Boettke and Leeson have done an admirable job assembling this collection, and Edward Elgar has put their selections together into two handsome volumes. The Legacy of Ludwig von Mises will prove useful to both the expert in so-called Austrian economics as well as the novice who wonders what all the fuss is about—since after all, most economists haven't even heard of this man, though a small minority venerate him. Indeed, there are dozens of living economists (myself included) who would rate Ludwig von Mises as the most accomplished economist of the twentieth century, despite the fact that only his student, F. A. Hayek, enjoys any significant appreciation among social scientists.
Our editors tackle this apparent discrepancy head on. They explain that Mises’ “methodological apriorism”—his insistence that economic laws must be logically deduced from the axiom of purposeful action—was a serious turnoff to his Popperian peers. Moreover, Mises was a staunch classical liberal, who thought the only proper role of government was to enforce property rights and protect the nation from foreign invasion. Needless to say, these political views were quite quaint in the 1930s and ‘40s, when Mises’ ideas faded into obscurity amidst the Keynesian revolution. To their credit, Boettke and Leeson go further and discuss Mises’ personality traits that contributed to his professional obscurity:
… Mises, though always the gentlemen [sic], was more formal, more obstinate, and more difficult to approach than thinkers like Hayek, which may have artificially circumscribed his influence …. It is said that Mises did not suffer fools gladly and was less than totally patient with those he disagreed with (I, xii).
Those who have read Mises’ scathing critiques (though they are paragons of courtesy compared to those of his predecessor, Böhm-Bawerk) but never met the man, can only imagine that he would have been an intimidating figure at faculty meetings. Of course, there are plenty of Nobel laureates who are not known for their gentleness or humility, but surely personality differences at least partially explain the relative success of Hayek versus his mentor. (I note for those readers who may have been angered by the quotation above, that only a few sentences later our editors declare, “If Mises is like a surgeon with a laser beam, then Hayek is like a surgeon wearing a blindfold” [I, xii].)
The two volumes are devoted to Theory and History, respectively, which appropriately reflects the work of Mises (who fittingly had a book titled Theory and History). Our editors stress more than once that it is simply not true that Ludwig von Mises was somehow opposed to empirical observation:
Oddly enough, some of Mises’ greatest allies and foes have the same mistaken understanding of Mises’ stance towards the empirical world. His foes point to his extreme apriorism …. They also point to Mises’ castigations of econometric measurement ….
Some of Mises’ greatest advocates point to the same positions … but embrace these items rather than condemn him for them. They use these arguments in Mises to provide evidence for the ‘impurity’ of doing empirical work—to suggest an alleged contradiction between empirical investigation and the true Austrian or Misesian framework.
While both accounts contain some truth, both are mostly wrong. It is true, Mises was an extreme apriorist and he did caution against the use of econometrics. But the architecture of his system is actually radically empirical … (II, p. ix).
Our editors interpret Mises—correctly, in my view—to say this: Economic laws are indeed a priori; it is as pointless to go “test” the Law of Demand as it is to use a compass and ruler to assess the validity of Euclid. Economic laws rely on ceteris paribus assumptions, and thus cannot be falsified by any experimental outcome. (If quantity demanded increases while prices rise, that simply means “other things” aren't equal.) However, knowledge of the a priori laws of economics is crucial to understanding history; “[i]n Mises’ system [economic] theory bounds our empirical investigations. It sets parameters for our explanations of the world” (II, xi). Just as an historian versed in physics wouldn't believe an ancient text that described a battle won with a perpetual motion machine, so too will the economist reject accounts that attribute the rise in wages over the twentieth century to labor regulations.
For a two-volume collection spanning some 1,200 pages, I surely cannot provide an exhaustive review. Let me therefore provide some general criticisms before focusing on my favorite components of the Austrian worldview, namely capital & interest theory and the Misesian explanation of the business cycle.
On the whole, I think Boettke and Leeson did a remarkable job, touching on many aspects of the Misesian legacy while (mostly) choosing readings from which an outsider could benefit. At the same time, they included several items that are not necessarily “old hat” to veteran Austrians, and so even the experts will appreciate the volumes. (For example, I personally had never before read Murray Rothbard's Kuhnian analysis of Mises in Modern Age, and I know that many Austrian scholars have heard of, but never actually read, thinkers such as Ludwig Lachmann, Fritz Machlup, Alfred Schuetz, and Gottfried Haberler.) Volume II contains several wonderful historical pieces exploring socialism (including the transition to markets) and business cycles (including the savings and loan debacle), demonstrating that the “Misesian legacy” is still quite relevant.
Having praised them in general, I must quibble with some of the choices of our editors. My biggest complaint is their selection for the very first essay, Frank Knight's 1941 review of Mises’ magnum opus Nationalökonomie (the predecessor to the English Human Action). Rather than summarizing the book, Knight instead uses his space to critique Mises’ approach to issues of capital and interest. Now my dissertation was on this very topic, and I confess that I found it difficult to digest Knight's piece. (In my defense, I am virtually certain that Knight has a confusing typo, when he claims that Mises endorses Böhm-Bawerk's “first ground” for a higher valuation of present over future goods, when the passage makes sense only if Knight meant to write the second of the three grounds offered by Böhm-Bawerk.) Clearly, someone who is mildly curious about this Ludwig von Mises fellow might be scared off by such an intimidating introductory essay. I realize that our editors wanted to include the piece because it demonstrates the reputation that Mises once had—and because the issues Knight raises are quite important—but without an editors’ introduction for each selection, I personally would have omitted it. (For those newcomers who pick up the book, I suggest the early selections from Lachmann and Rothbard as starting points.)
My other objection is to the inclusion in Volume II of Friedman and Stigler's 1946 article on rent control. Yes, their classic paper could be construed as part of the legacy of Ludwig von Mises, since one of his seminal contributions was the unpopular claim that there could be no “middle ground” between socialism and a market economy; government interventions only caused distortions that required further regulations. Yet to follow this line, any paper on unintended consequences would fall under the umbrella of Mises’ legacy, which seems to dilute the term.
Far and away, my favorite item was Haberler's 1932 lecture on “Money and the Business Cycle.” As I write (in August 2007), the Fed has just cut the discount rate 50 basis points and has injected a total of hundreds of billions in temporary reserves over the last two weeks, attempting to soothe credit markets. In my opinion, no other school can approach the Austrians when it comes to explaining financial meltdowns and recessions.
Haberler's short selection is perhaps the most succinct summary of the Misesian explanation for trained economists. It is not as “dogmatic” as Mises’ own expositions, yet it is far more readable than Hayek's often convoluted prose. As if he had the US experience in the early 2000s in mind, Haberler declares that—contrary to many theorists—“a credit expansion has a much deeper and more fundamental influence on the whole economy, especially on the structure of production, that that expressed in the mere change of the price level” (I, 365). Of course Haberler has in mind the 1920s, when increased real output should have led to falling prices; the stable price level thus indicated massive injections of bank credit into the system. This stimulated unsustainable investments as entrepreneurs (fooled by artificially low interest rates) attempted to make the economy more “roundabout” than was justified by the actual supplies of capital goods. The bubble eventually popped in the late 1920s, just as it apparently will in the late 2000s.
In conclusion, Boettke and Leeson have performed a valuable service in the history of economic thought, by providing a collection that will benefit both expert and novice. I can only hope that future scholars will return to the pioneering contributions of Ludwig von Mises, whose insights on methodology, monetary theory, comparative economic systems, and business cycle theory have yet to be appreciated by the vast majority of economists.
