Beyond the opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), rights of nature have not received international recognition. In contrast, the human right to a healthy environment (RHE) was recognized by the United Nations General Assembly in 2022 and by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2025. What effect will acceptance of the RHE have on efforts to achieve international recognition of rights of nature? The answer depends at least in part on another issue whose resolution is still evolving: what does the RHE include? If the RHE is interpreted broadly, to encompass protection of the natural environment without direct connections to human health and well-being, it may subsume some—but not all—of the primary arguments for rights of nature.
Those arguments fall into two major categories, centered on: (1) the instrumental value of such rights for achieving better environmental protection; and (2) the inherent value of nature itself. Proponents of rights of nature argue both that such rights protect the environment more effectively than anthropocentric approaches, and that treating the environment as having intrinsic value is simply the right thing to do.
Rights of nature vary in other ways, including in their scope.Footnote 1 Some proponents seek to introduce transformative changes in the relationship between human beings and other entities on this planet, by recognizing rights of nature—or “Nature”—as a whole.Footnote 2 Others seek to attribute rights only to specific entities such as rivers.Footnote 3 The latter approach is often associated with the worldviews of Indigenous peoples, so much so that some scholars have suggested that such cases are more about recognition of Indigenous rights than recognition of rights of nature.Footnote 4 Characterizing place-limited rights of nature in this way may make them more politically acceptable, but at the risk of subsuming them into a sub-category of Indigenous rights.
My argument here is that broad interpretations of the RHE may offer, or threaten, a similar prospect for rights of Nature writ large. If the RHE is effectively interpreted to protect the right of all human beings to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, it must provide extensive protections against human modification of nature, even without treating nature as having rights of its own. One result may be that the instrumental justification for rights of nature is largely fulfilled by the expansive application of the RHE and other human rights, such as those of Indigenous peoples. As that justification fades away, proponents will have to lean more heavily on what Mihnea Tanasescu has called “ecotheological” justifications for rights of nature—that is, arguments that Nature must be recognized as having intrinsic value for its own sake.Footnote 5
Parallel Paths, Different Levels of Success
Unsurprisingly, human beings have been far more willing to promote and recognize their own rights than those of nature. From the beginning of the modern environmental movement, advocates have used the language of human rights to argue for the importance of environmental protection. In 1968, when the United Nations decided to hold what became the first international conference on the environment, the General Assembly expressed its concern about the effects of “the continuing and accelerating impairment of the quality of the human environment” on the enjoyment of human rights.Footnote 6 The conference, held in Stockholm in 1972, did not explicitly recognize a human right to a healthy environment, but it came close, stating in the gendered language of the day: “Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.”Footnote 7
From that moment to the present, advocates have convinced legislatures to include the RHE in national constitutions and persuaded courts to interpret other constitutional rights to include it. The average number of rights in a constitution has more than doubled since World War II,Footnote 8 but the right to a healthy environment has not just surfed the wave; it is the most popular new right since the International Bill of Rights was adopted. By 2006, most countries had added some form of environmental right to their constitutions.Footnote 9 And the courts of at least twelve others, including India and Pakistan, have issued decisions deriving the right to live in a healthy environment from the constitutional right to life.Footnote 10 The RHE has also been included in many regional agreements and declarations.Footnote 11 Considering regional treaties and domestic laws together, well over 160 states have explicitly accepted the RHE as a legally binding norm.Footnote 12
Global recognition took longer, but it eventually arrived. The UN Human Rights Council recognized the right in 2021,Footnote 13 and the following year, fifty years after the Stockholm Declaration, the UN General Assembly did so as well, by a vote of 161 in favor, zero against, and only eight abstentions.Footnote 14 Three years later, the ICJ stated, in its advisory opinion on states’ obligations with respect to climate change, that the RHE is part of international human rights law.Footnote 15
In comparison, rights of nature have lagged far behind. As other contributions to this symposium describe, several states have recognized such rights at the national level, including Ecuador in 2008, Bolivia in 2010, and Panama in 2022.Footnote 16 Most other examples are specific to particular cases or arrangements, such as the agreement between the New Zealand government and a Maori iwi granting legal personhood to Te Awa Tupua, the Whanganui River ecosystem.Footnote 17
The closest the United Nations has come to recognizing rights of nature has been in annual General Assembly resolutions on “Harmony with Nature.” These resolutions do not recognize rights of nature but rather recognize recognitions of rights of nature, by noting that “some countries recognize the rights of nature in the context of the promotion of sustainable development.”Footnote 18 In response to these resolutions, the secretary-general has published a series of reports that describe examples of recognition of rights of nature at the national and local levels.Footnote 19 Notably, the General Assembly resolution recognizing the RHE does not refer to these resolutions and reports, or rights of nature, at all. Indeed, the resolution does not even include the word “nature.”Footnote 20
The Evolving Right to a Healthy Environment
At the international level, the RHE is still in its infancy. However, the field of environmental human rights law is not. Human rights bodies have “greened” other human rights, including the rights to life and health, and constructed a detailed, coherent body of norms.Footnote 21 Therefore, a recurring question for the RHE is what relationship it has, or should have, to the existing framework.
