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Life's Labors Lost: Priestly Death and Returning Home From a City of Refuge in Ancient Israel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 July 2018

Richard Whitekettle
Richard Whitekettle*
Affiliation:
Calvin College
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

According to Numbers 35:9–34, someone who had killed an innocent person intentionally was to be killed by an avenger of blood. However, someone who had killed an innocent person inadvertently was allowed to take up residence in a city of refuge where he (the legislation appears to be focused on males) would be shielded from being killed by this avenger. After the death of the high priest, the inadvertent killer could leave the city and return home safely.

This paper analyzes the six most common and substantial explanations for why an inadvertent killer could leave a city of refuge and return home after the death of the high priest, and shows why they cannot be correct. Another explanation is then offered, the basic elements of which are as follows.

An inadvertent killer was confined to a city of refuge in order to equalize the circumstances of the killer and his family/kin group with the circumstances of the victim and his family/kin group: specifically, the confinement of the killer in a city of refuge removed his presence and labor from his family/kin group just as the death of the victim had removed his presence and labor from his family/kin group. The legists behind Numbers 35:9–34, however, deemed it right and fair to limit the duration of that equalization to what the victim and his family/kin group had actually lost: the unfulfilled balance of the victim's natural lifespan. Since there was no way to know when the victim's natural lifespan would actually have come to an end, the legists availed themselves of the high priest's representational function, and used his death to represent when the natural death of the victim would have taken place. An inadvertent killer was, therefore, released from confinement after the high priest died, and his circumstances were normalized.

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Type
Articles
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Harvard Theological Review , Volume 111 , Issue 3 , July 2018 , pp. 333 - 356
Copyright
Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College 2018 

I. Introduction

According to the legislation in Numbers 35:9–34, someone who had killed an innocent person intentionally was to be killed by an avenger of blood (35:16–21). A ransom could not be given to prevent the killing of the intentional killer (35:31). Someone who had killed an innocent person inadvertently (

), however, would have his case heard by an assembly. If the assembly determined that the killing had, indeed, been inadvertent, the killer was allowed to take up residence in a city of refuge where he would be shielded from being killed by an avenger (35:9–15, 22–25).Footnote 1 After the death of the high priest, the inadvertent killer could leave the city and return home safely (35:25, 28, 32). A ransom could not be given to allow him to return home prior to the death of the high priest (35:32). If the inadvertent killer left the city prior to the death of the high priest, the avenger could kill him without being guilty of murder (35:26–27). In sum, Num 35:9–34 contains the following three cases and protocols (hereafter, Case I will be referred to as the intentional killer, Case II as the killable inadvertent killer, and Case III as the releasable inadvertent killer):

The stipulation that an inadvertent killer could leave a city of refuge and return home safely after the death of the high priest is also mentioned in Josh 20:6. The other asylum texts (Exod 21:12–14; Deut 4:41–43; 19:1–13) do not mention how long an inadvertent killer was to stay in the place of asylum.

No explanation is given in Num 35:9–34 or Josh 20 as to why an inadvertent killer could leave a city of refuge and return home safely after the death of the high priest. This paper will present and critique the scholarly explanations which have been proposed, and then propose another explanation.

II. Previous Explanations

This section will present and critique the six most common and substantial explanations for why an inadvertent killer could leave a city of refuge and return home safely after the death of the high priest. The analysis of each explanation will begin with a full description of how the explanation works. Not everyone who puts forward a particular explanation mentions every element found in the description. It is assumed here, however, that the description is an accurate portrayal of the particulars and underlying rationale of a given explanation and the thinking of its proponents.

A. The Expiation Explanation

The expiation explanation is as follows.Footnote 2 The killing of an innocent person created bloodguilt and impurity in the land ( [Num 35:33]; [Num 35:34]). If the killing had been intentional, expiation of the bloodguilt/impurity was accomplished through the shedding of the killer's own blood. If the killing had been inadvertent, the killer was shielded from being killed while he resided in a city of refuge. The shedding of innocent blood, however, although inadvertent, had still generated bloodguilt/impurity which could only be expiated through the death of a human being. Consequently, the death of the high priest expiated the bloodguilt/impurity because the priest died as a substitute for the inadvertent killer, and/or the priest bore and carried the bloodguilt/impurity away with him when he died. The high priest could function in this way because, during his lifetime, he made atonement for others through his cultic activities (e.g., Exod 28:36–38; Lev 4:13–21; 10:17; 16:17, 32–33). The expiatory function of the high priest's death was, therefore, an extension of his pre-mortem expiatory activity.

There are several problems with this explanation. First, Num 35:33b describes the procedure which can atone for the killing of an innocent person in the following way:

An intentional killer and an inadvertent killer have each shed blood, which matches the parameter of “the blood which has been shed” in line 2, and an intentional killer and a killable inadvertent killer were to have their own blood shed, which matches the parameter of “by the blood” in line 3. Thus, Num 35:33b established how the bloodguilt/impurity associated with both the intentional and inadvertent shedding of innocent blood could be atoned for.Footnote 3

The + prefix-conjugation sequence in line 1 (“atonement cannot be made”) presents an absolute prohibition, and the compound particle in line 3 (“except”) presents the only exception to that prohibition.Footnote 4 Thus, according to Num 35:33b, the only way to atone for the bloodguilt/impurity associated with an intentional or inadvertent killing of an innocent person was for the actual killer to be killed. This rules out the possibility that the death of the high priest could provide atonement on behalf of an inadvertent killer.Footnote 5

Second, Num 35:9–34 is one of many Israelite legislative texts which delineate procedures that remedy offenses and impurity. These procedures consist of an event(s) which is either performed or natural. A performed event is something which a person does (e.g., bathing, laundering, giving a sacrifice, making restitution), or which is done to a person, animal, or object (e.g., a person or animal is killed; an object is destroyed or discarded). A natural event is something which happens of its own accord (e.g., the high priest dies). The procedures also consist of a time frame when the remedying event(s) takes place, with the event taking place according to either a predictable schedule or an unpredictable schedule. With a predictable schedule, the event takes place 1) in relation to a specific time period after an offense or the start of impurity (e.g., evening; seven, forty, or eighty days), 2) on the annual Day of Atonement, or 3) as soon as possible after an offense or the start of impurity.Footnote 6 With an unpredictable schedule, the event takes place purely by happenstance (e.g., the death of the high priest takes place when the high priest happens to die).

The following chart shows the legislative texts which contain procedures that remedy offenses and impurity, and organizes the texts according to the type of event, the type of time frame, and the type of thought world or legal situation involved:Footnote 7

As is apparent, regardless of the thought world or legal situation, the procedures that remedy offenses and impurity almost always consist of a performed event and a predictable time frame. The only procedure where this is not true is the one that releases an inadvertent killer from a city of refuge (the texts marked by asterisks). That procedure consists of a natural event (the high priest dies) and an unpredictable time frame (the death of the high priest occurs by happenstance). The anomalous character of this latter procedure suggests that it remedies an offense and impurity differently from how other procedures do that. And since those other procedures remedy offenses and impurity by expiating them, it is plausible that the death of the high priest remedies the bloodguilt/impurity of an inadvertent killing in some way other than by expiating it.

