In many respects, this book is a tour de force, combining new qualitative data with existing statistics and a wide range of theoretical approaches (from Harvey to Polanyi to Zizek and many others) to explore the growth of consumer credit before 2008. The main thesis of the book is that changes in our shared cultural identity facilitated the growth of consumerism which itself fed on credit. Thus prosperity relied on a ‘culture of indebtedness’ which, as the book's intriguing title suggests, ultimately had a dark side in terms of problem debt, particularly when the credit crunch and the economic crash occurred. This thesis is not entirely new. Colin Crouch's work on ‘Privatised Keynesianism’ is particular interesting here though surprisingly not referenced in the book. But Horsley's particular mix of data and theoretical insight is creative and thought-provoking. And his focus on cultural change is rather different from the many existing approaches taken by political economists. His in-depth interviews with people with debt problems provide extremely rich evidence for a critical discussion of the role of aspiration, fantasy and emotional investment in the growth of consumer culture, along with the increasing ease of access to credit.
However, while the book is definitely a worthwhile and stimulating read, there were some frustrations along the way. The book could have made a clearer distinction between (different types of) credit and problem debt (or over-indebtedness). In terms of the amount of money borrowed, by far the largest proportion is secured on property in the form of mortgages. The minority is unsecured ‘consumer’ credit. Of course, there is evidence that increases in house prices prior to the credit crunch did lead people to re-mortgage in ways to fuel consumption, so the two forms of lending are not entirely distinct but do need to be discussed. And there are many different reasons why people borrow, with consumer purchases being only one. Those on lower incomes are often borrowing (at higher cost) for essential ‘needs’ rather than ‘wants’. The complexity, nature and interaction between different forms of credit therefore needed a little more discussion. Furthermore, most people who use consumer credit manage to pay it back without difficulty. The book's in-depth interviews ignore this group entirely to focus on those who have debt problems. Indeed, the book suddenly changes from talking about ‘borrowers’ to ‘debtors’ without a real explanation of this important distinction. Such a focus on people who have problems repaying credit agreements is perfectly appropriate given the book's aim but it is important to put these into context rather than give the impression that this group is somehow typical of all those who borrow. And what about people who do not borrow at all? We are all ‘consumers’ now but we are not all borrowers.
While the main content of the book was full of interesting ideas and reflections on data and theory, the final chapter did seem to run away with itself a little, not least the suggestion (echoing Mark Fisher) that the ’great problem’ of the early 21st century will be our ‘liberal social ideals’ (p.164) with the focus on individual enjoyment and self-fulfilment. This seemed rather sweeping and also ignores the broader political and economic structures of late capitalism. The book's emphasis on individuals, culture and therefore the ‘demand side’ was in many ways a strength but also ultimately a weakness as it failed to engage sufficiently with structures and the ‘supply side’ to provide a more balanced account of late capitalism's ‘culture of indebtedness’.
