Broadly speaking, this is a book about the distribution of infrastructure resources in the absence of democracy. Although existing studies on distributive politics typically focus on policy makers, Xiao Ma’s research examines how the local bureaucracy contributes to the uneven development of China’s high-speed railway program. He argues that local governments, as intermediary policy recipients, actively negotiate policy details with policy makers and influence the distribution of policy benefits in a process Ma refers to as “localized bargaining.” Localities are categorized into “cardinal” and “cleric” localities, drawing on terminology from the congressional politics literature. These two types of localities differ in terms of their resources, bargaining power, and strategies used to secure their share of infrastructure investments.

The arguments developed in Localized Bargaining are supported by ample evidence and meticulous analysis. The data include interviews with government officials and experts, government documents, an original dataset on the construction of railways, and a survey of local officials. The author demonstrates strong methodological skills and uses a variety of research techniques, such as qualitative evidence to examine unique cases and analyze bargaining dynamics, regression analysis to draw broadly generalizable inferences about railway investment allocation, and survey experiments to mitigate social desirability bias when soliciting answers to sensitive questions from local officials.

The book contends that a fragmented central bureaucracy lacks the ability to impose decisions unilaterally and creates opportunities for local governments to engage in bottom-up bargaining. Key players in this process are the Beijing offices of localities, which serve as “domestic embassies” connecting local authorities with the central government. These offices facilitate reporting of local progress to Beijing, soliciting benefits for their localities, coordinating efforts, and building networks.

However, the presence of Beijing offices is not random: higher-level local governments and economically prosperous localities are more likely to have them. This raises questions about the allocation of railway investments between localities with and without Beijing offices. Is there a systematic difference in this allocation? If so, does it result from successful lobbying by Beijing offices, or is it merely coincidental that localities ineligible (such as due to population size or terrain) to apply for the high-speed railway program also tend to be less affluent and unable to afford Beijing offices? Furthermore, the book shows that some subprovincial governments have their Beijing offices. How could they bypass administrative level(s) to directly lobby Beijing under a hierarchical administration system? Or how do they coordinate authorities that are administratively above them?

Ma argues that the bargaining power of localities is influenced by their positions within the party–state hierarchy. Cardinal localities possess institutionalized bargaining power due to “dual appointment” or “concurrent appointment” through which their leaders concurrently hold positions in both local governments and higher-level party or government institutions. These appointments create an uneven playing field in competition for resource allocation among localities, because they provide cardinal localities with easier access to information, opportunities to articulate demands in closed-door meetings, and direct participation in decision-making processes.

Using an original dataset, Ma finds that municipalities whose leaders hold dual appointments at the provincial level received more favorable policy treatment; these results remain robust after controlling for various socioeconomic variables. Here, it is worth highlighting the author’s novel approach to measure policy bargaining, much of which involves under-the-table deals. Ma examines provincial Five-Year Plans (FYPs), which are publicly accessible policy agendas for future directions of economic and social development. To indirectly measure policy treatment, he uses the frequency of mentions for each municipality by each province in the FYPs relative to the total number of mentions for all municipalities. The underlining logic is that localities that have more mentions in the FYPs have greater bargaining power (and vice versa) and will be allocated more resources to fulfill the plan goals.

As Ma noted, the assignment of concurrent appointments is not random and reflects the political and economic importance of localities. Leaders of vice-provincial municipalities and provincial capitals consistently hold dual appointments. These localities have larger populations, greater economic development, and more infrastructure needs. That is, localities whose leaders hold concurrent appointments are also those where leaders can more easily justify requests for railway investments. This aspect is unobservable in the estimation models and is worth further analysis. In addition, it is also worth investigating why leaders of some small municipalities temporarily receive concurrent appointments. Are we expected to observe an increase in resource allocation during periods in which these leaders hold concurrent appointments?

In contrast, cleric localities have limited institutionalized bargaining power and rely on extra-institutional forces, such as allying with mass mobilizations, to pursue their policy goals. When the demands of the masses align with officials’ interests that they are otherwise unable to pursue, officials strategically tolerate mass protests to strengthen their bargaining power, a process referred to as “consent instability.” This transfers pressure from bottom-up mobilizations to higher-level authorities, forcing them to compromise or concede. It should be noted that the supporting case study focuses on government mergers, rather than the railway program. Ma argues that both cases share similar bargaining dynamics and that he had better access to firsthand sources about the merger case.

What is less clear is to what extent mass mobilizations have impacts beyond assisting cleric localities gain bargaining power. Mass mobilizations can be threatening to officials due to their demands and scale, as hundreds or thousands of citizens gather under an authoritarian context. There is a possibility that they will generate demonstration effects, encouraging citizens and local officials in neighboring localities to adopt similar strategies. Additionally, mass protesters may change their demands from being congruent with officials’ interests to being against them, a situation that is not uncommon in China. How do cleric localities restrict the scale and demands of mass mobilizations, if at all?

The book raises a few points that warrant further discussion. Clearly, only a small portion of localities have leaders who hold concurrent appointments in higher-level authorities, and not all the other localities rely on the power of mass mobilizations. That is, there are localities that do not fall into the cardinal or cleric categories. How do these localities bargain for infrastructure investments? Moreover, demands for railway investments can vary, such as the need for stations, lines, or stops. Are there systematic differences in demands across localities? This question becomes more complex when considering the free rider problem, where successful bargaining by cities located at the two ends of a railway line allows other localities along the line to benefit without actively participating in the bargaining process.

Overall, this book is a well-executed research project characterized by thoughtful design, extensive original data, and rigorous analysis. Ma emphasizes the role of local governments in shaping policy outcomes within an authoritarian context and sheds light on the significance of formal institutions, particularly Beijing offices and concurrent appointments, which have often been overlooked in much of the Chinese politics literature. Localized Bargaining also engages with a broad range of scholarship beyond Chinese politics, including on bureaucracy, public policy under authoritarianism, distributive politics, comparative political economy, and political institutions. Scholars working in these areas will find this book particularly valuable.