Third, the expiation explanation construes the priest to die in place of or on behalf of a releasable inadvertent killer, and/or to bear and carry away the bloodguilt/impurity generated by the shedding of innocent blood. Thus, the priest is understood to function in a way akin to that of an animal in the sacrificial rituals of the burnt offering (Lev 1) and sin/purification offering (Lev 4:1–5:13), or to that of the released animal in the elimination ritual of the Day of Atonement (Lev 16).

An important part of these rituals is the establishment of a relationship between the one performing the offering and the offered object, such that the effects of the ritual performed on the object redound to the benefit of the offerer. This is accomplished through the placement of the offerer's hand or hands on the object.Footnote 8 There is no indication, however, that a relationship was established between the inadvertent killer and the high priest. There is no indication of physical contact (e.g., through hand placement), of physical proximity (e.g., by being in a city of refuge at the same time), or of an intangible relationship (e.g., the killer working for the priest) existing between the high priest and an inadvertent killer before, during, or after the high priest's death.Footnote 9 In sum, no relationship existed between an inadvertent killer and the high priest such that an expiatory effect of the high priest's death would redound to the benefit of the inadvertent killer.

Fourth, in the expiation explanation, the high priest was understood to function as an object which died in place of the inadvertent killer, and/or which carried the bloodguilt/impurity away with it when it died. Israelite priests, however, only ever functioned as subjects and never as objects in their official duties. For example, in the burnt offering, sin/purification offering, and Day of Atonement rituals, the offerer and the priest were subjects who acted upon an object according to a ritual process through which offenses were atoned for and impurity was eliminated. The offerer and the priest each had specific tasks in the process to perform, with the priest managing the process as a whole and performing certain actions that only he was authorized to perform. Thus, a priest functioned in a ritual, not as an object which died in place of an offerer and/or which carried sin/impurity away, but rather, as a subject who facilitated, managed, and acted in a ritual process which would benefit an offerer by carrying sin/impurity away.Footnote 10

It might be argued, however, that the high priest functioned in the release of an inadvertent killer in a manner similar to that of the person described in the Servant Song found in Isa 52:13–53:12 who does function as a representative/expiatory object.Footnote 11 This, however, is not an apt analogy. Suffering is integral to the function of the person in Isaiah (52:14; 53:3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12).Footnote 12 It is not, however, integral to or mentioned in connection with the high priest's death, the activity of priests in general, or even the treatment of animals in sacrificial/elimination rituals.Footnote 13 Furthermore, the person in Isaiah is righteous and innocent (53:9, 11), which enables him to bear the iniquities of others.Footnote 14 Righteousness and innocence do not, however, naturally characterize a priest.Footnote 15 A priest must expiate his own sins before he is able to approach God and expiate the sins of others (Lev 8:34; 9:7–8; 16:3–17, 24; Heb 5:2–3; 7:27; 9:7). There are, however, no instructions in Num 35 and Josh 20 stating that the priest must expiate his sins before he dies and the inadvertent killer can be released. To reiterate then, priests always functioned as subjects, never as objects. Thus, they never functioned as required by the expiation explanation.

B. The Time Period Explanation

The time period explanation is as follows.Footnote 16 A penalty was imposed on an inadvertent killer for having shed innocent blood: confinement inside a city of refuge. Because the killing had been inadvertent, a limit was set on the duration of the penalty. This limit was tied to the death of the high priest because that event marked the end of an era in the life of the nation, and therefore, the end of judicial sentences incurred during that era. Of course, the death of a king also marked the end of an era, and kings were closely associated with judicial matters. But the death of the high priest marked the end of an inadvertent killer's confinement because cities of refuge were also levitical cities (i.e., cities where Levites, who were cultic functionaries, resided) (Num 35:1–8; Josh 21:13, 21, 27, 32, 38) and were therefore associated with the cult, and because asylum for inadvertent killers had an early and foundational association with the altar of God (Exod 21:12–14). In sum, the death of the high priest marked the end of the administrative time period during which an inadvertent killer was to be confined.

There are several problems with this explanation. First, an inadvertent killing was an offense which was serious enough for an avenger, acting on behalf of the victim and his (or perhaps her) kin group, to kill the killer, and for the legists of Num 35:9–34 and Josh 20 (hereafter, the legists) to allow the avenger to do this if the killer was found outside a city of refuge prior to the death of the high priest. While not impossible, it is difficult to imagine that a kin group/avenger would be content to give up the desire and responsibility to avenge the death of the victim simply because an administrative transition, which had no meaningful connection with the victim and his death, had taken place. In other words, it seems unlikely that a kin group/avenger, who had a desire and responsibility to kill an inadvertent killer on Monday, would be content to drop the matter on Wednesday, just because the high priest had died on Tuesday, an event which marked nothing more than, to use a current administrative analogy, the closing of accounts for the prior fiscal year. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the legists would have treated the deep and intense sensibilities of kin groups/avengers in such a perfunctory way.

Second, an inadvertent killing was an offense serious enough to pollute the land (Num 35:33–34), and to warrant killing the killer if he was outside a city of refuge prior to the death of the high priest. None of the legal/ritual mechanisms for remedying offenses/impurities found elsewhere in the Israelite thought world was used to remedy the offense/impurity of an inadvertent killing. For example, the giving of ransom was prohibited (Num 35:32), and the sin/purification offering, which dealt with -offenses/impurity (Lev 4:2, 13, 22, 27), which is how an inadvertent killing was characterized (Num 35:11,15; Josh 20:3, 9), is not mentioned. Since none of the available legal/ritual mechanisms for remedying offenses/impurities was considered capable or suitable to remedy the offense/impurity of an inadvertent killing, it seems unlikely that the legists would think that a purely administrative event would be capable or suitable to do so.

Third, by tying the end of an inadvertent killer's confinement in a city of refuge to the death of the high priest, the legists made it so that the duration of such confinements would vary. For example, if a high priest died after serving in office for fourteen years, the confinements incurred during his tenure in office could be as short as one day or as long as fourteen years. And if one high priest died after one year in office, the maximum duration of confinements incurred during his tenure would be one year, while if another high priest died after fourteen years in office, the maximum duration would be fourteen years.

If the legists connected the release of inadvertent killers from confinement to the death of the high priest because that death marked the end of an administrative time period, then the duration of confinements, and their variability from case to case, were merely side-effects of a purely administrative process. That is to say, the duration of confinements and their variability did not have any significance. They were a random consequence of when a high priest happened to die and an administrative time period came to an end. There was no significance then to whether the duration of a confinement was one day, one year, or fourteen years. Durations and their variability were simply consequences of happenstance.

To inadvertent killers and kin groups, the insignificance of durations could very easily have bred resentment and rekindled or aggravated vengefulness, rather than helping to restrain and control those sentiments (as the legislation regarding cities of refuge was designed to do). For example, if releases from confinement occurred for no other reason than the fact that an administrative time period had come to an end, the kin group/avenger of a victim whose inadvertent killer was released after only one day of confinement could very well have become resentful/vengeful about the handling of their case if they saw that another inadvertent killer was released on the same day after many years of confinement; or, if an inadvertent killer was released after many years of confinement, he and his kin group could very well have become resentful/vengeful over the handling of their case if they saw that another inadvertent killer was released on the same day after only one day of confinement.

