A significant amount of research surrounding traditional practices of conflict resolution and social reconstruction has been conducted in Uganda.Footnote 1 Many of these studies have claimed, wrongly, that traditional mechanisms are the best possible solution.Footnote 2 Most of these studies have centred around traditional practices in northern Uganda, as a kind of antidote to the horrors of the civil conflict that was concentrated there from the mid-1980s until the early 2000s. Indeed, enough interest in these practices has been garnered that the government of Uganda itself extolled the virtues of their use in resolving the conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).Footnote 3
It is becoming increasingly clear, however, that these traditional practices are used successfully in some communities but not in others, in the north and elsewhere. The author's work on traditional practices throughout Uganda, and a small number of studies carried out on practices other than those in the north, have pointed to differences in these practices throughout the country.Footnote 4 This article explores a number of potential hypotheses that might explain these differences.
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF CONFLICT IN UGANDA
Since independence in 1962, Uganda has been wracked by conflict. Under both Idi Amin and Milton Obote, many thousands of Ugandans were wounded and killed. It is estimated that between 300,000Footnote 5 and 500,000Footnote 6 Ugandans were killed during the time of Idi Amin, from 1971 to 1979. Under the rule of Obote, between 1980 and 1985, approximately 300,000Footnote 7 to 500,000Footnote 8 were also killed. The current President, Yoweri Museveni, seized power by means of military force in 1986. As with his predecessors, Museveni has faced considerable opposition from many of the 56 different ethnic groups throughout the country. Between 1986 and 2008, Museveni faced more than 27 armed insurgencies.Footnote 9
Added to this is the complex web of transitional justice instruments that have been employed (often frivolously) to deal with the millions of criminal acts committed in Uganda.Footnote 10 Two truth commissions have been appointed to deal, in turn, with the disappearances committed specifically under Idi Amin,Footnote 11 and all of the abuses committed between 1962 and 1986.Footnote 12 Subsequently, an Amnesty Act was promulgated in 2000, under which 22,107 ex-combatants were granted amnesty by July 2008.Footnote 13 The International Criminal Court began an investigation into the crimes perpetrated by Kony and other senior LRA members in 2004.Footnote 14 Aside from this, national courts and traditional practices of acknowledgement are also entitled to hear evidence in such cases.
These conflicts have devastated Uganda. Throughout the country, especially in the north, although also in Luweero Triangle and elsewhere, people continue to suffer the effects of conflict. The physical scars are easy to see: women in Luweero Triangle have been ostracized from their communities because of gynaecological fistulae; many former abductees in northern Uganda have only scar tissue where once there were noses and lips; and hospitals and schools are in a state of disrepair. The emotional and social costs, though harder to spot at first glance, also remain and are more difficult to fix. The author posits that customary practices of acknowledgement might be able to assist in coming to terms with the social and emotional scars caused by conflict.
WHAT ARE TRADITIONAL PRACTICES, AND HOW ARE THEY USED IN UGANDA?
As the author has written elsewhere,Footnote 15 cultures and societies around the world have traditionally had highly complex, highly developed systems for dealing with conflict and conflict resolution, and the social deficits brought about by conflict; these are called customary law. In traditional times, these systems had a number of elements, including mediation, arbitration, adjudication, restitution and punishment: the same retributive elements included in the kinds of systems familiar in “modern” justice. They also often included elements of restoration and reconciliationFootnote 16 and these elements typically functioned in tandem.
