Marcos Cueto, Theodore M. Brown and Elizabeth Fee have written the first comprehensive narrative history of the WHO, from its inception up to the twenty-first century. At a structural level, the main thesis of the book is that the history of the WHO is characterized by the dialectical tension between a socio-medical horizontal perspective and a technocratic vertical one on health issues. The two contrasting approaches ultimately mirrored tensions during and after the Cold War.
The WHO unified four different functions: centralized epidemiological surveillance, campaigns against epidemics, diseases control and reform of health systems. Although the book focuses on the last two, it is, nevertheless, also rich in information and analysis on the first two. The authors convincingly link the technology-driven perspective to the persistence of the colonial civilizing mission even after the Second World War, whereas they attribute the emphasis on the second perspective to the entrance in the WHO of new African and Asian independent countries in the 1960s, which led Western countries to lose control of the agency. This is an important point. As early as 1941 the USA put pressure on Britain to give up the Commonwealth privileged trade system. Indeed, in the post-war years Washington aimed at dismantling the European colonial empires and creating a multilateral world trade system, which could bring peace and prosperity worldwide. This new asset of world trade by offering an alternative to the European working classes and to the poor masses of developing countries would contrast with the expansion of communism (see M. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: The Truman Administration and the Cold War (1993); Tony Judt, Post-war: A History of Europe since 1945 (2005)). The United Nations and its affiliated agencies became one of the main scenarios in which Cold War confrontation unfolded. Most African and Asian countries gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Indirect forms of dominion replaced colonial occupation, and the persistence of a technocratic perspective on health issues ultimately mirrored the continuity of the dominance relation between the First and the Third Worlds. At the same time the authors frame the two perspectives within the global Cold War confrontation and stress the role of the Soviet Union in determining the making of the socio-medical perspective. The clear example of the contrast between the two perspectives is provided by the two global eradication campaigns the WHO set forth, the unsuccessful malaria eradication campaign promoted by the USA and the successful eradication campaign promoted by the USSR. The smallpox campaign was initially contested by the USA, but then the USA and the USSR collaborated. The Soviet–USA collaboration during the détente is one of the most interesting topics of the whole story and one of those aspects of Cold War biomedicine that would deserve further investigation. By the end of the Second World War, the Allies had discontinued the scientific and technological collaboration with the USSR that they had decided to carry over at the Teheran conference two years before, and in the second half of the 1940s, London and Washington were concerned with the progress of Soviet medicine. They tried, for instance, to slow down penicillin production by controlling the export of Podbielniak extractors. By contrast, during the détente they set up a number of collaborative research programmes even in strategic sectors such as the Apollo–Soyuz project.
The book is very informative on the different individual and collective actors. Difficult relations with other UN organizations such as UNICEF are detailed, as well as how WHO officials developed a feeling of being international civil servants, rather than mere national agents, through accurate analysis of the activity of a number of central figures in the history of the WHO. Spanning from the end of the Second World War to the present, the authors explain the evolution of the WHO and its relations with private foundations and other international actors. The Rockefeller Foundation, which was one of the main agents in promoting sanitary campaigns before the Second World War, retreated with the creation of the WHO. Especially between 1948 and 1953 the agency became closer to US interests. The USA assured indirect control of WHO activity by means of loans. In the 1960s, as a result of decolonization, Western countries lost control of the WHO and a socio-medical approach in the smallpox eradication campaign gained momentum. The Alma Ata conference in 1978 and the launch of the Primary Health Care movement shifted the WHO focus on the social-medicine approach. Indeed, the Soviets promoted the idea that the agency should boost medical technology suitable for all people rather than sophisticated medical technology difficult to implement in rural areas of developing countries. By the 1990s, with the end of the Soviet Union, the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO had become the leading actors of a neo-liberal perspective on health issues, and private foundations, such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, acquired a central role in sponsoring health campaigns of the WHO, and therefore in orienting its policy. The authors convincingly remark that the WHO should not be looked on as a declining entity. Rather its history must be seen as part of the wider history of the Cold War, in which the UN and affiliated international organizations changed their role with the end of Cold War confrontation and the emergence of new global actors such as China and India.
Spanning from 1945 to the present, the book cannot, of course, offer the same level of analysis, as recent events are rather a matter of chronicle. The choice of dealing with the 2010s policy of the WHO, however, not only provides readers with interesting information, but also allows them to understand the making of neo-liberal perspectives on health issues and the tensions they generated.