While not impossible, it is difficult to imagine that the legists would have included a parameter in the protocol for handling an inadvertent killer which could easily have encouraged resentment and vengefulness rather than restraining and controlling those things. It seems likely, therefore, that they intended the duration of confinements and their variability to be significant parts of the handling of an inadvertent killer rather than insignificant byproducts of an administrative process. If so, then the legists connected the release of inadvertent killers from confinement to the death of the high priest, not because that death marked the end of an administrative time period, but for some other reason.Footnote 17

Fourth, there were various mechanisms in the Israelite thought world that released people from burdens and constraints. For example, the septennial sabbatical year was a time, in deuteronomic thought, when debts were cancelled (Deut 15:1–11). The jubilee year (Lev 25:8–55), which occurred every fiftieth year following seven sabbatical cycles, was a time, in levitical/priestly thought, when people regained and returned to ancestral land that had been sold, and when Israelite slaves were released. And Hebrew slaves were released in the seventh year after six years of service (Exod 21:2–4; Deut 15:12–18).

The timing of the release in these mechanisms was based on the number seven, which had strong associations with the concept of completeness or fullness in Israelite thought.Footnote 18 Thus, there was a strong and overt sense of meaningfulness in the release given or gained in the sabbatical year, the jubilee year, and the seventh-year release of slaves.

The existence of these release mechanisms raises two questions. First, why did the legists not base the timing of an inadvertent killer's release on the number seven by placing it in the seventh year (or a multiple, such as fourteen) as counted from the day of the killing or the granting of asylum? This would have created a uniform duration for the sentences of inadvertent killers. Second, why did the legists not connect the release of an inadvertent killer to the sabbatical or jubilee years? The levitical/priestly legists of Num 35:9–34 could have tied the release to the jubilee year (Lev 25:8–55), which would have found its way into Josh 20 (since Josh 20 is often thought to be related to Num 35:9–34).Footnote 19 The deuteronomic legists of Josh 20 could have tied the release to the sabbatical year (Deut 15:1–11), as could the levitical/priestly tradents of Num 35:9–34, since the sabbatical year was known in levitical/priestly circles (Lev 25:2–7), and probably had connotations of release in that thought world as well.

The reason that the legists did not tie the timing of an inadvertent killer's release to the number seven, the sabbatical year, or the jubilee year, was presumably that they found the meaningfulness they wanted for the timing not in those things, but in the death of the high priest. The question then remains: Was this meaningfulness located in the death's function as an event which marked the end of a time period, or in some other aspect of the death?

The levitical/priestly and deuteronomic legists handled the release of people from the burdens and constraints of civil matters—debt, enslavement, and estrangement from land—with mechanisms that were numerically symbolic and devoted to the handling of those releases. Thus, they treated the release of a person in these civil matters as a significant event which required distinctive handling. Given this way of handling releases in civil matters, it seems reasonable to assume that the legists would have handled the release of a person from the penalty for the very serious offense/impurity of bloodshed in the same way—as a significant event which required distinctive handling. If so, it seems unlikely that the legists would have thought that they could achieve the appropriate level of significance and distinctiveness for the release mechanism of an inadvertent killer by treating it as a purely administrative procedure, and by tying its timing to another event, an event which had no distinctive connection with inadvertent killings and which did nothing more than mark the end of an administrative time period. This unlikelihood suggests that the meaningfulness that the legists found in the death of the high priest as the appropriate moment to release an inadvertent killer from confinement involved some aspect of that death other than its function as an event that marked the end of a time period.

C. The Amnesty Explanation

The amnesty explanation is as follows.Footnote 20 Amnesty or release from such things as debts, slavery, imprisonment, and exile was granted by various ancient near eastern kings at the time of their accession to the throne or early in their reign (e.g., in the first year).Footnote 21 In a similar way, the inadvertent killer was granted amnesty when one high priest died and another was installed in office. Having been granted amnesty, the killer could then return home safely. The amnesty granted to an inadvertent killer was associated with a high priest and not a king because an inadvertent killing involved the cultic issue of impurity, and perhaps because the context of Num 35:9–34 and Josh 20 was the postexilic period when the high priest had taken on many of the functions of the king.

There are several problems with the amnesty explanation, too. First, ancient near eastern amnesties, when they did not come in the middle of a reign (as occasionally happened), came at the start of a king's tenure in office, not at the end. The release of an inadvertent killer in Num 35:9–34 and Josh 20, however, came at the end of a high priest's tenure in office, not at the start. The release of the inadvertent killer in Israel did not, therefore, fit the pattern of ancient near eastern amnesties in the most basic of ways: when the release happened during a leader's tenure in office.Footnote 22

Second, amnesties in ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia were promulgated and proclaimed. In Israel too, the release and restoration of the year of jubilee (Lev 25:8–10; Isa 61:1–3), the cancellation of debts in the sabbatical year (Deut 15:2), and King Zedekiah's freeing of slaves (Jer 34:8–20) were all proclaimed. There was no declaration of amnesty, however, when an inadvertent killer was released from a city of refuge. The killer simply left the city and returned home.

It might be argued, however, that it was unnecessary to mention the declaration because the promulgation/proclamation of amnesty had become customary and was a matter of general law.Footnote 23 However, if the protocol for releasing an inadvertent killer from a city of refuge had become customary, then the protocol for admitting an inadvertent killer into a city of refuge would surely have become customary as well. And yet, many particulars of the admission process are mentioned in Num 35:9–25 and Josh 20. It is reasonable to assume, then, that the absence of any mention of a declaration of amnesty reflected the fact that there was no declaration of amnesty.

Third, in Israel and elsewhere in the ancient near east, amnesties dealt with matters of great importance, and altered the lives of individuals and the fabric of society. Thus, the granting of amnesty was a weighty matter. As noted above, an act of promulgation/proclamation formally enacted an amnesty. But this act did more than just enact an amnesty. It enacted an amnesty in a ritualized, official, and authoritative manner, marking it as a serious and consequential matter. Thus, the weighty nature of an amnesty was reflected in the weighty way it was enacted.

Note then that when an inadvertent killer was released from a city of refuge, he simply left the city and returned home (Num 35:25, 28; Josh 20:6). There were no statements, no ceremony, no official(s) involved, and no ritual action as was common in levitical/priestly procedures that marked transitions (e.g., washing or changing clothes). Nothing happened in a manner which would indicate that the release was a serious and consequential matter which a granting of amnesty would have been.

It might be argued, though, that those aspects of the release process which made it a weighty affair were simply not recorded. The legists, however, recorded details which showed that the admission process was a serious and consequential matter. According to Num 35:12, 24–25 and Josh 20:4–6, the admission process involved officials, statements, a process of adjudication, and management of the killer. Given this attention to detail in the admission process, it is reasonable to assume that the absence of details showing the release process to be a weighty matter was because there were no such details to record. To reiterate then, the release process was not the weighty affair which a granting of amnesty would have been.