One possibility—probably the most likely—is that the RHE should be considered an autonomous right, whose content is informed by, but not limited to, the parameters set by the environmental application of other rights. As Marcos Orellana wrote before the recognition of the RHE by the General Assembly, as an autonomous right the RHE can both be an umbrella for the “normative acquis … derived from the environmental dimensions of existing protected rights and fundamental human rights principles,” and provide a basis for further “normative development.”Footnote 22
This dual role for the RHE appears to be the approach adopted by the General Assembly in its 2022 resolution. Compare that resolution’s first operative paragraph to the first paragraph of the 2021 resolution of the Human Rights Council. In the Council’s resolution, the first paragraph “Recognizes the right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment as a human right that is important for the enjoyment of human rights.”Footnote 23 This language could be interpreted as suggesting that the RHE is primarily derivative of other rights, even if such an interpretation would be somewhat strained. The General Assembly avoided this possibility entirely by removing the italicized language from its own resolution. At the same time, it kept intact the second operative paragraph from the Council resolution, which states that the RHE “is related to other rights and existing international law.” Moreover, several of the preambular paragraphs emphasize the relationship of environmental protection to the enjoyment of all human rights.
The regional treaties also treat the RHE as an autonomous right. Although the formulations of the RHE in the African Charter, the San Salvador Protocol, the Aarhus Convention, and the Escazu Agreement vary, none of them suggests that the RHE is merely derivative of other rights.
A second approach is to characterize the RHE as derived from other rights, such as the rights to life and health. In this case, the RHE might be “genetically constrained” to the scope of the rights from which it derives.Footnote 24 This approach may be especially attractive to states that wish to limit the right, and at least one—the United Kingdom—has already characterized the RHE in this way.Footnote 25 But there is little support for this interpretation in environmental human rights law. Only one treaty, the Arab Charter, treats the RHE as merely derivative, by presenting it as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living.Footnote 26 One might also read the ICJ’s 2025 advisory opinion as reflecting this approach, given that the Court described the RHE as “inherent in” and “essential for” the enjoyment of other rights.Footnote 27 In my view, however, the ICJ opinion was not intended to prevent further normative development of the RHE beyond the scope of other rights. Indeed, the ICJ preceded its endorsement of the RHE by reviewing the recognition of an autonomous RHE at the national, regional, and global levels.Footnote 28
The third and most expansive path of development for the RHE has been indicated by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in its 2017 and 2025 advisory opinions.Footnote 29 In addition to setting out a detailed and comprehensive interpretation of the RHE, the Court suggested that the RHE protects the components of the natural environment as interests in themselves. Effectively, then, the Court seems to have grafted a rights of nature branch on to the RHE tree.
The Effect of the RHE on Rights of Nature
The effect of the RHE on rights of nature will depend on which of these three paths the RHE takes: as an autonomous right, a derivative right, or a right that already includes rights of nature.
The simplest approach to interpret is that of the Inter-American Court. If the cost of recognizing rights of Nature writ large is that they be grafted to the RHE, that is a cost that many advocates for rights of nature seem happy to pay, just as many advocates for rights of specific rivers and ecosystems have welcomed the linkage to Indigenous rights.Footnote 30 However, the Inter-American Court’s approach seems unlikely to find success at the United Nations. As noted above, the recognition of the RHE by the General Assembly and the ICJ do not refer to rights of nature at all. Therefore, at the global level, at least for the foreseeable future, the RHE will remain a human right, without a rights of nature annex.
That leaves the choice between the autonomous and the derivative RHE. What difference does this choice make for the scope of the RHE and, by extension, for the recognition of rights of nature? For many types of environmental harm, there may not be much difference in practice. Air and water pollution, for example, have already been the subject of successful cases brought on the basis of the rights to life, health, and private and family life.Footnote 31 However, in some cases, especially those involving protection of natural ecosystems, the link between environmental harm and human well-being is less direct.Footnote 32 In those cases, the autonomous RHE could be used more easily to protect those aspects of nature that are less evidently tied to human interests.
Moreover, this gap in coverage between the derivative and the autonomous RHE is likely to gradually close over time, as human dependence on biodiversity becomes clearer. The UN special rapporteurs on human rights and the environment have emphasized the necessity of protecting biodiversity in order to protect human rights, including but not limited to the RHE.Footnote 33 As our understanding of our dependence on biodiverse ecosystems deepens, a derivative as well as an autonomous RHE will increasingly protect components of natural ecosystems that were previously believed not to have direct connections with human well-being.
As the coverage of the RHE expands to include biodiversity generally, it is likely to obviate instrumental arguments for rights of nature, leaving only “ecotheological” justifications. More generally, the overlap between the RHE and rights of nature may call into doubt the idea of a clear division between anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches to environmental protection—which, in turn, may require rethinking the ecotheology of natural rights. After all, as Indigenous peoples have been reminding the rest of us for a long time, human beings are part of the natural world. But that issue deserves deeper consideration than space permits here.
Conclusion
The rapidly evolving scope and content of the RHE will probably occupy much of the legal space that rights of nature would otherwise claim, thereby undermining instrumental arguments for separate recognition of rights of nature. As the distance between anthropocentric and ecocentric approaches to environmental protection shrinks, it may become clearer that the most effective way to protect nature is to protect the right of all human beings to live in a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment.
