Introduction—Peirce’s Continuum
In this inquiry, I testify to the central place of signs in Charles S. Peirce’sFootnote 1 cosmology, and to the power of entertaining novel propositions (complementary and conflicting) through dialogue to foster the unity necessary to weld members of his continuum. Peirce’s continuum is, in fact, the essence of his cosmology; but without the regenerativity and mutual receptivity among sign users, the continuum can be short-circuited:
Moreover, signs require at least two quasi-minds; a quasi-utterer and a quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human psychology, but a necessity of logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic.Footnote 2
Peirce’s concept of the flow of dialogue (mutual presentation and acceptance of ideas) becomes the conduit to weld each member of the continuum with the others. But, we must not miss Peirce’s primary mover in bringing about this ‘welding’ of minds—the sign itself.
Emphasis on the unity of meaning in the sign demonstrates how his continuum does not refer to each member as unique, but all fit together as a complete whole as is the case for Scotus (contraction).Footnote 3 Scotus’ notion of continuum (contraction) is distinct from that of Peirce, but similar to that of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. The monad for Leibniz, constitutes the elementary substance foundational to the continuum: “Briefly, [monads] are the elements of things.”Footnote 4 Because Leibniz insists that the originary monad (deity) determines the substance and existence of derivative monads, his notion of continuity is restricted to Scotus’ paradigm of contraction, in which each monad is merely a redundancy of other monads, resulting in a string of monads into infinity (redundant recursiveness): “[The continuum] is not divided into points because points are not parts but limits.”Footnote 5 This lack of limitation reflects the indefinite redundancy of each monad insofar as each one is a direct perception of the continuum. Conversely, Peirce’s continuum showcases the uniqueness of its members, together with features common to all. His premise is essentially that each member, despite individual status as a unique, coalesces into the manifold of the continua. Peirce’s emphasis on distinct qualities of each member is balanced with the individual’s dependence upon the continuum for new meanings in semiosis and is consonant with his pragmatic principles. Since for Peirce (unlike Scotus and Leibniz) originary substances do not define other members of the continuum (but the welding of individuals with other members does), possibility for regenerativeness (idiosyncratic inferencing) is not precluded.Footnote 6 John Boler interprets Peirce’s view of concretion accordingly—with the issue of possibility in mind (Firstness as applied to Secondness) in the virtual absence of Thirdness: “… the would-be is never contracted to the is.”Footnote 7 Nonetheless, even the issue of ‘would-be,’ although potentially becoming a Thirdness construct (deductive inferencing), permeates fields of Secondness, in that possibility in Firstness is embodied. Any possibility in Secondness can rise to the level of a ‘would-be.’ For example, the geometric arrangement of objects/persons in the physical world is pregnant with virtually infinite permutations of locations, orientations and reference points, demonstrating that within Secondness resides ‘would-bes’ by virtue of possibilities consequent to operations of Firstness, since the nature of Firstness includes possibility. The nature of Firstness is spontaneity of feeling and, as mentioned, possibility, while the nature of Secondness is effort and resistance. Thirdness, in contrast, engenders law-like conformity to conventions or regularity.