D. The Pollutable Local High Priest Explanation

The pollutable local high priest explanation is as follows.Footnote 24 The high priest mentioned in Num 35:25, 28 and Josh 20:6 is the high priest of the city where the killing took place, and not, as is generally assumed, the high priest of the whole country. This local high priest, and the area where the inadvertent killing took place, “are polluted not merely by the crime [of an inadvertent killing] . . . but by the continuing presence of the offender. The means to remove this pollution is removal of the offender himself—by . . . banishment.” However, once the high priest dies, the inadvertent killer can no longer ritually pollute him. “Hence the killer can . . . return after his death.”

There are several problems with this explanation. First, there is no evidence that the term “high priest” () referred to a local high priest in Num 35 and Josh 20, or anywhere else it appears (e.g., Lev 21:10; 2 Kgs 12:11 [Eng. 10]; Neh 3:1; Hag 1:1; Zech 3:8). There is no reason, then, to believe that the legists thought that an inadvertent killer would pollute a local high priest through his presence.

Second, if the term “high priest” did refer to local high priests, then one could reasonably assume that the cities of refuge, especially since they were levitical cities, would have had local high priests. If so, and if an inadvertent killer's ability to pollute was transportable out of the area where the killing took place, then inadvertent killers would be able to pollute the high priests in the cities of refuge. No measures are prescribed, however, to guard against that.

Third, if an inadvertent killer was banished because he posed a threat of pollution to the area where the killing took place and to the local high priest of that area, he would still have posed a threat of pollution to that area and to the new local high priest of that area when he returned. After all, the killer did not go through a process of expiation or purification either before or after the high priest died. Thus, he would have still carried in himself the ability to pollute.

E. The Paramone-Like Relationship Explanation

The paramone-like relationship explanation is as follows.Footnote 25 Hellenistic contracts beginning in the third century BCE sometimes contained paramone clauses (from παραμονή [obligation to continue in service]; παραμένειν [to remain, stay]). These clauses stipulate that “one party will ‘remain with’ the other for a fixed period or for the latter's life and perform work for him.”Footnote 26 In a similar manner, an inadvertent killer entered into a paramone-like relationship with the high priest in which the killer would be protected and provided for, and would carry out any tasks given to him. When the high priest died, the paramone-like relationship came to an end and the inadvertent killer could return home, and do so safely because public opinion would, by then, have come to consider the killing atoned for through the long separation of the killer from his home.

There are, again, several problems with this explanation. First, in Hellenistic contracts containing paramone clauses, the contracting parties are known to each other when the contract is established, they knowingly enter into a contractual relationship with each other, and the requirements of the contractual relationship are specified. The inadvertent killer and the high priest, however, are not known to each other at the time the killer is granted asylum; they do not knowingly enter into a contractual relationship with each other at the start of the killer's period of asylum; and nothing is specified about what is required of the killer during his period of asylum. There is nothing, then, in the textual record which indicates that a paramone-like relationship existed between the inadvertent killer and the high priest during the killer's period of asylum.

It might be argued, however, that the relative clause in Num 35:25b (italicized in the translations that follow), which is usually understood to indicate that the high priest had been anointed (“he [the inadvertent killer] will remain there [in the city of refuge] until the death of the high priest who had been anointed with holy oil”), actually indicates that the high priest had anointed the inadvertent killer (“until the death of the high priest who had anointed him with holy oil”). If so, it might be thought that the anointing of the inadvertent killer by the high priest marked the creation of a paramone-like relationship between them.Footnote 27

There are several problems with this understanding of the relative clause. First, if a high priest did anoint an inadvertent killer and establish a paramone-like relationship with him, this would have been an important part of the admission process which authorized and inaugurated asylum for an inadvertent killer. The relative clause, however, is located, not with the description of the admission process, but with the description of the release process. Second, even if the high priest did anoint an inadvertent killer, in the levitical/priestly thought world, anointing was a religious action which created a relationship between the anointed object and God, not a civil action which created a relationship between the anointed object and a human being (note that the oil is referred to as holy oil).Footnote 28 Third, according to Exod 30:30–33, holy anointing oil () was not to be used on anyone other than a priest. To reiterate then, there is nothing in the textual record which indicates that a paramone-like relationship existed between the inadvertent killer and the high priest during the killer's period of asylum.

Second, it cannot be the case that the legists released an inadvertent killer after the death of the high priest because public sentiment would, by then, have come to consider the inadvertent killing atoned for through the long separation of the killer from his home. Offenses and impurity were remedied in levitical/priestly and deuteronomic thought not on the basis of public sentiment about what was right and sufficient, but according to juridical and cultic standards and procedures. Furthermore, there was no certainty of safety for an inadvertent killer returning home if that safety was based on public sentiment (which presumably, and most importantly, included the sentiments of the victim's kin group and avenger). After all, at the time of the high priest's death, public sentiment might have softened and become accepting of the inadvertent killer, or it might still be hardened and avenging towards him, especially if the duration of his confinement had been short.

F. The Levitical Bond Explanation

The levitical bond explanation is as follows.Footnote 29 The cities of refuge were levitical cities. Consequently, when an inadvertent killer was granted asylum in a city of refuge, he entered into a special relationship with the tribe of Levi through which he received protection and hospitality. The high priest was the head of the tribe of Levi. Therefore, when the high priest died, the connection between the inadvertent killer and the tribe of Levi and the (levitical) city of refuge was unfastened and the inadvertent killer could return home.

With this explanation as well, there are several problems. First, it does not explain why the kin group/avenger of a victim would give up their responsibility to avenge the victim's death by killing his killer following the death of the high priest. After all, before the death of the high priest, if an inadvertent killer ventured outside a city of refuge, and thereby unfastened himself from his connection with the tribe of Levi and a (levitical) city of refuge, he would be killed. Why then would he not still be killable after the high priest's death had unfastened that connection?

Second, it does not explain how the bloodguilt/impurity generated by the inadvertent killing of an innocent person was remedied. After all, in the Levitical bond explanation, the only thing the death of the high priest did was to unfasten a social and physical connection the inadvertent killer had with the tribe of Levi and one of their cities.

G. Summary of Section II. Previous Explanations

In summary, all of the explanations that have been proposed regarding why an inadvertent killer could return home safely from a city of refuge after the death of the high priest have significant weaknesses and flaws. While these weaknesses and flaws are not, perhaps, sufficient to rule out any of these explanations entirely, they do show quite clearly that none of the explanations is ultimately successful or satisfactory. There is a need then to find another and better explanation, one which is more robust.

In crafting such an explanation, several things need to be kept in mind. First, it appears that, when the high priest died, the bloodguilt/impurity of an inadvertent killing, since it was not expiated through a legal/ritual mechanism, simply ceased to exist (see section II.A). Second, the duration of confinements and their variability were significant parts of the protocol for handling an inadvertent killer (see section II.B). Third, the inadvertent killer left the city of refuge, not as someone who had been pardoned of something, but as an ordinary citizen going home after having been away (see section II.C).

III. The Equalization and Unequalization of Circumstances

Before turning to consider anew why an inadvertent killer was released from confinement when the high priest died, it will be helpful to note what the killer was being released to and what he had been confined from. In order to do that, it will be helpful to look at the plotline which flows through the legislation of Num 35:9–34 and Josh 20.

