it does suggest that gender equality requires a substantial state welfare system—unless, that is, we rely upon the slender stem of a shared egalitarian ethos. Waheed Hussain likewise argues that a liberal democratic POD locks people into economic competition, but a welfare corporatist version, as evidenced by public attitudes in such societies, leads people to more public-spirited attitudes. Once again, the argument is that POD requires the welfare state rather than being a stand-alone alternative to welfare state capitalism. David Schweickart compares POD to his own preferred account of democratic market socialism.

Other arguments presented in the book examine the plausibility or political feasibility of POD as opposed to creating a fairer redistributive welfare system. Thad Williamson suggests a fairly modest redistribution from the richest to the poorest US citizens would allow all to be property owners in housing, money, and stock. He does not model the effects of such redistributions on their relative value, however, nor consider transfers across people even with such tax-induced forced redistributions. More modest basic income or stakes is the subject of Sonia Sodha's contribution, though again how close this comes to POD or whether it is just another welfare system inside capitalism is moot.

While individually all the chapters in this book display a high standard of reasoning and argument, together they have an air of incompleteness. The general theme is the relationship between property-owning democracy and Rawlsian social justice. Can POD, and only POD, provide for the sort of justice Rawls wants, or is capitalism with welfare provision, full-blown market socialism, or only a society with a strong and stable egalitarian ethos or republican values capable of delivering justice as fairness? The problem is that no demonstration of such a relationship between institutional forms and such general theory is possible.

One reason for the incompleteness of these philosophical considerations of the nature of constitution for Rawlsian social justice is that the institutional details of general ideal formulations of such constitutions in fact play a vital role in generating social justice. The issue is not so much capitalism versus welfare-provision, or wide property owning versus state ownership, but rather what specific welfare provisions are required given different regulatory systems. And the different regulatory systems might well operate differently when subject to specific economic conditions. For example, historically, agricultural primogeniture clearly provided greater economic growth than more egalitarian distributions of land, which tended to pauperize communities over time. The difference principle might be applied here, with primogeniture alongside welfare redistribution. But what exactly does this tell us about modern asset holding? Is higher growth maintained now only through restricted inheritance? The answer, to say the least, is not obvious. Nor indeed is whether high growth rates are something we should still find desirable. The shift from general ideal theory to institutional form is too big for one essay, or even one book. Perhaps it is better to keep general theory and institutional details apart. General theory can provide a background, but the specific mechanics of institutions and how they interact with responsibility, welfare, or equality are questions that cannot be regarded as instantiations of general theory.