At first glance, it would seem absurd to argue that not enough scholarly literature has dealt with Yugoslavia and its dissolution: According to WorldCat, some 177 scholarly books have been published since 1991, with the “Dissolution of Yugoslavia” as a keyword, not to mention thousands of academic articles covering this topic. Much of comparative politics, however, has long ignored Yugoslavia, its dissolution, and the successor states. If considered, it has been treated as a case of ethnic conflict and war. But studies that contextualize the post-Yugoslavia space in terms of the transformation from authoritarianism to democracy have been relatively few. This Yugoslav “exceptionalism” appears already engrained in the different socialist models that the country pursued after its rift with Stalin in 1948. Scholars of socialist Eastern Europe often treated Yugoslavia as a separate case, distinct from the other communist regimes. With a limited consumer society, freedom to travel since the 1960s, and close ties to the West, Yugoslavia did not fit the paradigm of an isolated totalitarianism system. When the state collapsed just two years after the fall of the Berlin wall, the violence that ensued again appeared to set Yugoslavia and the countries that emerged from it apart from the remainder of Eastern Europe.
These three books, which in part or exclusively discuss the Yugoslav and post-Yugoslav space from the perspective of comparative politics, offer a valuable impetus to reconsider the lens through which the region is examined. Each challenges “Yugoslav exceptionalism” from a different perspective, and makes a substantial contribution to the analysis of variations in the process of democratization in Eastern Europe and the former Yugoslavia in particular. Methodologically diverse, each emphasizes the need to bring the Yugoslav experience with democratization and social movements into a larger comparative context, and each contends that ignoring the countries that emerged from the Yugoslav federation means missing a key part of the puzzle of how and why some countries became consolidated democracies and some did not. Nebjoša Vladisavljević looks only at a short period during the process of dissolution, namely, the period of mass mobilization in Yugoslavia between 1986 and 1989, while Mieczysław Boduszyński focuses on the 1990s in great detail (the 2000s more cursorily) to explain the variation in the democratization of the Yugoslav successor states. The volume edited by Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss focuses on the second democratic breakthroughs, beginning with Romania and Bulgaria in 1996–97 and ending with the revolution in Kyrgystan in 2005.
The three books seek to answer the question of why some countries in postcommunist Europe failed or were at least significantly delayed in establishing a democratic system of government. And while some of the authors focus on the revolutions or other instances of social mobilization and consider why and how these can lead to “democratic breakthroughs,” others explore the long-term processes that ensue after revolutionary moments and result in either the consolidation of a democratic system or reversals and the emergence of a hybrid regime.
In Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution, Vladisavljević argues that the popular mobilization that took place in the late 1980s in Yugoslavia, especially among Serbs, was not the result of elite manipulation for the advancement of their own nationalist agenda. He challenges a widely held view that Slobodan Milošević used mass rallies in an effort to bolster his position in Serbia and Yugoslavia and to undermine political opponents. The author does not deny that elite manipulation mattered at a later stage during the protests, but argues that initially, the protests constituted a genuine social movement driven by grassroots grievances. The protests of Kosovo Serbs against the discrimination they experienced in Kosovo coincided with a dramatic increase in strikes throughout Yugoslavia and in other social protests—by 1988 there were nearly 2,000 strikes with close to 400,000 participants in Yugoslavia (p. 112). These strikes were motivated by high inflation and shrinking living standards. The modest consumer society Yugoslavia had become by the 1970s came under threat through bulging debt and the inefficiencies of the complicated self-management system. Austerity measures of the government further motivated workers to take to the streets.
These grievances did not differ from those in other communist countries with one key variation. In Poland, the economic crisis compounded the ideological crisis, and workers who joined Solidarity demanded not just improved working conditions or better wages but also a change of the political system. In contrast, in Yugoslavia the protesting workers, as Vladisavljević argues convincingly, “perceived the institutions of the regime and state as essentially legitimate and ultimately their own” (p. 119). As a consequence, democratization was not at the forefront of these social movements in Yugoslavia, and communist elites had a greater ability to “capture” the protests and to retain power than in Central Europe. Eventually, the social and nationalist protests in Serbia and Montenegro effectively fused, to the point where, as one observer noted, the participants “came as workers and went home as Serbs” (Slavoljub Djukić, Izmedju slave i anateme. Politička biografija Slobodana Miloševića, 1994, 106).
Vladisavljević makes a very convincing case about the limited involvement of Milošević in the origins of the Kosovo Serb social movement and thus shifts the research focus on the dissolution of Yugoslavia away from an often elite-centered view. Yet his own research, ironically, often focuses on the elites of these social movements, and we hear few voices of the ordinary Serbs who participated in these protests about what motivated them. As such, the reader is still left wondering why ordinary citizens participated and, more importantly, why they shifted their goals and demands, especially from social to national issues. Of course, such a reconstruction might be impossible methodologically. But the author's own argument points toward the importance of knowing more about this.
While Vladisavljević's study centers on social movements, Boduszyński focuses on parties and on how regimes in the successor states adopted different trajectories after the fall of socialism. He argues that during the 1990s, only Slovenia built a substantive democracy, while the other successor states (he does not discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina or Montenegro as separate cases) developed some form of hybrid regime, some closer to authoritarianism (Serbia's “Populist Authoritarianism”) and others closer to a democratic system (Macedonia's “Illegitimate Democracy”). One can challenge the view that Serbia was a full authoriatrian system in the 1990s, as regular elections were held and independent media were able to operate with limitations. The populist features of the regime decreased as its authoritarianism increased during the 1990s and it took on sultanistic traits. This does not, however, undermine the argument of Regime Change in the Yugoslav Successor States that the successors displayed a great variety of political regimes.
