In this book, Evan Medeiros seeks to explain the Chinese Communist regime's policies on nuclear proliferation and missile proliferation, comparing the Mao era with the post-Mao era. The rich data that he vividly presents is a synthesis of interviews with specialists in both the PRC and the U.S., as well as key writings from both countries. The result is a magisterial study of encyclopedic breadth that will serve as a solid reference for all concerned with changes and continuities in Chinese nonproliferation policies.
Medeiros concludes that “U.S. policy played a decisive role” in “positive change in the direction of greater support for WMD nonproliferation” (p. 260). The U.S. is said to have fostered an epistemic community of Chinese specialists through engagement in the post-Mao era. Constructivism helps one comprehend how ruling groups in Beijing came to see WMD nonproliferation to be in China's interest. Realism is said to be incapable of explaining these changes.
Actually, the wonderful data unearthed by the thorough research of the subtle and knowledgeable Medeiros is more complex than the conclusions he draws from it. Medeiros finds that while China moved from enabling nuclear proliferation in the Mao era to joining those who would stop nuclear proliferation in the post-Mao era, China continues to be a major proliferator of missiles and missile technology. While Medeiros suggests that significant progress has been made on missile nonproliferation, the data shows otherwise. The enigma is why the creation of an epistemic community would work for nuclear weapons but not for missiles. I would maintain that looking at China's real international interests and Beijing's domestic politics offers more powerful and persuasive hypotheses than does constructivism.
Is it credible that Mao-era leaders could not understand Chinese interests and therefore irrationally promoted nuclear weapons proliferation until enlightened American specialists helped the Chinese to see their true interests? To be sure, interests can change. The point is to explain how. Even before the PRC was officially established, Mao sent specialists to “ban the bomb” peace conferences in Europe with instructions to begin purchasing what was needed for a Chinese nuclear project. Alliance with Stalin's regime allowed Chinese scientists to learn about nuclear technology. When Khrushchev refused to deliver the bomb, Mao pushed a project to speed WMD production, even though it increased Chinese famine deaths. Mao understood his anti-Soviet interest and Chinese national interest to mean that for China to be a world power, equal to Russia and America, China would have to acquire WMD. The episteme that is decisive is China's national identity as a world power at least the equal of the most powerful.
Before China had a secure second strike deterrent, the PRC was temporarily more vulnerable. Both Kennedy and Brezhnev looked into destroying China's nuclear facilities. Mao, as the leader of a vulnerable nation, responded by promoting nuclear proliferation to cause problems for the two superpowers and by seeking détente with Nixon to deter Brezhnev. Obtaining nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them was a top Chinese interest. To become a world power equal to other great powers, China had to risk an era of vulnerability. Ambitious post-Mao leaders share Mao's view of China's hegemonic status.
Once China had a decisive, deterrent second strike in the post-Mao era, however, the interests of the PRC were redefined. China's rulers then did not want to see other nations in their region going nuclear. China opposed India becoming a nuclear power. It works to end the North Korean nuclear program because North Korean WMD could prod Japan, the economic colossus of the region, to go nuclear, something Chinese leaders very much do not want to happen, as Medeiros notes. Hardheaded real interests of an ambitious ruling group whose situation fundamentally changes explain why China could first be a nuclear proliferator and then an opponent of proliferation. China still wants to be the dominant power in its region.
In addition, post-Mao growth creates a Chinese need for oil and nuclear power, as Medeiros writes. Once China needs energy from the Middle East to keep its economy going, a nuclear Iran destabilizing the Middle East is no longer in China's interests. Focusing on the creation of an epistemic community calls attention away from the actual changing interest dynamics that shape Chinese policy-making.
In addition, although Medeiros claims that sanctions do not work, his data shows that U.S. sanctions against Chinese proliferation have in the past had an impact on Chinese policy. Whether sanctions on China will work in an era when the American economy is weaker and China's is stronger is another question.
Why, then, has China remained a missile proliferator? Medeiros's excellent study again provides the data. Families of ruling groups make lots of money on these deals. China finds that the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), like so many IOs, serves American interests. China regards missiles to Pakistan and Iran as balancing America and its friends. For Beijing, Chinese missile proliferation is stabilizing. China sees American Theater Missile Defense (TMD) with Japan and American Patriot missiles to Taiwan as undermining Chinese dominance in the region. The MTCR serves American interests by allowing America to proliferate but not China. So China proliferates missiles.
These differences in attitude to the MTCR and TMD matter because analysts understand policy possibilities with China in terms of “the extent to which China supports current international institutions” (p. l). While ruling groups in Beijing understand their international policy goal as making China “a great power” with “comprehensive national power” (p. 2), observers debate whether China imagines itself achieving this goal by acting as a revisionist power that challenges the international institutions constructed by the previous hegemon, the United States. Since post-Mao China welcomed IMF advice, World Bank loans, and membership in the WTO, specialists agree that China is not acting as a revisionist power—that is, except in realms such as good governance. The Communist Party of China (CCP) government works to undermine a universal regime of human rights and to offer itself as an alternative to international financial institutions (IFI) good governance conditionality aimed at nudging corrupt authoritarian rulers in the direction of transparency, accountability, and democracy. Ruling groups in Beijing can distinguish which international norms are congruent with the interests of an authoritarian CCP and which are not.
In short, that Beijing does not act as an out-and-out revisionist regime does not mean that it seeks to integrate with the dominant institutions of the international system in missile proliferation or anything else. A bi-polar choice of revisionism versus integration omits China's actual policy alternative. CCP ruling groups seek to use existing international institutions that serve their interests but not to subordinate China to international organizations understood as serving the interests of America or of democratization.
Medeiros does not sufficiently appreciate how much a self-confident, world power China seeks to establish itself as a global pole. It has created its own international organization for dealing with Africa. In Southeast Asia, it prefers to work through the APT, which excludes America and India and Australia, instead of working mainly through Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), seen as a tool of the U.S. In Central Asia, China works through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which excludes America. In fact, China has used the SCO to expel the American military from Central Asia. In short, Medeiros's framing of the issue, whether China is integrating with international norms, obscures how much the CCP regime imagines itself as a source of international norms that are, for the authoritarian CCP, superior to international norms that serve American interests. Without acting as a revisionist power, ruling groups in Beijing, as with missile proliferation, reject international norms that serve American interests. The serious clash of interests at stake is not examined by Medeiros.
As one would expect from the superior work of a top-rank professional, Medeiros provides data that others can find contradictory to his constructivist hypothesis. What is missing from Medeiros's wonderful scholarship is a coming to grips with a harsh reality: Chinese interests conflict with American interests. Those clashes have to be managed to maintain the peace. They cannot be wished away by imagining a shared China-America episteme.
