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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2004
In this admirably short book, Rudy Higgens-Evenson encapsulates an important chapter in the history of American governance. Between Reconstruction and the Great Depression state and local governments underwent a fundamental transition, as the scope of their activity widened and as the center of gravity shifted to the states. Higgens-Evanson situates the expanding public agenda within an emerging interest-group politics, which allowed expenditure demands to find expression outside the fiscal restrictions of nineteenth-century partisanship. Government officials and academic experts also played key roles in lobbying for a larger government role, in critiquing the old fiscal regime—one based on a locally administered general property tax, and in shaping the particulars of new tax systems. A chief complaint centered on the general property tax's inability to effectively tap the wealth of an emerging corporate economy. Land owners felt unduly burdened compared to the holders of financial and corporate property. Government officials and program advocates thought their efforts were being hampered by a constrained fiscal device. And corporations chafed under the complexity and unpredictability of the general property tax, which varied considerably from one jurisdiction to the next, depending on the sympathies of the local assessment machinery.
These concerns merged in the fiscal transformation running through the center of Higgens-Evenson's narrative: the movement of state governments away from the general property tax and toward an assortment of corporate levies. Political acceptance of the new systems of corporate taxation typically required a compromise among three parties: state governments, which got a new revenue source to satisfy rising expenditure demands; corporations, which got significant exemptions from the local property tax, rationalizing— and sometimes lowering—an important business expense; and local governments, which received revenue from the state to compensate for their diminished property tax base. The growing state dependence on corporate wealth also had important political consequences, as corporations became more directly involved in state policy making, exerting greater influence along administrative, legislative, and intellectual channels.
The precise outcome from this three-way bargaining varied across the states, differing in the types of corporate taxes employed, in the relative winners and losers across economic sectors, in the fiscal arrangements struck between governments, and in subsequent corporate influence over state policy. Also, even though policy expansion and administrative centralization were widespread, the shift to corporate taxation was not universal. Fiscal divergence was underway, creating a division between what Higgens-Evenson calls the “corporate states” and the “Jeffersonian republics.” The former were typically more industrial; they had a larger corporate sector to tax; and they embarked earlier on programs of fiscal expansion. The latter had economies based mainly on agriculture and extractive industries and thus funded their growing, though less ambitious, commitments under the general property tax.
Higgens-Evenson captures this diversity through an approach that aptly combines case study, fiscal data collection, and a synthesis of secondary literature. In addition to tracking the course of tax reform, the book examines prominent expenditure areas, notably education and road building, the latter tied to another significant revenue transformation beginning in the 1920s: heavy reliance on gasoline taxes and related licenses.
My primary reservation about the book falls under the category of missed opportunities. This topic cries out for more explicit quantitative treatment, especially in light of the project's data collection efforts. The available data may not be perfect and the fiscal sources can be maddeningly idiosyncratic, but the situation is not hopeless. A number of statistical patterns and relationships could have been explored, quite possibly buttressing the book's themes, several of which are reinforced by an encouraging, though still underdeveloped, body of recent fiscal research. Missed opportunities aside, Higgens-Evenson has done the field a service by placing a concise narrative on the table, ready for closer scrutiny.
Such scrutiny must grapple with an interpretive puzzle and a historical irony. The puzzle concerns our larger political evaluation of the shift to corporate taxation. Although corporations were targeted with new taxes amid a political environment with some anti-corporate strains, they also were relieved of the hassles and (potentially heavy) burden of the general property tax, which at its core was a tax on wealth. Still unclear in the existing literature is the extent to which changes in tax policy were driven by corporate politicking and ideological predispositions sensitive to corporate interests, rather than by high-minded tax reform or a pragmatic effort to fund a wider public agenda. In rough schematic terms, the present narrative suggests a causal chain running from diverse expenditure demands, through tax reform modulated by expert opinion and interest-group pluralism, and to the (seemingly unintended) consequence rising corporate influence over state governance and politics. An alternative schematic might place a more sustained emphasis on corporate influence all along, in propagating some expenditure demands, in defining the fiscal crisis and acceptable solutions, and in engineering a system conducive to enhanced political influence. Such an alternative might find reinforcement in the historical irony revealed by extending the time frame beyond 1929. Although state governments relied heavily on corporate taxation for a time, the larger trend was very different—away from a taxpaying public defined by property ownership and corporate status, and toward a universal taxpaying public tapped on both its incomes and purchases. The corporate tax may have been the “price of progress” during the early twentieth century, but a rebate was right around the corner.