Although the self’s place as an expression of all components of the physical world (Secondness) will be addressed (integration first by means of identifying other members of the continuum), primary focus will be accorded to logical shifts ascertained via transition of linguistic signs. The assumption is that abductive reasoning prefigures any form of dialogue,Footnote 8 particularly internal musings, since each self (including each momentary self of the same self) taking part in the dialogue is inaugurated and developed consequent to solving ignorance problems—in identifying and explaining error. I shall take up the development and influence of internal dialogue, as Peirce perceives it, to foster the expression of the all in the oneFootnote 9 or as Boler would have it, “the whole is ‘in’ its parts”Footnote 10:
Man is not whole as long as he is single; he is essentially a possible member of society. Especially one man’s experience is nothing, if it stands alone. If he sees what others cannot we call it hallucination. It is not my experience but our experience that has to be thought of; and this “us” has indefinite possibilities.Footnote 11
Peirce calls us to transcend our idiosyncratic, practical experience, and to bring ourselves to a commitment to appreciate complexions of thought incumbent to the several. He characterizes this extension of self-thought as a duty to contribute to our natural place in the continua. Peirce speaks to this duty in the following passage: “The very first command that is laid upon you, your quite highest business of duty, becomes, as everyone knows, to recognize a higher business than your business … a generalized conception of duty which completes your personality by melting it into the neighboring parts of the universal cosmos.”Footnote 12 By ‘melting’ our personalities ‘into the neighbouring parts of the universal cosmos,’ Peirce re-asserts the primacy of shared representations, particularly reminiscent of (although later) the ‘welding’ of minds in sign use. This claim underscores the indispensability and vitality of signs to advance unification and purpose ratified in mutual sign implementation—the same representamen (the vehicle of the sign) targeted to distinctive objects and, often times, distinctive meanings. In fact, were it not for shared meanings of signs (their interpretants), unification in the continuum would be a mere theoretic. Peirce later makes the following argument:
We think in signs; and indeed meditation takes the form of a dialogue in which one makes constant appeal to his self of a subsequent moment for ratification of his meaning in respect to his thought-signs really representing the objects they profess to represent. Logic therefore is almost a branch of ethics, being the theory of the control of signs in respect to their relation to their objects. My idea of a sign has been so generalized that I have at length despaired of making anybody comprehend it, so that for the sake of being understood I now limit it ….Footnote 13
In exercising the ‘duty’ to serve higher callings than the self, we embark upon a deictic adventure—to the extent that others’ seemingly unorthodox thoughts are not dismissed out-of-hand as ‘hallucinations’; rather they are given audience—the legitimacy of some is recognized, while others are ultimately embraced as our own. This process is best facilitated via the unfolding of dialogue—taking on distinctive participant roles, the space where identifications are made, where translations can be orchestrated, where persuasions find their mark, and where logical justifications are uncovered. It is in this constructed situatedness that dialogue becomes the forum where logical minds meet.
Relevance of Peirce’s Continuum to Collaborative Exchange
In Peirce’s concept of the world as a continuum humans are not truly individuals in the strictest sense of Peirce’s notion of individual. His strict definition encompasses the momentary state of an entity when it reacts, demonstrating effort or resistance in Secondness. Peirce claims that the individual exists as: “… a reaction may be experienced, but it cannot be conceived in its character of a reaction; for that element evaporates from every general idea.”Footnote 14 This definition of ‘individual’ reflects the prominence of Secondness to his notion of the continuum, since reactions (once they materialize) cease to exist, and since a reaction or trajectory of reactions against another entity/force entails effort and resistance within a context of otherness, such that existence as an individual is primarily perceived as a momentary response to other members of the continuum—haphazardly colliding with other entities and constructing the self via these encounters. But, as Vincent Colapietro determines, Peirce meant to extend his notion of individual to represent a “kind of continuum—encompassing the more enduring properties of the self.”Footnote 15 In fact, Peirce’s strict notion of individual would ultimately not serve his continuum well, since individuals would merely exist as discrete unhomogenized parts—resulting in nothing short of ephemeral, discontinuous, non-fitting parts.
Peirce intimates that humans often short-circuit the unification of the several in the one: “… a person is not absolutely an individual.”Footnote 16 As a consequence “… man is so completely hemmed in by the bounds of his possible practical experience, his mind is so restricted to being the instrument of his needs, that he cannot mean what transcends those limits.”Footnote 17 Nonetheless, humans can naturally be delivered from such subjectivity and sterility via continued reception to plausible propositions from others and eventually from the self. This form of dialogue frees us from formulaic paradigms—from literal thinking and from conformity to a single, perhaps flawed perspective. In line with Peirce’s aforementioned need to transition from self-centered focus to a higher calling, David Dearmont refers to “habit-taking” or “absolute chance.”Footnote 18 As such, the ability to “move things … from a state of homogeneity to a state of heterogeneity”Footnote 19 becomes particularly poignant. In becoming less homogeneous and more heterogeneous, we are open to appreciate distinct modal perspectives. Becoming more heterogeneous entails implementation of possibility in Firstness—apprehending increasingly more diverse viewpoints. Likewise, effort expended in Secondness to discover novel orientations through action and reciprocal posturing in the world of experience can facilitate recognition of heterogeneous spatial and temporal vantage points. Thirdness is paramount to ascertaining heterogeneous perspectives in that it obviates conventional and shifting roles inherent in conversation and in event profiles.
