It is interesting, however, that we know very little about the people inside the Commission. Most analyses of the EU structures have been policy oriented, portraying the Commission as a unitary actor. Liesbet Hooghe's approach is the opposite; by studying preference formation on different issues among senior Commission officials, she seeks to generate a broader understanding of governance in the EU. She investigates such preference formation among top officials in the EU on four dimensions: surpranationalism vs. intergovernmentalism; a neoliberal model of capitalism vs. a model of regulated capitalism; a “principal” type vs. an “agent” type of Commission; and a consociational vs. a Weberian model of EU bureaucracy.

The four dimensions capture the most salient issues in the EU. The tension between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism remains a defining feature of EU politics. Supranationalism as an institutional ideology accords greater influence to EU institutions vis-à-vis member states and thus relates directly to the overarching issue of the pace and objectives of integration. Economic policy is also a salient dimension of the Union; a neoliberal economic policy was predominant for a long period until the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 signaled a growing support for a more regulatory regime embedded in a broader agenda of social change. Similarly, the Commission's power and autonomy in relation to elected officials and the European Parliament reflect the long-established predominance of the Commission in European governance that has become increasingly contested over the past several years. The fourth dimension, finally, refers to the issue of the extent to which the Commission should be consociational with strict adherence to national representation, or whether Weberian and meritocratic ideals should characterize the bureaucracy.

Hooghe wants to know to what extent the EU top officials’ views on these issues are determined by socialization or utility maximization. Socialization in the present context is defined as the outcome of experiences outside (and prior to) the Commission, such as previous experience in national administration, political parties, and so on. Utility maximization, on the other hand, is based on assessments of how changes in institutions or policy affect the individual in terms of career options, influence, promotion, pay, and similar factors. She argues that this distinction can be sustained, theoretically and empirically: “Utility maximization presumes that top officials are guided by tangible, immediate career benefits, whereas socialization implies that top officials’ preferences reflect intangible, long-standing dispositions that were internalized through participation in groups or institutions over time. This way, the two basic logics are unambiguously distinct” (p. 22).

Hooghe's analysis draws on 137 interviews with top officials and a study questionnaire given to each interviewee that yielded a 77% response rate. (She sought to interview all 204 top officials but only 137, equal to 67%, granted her access.)

Hooghe's main argument is that analyses that portray the Commission as a unitary actor fail to acknowledge and account for the heterogeneity of the Commission. The unitary actor assumption rests on two requirements, both of which are missing in the Commission context: a high degree of “a priori preference convergence” (p. 198) and an advanced institutional capacity for the resolution or management of conflict. If to these observations we add the simple facts that the Commission with its 4,000 staff—reflecting different national and administrative cultures and traditions—is divided into 24 directorates plus a Secretariat-General and relates to 15 member states, we soon understand that the assumption that this is a unitary actor is an analytical construct. If anything, the Commission is the archetype of a multiorganization. The analysis also shows that top officials’ preferences are reflective of both socialization and utility maximization. On the four dimensions, two—supranationalism/ intergovernmentalism and neoliberal/regulated capitalism—preferences are explained predominantly by socialization variables. Preferences on one dimension, consociationalism/ Weberianism, are primarily explained by utility maximization variables, while the fourth dimension, “principal/agent,” presents a mixed result.

By now, it should be obvious to the reader that this book offers a highly intriguing and illuminating account of the Commission. Hooghe accompanies her quantitative analysis with an elegant theoretical argument, as well as extracts from her interviews that add context and provide a broader understanding of the top officials’ Weltanschauung and perception of issues. That having been said, a couple of questions should have been addressed more clearly. One such question refers to the validity of some of the data. While the top officials she studies deal with political issues and make political decisions, they are not elected officials and they appear to be very much aware of the duality of their office. She quotes an official as saying (apropos left-right ideological orientation): “We all have our own ideals of course, but we do not always put them on the table” (p. 88). Indeed, 30% of the interviewees maintain that personal preferences should not interfere with their job as a civil servant (p. 88). Put slightly differently, the book does not say very much about the extent to which individual preferences are translated into behavior. The Weberian ideal–type civil servants are not devoid of personal beliefs and opinions, but the institutional and regulatory framework within which their offices are embedded ensures that professional behavior is not affected. Since a large number of top EU officials come from Weberian administrative systems, it is not always clear what the attitudinal data tell us about the actual behavior of the officials. Similarly, the book could have devoted more attention to the process through which individual preferences are aggregated into institutional behavior.

These are minor points that should not overshadow the fact that Hooghe's book offers an excellent scholarly analysis of the Commission staff. It will be difficult to overlook her findings in future research on the EU Commission.