In many parts of the world, these practices were moved aside to make way for modern, western ideas and practices. Colonial rulers disparaged the traditional customs and only allowed “natives” within the colonies to utilize them, setting up separate mechanisms for use by “non-natives”, effectively creating a dual system.Footnote 17 In Uganda, traditional practices were officially prohibited in 1962, at the time of independence, in favour of a harmonized court system modelled on the British system.Footnote 18 Uganda's 1967 Constitution, promulgated by Obote, outlawed the many kingdoms and traditional cultural institutions across the country. Yet the kingdoms and other traditional cultural institutions remain, and traditional practices have continued to be used in different parts of the country.Footnote 19 Traditional cultural institutions themselves have special status under article 246 of Uganda's 1995 Constitution (the 1995 Constitution). Traditional practices are now legally provided for under legislation, including article 129 of the 1995 Constitution, which provides for local council courtsFootnote 20 to operate at the sub-county, parish and village levels,Footnote 21 and the Children Statute 1996, which grants these courts the authority to mandate many things including reconciliation, compensation, restitution and apology.Footnote 22 The Ugandan government subsequently included these practices in the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation and the subsequent annexure that emerged from the Juba Peace Talks.Footnote 23 Although these mechanisms broadly fit within very different approaches to justice, whether retributive or restorative, and fulfil different roles within their respective societies, from cleansing and welcoming estranged persons back home to prosecution and punishment, what they have in common is that they draw upon traditional customs and ideas in the administration of justice in modern times.
These institutions are still widely used throughout the country by many of the 56 different ethnic groups.Footnote 24 Among the Karamojong, the akiriket [councils of elders] adjudicate disputes according to traditional customsFootnote 25 which include cultural teaching and ritual cleansing ceremonies.Footnote 26 The Acholi use a complex system of ceremonies in adjudicating everything from petty theft to murder;Footnote 27 in the current context, at least two ceremonies have been adapted to welcome ex-combatant child soldiers home after they have been decommissioned: mato oput [drinking a bitter herbal soup to cleanse impurities] and nyono tong gweno [a welcome ceremony in which an egg is stepped on over an opobo twig].Footnote 28 These ceremonies are similar to those used by the Langi, called kayo cuk, the Iteso, called ailuc, and the Madi, called tonu ci koka.Footnote 29 The Lugbara, in the northwest of the country, maintain a system of elder mediation in family, clan and inter-clan conflict.Footnote 30 In 1985, they held an inter-tribal reconciliation ceremony, gomo tong [bending the spear], to signify that “from that time there would be no war or fighting between Acholi and Madi, Kakwa, Lugbara or Alur of West Nile”.Footnote 31 A similar ceremony, amelokwit, took place between the Iteso and the Karamojong in 2004.Footnote 32
In some areas, however, these practices are no longer used regularly. The author posits that traditional practices are, in fact, used far less widely in the “greater south” and among Ugandans of Bantu origin.Footnote 33 From time to time, however, the Baganda use the traditional kitewuliza [a juridical process with a strong element of reconciliation] to bring about justice.Footnote 34 Among the Bafumbira, land disputes, in particular, are settled through traditional practices, with local council officials adjudicating.Footnote 35 The Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation also lists those mechanisms used by the Ankole, called okurakaba,Footnote 36 although the author has uncovered only weak anecdotal evidence of their continued use.Footnote 37
People from nearly all of the 56 ethnic groups in Uganda have reported to the author that “everyone respects these traditions”Footnote 38 and that reconciliation continues to be an “essential and final part of peaceful settlement of conflict”.Footnote 39 However, many people, particularly young educated Ugandans who live in the city, have also reported that they have never participated in such ceremonies.Footnote 40 Nevertheless, a common understanding of these symbols, ceremonies and institutions and their meanings remains throughout Uganda, even in those areas where such practices are no longer followed.
WHY TRADITIONAL PRACTICES ARE USED HERE, NOT THERE
What no-one has yet explored are the reasons behind why these mechanisms are utilized in some societies, while they have seemingly been abandoned by others. For they are by no means used universally across the country. This article now explores five potential hypotheses.
Social change
Institutions change over time.Footnote 41 “Social change is the alteration of social interactions, institutions, stratification systems, and the elements of culture over time.”Footnote 42 Like any social practice located in the sphere of actions that is governed by human activity, it is to be expected that social customs will become modified as those actions that inform them also become altered.
