Michael R. Botson, a steelwork turned historian, has written a tremendously important book. Although the title, Labor, Civil Rights, and the Hughes Tool Company, would suggest yet another case study of the nexus between the civil rights and labor movements, Botson's work has much larger historiographical implications. Botson does indeed illuminate an oft-ignored but consequential story about a group of Houston's black steelworkers who successfully fought for their civil and labor rights. Botson argues that it was their activism with the support of the federal government that created the conditions to improve their lives. This history, however, is connected to much deeper historical questions about the relationship between black workers and organized labor and about the historic nature of racial discrimination in employment. Although in the end, Botson raises as many questions as he answers, his study offers fresh fodder for the continuing historiographical battles about race, employment, and the labor movement.

Founded in 1915, the Hughes Tool Company became one of the nation's largest steel fabricating plants. When it was small, the factory, which was run directly by Howard Hughes Sr., had the air of a family business. But as the manufacturer of steel drill bits grew, labor relations changed dramatically. To fight the worsening working conditions, workers joined the Houston Metal Trades Council and went on strike in 1918. The protest was crushed. Afterward, the anti-union Hughes decided to use a modified version of the American Plan to forestall any future union activity. The Hughes Tool Company's managers fostered two company unions, an all-white Mutual Welfare Organization and an all-black Hughes Tool Colored Club (HTC). This set-up seemed to have near universal support. As Botson points out, company officials supported the segregated organizations out of their racist views and because it kept workers divided and wages low. Most whites believed that biracial company unions were proper and in line with the larger community standards. Finally, and importantly, the black workers assented to this design out of a rejection of the more mainstream—but still racist—labor organizations such as the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and out of a preference for mutual assistance. Segregation for these black steelworkers was not a product of some fringe ideas about nationalism or group identity. Rather it was a conservative response to America's conservative labor movement.

The Great Depression and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal upset the fragile equilibrium in the Hughes Tool Company's labor relations. Angered by company managers who dealt with the economic disaster by firing workers and cutting wages while increasing productivity and seeing a chance for an independent union, many white workers left the old MWO to join the International Association of Machinists (AFL). Hughes' primary supervisor, R. C. Kuldell, did everything he could to disrupt the IAM unionists as well as the Congress of Industrial Organizations' steelworker organizers who were also making inroads on the shop floor. In fact, it was the CIO, and not the AFL, that posed the greatest challenge to the status quo at Hughes. The Congress's commitment to organizing the unorganized on an industrial basis and to supporting civil rights threatened not only low wages but also southern mores concerning race and union power. Kuldell fought the CIO by reinvigorating the two company unions: the Employees Welfare Organization (a modified version of the MWO) and the HTC, which together merged into the Independent Metal Workers Union Local 1 (all white) and Local 2 (all black). The IMW won initial National Labor Relations Board elections against the CIO, but shortly after the United States enter World War II, the balance shifted to the Congress. The CIO defeated the IMW by altering its union strategy. The Congress's organizers focused almost exclusively on bread-and-butter issues such as wage increases and maintenance-of-membership. Moreover, to attract white workers, it created segregated locals. To avoid alienating its black supporters, the CIO at Hughes promised that it would fight for civil rights once it was the sole bargaining unit. The tactics worked at first, but a resurgent IMW finished off the CIO for good after the war. It was at this point that Hughes's black employees—stuck in IMW Local 2—decided to wage their own fight for civil and labor rights. Unsurprisingly, they went outside their union for support. They found an ally in the NAACP, which helped them file a discrimination case with the National Labor Relations Board. In 1964 the NLRB ruled in Hughes's black steelworkers' and the NAACP's favor and against the IMW. This pathbreaking decision blazed a new trail for federal activism in the field of employment discrimination.

Labor, Civil Rights, and the Hughes Tool Company is a compelling read. Botson is an excellent historian and storyteller. The book is rich in detail, and he more than adequately recaptures the monumental struggle for justice at this Houston factory. But in some ways, the book's strength is also its weakness. Botson does not always take the opportunity to link his narrative fully to larger historiographical debates. For example, recently some historians have argued that labor unions were primarily to blame for racial discrimination in employment and that managers merely responded to market conditions. Botson's story is a clear illustration that shop floor racial politics were more complex, and at least in this case, reflected ideologies and compromises from all parties involved. Botson also offers a much more nuanced view of the relationship between blacks and the labor movement. As much as their white co-workers, blacks wanted to belong to labor organizations. And, they were similarly suspicious of the large, national federations, which did not seem to keep local conditions in mind. Furthermore, Botson's discussion of segregated unions complicates our view of the past. By accepting segregated unions, these African-American steelworkers were complicit in maintaining Jim Crow at the workplace. And yet, these unions also shielded black workers from some abuse by the white-dominated AFL and CIO unions. Finally, Botson's book urges historians to examine more carefully the history of company and independent unions. Although the CIO and AFL dominated the national scene for decades, these smaller unions nonetheless played significant roles. In summary, Labor, Civil Rights, and the Hughes Tool Company is an exceptional case study that might act as a springboard for the further investigation of larger historical and historiographical questions concerning the race and the labor movements.