In treating ourselves as event participants, not always as agents, we can habit-take by availing ourselves of viable propositions/assertions, which other members of the continuum afford within the construct of dialogue. This intellectual openness transforms individual minds into an expression of the collective, in that dialogue brings us to the realization that we are one expression of the continuum and have the obligation to evaluate and incorporate the viable propositions presented by others. Accordingly, each of us has all of the complexions of the continuum within us, given our imperative to communicate our own momentary propositions and, at the same time, select out legitimate propositions asserted by others. The upshot is to reach a ‘common perspective,’ which entails capturing more than conventional meanings. Herbert Clark and Deana Wilkes-Gibbs express this acquisition of common perspective as: “Very roughly, [the speaker] must believe that the referent is mutually identifiable to him and his addressee from their common ground.”Footnote 20
In this way, each person possesses the power to influence others by successfully riveting their attention and allowing capture of one’s own attention. This process is well recognized in current models of dialogue-making, especially in the work of William Rapaport and Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, in which dialogue is characterized as a kind of collaboration with other members of the continua. The nature of the collaborationFootnote 21 is two-fold: 1) to coordinate the meaning(s) accorded to the sign by involved parties (a semio-semantic enterprise), and 2) to establish contextual anchors (a semio-pragmatic enterprise). The former primarily fastens on sign-interpretant relations, whereas the latter largely entails interpretant-object connections. Although both are essential in dialogue-making, the latter particularly depends upon coordinating indexical with iconic factors: geometric relationships pertaining to components of the physical world, placement of interlocutors during the referential act, and orientation of each party to referent objects and their location. In fact, adopting another’s perspective—aligning one’s self with the location, orientation and vantage point of another (allocentric perspective)—is a skill which adults often display particularly when describing the location of objects.Footnote 22 Matthew Watson, et al. likewise lay claim to the presence of modal logic in dialogue-making, reasoning that it naturally requires the manufacture of spatial, temporal, and modal inferences, because one party makes assumptions about the knowledge and viewpoint of the other party.Footnote 23 As such, mental diagrams of perspectival orientations materialize consequent to the coordination of indexical and iconic representations, such that (consonant with Peirce’s 1898 intimations in MS 485) vantage-points are nothing short of situated icons within event structures. Moreover, reaching a common perspective is best ascertained with as little collaborative energy as possible, i.e., with “minimal collaborative effort.”Footnote 24 Accordingly, “Getting a definite description (and the perspective it imposes) accepted should take less collaborative effort if the common perspective the partners try to establish is holistic, in which the object is conceived of as a whole, than if it is segmental ….”Footnote 25 This holistic preference/bias demonstrates the existence of a primary need to individuate—to single out an object from others in the near surround.
Establishing common perspective, according to Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs; Watson, et al., or in Peircean terms, common ground, between speaker, listener and the physical world, especially when individuating a single object, is, at best, a hit-or-miss proposition absent the will to match representational systems. As such, assigning signs of other users to the intended objects and their propositions requires switching perspectives—a rather complex socio-cognitive competence. In fact, certain signs are more useful in this process than are others. Those which point or draw paths (as do Dicisigns)Footnote 26 to referents particularly enhance referent individuation, e.g., those which naturally illustrate geometric shape in the physical world (diagrams), alterations in dialogue topic, and speaker-addressee shifts.