Thus, like all institutions, traditional practices have also changed. In neighbouring Rwanda, the gacaca courts represent the embodiment of this idea. They are a newly constituted practice that has been constructed in the manner of a collection of traditional practices which had ceased to exist for a number of years, and that now carry the same, traditional name. Similarly, traditional elders courts that operate in aboriginal communities across CanadaFootnote 43 and Navajo courts that have been (re)created in the United StatesFootnote 44 mimic the traditional practices that used to exist. They are modelled on old institutions, with changes made to make them relevant to contemporary circumstances. In this way, they are “neo-traditional” institutions.Footnote 45
In other instances, these traditions have continued without interruption over time, but have gradually been adapted. Traditional values and teachings continue to inform the ritual of such practices. Conselho psychological healing in AngolaFootnote 46 and ceremonies to “cool the heart[s]” of child ex-combatants upon their return to their home communities in Sierra Leone, are said to be an extension of traditional practices, although they have become modified over time.Footnote 47 As such, these customs look very similar to the kinds of mechanisms that are understood to have existed in pre-western societies. In many cases, these mechanisms have also been formalized, in that their proceedings are regularized and carried out according to pre-arranged and codified rules. This is also the case in Uganda.
It is not surprising that the role played by traditional mechanisms of justice has changed. As has been shown about social institutions throughout the world, these kinds of conventions change over time, influenced by current social practice. The intrusion of colonial powers into Uganda caused a significant upheaval in the country's social customs, as did the centralization of governance structures.
The introduction and subsequent influence of other religions, particularly Christianity, cannot be underestimated in this case. The evangelical revival in central Uganda in 1926 seems to have led many to convert to Christianity, and Pentecostalism in particular.Footnote 48 This conversion to Christianity forcefully led many to reject traditional mechanisms,Footnote 49 although a number of people interviewed referred to the level of compatibility between their religious beliefs and Acholi traditional mechanisms and saw no contradiction. This is of great concern for those who have converted to Christianity but hold their traditional beliefs as well. Many are also concerned that some groups, including religious leaders, are co-opting the process. One woman said:
“It is no use performing healing rituals in town. The thing they are doing now is a big mistake. It will take all the cen [evil spirits] to the place where it is done. Those rituals will have to be done by clan elders. The Acholi are losing their culture. Culture was created by God. I am very Christian. Jesus goes with my culture. I love God so much. I respect Catholics. They brought Jesus to us. But they must correct their mistake. I helped set up the Acholi Traditional Ritual and Prayer Committee. We collected information and messages from old elders and summarized them. Instead of listening, the rwodi mo [annointed traditional chiefs] are fighting those people. It is because the religious leaders are mobilizing the rwodi mo. They are saying the old ways are Satanic ... They are fighting against the real rituals. We need to mobilize the elders for prayers and rituals. I don't want rwodi mo interfering.”Footnote 50
There is some evidence of the decline in the use of these practices.Footnote 51 “The traditional values, cultural knowledge and social institutions of everyday life are threatened.”Footnote 52 “Certain practices and beliefs are still widespread in some areas of Acholi but less common in others. Moreover, some rituals might not have been performed for a long time in a particular area because it has not been possible to put together all the necessary components due to extreme poverty or war-time insecurity, but might still be applicable and sought after by the community.”Footnote 53
Furthermore the social meanings of the ceremonies that are still practised appear, in some cases, to be shiftingFootnote 54 as people move farther away from their gemeinschaft communitiesFootnote 55 toward better education and jobs in cities. Among the KaramojongFootnote 56 and also the Acholi,Footnote 57 cultural education through practice and social education is beginning to decline. Yet, even institutions no longer in common use provide strong examples of social order:
“It would be wrong to imagine that everything traditional has been changed or forgotten so much that no traces of it are to be found. If anything, the changes are generally on the surface, affecting the material side of life, and only beginning to reach the deeper levels of the thinking pattern, language content, mental images, emotions, beliefs and response in situations of need. Traditional concepts still form the essential background of many African peoples, though obviously this differs from individual to individual and from place to place. I believe ... that the majority of our people with little or no formal education still hold on to their traditional corpus of beliefs.”Footnote 58
These kinds of ceremonies “help us deepen our experience of events, cope with them, humanize them”.Footnote 59
“These practices, far from being dislocated in a past that no longer exists, have always continued to be situated socially. They are called upon to address present concerns. Of course, like any culturally informed practice, with time they shift in meaning and appearance.”Footnote 60 Traditional practices, for example, have been widely reported to be used in northern Uganda to deal with those children who have returned home after forcible abduction, during which time they have been forced to commit unspeakable atrocities. Traditionally, Acholi ceremonies of mato oput and nyouo tong gweno were utilized to bring about healing between a perpetrator and his victim(s). In the present context, multiple ceremonies of both are being carried out in which hundreds of perpetrators are healed at a time, each walking on the same broken egg and drinking from the same soup.Footnote 61
Conflict
Conflict causes tremendous upheaval. The scope and scale of conflict in Uganda has been immense. Including the LRA conflict, it is estimated that three million people have been killed, tens of thousands gravely injured, tens of thousands abducted and forcibly conscripted,Footnote 62 and close to two million forced to flee situations of conflict within their own country. Similarly, dozens of conflicts have affected different parts of the country since independence in 1962, causing death and destruction. It is the case that the presence of protracted civil conflict in various parts of the country has altered the manner in which people are able to live and, consequently, to deal with conflict.