Boduszyński singles out two variables to explain the different outcomes, namely, “the reproduction of economic disparaties over time” (p. 252) and the local response to the international norm transfer through the European Union and other international actors. He thus combines path dependency with external agency. The emphasis on historical legacies is a useful contribution and challenges the literature on democratization that downplays historical conditions preceding the democratization process. Thus, the early phase of democratization might constitute a critical juncture at which to shape the institutions and constitution, but countries do not begin with a level playing field. Boduszyński, however, does not fall into the trap of historical determinism, and puts less emphasis on historical legacies of rule of law or democracy than on different levels of economic development. He also attends carefully to the interelationships between international and domestic actors, suggesting that the success of international policies promoting democracy depends on local elites and their attitudes to both the content of the norms and the agency promoting them (p. 266).
The author also notes that while during the 1990s the Yugoslav successor states diverged, in the 2000s there has been a great deal of convergence. Indeed, most Yugoslav successor states, together with Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, share a number of similarities as weak states, with high levels of volatilty and political parties intent on rent seeking and capturing state resources. The annual “Nation in Transit Report” of Freedom House thus places most of these countries into the category of “semiconsolidated democracies.” Among the postcommunist countries, the Balkan democracies thus constitute one group, distinct from the Central European democracies and the hybrid regimes in the post-Soviet space. This convergence, however, raises the question of whether the focus on economic disparaties is a convincing explanation, as these structural economic differences did not change during the 1990s, and with the exception of Slovenia, the successor states no longer vary greatly in terms of democratization. The acceptance of outside norms, in particular European integration, might hold greater explanatory value, especially as integration into Western institutions became more credible after 2000 than it was in the 1990s everywhere except in Slovenia.
A similar focus on external agency characterizes the volume edited by Bunce, McFaul, and Stoner-Weiss. Rather than the long-term consolidation (or lack) of democracy, Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World concerns “second democratic breakthroughs,” namely, critical junctures when hybrid regimes that came to power (or managed to retain power during the transition from communism to multiparty politics) after 1989 were overthrown. The authors contend that these “revolutions,” mostly triggered by elections (often manipulated by incumbents), form a distinct category at the end of socialist regimes during the third wave of democratization between 1989 and 1991. These authors attribute particular importance to the international context, including the norm transfer that Boduszyński discusses. Like Mark Beissinger (“Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” Perspectives on Politics 5 [June 2007]: 256–76), they also emphasize the diffusion effect of the revolutions themselves. Of course, the dynamic of diffusion has been a feature of revolutions since 1848, including in 1989, and thus does not constitute a novelty of the “colored” revolutions.
At the same time, while focusing on these key moments, the editors also accept the need to look at the long-term trajectory of political regimes: “Hybrid regimes combine elements of democracy and dictatorship for a reason, and their costs with respect to political instability, weak states, and poor economic performance do not go away simply because of a change of government” (p. 333). In her chapter, Milada Vachudova discusses how the European Union became effective in preventing the countries from falling back into authoritarian patterns and encouraging regime parties (once in opposition) to adapt to an EU-compatible democratic agenda (p. 97). Such was the case with the Croat Democratic Community in Croatia after 2000 and the moderate offshoot of the Serb Radical Party, the Progressive, led by Tomislav Nikolić in Serbia after 2008. This trajectory also helps to explain why the second democratic breakthroughs have fared worse in Ukraine, Georgia, or Kyrgystan, where there have been few external incentives, such as EU membership; all three have reverted to a more hybrid regime similar to the one preceeding the revolution.
With a focus on social movements, economic disparties, and external actors and norms, all three books, in their own way, downplay nationalism as a factor to explain the failure and success of democratization. In the case of the Yugoslav social movements of the 1980s, the puzzle remains as to why nationalism became the dominant frame for mobilization over economic grievances. Boduszyński similarly attributes little significance to either ethnic diversity or nationalism in explaining the variation among post-Yugoslav regimes, although he does note that it is not ethnic diversity as such but its politization that can negatively impact democratization (p. 12). Finally, a number of the essays in the edited volume note that weak states and ethnic tensions can serve to establish and sustain hybrid regimes. But the case studies do not explore how and why nationalism became the most salient issue or how democratic groups could circumvent the regimes' rhetoric about defending national interests. In a commendable effort to shift attention from an excessive focus on ethnicity in discussing the post-Yugoslav space, the books might nonetheless be inadvertently neglecting the interrelationship among nationalism, “stateness,” and democratization.
The ability or inability to constitute an uncontested state, often defined as a nation-state, could be considered central to explaining variation among the Yugoslav successor states and the success of second democratic breakthroughs. The nature of the state and the borders of Slovenia were never contested as in the other republics. After the end of the wars in the mid-1990s, the transition toward a more consolidated democracy also become possible in Croatia. In Serbia, the end of the Milošević regime came at a point when all main disputes had become externalized, with Bosnia and Kosovo coming under international administration and the remaining minorities within Serbia not posing a credible threat to continued legitimacy of the regime. Furthermore, the opposition carefully stayed clear of the question of nationalism. Macedonia, Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, remain partly contested polities, rendering the consolidation of their democratic institutions more difficult. Of course, neither ethnic diversity nor nationalism is an independent variable, which constitutes an obstacle for the consolidation of democracy without their strategic use by populists at particular junctures (as Boduszyński also notes in his book). Vladisavljević argues that the success of authoritarian nationalism can be explained by a combination of three factors: dysfunctional institutions, nationalist mobilization, and a failure of political elites. He refers here (pp. 208–9) less to the obvious responsibility of Milošević and nationalist leaders in other parts of Yugoslavia than to the weakness of the political elites they replaced.
The three books make excellent contributions to scholarly debates and will help anchor the Yugoslav experience in the framework of the comparative politics of postcommunist Europe.
