This is the paperback, second edition of Volume II of this book, which was originally published in 2005. It presents a comprehensive account of the Falkland Islands hostilities of early 1982 between the United Kingdom and Argentina. The first volume set out the history of the dispute with Argentina together with an account of the years of intermittent negotiation that had failed to find any resolution to it. The present volume starts with the invasion of the islands by Argentine forces, and with the consequent sending of a task force with the capability of expelling them and the intense, and in the end futile, political activity directed towards reaching a peaceful solution. Following this, a full account of the hostilities themselves is given together with a study of the aftermath up to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1990. The author states that that while he had ‘many offers of help from Buenos Aires,’ his intention is to present ‘British policy and strategy,’ intending at the same time to report the Argentine position ‘fairly.’

Official histories have the great advantage that the historian has, or should have, unrestricted access to all the relevant government papers. The author describes these as ‘quite staggering’ in volume and permits himself the wry observation that on occasion ‘the amount of signal traffic significantly slowed the transmission of signals.’ The other point about official histories is that they have a tradition of being rather bland, indeed boring, in tone. This is definitely not the case with the present volume. There are throughout continuous and timely reminders of the huge risks that were being accepted by the government and, by implication, by the people of the UK in engaging in hostilities at such a long range. There are also important accounts, with a wealth of previously inaccessible detail, concerning the progress of diplomatic relations with the United States and European nations. These were frequently tense. But throughout the whole crisis there was support from the Americans: ‘truly marvellous’ was how it was described by the British defence staff in Washington. However, this reviewer was surprised to be informed of the important, almost vital, support provided by the French to the British efforts. This included informing them of details of French arms supplied to Argentina, including the precise specifications of those arms. They even went so far as to send some French aircraft ‘to conduct mock dogfights with British pilots.’ It was observed by the then British Defence Secretary that: ‘In so many ways Mitterand [the President of France] and the French were our greatest allies.’

The account dwells on the command structure adopted for the operation and especially on whether it was ideally suited for the purpose, and devotes considerable space to the acute problems of dealing with the media. The descriptions of the actual hostilities are fully detailed, and of great interest are the accounts of the sinking of Belgrano, the landings at San Carlos, the battle for Goose Green, and the battles in the hills surrounding Stanley.

One aspect of the land and sea actions that was of particular interest to this reviewer, who, in a previous existence, was an air defence gunner, was the poor state of the British air defence artillery. The campaign was fought at a time when missiles, fired by ships, were reasonably efficient weapons but at which those fired from land were not nearly so effective. The author comments in detail on the Rapier system, noting that some launchers had suffered damage on the voyage and required a good deal of time to get into action, that at San Carlos the launchers do not seem to have been effectively deployed, and, in particular, on the extent to which its ‘kill’ ratio seems to have been inflated in official reports with the implication that nothing should be done to minimise possible sales to countries that might be interested in purchasing it. An additional point is the frequency with which the British had very short notice of the arrival of attacking Argentine aircraft. One wonders how many observation posts had been deployed. Nothing is written in this volume to dispel the profound impression this reviewer had at the time that the situation would have been much better for the British at San Carlos if they had had a couple of batteries of Bofors 40mm guns, simple and robust weapons that had then been effective for almost 50 years, and still are, rather than the relatively ineffective Rapier. The ships of the fleet seem also to have been naked in the face of Argentine air and missile attack, and indeed the inability of the Royal Navy to deal with the exocet missile has led to a widespread reappraisal of the rapid firing gun as a means of defence against it. Certainly if the Royal Navy vessels, and associated vessels like Atlantic Conveyor, which had no defences at all, had been equipped with more Bofors, more of them might have stayed afloat.

The author is absolutely candid concerning a criticism of the first edition that ‘more time (was) spent on the diplomacy, covered in minute detail, than on the various military engagements, covered with irritating brevity.’ He freely admits that he had a personal preference in this, being more ‘at home’ discussing such matters, and indicates that many accounts of the actual fighting exist. Here is an indication of the distance that the genre of the official history has travelled since, for example, the First World War, in the accounts of which the balance is the exact opposite, enormous amounts of space being devoted to combat and relatively little to diplomacy. This was partially a consequence of the different authors, the accounts of 1914–1918 being written by bemedalled veterans of the fighting rather than, as at present, by an academic, who admits that he has ‘no experience’ of it. The author also points out with justification that the actual land battles took up little time in comparison to the often drawn out diplomatic exchanges. In these circumstances the author is to be congratulated, not for the precision and objectivity of his accounts of the diplomatic activity associated with the crisis, which, bearing in mind his background and experience, may be taken for granted, but from the way he has succeeded in making sense of battle. Eschewing any attempt to tell the story at the level of the individual, the author does manage to introduce a ‘whiff of cordite’ into his accounts of, for example, Goose Green, that enhances his overall straightforward and somewhat dry approach.

To sum up: this is an example of official history at its best. It is comprehensive, compelling, and convincing and will remain the standard work on the topic for the foreseeable future. The book is well presented and the maps are excellent. There are no photographs save for that on the cover. This is one of the iconic scenes of the Falklands conflict, a group of heavily laden marines ‘yomping’ along a remote track. All those with interests in the Falklands should read it.