The effect has been that people have been forced to live apart from their gemeinschaft communities, in reconstituted and blended settings like camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs). It is estimated that 1.8 millionFootnote 63 people were internally displaced within northern Uganda, living in ostensibly protected camps for IDPs, a figure which represented more than 80 per cent of the region's population. These camps are an “integral part of the Ugandan government's anti-insurgency policy. In some places, anyone who refused to move from their rural homes was forcibly displaced”.Footnote 64 Effectively, the people were “herded into camps where they [are forced to] survive on relief aid”.Footnote 65 “While roughly 230,000 people have left the camps, few have actually returned home. Most have been relegated to smaller resettlement camps where conditions are often as bad (or worse) than the older, more established sites.”Footnote 66 The camps have led to a phenomenon of “suspended animation”;Footnote 67 people have put off carrying out the activities of daily life, merely trying to survive, hoping that they would soon be able to leave the camps and return to their homes to pick up where they had left off.
Research has begun to demonstrate that those who have been living in the camps are fearful of encountering violence upon their return and are, therefore, reluctant to do so. While many people do remain in the camps, a number have begun to transit back and forth regularly between the camps and their village homes; in one community, more than 53 per cent of the population reported maintaining a residence in both the camp and their community.Footnote 68 For many, these camps, in which people have been living since the mid-1980s to early 1990s, have become communities.Footnote 69 Some have suggested that a substantial number of IDPs may not ever be able to return to their homes.Footnote 70 In this case, the enforced “communities” that have sprung up within the camps may be formalized, and the camps themselves will become permanent.
As such, the behavioural patterns of those forced to live in the camps have also changed. For example, it is considered too dangerous to sit around the traditional wang oo [campfire] at night, where such issues ought to be discussed. “Thus the oral tradition and all that is bound up in it has been subsumed beneath the constant threat of violence.”Footnote 71 “War is destroying our tradition. In the camps, the animals are not there - not even chickens, not even the eggs that the ones who come back from the bush have to step on. And we can no longer sit at night and discuss all these things. The army tells us to stay inside.”Footnote 72 “You know, the camp is like a tree where you are getting shelter, it is not like a home where cultural things can be carried out.”Footnote 73
“If you look at the way huts are built, squeezed together, and what people do at night – even at daytime – has removed respect completely now … Morally we are completely broken, the Acholi way of life is torn apart … Raping women has not been acceptable in Acholi culture, but today it is very pleasing. Killing has never been accepted in Acholi culture, but today it is considered a game. Go and see in the street what kind of games people play, the words people use. Our children now talk about laying ambush, shoot to kill – war games. Before they used to play marriage games, dancing games, hunting games. Now they make tanks, lorries, airplanes.”Footnote 74
“Our culture was very rich. Education was not just got from formal classrooms. Wang-oo was the place all the cultural, moral education happened. In camps the wang-oo is not there. Now parents do not have time to talk to their children ... Now the basic ‘family’ is destroyed and also the community at large. The camp situation has left people not believing in reality. They now have this as their way of life, they now dwell on artificial life, the hand-outs, feeding on WFP [World Food Program-provided food]. Being dependent is now part of the system, something that used not to happen”.Footnote 75
Some of the people of Northern Uganda have reported that traditional mechanisms can no longer be applied in any meaningful way in a context of displacement; ceremonies have little meaning when there is no place to perform them and food is so scarce that there are no animals left to sacrifice.Footnote 76 “The pre-war cultural agency of the displaced Acholi people diminishes. In the long run, the situation is of course socially destructive.”Footnote 77