The basic plotline of Num 35:9–34 and Josh 20 consists of the following elements. Person A and person B are living their lives normally. Person B inadvertently kills person A. Person B flees to a city of refuge and is granted asylum. Person B lives a life of confinement in the city of refuge. The high priest dies. Person B leaves the city of refuge and returns home. Person B lives his life normally.

This sequence can be schematized in the following way (the bolded/italicized elements will be discussed below) (this diagram will be referred to below as diagram one):Footnote 30

During the middle stage, the victim of the inadvertent killing (person A) is shut off from the normal life he had lived in the initial stage. He is not at home, not with his family, not laboring at his livelihood, and not a functional member of his kin group. The inadvertent killer (person B) is also shut off from the normal life he had been living in the initial stage. The difference, of course, is that the inadvertent killer, being alive, could live a normal life in the middle stage, while the victim, being dead, could not. Thus, the killer's confinement during the middle stage, was a way to equalize 1) the circumstances of the killer with the circumstances of the victim, and 2) the circumstances of the killer's family/kin group (who lose the presence and labor of one of their members through his confinement) with the victim's family/kin group (who have lost the presence and labor of one of their members through his death).Footnote 31 In the final stage, the victim (person A), being dead, does not live a normal life. The inadvertent killer (person B), however, being alive, does live a normal life. Thus, the equalization of the circumstances of the releasable inadvertent killer and his family/kin group with the circumstances of the victim and his family/kin group was only temporary.

Apparently, then, the legists thought that after the death of the high priest, the equalization of circumstances was no longer important or necessary. The question, of course, is why? Why did the legists think that it was right for the circumstances of the inadvertent killer and his family/kin group to be equal to those of the victim and his family/kin group before the high priest died, but unequal after the high priest died?

IV. The High Priest and Victim Explanation

The death of the high priest has generally been understood to effect the release of an inadvertent killer through some connection it had with the killer (e.g., it provided expiation for the killer; it severed a paramone-like relationship the killer had with the priest). As seen in section II, however, this approach to explaining the function of the high priest's death has not been successful. There is, however, another way to look at the death of the high priest.

The confinement of the inadvertent killer in a city of refuge is bookended by two deaths (see the bolded/italicized elements in diagram one). Each of these deaths has a connection with the inadvertent killer (reflected in the downward arrows in the diagram). But these two deaths are also connected to each other (reflected in their common bolded/italicized typeface). The first death leads to a state of affairs (confinement of the killer in a city of refuge) that is undone by the second death; the second death undoes the state of affairs (confinement of the killer in a city of refuge) that has been created by the first death. Perhaps, then, the death of the high priest effected the release of the inadvertent killer from confinement, not because of some connection it had with the killer, but because of some connection it had with the victim and his death.

Note, then, several things about the high priest and his death, and the victim and his death. First, the high priest dies naturally, whereas the victim dies unnaturally. Second, the high priest's natural lifespan is completed, whereas the victim's natural lifespan is cut short. Third, the high priest, while alive, acted as a representative of the people, and the victim, while alive, was one of the people the high priest represented. These observations, in conjunction with the concept of equalization from section III, suggest the following as the reason that an inadvertent killer was released from confinement when the high priest died.

A penalty was imposed on an inadvertent killer for having shed innocent blood: confinement inside a city of refuge. The confinement of the killer equalized the circumstances of the killer and his family/kin group with those of the victim and his family/kin group. The legists, however, recognized several things. First, the killing had been inadvertent and not intentional. Second, unlike the killable inadvertent killer, the releasable inadvertent killer, by remaining confined in the city of refuge, had submitted to the principle of equalization and had acknowledged the seriousness of the shedding of innocent blood, even when it had been inadvertent. Third, in the ordinary course of time, the life and labor of the victim would have been lost to himself and his family/kin group after his natural death. Given these three things, it was deemed right and fair to limit the duration of the killer's confinement and his equalized existence, and to set the timing of that limit as the moment when the victim's natural death would have occurred. After all, in keeping with the talionic principle that “the penalty must be equivalent to the harm inflicted” found elsewhere in the Israelite thought world (e.g., Exod 21:23–25; Lev 24:17–21; Deut 19:16–21), it was what the victim had actually lost when he was killed—the life and labor of the rest of his natural lifespan—which should be compensated for through the killer's confinement and equalized existence.Footnote 32 There was no reason then to keep the killer confined and his existence equalized after there was no longer anything to compensate for.

The problem, of course, is that it was impossible for the legists to identify when the victim would have died a natural death. They, therefore, established a hypothetical date for it. They did this by using the date of the natural death of the high priest to represent the date of the natural death of the victim.

The legists signaled this connection between the death of the high priest and the death of the victim by mentioning the anointed status of the high priest. References to an anointed priest(s) are found in only a few other texts, all of which, like Num 35:25, are levitical/priestly texts (Lev 4:3, 5, 16; 6:15 [Eng. 22]; 16:32; 21:10; Num 3:3). Four of these seven texts, like Num 35:25, deal with the remedying of offenses and impurity (Lev 4:3, 5, 16; 16:32), and three of those four, like Num 35:25, deal with -offenses (Lev 4:3, 5, 16). In the four remedy-texts, the anointed priest either represents others before God and expiates their offenses (Lev 4:16 [see Lev 4:13–21 for the broader context]; Lev 16:32 [see Lev 16 for the broader context]), or he harms those he is supposed to represent before God with his own offenses (Lev 4:3 and 5; see Lev 4:2–12 for the broader context). Thus, the mention of the anointed identity of the priest in these four passages indicates that the anointed identity of a priest and his representational function were associated with each other in the minds of the levitical/priestly legists behind these passages. That is to say, the priest had been anointed and so he was able/authorized to represent others (and through that capacity, either to help or to harm them), and he was able/authorized to represent others (and through that capacity, either to help or to harm them) because he had been anointed.Footnote 33 And so, the levitical/priestly legists behind Num 35:25, availing themselves of the association in their thought world between a priest's anointed identity and his representational function, mentioned the anointed identity of the priest whose death marked the end of the killer's confinement in order to signal 1) that the high priest, at the time of his death, was to be thought of as representing someone (who, as discussed above, was the victim), and, by extension, 2) that the death of the high priest was to be thought of as representing the death of that someone (which, as discussed above, was what would have been the natural death of the victim).

Consequently, because the death of the high priest represented the timing of when the victim would have died a natural death, it marked the end of that portion of the victim's natural lifespan which had been lost due to his having been killed. It, therefore, marked the end of the equalization period for the inadvertent killer. Thus, an inadvertent killer was released from confinement when the high priest died, and his circumstances were normalized.Footnote 34

This way of explaining why an inadvertent killer was allowed to leave a city of refuge and return home safely when the high priest died can be schematized in the following way:

This way of explaining the significance of the death of the high priest accounts for several things that were mentioned in section II or are found in the text. First, it accounts for why the offense and impurity of an inadvertent killing simply ceased to exist after the high priest died without any expiatory legal/ritual procedure having been performed (see section II.A). The offense and impurity of an inadvertent killing were tied to the loss of the victim's life as an existential fact and to the loss of the life the victim would have lived during the rest of his natural lifespan. The offense and impurity, therefore, existed only during the span of time between the victim's death and the end of what would have been his natural lifespan. Since the legists fixed the timing of the end of the victim's natural lifespan as being when the high priest died, the offense and impurity of an inadvertent killing ceased to exist after the high priest died.

