No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 February 2006
United We Stand? Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility. By Aron Belkin. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. 161p. $60.00 cloth.
This book presents a new thesis that attempts to explain threats to civil–military relations from a different perspective. In the process, it makes a useful, albeit limited, contribution to the civil–military relations literature.
This book presents a new thesis that attempts to explain threats to civil–military relations from a different perspective. In the process, it makes a useful, albeit limited, contribution to the civil–military relations literature.
Aron Belkin's main thesis is that the generally accepted premise in civil–military relations research (what he calls the diversionary thesis)—that political leaders use external threats as a way to avoid coups—is flawed. Instead, he maintains, “when the risk of a coup d'etat is high, leaders tend to divide their armed forces into multiple organizations that check and balance each other and protect the regime” (p. 3). His point is that instead of striving for unity, the political leader intentionally works to achieve disunity among the services, thereby removing or at least minimizing the threat of unified military action against the regime. How do leaders do this? According to the author, they achieve this end by intentionally working to promote “jealousy and strife among their own forces” (p. 4).
Belkin does not believe that simply promoting differences among the services (and presumably within the services as well) is sufficient. In order to ensure their political security, he maintains, politicians exacerbate service differences by engaging in international conflicts. Why? For the simple reason that conflict will help exacerbate service differences, which will intensify splits among the different branches or services.
To substantiate his two hypotheses, Belkin selected two case studies—Syria under Hafiz al-Assad and postcommunist Georgia. While his work is limited to these two polities—and shows considerable research and thought, in this reviewer's opinion—Belkin makes a major mistake when he states that “my theory is intended to apply to all regimes, regardless of whether they are democratic, authoritarian, military, civilian, praetorian, or post-communist” (p. 4). This is a major overstatement, to say the least. As is unfortunately often the case, in an effort to come up with a new conceptual or theoretical framework, some political scientists often claim more validity and utility for their work than the reality of the situation warrants. An author who does what amounts to two case studies is not in a position to make such a sweeping conceptual generalization.
This is particularly true insofar as Belkin's second hypothesis is concerned. There is no doubt that political leaders have long used a “divide and conquer” rule in an effort to control their militaries. But it would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that many political leaderships have gone to war to reinforce divisions among the services. Indeed, this reviewer would argue that such argumentation often results in the formulation of tautologies to support such a hypothesis, that is, if there is a question why country X went to war, it must have been to protect the leader from the military.
Permit me to provide some examples. If there was ever a case of a contemporary political leader who feared the potential of the military to carry out a coup it was Boris Yeltsin of Russia. From the very beginning of his time in office, Yeltsin set out to ensure that the Russian military and its leadership would not be in a position to threaten him. This was one of the major reasons why he starved the military for funds, put Pavel Grachev in as defense minister, shuffled military leaders, and constantly made promises to the military he knew he would not carry out. So far Belkin's hypothesis makes sense.
However, to argue, or even suggest, that a major motivating factor behind Yeltsin's decision to invade Chechnya had something to do with control of the military makes little sense. He was trying to keep Russia unified in the face of the Chechens' attempt to secede. Besides, the vast majority of the Russian military (and in practice that meant the ground forces) opposed his decision. They were well aware that the armed forces had been starved, that no major training exercises had been conducted for several years, that their equipment was outdated, and that the army was beset by numerous and very serious social problems—from crime, corruption, and poor pay to the infamous dedovshchina, or the harassment, of junior soldiers by more senior ones. The generals were furious at Yeltsin because he was sending them off to fight a war that they knew would be suicide for the troops they were leading, and they objected to his political interference in internal military affairs. This is why around 550 officers resigned rather than carry out his orders.
This reviewer is not aware of a single case of interservice rivalry among the various services in Chechnya. There were major problems in coordination, intelligence, competence, training, and so on, but the operation was directed by either the army or the Interior Ministry. In fact, especially during the First Chechen War, the army was a hodgepodge of naval infantry, airborne, regular army, reservists, and just about everything Moscow could throw at the Chechens.
It is true that there were problems between troops from the Interior Ministry and those of the Defense Ministry, but they had more to do with personality differences (on the part of some of the generals), as well as a lack of joint training and interoperability. Yeltsin would later try to play the Interior Ministry against the Defense Ministry, but this kind of action would fit Belkin's first hypothesis far better than his second one.
The American case also raises very serious questions about both of Belkin's hypotheses. There have been numerous occasions when presidents have been locked in bitter conflict with the American military—or individual services—but it is far too simplistic to suggest that the president was trying to divide and conquer, or that he resorted to the use of military force to solidify divisions among the services. Indeed, the history of the post–World War II military has been to unify the services, not split them. If the attempted rescue in Tehran, the deaths of the marines in Lebanon, and the invasion of Grenada taught the U.S. national security community anything, it was the importance of unified command and control.
My point is to suggest that scholars like Belkin would be wise to claim less universality for their conceptual frameworks. I suspect that if Belkin had seen civil–military relations from the perspective of a policymaker or a military officer, he might have been less willing to make such generalizations. Humility has its virtues.