Ontogenesis of Dialogue
In human ontogeny, inter-actional dialogue materializes prior to intra-actional dialogue; and precursors to dialogue entail implementation of signs which individuate within the global continuum. These early individuating signs ordinarily materialize as Dicisigns in that they represent both iconically and indexically. Joint attentional signs (Dicisigns) form the foundation for the substance of what is referred to within dialogue. This constitutes the inception of adopting complexions of the continuum within us—it illustrates examination of perceptual and functional properties of real-world elements eventually acceptable to more than a single party. This individuating process precedes naming (entities and event profiles). It represents the dawning of attentional propositions—the ability to influence another’s conduct as a kind of foundational imperative. Apprehending that this influence across parties to events is not unidirectional is paramount to advancing Peirce’s continuum. Recognition that any influence of shared propositions is reciprocal—that self can subsist as a receiver of plausible thoughts to integrate into his own repository—must be operational if the continuum is to be fully realized.
With the advent of joint attention, and semiotic devices to secure a common focus (gaze, pointing), emerges the imperative to utilize linguistic competencies to label pieces of the continuum. Naming entails applying pronouns, nouns, verbs, and other syntactic categories to capitalize on their membership in a class of other like objects/actions/states. Although names, like attentional signs, individuate objects, they likewise classify them.Footnote 27 In this latter function, names form elementary propositions within dialogue, especially between two parties propositionalizing about the identity of a focused object/event with respect to like characterizations within the continuum. While pronouns as names individuate items (Peirce refers to them as individuals), nouns (and in many cases, proper names) are singulars because they largely integrate their referents into a category of other like objects.Footnote 28
It is at this stage that the ‘endoporeutic principle’ begins to operate. ‘Endo’ means ‘internal,’ while ‘poreutic’ refers to ‘passage into.’Footnote 29 Although endoporeutic processes are largely governed by illustrations of receptive competencies within the individual, they likewise apply to the receptivity of the masses to access and embrace propositions. By their very nature, endoporeutic principles encompass more than one interlocutor checking whether his meaning matches that of the other interlocutor, namely, translating into his own system what the other party intends. RapaportFootnote 30 and BrunerFootnote 31 confirm that, despite meaning differences between interlocutors, via translation derived from inferences, communication is, nonetheless, successful. In fact, it is just this agreement between partners which, according to Peirce, gives rise to solidified universes of knowledge: “The universe must be well known and mutually known to be known and agreed to exist, in some sense, between speaker and hearer, between the mind as appealing to its own further consideration and the mind as so appealed to, or there can be no communication, or ‘common ground,’ at all.”Footnote 32 In other words, but for the mutuality of meaning-making (which motivates/provides the purpose for object/event identification), the endoporeutic principle (passage of propositions abroad from within) would be truncated at an early stage. This endoporeutic principle illustrates Peirce’s continued commitment to his earlier claim—that the sign is the source for ‘common ground’ or agreement regarding meanings.
Both names and attentional signs provide the mutuality necessary to identify and translate items within the continuum—inferring and negotiating the common components of meaning or, as Peirce terms it, ‘common ground.’ Both types of names (pronouns, nouns) advance the practice of reaching common ground. Either interlocutor can influence the other to fasten on a referent employing the same or similar sign. But, the deictic character which the signs encode has particular import in establishing and maintaining mutuality of sign meaning (interpretants)—they (nouns, pronouns, verbs) serve to persuade another to focus on a common topic, in spite of shifting contextual variants inherent to their make-up: location, orientation or vantage points. As Peirce claims: “No man can communicate the smallest item of information to his brother-man unless they have που στωσι [a place to stand] of common familiar knowledge; where the word ‘familiar’ refers less to how well the object is known than to the manner of knowing.”Footnote 33 Here Peirce reminds us that his notion of the ‘common ground’ is ever grounded in pragmatic principles—the necessary precursor to successful communication. How the object is known entails real and often direct practical familiarity—actions, reactions, and interactions related to that object in diverse contexts, illustrating the import of Secondness in sentient habit-taking. Furthermore and perhaps more important, Peirce instructs us that this ‘common ground’ does not reside so much in the amount of experience of either of the interlocutors with the referent, but instead, in the quality of experience with it. By quality or ‘manner,’ Peirce confirms his commitment to his pragmatic maxims—that to know/mean something necessarily entails direct action/interaction not merely with its properties, but with its functional effects across contexts of experience. Essentially, Peirce requires that the same quality of sign use (the active association of quite similar interpretants) be present for mutual understanding; without common ground supplied by interpretants, dialogue is impossible.