Second, it accounts for why the remedy of the offense and impurity generated by an inadvertent killing was a natural event with an unpredictable time frame when the remedies for all other offenses and impurity were performed events with scheduled time frames (see section II.A). The natural death of the high priest—a natural event with an unscheduled time frame—was used to represent what would have been the natural death of the victim—a natural event with an unscheduled time frame.

Third, it accounts for why the kin groups/avengers of victims would, or why the legists expected them to, consider 1) the high priest's death meaningful enough as the release date of killers to give up thereafter the desire and responsibility to avenge the death of the victim (see sections II.B, II.E, II.F) and 2) the variable duration of confinements to be right and fair (see section II.B). The death of the high priest represented what would have been the end of the natural lifespan of the victim. Thus, whether the time span between the victim's inadvertent killing and the death of the high priest was one day or fourteen years, that time span represented the life and labor of the victim which had actually been lost to the victim and his family/kin group. Once that time span came to an end, there was no longer an imbalance of circumstances between the victim and the killer, or between the victim's kin group and the killer's kin group. Since there was no longer an imbalance, there was no need for compensation through the equalizing confinement of the killer. The kin group/avenger would, therefore, have considered it right and fair for the killer to be released and his circumstances to be normalized at that time.Footnote 35

Fourth, it accounts for why the killer and his family/kin group would, or why the legists expected them to, consider the variable duration of confinements right and fair (see section II.B). The time span between the victim's inadvertent killing and the death of the high priest represented the amount of the victim's life and labor which had been lost due to the victim's inadvertent killing. The duration of the killer's confinement was, therefore, compensation for the duration of the damage which the inadvertent killing of the victim had done to the victim and his family/kin group. The killer and his family/kin group would, therefore, have considered the duration of his confinement, however long it was, to be right and fair.

Fifth, it accounts for the unusual mention of the anointing of the high priest in Num 35:25. The anointed high priest was a central figure in the life of the nation and its people, who, among other duties, represented the nation and its people before God and acted on their behalf. And so, the legists, availing themselves of the anointed high priest's role as someone who represented others, used the timing of his natural death to represent the timing of when the victim's natural death would have occurred.

In sum, a robust case can be made that the correct explanation of why, according to Num 35:9–34 and Josh 20, an inadvertent killer could leave a city of refuge and return home safely when the high priest died is that the high priest's death was taken to represent what would have been the timing of the victim's natural death. That is to say, an inadvertent killer was confined to a city of refuge in order to equalize the circumstances of the killer and his family/kin group with the circumstances (the loss of life and labor) of the victim and his family/kin group. The legists deemed it right and fair, however, to limit the duration of that equalization to what the victim and his family/kin group had actually lost when he was killed: the unfulfilled balance of his natural lifespan. Since there was no way to know when the victim's natural lifespan would actually have come to an end, the death of the high priest was used to represent when the natural death of the victim would have taken place. An inadvertent killer was, therefore, released from confinement after the high priest died, and his circumstances were normalized.

References

1 It has been suggested that “based on our general knowledge of the role of women in Israelite culture, it seems unlikely that a woman who had killed someone could live alone in a strange city for an indefinite period” (Sakenfeld, Katharine Doob, Journeying with God: A Commentary on the Book of Numbers [ITC; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995] 183Google Scholar). Furthermore, it would only have been in exceptional cases (Num 27:1–11, 36) that a woman would possess property () to which she could return (Num 35:28). See Seebass, Horst, Numeri. 3. Teilband Numeri 22,2–36,13 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 2007) 445–46Google Scholar. It will, therefore, be assumed here that this legislation is focused on male inadvertent killers.

2 Nicolsky, N. M., “Das Asylrecht in Israel,” ZAW 48 (1930) 146–75, at 167–72Google Scholar; Greenberg, Moshe, “The Biblical Conception of Asylum,” JBL 78 (1959) 125–32, at 126–31Google Scholar; Traulsen, Christian, Das sakrale Asyl in der Alten Welt. Zur Schutzfunktion des Heiligen von König Salomo bis zum Codex Theodosianus (Jus Ecclesiasticum 72; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004) 59–61Google Scholar; Staubli, Thomas, Die Bücher Levitikus, Numeri (NSKAT 3; Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1996) 344–45Google Scholar; Sturdy, John, Numbers (CBC; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976) 242Google Scholar; Clarke, Terrance A. Jr., “Cities of Refuge,” in Dictionary of the Old Testament: Pentateuch (ed. Alexander, T. Desmond and Baker, David W.; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003) 125–28Google Scholar, at 127; Dozeman, Thomas B., “The Book of Numbers: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” NIB 2:265–66Google Scholar; Knohl, Israel, The Sanctuary of Silence: The Priestly Torah and the Holiness School (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995) 179–80Google Scholar; Milgrom, Jacob, Numbers (JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1990) 294, 510Google Scholar; Duguid, Iain M., Numbers: God's Presence in the Wilderness (Preaching the Word; Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2006) 359Google Scholar; Kawashima, Robert S., “The Jubilee Year and the Return of Cosmic Purity,” CBQ 65 (2003) 370–89, at 374, 380–82Google Scholar; Ashley, Timothy R., The Book of Numbers (NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1993) 654–56Google Scholar; Burnside, Jonathan, God, Justice, and Society: Aspects of Law and Legality in the Bible (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 268–71Google Scholar; Woudstra, Martin H., The Book of Joshua (NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1981) 301Google Scholar; Barmash, Pamela, Homicide in the Biblical World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 100–106Google Scholar, esp. 102–3; Davies, Eryl W., Numbers (NCB; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995) 365–68Google Scholar; McConville, J. Gordon and Williams, Stephen N., Joshua (Two Horizons Old Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010) 80–81Google Scholar; Wenham, Gordon J., Numbers: An Introduction and Commentary (TOTC 4; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1981) 48–49Google Scholar, 238–39; Stackert, Jeffrey, Rewriting the Torah: Literary Revision in Deuteronomy and the Holiness Legislation (FAT 52; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007) 77, 88–96Google Scholar; Haas, Peter, “‘Die He Shall Surely Die’: The Structure of Homicide in Biblical Law,” Semeia 45 (1989) 67–87, at 83Google Scholar.

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4 On the + prefix-conjugation sequence as an absolute prohibition, see Naudé, Jacobus A. and Rendsburg, Gary A., “Negation: Pre-Modern Hebrew,” in Encyclopedia of Hebrew Language and Linguistics (ed. Khan, Geoffrey; 4 vols.; Leiden: Brill, 2013) 2:801–11Google Scholar, at 802; Bright, John, “The Apodictic Prohibition: Some Observations,” JBL 92 (1973) 185–204Google Scholar, at 187–88, 197–98; van der Merwe, Christo H. J., Naudé, Jackie A., and Kroeze, Jan H., A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar (Biblical Languages: Hebrew 3; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999) 149Google Scholar §19.3.5.iii, 151 §19.4.2.ii, 320 §41.5.8.ii; Arnold, Bill T. and Choi, John H, A Guide to Biblical Hebrew Syntax (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 137CrossRefGoogle Scholar §4.2.11; J. Watts, Washington, A Survey of Syntax in the Hebrew Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1964) 23Google Scholar; GKC §107o, §152b(a). On the strong, exhaustive, exceptive force of the particle , see Merwe, et al., A Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar, 303 §40.9.II.3; Watts, A Survey, 135; Andersen, Francis I., The Sentence in Biblical Hebrew (The Hague: Mouton, 1974) 70–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar §4.4.2, 171–72 §13.1, 174–75 §13.7; Follingstad, Carl N., Deictic Viewpoint in Biblical Hebrew Text: A Syntagmatic and Paradigmatic Analysis of the Particle (kî) (Dallas, TX: SIL International, 2001) 563–66Google Scholar §F.3.2.1.2.