In short, securing another’s attention and permitting him likewise to influence self-knowledge is the hallmark of membership in the continuum; and active practice-shifting between two legitimate perceptual social and cognitive orientations advances this cause. The upshot is the emergence and unfolding of elemental forms of modal logic within the individual as an expression of the continuum.
Intra-active Dialogue
In turn, this complexus of experience grounds individuals to recognize the affordances (in the Gibsonian sense)—giving rise to increased internal inference-making. At this juncture (consequent to internal inference-making) intra-actional dialogue emerges; and increased utilization of inference in collaborative exchanges extends to talking with self, in which propositional logic is sufficiently developed to embrace unconventional propositions, to consider competing explanations for an unexpected event, and to revise earlier explanatory versions.Footnote 34 Peirce describes the process of arriving at explanatorily adequate hypotheses from among possible thought directions as: “Thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue—a dialogue between different phases of the ego—so that, being dialogical; it is essentially composed of signs, as its matter ….”Footnote 35 The upshot of inference refinement as the foundational core of self-control is collaboration between different knowledge states of the self, analogous to Lev S. Vygotskii’s ‘inner speech.’Footnote 36 In this intra-actional paradigm, the self proposes novel hypotheses to the self; and consideration is made whether to alter old schemes to incorporate new knowledge, to merely augment prior knowledge, or to reject the inference out-of-hand as flawed. This internal talk (a form of inner speech) appears to mark the inception of more conscious abductive thought—a step beyond the free reign of insight and instinct. With the exercise of self-talk deliberate and conscious consideration of the plausibility of propositions is facilitated, and becomes operational when several potential proposals can be held in mind simultaneously and when cognitive conflicts do not short-circuit the inferencing process.
Once some appreciation for shifting perspectives is operational and once a degree of time travel is in place (at 4;0 and thereafter according to Endel Tulving),Footnote 37 children can launch their own, internal dialogue. This ability transcends merely talking to one’s self; it rather involves an informational exchange, such that the self actually reasons with the self, rejecting propositions and provisionally accepting others. Such reasoning entails consideration of which of several potential factors pertaining to external events is to be provisionally accepted as viable contributors to the known consequence. This hypothesis consideration entails coordination of premises into assertions which are subject to doubt or confirmation. Inferencing likewise surfaces when one serves as an on-looker of one’s own person. In fact, any knowledge pertaining directly to patterns of self-conduct/appearance (substantial or procedural) necessarily qualifies as inferential reasoning, presumably consequent to the more indirect nature of self-observation. Peter Skagestad goes so far as to make the claim that “all self-knowledge can be accounted for as inferences from external facts.”Footnote 38 Essentially the self becomes an observer of him/herself; and, in so doing, these observations from without are tantamount to external facts—self-proclivities derived from on-looker status. Nonetheless, Peirce insists that it is not only passive observance of physical attributes or mere propositions based upon on-looker observations which culminates in familiarity/intimate knowledge,Footnote 39 rather the kind of familiarity derived from participant status—inclusive of all of its advantages.
The Call to Habit
The Peircean concept of habit encompasses both innate dispositions and acquired skills.Footnote 40 Although habit ordinarily embodies Thirdness, in that it expresses a general law/regularity,Footnote 41 the kind of Peircean habit which is taken up here pertains to illustrations of Firstness of Thirdness—novel inferencing which dialogue affords, especially internal dialogue. Here, habit defies conformity to conventions/previous paradigms of mental and action-based conduct. This non-conformity of patterns applies to living and non-living systems alike, although it operates in the latter with far less frequency. Peirce is clear that absolute chance materializes on “excessively rare sporadic occasions [when] a law of nature is violated in some infinitesimal degree.”Footnote 42 Peirce tacitly distinguishes between mathematical and metaphysical habit,Footnote 43 which can be framed in terms of a distinction between whether habit applies to mind (sentient beings) or matter (non-sentient entities). The latter is a more mathematical construct (in the form of natural laws) which is less subject to absolute chance and more subject to mechanical regularity; the former (beings capable of reflection) warrants frequent insinuation of absolute chance (what Peirce refers to as ‘habit-taking’), given its metaphysical nature. An alteration in the substance or procedure of any law which is other than random (applying to mind or matter) meets muster to qualify as habit for Peirce.
Underlying conformity and non-conformity to the law is chance. As Peirce illustrates in his “Reply to the Necessitarians,” there are four arguments in favour of chance, of which the third is most crucial: “… Law, which requires to be explained, and like everything which is to be explained must be explained by something else, that is, by non-law or real chance.”Footnote 44 In fact, the phenomenon of chance pervades every regularity; and it is just this probability/possibility which situates the likelihood of an event to materialize, obviating the presence of Firstness at every turn. Firstness is particularly poignant in absolute chance, consequent to the spontaneity evident in outcomes which are not predetermined. Peirce equates habit-taking with the force of absolute chance, or to the direct point, “Absolute chance is habit-taking.”Footnote 45 This is so, such that independent of the odds, the eventuality of an event happening for sentient event participants does not follow a prescribed path. For example, the likelihood of drawing heads in a coin toss twice or more in succession is equally possible to not drawing such sequence; hence absolute chance rears its head especially in metaphysical contexts to defy prescribed regularity.
In fact, Peirce emphatically asserts that laws (behaviours, beliefs, event profiles, and occasionally natural/scientific events) which persist in mechanistic conformity, such that change is impenetrable to the schema, are anything but habits: ”Were the tendency to take habits replaced by an absolute requirement that the cell should discharge itself always in the same way, or according to any rigidly fixed condition whatever, all possibility of habit developing into intelligence would be cut off at the outset; the virtue of Thirdness would be absent.”Footnote 46 In other words, if laws fail to incorporate, as an intrinsic component of their make-up, a departure from the regular profile, they do not approach habit. Habits, according to Peirce, are “all natural dispositions to feel, act, or think in certain possible kinds of way”Footnote 47 in contradistinction to ‘acquired habits’—they merely prototype cases, which lack the means to unequivocally predict the next consequence or to discern from a consequence the contributing factors. In the same spirit, Peirce claims that “[t]he essence of belief is the establishment of a habit.”Footnote 48 Later in his life, Peirce reiterates and expands this sentiment: “… every belief and every inclination toward belief is a Habit ….”Footnote 49 By the ‘essence of a belief,’ Peirce refers to the taking of a belief after forces from within, namely insight from ‘instinct,’ convince us that a particular proposal has some merit, and after brief consideration of the merit of competing proposals. Essentially, belief is adopted and may supplant, substantially alter, or merely augment previous beliefs (at least for a time). The newly adopted belief (however revisional and temporary) nonetheless represents a quintessential case of habit, since it incorporates habit’s primary characteristic—absolute chance.
Peirce’s notion of absolute chance permeates every activity for which a commitment is repeatedly made to search out anomalies to one’s own expectations (earlier belief system). Atocha Aliseda intimates that the precedent of every newly adopted belief (habit) is a state of doubt.Footnote 50 Presumably this state of doubt constitutes a precursor to a search for more tenable beliefs; and such is the essence of our call to absolute chance. Peirce impels us to ever recognize the need to strive toward more fitting explanations for surprising consequences. He further contends that the awareness (especially if it rises to the level of conscious awareness) is the hallmark for taking new habits/beliefs, in that it sensitizes the mind to apprehending relevant facts in the external world, in the continua. The actualization of Firstness of ThirdnessFootnote 51 is a propos here, in that the consciousness of the self in expectations coalesces with that of others and with laws of events in nature—culminating in the seemingly magnetic force of synechism. Peirce specifically makes this argument in connection to doubt as the opportunity to adopt new habits: “… It can be proved that the only mental effect that can be so produced and that is not a sign but is of a general application is a habit-change; meaning by a habit-change a modification of a person’s tendencies toward action, resulting from previous experiences or from previous exertions of his will or acts, or from a complexus of both kinds of cause.”Footnote 52
In dialogue (inter-actional or intra-actional), conscious deployment of habit is vital. Peirce terms ‘the consciousness of taking a habit’ as “habituescence.”Footnote 53 Peirce claims: “Some undisciplined young persons may have come to think of acquired human habits chiefly as constraints; and undoubtedly they all are so in a measure. But good habits are in much higher measure powers than they are limitations ….”Footnote 54 Good habits provide us with powers—a sustained pattern of belief which is open to alteration via absolute chance; they supply new mental dispositions to search for plausible explanations of unexpected consequences to enhance the effectiveness of a particular strategy within certain contexts. Well-placed rationale for anticipated behaviour within certain scenarios can facilitate well-formed inferences to assist in interpreting deictic features of dialogue, e.g., prediction of who will be the next speaker/addressee, what will be the next topic/focus, whether speaker’s location/orientation will change, and the like. The deictic features which frequently control the complexion of speech events defy mere regularity—they unquestionably represent a forum pervaded by change, hence chance. Although conversations (with others or the self) may proceed according to some general principles (one person typically speaks at a time), a host of factors critical to sign interpretation are known to shift: topic, referent object, locations of speakers/landmarks, and orientations of non-stationary objects/persons, militating in favour of generating creative strategies.