5 See Ruwe, “Das Zusammenwirken,” 215; Matties, Joshua, 325, 330.

6 In texts where no specific time frame is mentioned, it is reasonable to assume that a quick remedy to an offense or impurity was thought of as being ideal (see, e.g., Eccl 8:11).

7 It is assumed here that Num 35:9–34 is levitical/priestly material. See Nihan, Christophe, “The Priestly Laws of Numbers, the Holiness Legislation, and the Pentateuch,” in Torah and the Book of Numbers (ed. Frevel, Christian, Pola, Thomas, and Schart, Aaron; FAT II 62; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013) 109–37Google Scholar, at 118–19; Westbrook, Raymond, “Reflections on the Law of Homicide in the Ancient World,” Maarav 13 (2006) 145–74Google Scholar, at 163–72; Stackert, Rewriting, 57–96; Traulsen, Das sakrale Asyl, 57–63; Ruwe, “Das Zusammenwirken,” 209–18; Budd, Numbers, 382–83; Milgrom, Numbers, 504–9.

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9 This statement accounts for all possible scenarios. Several more specific observations, however, are called for. If the high priest came to bear the sin/impurity of the killing prior to his death, there would have been no need for the killer, having been relieved of it, to remain in asylum (see Stackert, Rewriting, 92–96), and the priest's ability to come into contact with the sacred in the course of his duties would presumably have been problematic. If the high priest did not bear the sin/impurity prior to his death, any association between him and the sin/impurity-bearing killer would probably have been problematic and avoided. Thus, it seems likely that, if a killer/priest relationship was going to be established, this could only have happened at the time of the priest's death or thereafter. However, as noted, there is no indication of this.

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17 No matter how long or short a confinement was, and regardless of the reason for its duration, kin groups and killers might still have been resentful and vengeful. The point here is that treating the release as a purely administrative matter would not have mollified those sentiments and could have encouraged them.

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19 Stackert identifies “several thematic and lexical connections” between Lev 25 and Num 35, and argues that Lev 25 was a “generative text” for the author of Num 35. See Stackert, Rewriting, 88–90. See also Weinfeld, Social Justice, 126; Ruwe, “Das Zusammenwirken,” 215–16.

20 Jackson, Bernard S., “Justice and Righteousness in the Bible: Rule of Law or Royal Paternalism,” ZABR 4 (1998) 218–62Google Scholar, at 230–31; Nelson, Richard D., Joshua: A Commentary (OTL; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997) 231Google Scholar; Levine, Baruch A., Numbers 21–36: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 4A; New York: Doubleday, 2000) 558Google Scholar; Creach, Jerome F. D., Joshua (Interpretation; Louisville, KY: John Knox, 2003) 105Google Scholar; Boling, Robert G., Joshua: A New Translation with Notes and Commentary (AB 6; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982) 474Google Scholar; Noth, Martin, Numbers: A Commentary (trans. Martin, James D.; OTL; Philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 1968) 255Google Scholar; Baentsch, Bruno, Exodus-Leviticus-Numeri (HKAT I.2; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1903) 695Google Scholar; Schneider, Heinrich, Numeri (EB 14.3; Würzberg: Echter, 1952) 91–92Google Scholar; Delekat, Lienhard, Asylie und Schutzorakel am Zionheiligtum. Eine Untersuchung zu den privaten Feindpsalmen (Leiden: Brill, 1967) 301–2Google Scholar; Staubli, Die Bücher Levitikus, 345; Ruwe, “Das Zusammenwirken,” 209–10, 214; Burnside, God, 269–70; Nelson, Raising, 13; Vasholz, “Israel's Cities of Refuge,” 118; Driver, “The Release of Homicides,” 20; Matties, Joshua, 325; Clarke, “Cities,” 127; Budd, Numbers, 382; Weinfeld, Social Justice, 126.

21 Smith, H. S., “A Note on Amnesty,” JEA 54 (1968) 209–14Google Scholar; La'da, Csaba A., “Amnesty in Pharaonic Egypt,” in Vergeben und Vergessen? Amnestie in der Antike. Beiträge zum 1. Wiener Kolloquium zur Antiken Rechtsgeschichte 27.–28.10.2008 (ed. Harter-Uibopuu, Kaja and Mitthof, Fritz; Wiener Kolloquien zur Antiken Rechtsgeschichte 1; Wien: Holzhausen, 2013) 17–43Google Scholar; Villard, Pierre, “L’(an)durāru à l’époque néo-assyrienne,” RA 101 (2007) 107–24Google Scholar; Hamilton, Jeffries M., Social Justice and Deuteronomy: The Case of Deuteronomy 15 (SBLDS 136; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992) 45–72Google Scholar; Charpin, Dominique, Writing, Law, and Kingship in Old Babylonian Mesopotamia (trans. Todd, Jane Marie; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010) 83–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lion, Brigitte, “L'andurāru à l’époque médio-babylonienne, d'après les documents de Terqa, Nuzi et Arrapḫa,” in Nuzi at Seventy-Five (ed. Owen, David I. and Wilhelm, Gernot; SCCNH 10; Bethesda, MD: CDL Press, 1999) 313–27Google Scholar; Jackson, “Justice,” 218–62, esp. 227–35; Weinfeld, Social Justice, 75–96, 140–78.

22 Jackson, Bernard S., Wisdom-Laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 21:1–22:16 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 138Google Scholar n. 104; Whitelam, Keith W., The Just King: Monarchical Judicial Authority in Ancient Israel (JSOTSup 12; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1979) 144Google Scholar; van Oeveren, Benjamin, De vrijsteden in het Oude Testament (Kampen: Kok, 1968) 168Google Scholar; Kaufman, Yehezkel, The Religion of Israel: From Its Beginnings to the Babylonian Exile (ed. and trans. Moshe Greenberg; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960) 186Google Scholar; Ashley, The Book of Numbers, 654; Greenberg, “The Biblical Conception,” 127; Clarke, “Cities,” 127; Barmash, Homicide, 102; Traulsen, Das sakrale Asyl, 59; Gispen, Het Boek Numeri, 304.

23 Jackson, “Justice,” 230–31.

24 The description of this explanation consists of quotes and close paraphrases from Westbrook, Raymond, Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law (CahRB 26; Paris: Gabalda, 1988) 81–82Google Scholar. See also Jackson, Wisdom-Laws, 138–39 n. 105. Westbrook notes that the explanation comes from the unpublished doctoral dissertation by Peretz Segal, entitled “Liability Under Divine Jurisdiction: The Death Penalty by a Human Court and ‘Divine Hand’,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 1986). I did not have access to Segal's dissertation. Haas works along the line that the high priest is the symbolic locus of pollution, though for him the high priest is not a local high priest; Haas, “Die,” 83.

25 Butler, Trent C., Joshua (WBC 7; Waco, TX: Word, 1983) 217Google Scholar; Delekat, Asylie, 302–20; Weinfeld, Social Justice, 126.

26 Westbrook, Raymond, “The Quality of Freedom in Neo-Babylonian Manumissions,” RA 98 (2004) 101–8Google Scholar, quote from 103. Cf. Sosin, Joshua D., “Manumission with Paramone: Conditional Freedom?,” TAPA 145 (2015) 325–81Google Scholar; Zelnick-Abramovitz, Rachel, Not Wholly Free: The Concept of Manumission and the Status of Manumitted Slaves in the Ancient Greek World (Mnemosyne Supplement 266; Leiden: Brill, 2005) 222–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Samuel, Alan E., “The Role of Paramone Clauses in Ancient Documents,” JJP 15 (1965) 221–311Google Scholar; Westermann, William Linn, “The Paramone as General Service Contract,” JJP 2 (1948) 9–50Google Scholar.

27 Delekat, Asylie, 316–20.

28 See, e.g., Exod 28:41; 29:7, 29, 36; 30:26–30; 40:9–15; Lev 6:13 [Eng. 20]; 7:36; 8:10–12; 10:7; 16:32–33; Num 7:1, 10, 84, 88). Porter, J. Roy, “Oil in the Old Testament,” in The Oil of Gladness: Anointing in the Christian Tradition (ed. Dudley, Martin and Rowell, Geoffrey; London: SPCK and Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1993) 35–45, esp. 36–37Google Scholar.

29 Maier, Gerhard, Das vierte Buch Mose (Wuppertaler Studienbibel. Reihe Altes Testament; Wuppertal: Brockhaus, 1989) 473Google Scholar; Ridderbos, “Cities,” 207; Leggett, The Levirate, 129; Oeveren, De vrijsteden, 169–70; Gispen, Het Boek Numeri, 304. For similar thinking, though without mentioning the tribe of Levi or the levitical character of the cities of refuge, see Cazelles, Henri, Les Nombres (2nd rev. ed.; Paris: Cerf, 1958) 153Google Scholar; Horst, Friedrich, “Recht und Religion im Bereich des Alten Testament,” EvT 16 (1956) 49–75, at 60Google Scholar; Lohse, Eduard, Märtyrer und Gottesknecht. Untersuchungen zur urchristlichen Verkündigung vom Sühntod Jesu Christi (2nd ed.; FRLANT Neue Folge 46 = Der ganzen Folge 64; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963) 64–66Google Scholar. Note that Delekat, in developing his theory about a paramone-like relationship, mentions and draws upon Lohse.

30 The structure presented here is essentially that of a rite of passage, which is “a series of rituals that conveys an individual from one social status to another,” and which generally consists “of three principal stages . . . (1) separation of the individuals involved from their preceding social state; (2) a period of transition in which they are neither one thing nor the other; (3) a reintegration phase in which through various rites of incorporation they are absorbed into their new social state” (Davis-Floyd, Robbie, “Rites of Passage,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences [ed. Darity, William A. Jr.; 2nd ed.; 9 vols.; Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2008] 7:256–59Google Scholar, at 256 and 257). See also Garwood, Paul, “Rites of Passage,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Archaeology of Ritual and Religion (ed. Insoll, Timothy; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 261–84Google Scholar; Turner, Terence S., “Transformation, Hierarchy and Transcendence: A Reformulation of Van Gennep's Model of the Structure of Rites de Passage,” in Secular Ritual (ed. Moore, Sally F. and Myerhoff, Barbara G.; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1977) 53–70Google Scholar.

31 Willis, Timothy M., The Elders of the City: A Study of the Elder-Laws in Deuteronomy (SBLMS 55; Atlanta: SBL, 2001) 135Google Scholar; Maier, Das vierte Buch Mose, 473–74; Burnside, God, 265. On the concept of equalization and social balance in Israelite social and legal thought, see Barton, John, Ethics in Ancient Israel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 105–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; von Soosten, Joachim, “Die ‘Erfindung’ der Sünde: Soziologische und semantische Aspekte zu der Rede von der Sünde im alttestamentlichen Sprachgebrauch,” Jahrbuch für biblische Theologie 9 (1994) 87–110Google Scholar. Equalization for the intentional killer and killable inadvertent killer came through their deaths.

32 Quote from Barmash, Homicide, 175; see pages 154–77 for her full discussion on lex talionis. See also Rothkamm, Jan, Talio esto. Recherches sur les origines de la formule ‘œil pour œil, dent pour dent’ dans les droits du Proche-Orient ancien, et sur son devenir dans le monde gréco-romain (BZAW 426; Berlin: de Gruyter, 2011) xi–xxiii, 83–88Google Scholar; Jacobs, Sandra, The Body as Property: Physical Disfigurement in Biblical Law (LHBOTS 582; London: Bloomsbury, 2014) 68–189Google Scholar; Otto, Eckhart, Kontinuum und Proprium. Studien zur Sozial- und Rechtsgeschichte des Alten Orients und des Alten Testaments (Orientalia Biblica et Christiana 8; Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996) 224–45Google Scholar; Barton, Ethics, 105–9; Burnside, God, 275–82.

33 On the representative function of the anointed priest, see Schwartz, Baruch J., “Leviticus: Introduction and Annotations,” in The Jewish Study Bible (ed. Berlin, Adele and Brettler, Marc Zvi; 2nd ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 202Google Scholar; Hoffmann, David, Das Buch Leviticus (2 vols.; Berlin, M. Poppelauer, 1905) 1:176–77Google Scholar; Rooke, Zadok's Heirs, 22–23; Kleinig, Leviticus, 338; Hartley, Leviticus, 59; Rendtorff, Leviticus 1,1–10,20, 152–54; Gorman, The Ideology of Ritual, 71, 91–102; Watts, Leviticus 1–10, 330–31. Regarding the representational/expiatory activities of the high priest, in the expiation explanation, the high priest functioned as an object which died in place of the killer, and/or which carried the bloodguilt/impurity of the killing away with it when it died. Israelite priests, however, only ever functioned as subjects, who facilitated, managed, and acted in ritual processes which benefited offerers by carrying sin/impurity away (see section II.A, fourth point); this is how the high priest is understood to function here.

34 If an inadvertent killer residing in a city of refuge died before the high priest died, this would simply have indicated that the inadvertent killer's natural lifespan had ended before the victim's natural lifespan would have ended.

35 It might be argued that a victim's kin group/avenger might not have believed or accepted the idea that the portion of the victim's natural life which had been lost was only one day (or some other short duration). It is assumed here, however, that the kin group/avenger would have understood that life was fragile, and that death, natural or otherwise, could happen at any time (see, e.g., Num 6:9; 2 Kgs 4:17–20). After all, they had not expected the victim to die on the day he actually did.