The indispensability of habit to interpret frames of dialogue is obviated in the myriad of novel competencies which it fosters on the inter-actional and intra-actional planes. In inter-actional dialogue scenarios, habit culminates in a host of new/modified skill-patterns. One of such states of readiness is receptivity to diverse perspectives created by placement and orientation alterations in the physical surround—impelling a transition from assuming an egocentric reference point to allocentric ones. A second competency entails recognition of the influence of partners’ imperatives to those within and without the dialogue. A third illustration of habit’s imposition of chance in establishing new behaviour patterns is its renovation of a personal house of logic to incorporate more public forums—determining the merit of partners’ affirmative and negative propositions about states of affairs. Another, more linguistic adjustment accorded to the influence of habit/absolute chance affects decisions about which label would enhance interlocutor’s search for meaning associations within his mental lexicon. In some cases, substituting explicit nouns for pronouns minimizes collaborative effort,Footnote 55 since rapid sign-referent associations often substantially reduce repair for the speaker and sign-object-interpretant fit for the hearer. Finally, the primary ampliative change which habit fosters is an intimate respect for the utility of the imagination in situating the self in places occupied by his interlocutors. Implementing this mental habit permits the self to guard his current place, while transferring himself to the location and orientation of the interlocutor. This novel competence grounds the viewpoint of the momentary self, while sustaining deictic vantage points of others, thereby legitimizing perspective differences and ultimately facilitating modal logic. This novel skill, to perspective-take, makes way for a mental operation of still more abstract proportion—when self meets self in intra-actional dialogue.
In intra-actional dialogue, habit affords the self a new mode of logical operation. It validates the principle of abductive reasoning—to ascertain the most plausible explanation (from competing ones) for consequences which produce a puzzling effect. The means to supersede consideration of one or two perspectives simultaneously and embrace several seemingly equally viable options (absent a partner to embody each position) constitutes a significant change in mental operation. This new mental pattern requires collaborating with the self to arrive at abductions. The procedure may require the self to reject some contenders, even when other explanations fail to supply a satisfactory solution. In these intra-actional scenarios, the self becomes an object to the self, despite their intimately connected nature. Accordingly, the advent of more advanced forms of abductive reasoning marshals the ego to view itself as an on-looker to propositions which arise from its own inventive processes. In short, receiving insight from one’s own internal constituency goes far to stimulate the state of logic that is later shared with other inventive minds. At this juncture, intra-actional dialogue qualifies as a deictic forum (ratifying propositions internally and externally) where creative answers for states of affairs acquire some objective reality.
Conclusion
It is evident that an appreciation for habit as absolute chance in dialogue scenarios can only serve to improve relations with the self and other members of the continuum in that habit establishes a kind of mental preparednessFootnote 56 to construct novel, well-reasoned assumptions/predictions/explanations for subsequent exchanges/events. This advantage, which habit provides, is evidenced in the disposition of interlocutors to make their way among the ever-changing features of visible, invisible, and imaginary spaces within Peirce’s deictic continuum.