In part because of the dislocation of the community into camps, and in part because the ceremonies themselves are being changed to some extent to deal with the present and formerly unknown circumstances, they feel that it is not proper to carry out these ceremonies. The rwot [chief] of Atiak reiterated these concerns: “[the performing of mato oput and other healing ceremonies] has to be done by the elders of each kaka [clan] [and not by government officials, as is being done now]. This thing they have been conducting in Gulu is not good. But what can I do? They accepted to do it there. They must do it separately [and not in groups as it is currently being done]. If they do it in the town it will make things worse. It will bring cen there...”Footnote 78
Added to this is the effect of displacement on children, who are no longer growing up within the type of environment that is conducive to passing on the ideas and values that underpin many of the cultural mechanisms. Many now feel that traditional mechanisms have become obsolete. Yet others believe that traditional practices ought to be resumed once people return home.Footnote 79 “[Traditional mechanisms] can work if all the people have gone to their normal settlements, not as IDPs. Because then you are sure of where your son or child is. But if we return to our homes, then we can start to do these things again.”Footnote 80 Many see the use of traditional mechanisms as a vital component to the whole process of return, symbolizing aspects of social cohesion that have been lost in the process of displacement.
There is some support for carrying out traditional practices in the camps. “Our chiefs are trying to revitalize the system, but not fully. Because now, many of the cleansing ceremonies for example are done here in Gulu. If it could be done in the camps, I think many of the young there would see, ‘this is the way things used to be done’. But when things are only done in Gulu, then only the wrongdoers see what is being done.”Footnote 81 Indeed, some feel that the younger generation does not recognize or understand such mechanisms any longer, a complaint that is not uncommon in many societies around the world. It has become difficult to “teach the children [the] Acholi culture”.Footnote 82
The war itself has caused tremendous change and dislocation. As a result, the use of traditional practices has slowed or even stopped.
Scope of conflict
Closely related to the manner in which people are able to deal with conflict is the scope of conflict and its relation to the use of traditional practices. It is likely that the extent of conflict in the present circumstance may have caused such traditions to become dislocated or modified beyond any useful form. One example of this type of modification is the group mato oput ceremonies, discussed above, which would have little meaning and would be largely unrecognizable if applied outside the current conflict situation.
Some maintain that none of the traditional practices was ever designed to deal with conflict on this scale. The magnitude of conflict throughout Uganda, and particularly in the north, has never been seen before. When asked, many Ugandans acknowledge that violence and murder have taken place on such a scale that it is no longer possible to determine who is responsible for individual deaths. There is no parallel to the severity or longevity of the LRA conflict in the history of the country. As one man living in the same IDP camp said, “Kony has brought killings where people kill in their own clans and families. This is so complex that I do not think it can easily be handled.”Footnote 83
Yet there have been cases of massive conflict throughout the modern history of Uganda. Particularly gruesome conflicts have erupted and spilled across ethnic borders. And solutions have been found, particularly at the inter-ethnic level. For example, this occurred with the gomo tong between leaders from across the greater north, in the realm of “traditional resolution between warring clans or tribes when a symbolic spear from each is bound together and then broken”.Footnote 84 Similarly, a ceremony known as amelokwit, took place between the Iteso and the Karamojong in 2004. While not entirely common, these ceremonies have been developed and used regularly in responding to crises on a grand scale.Footnote 85
What is less clear is whether such practices can and should extend to the kinds of circumstances created in the context of war. Finnström and others maintain that they can.Footnote 86 Whether they should is a question that remains to be answered.
Stratification
The author has noted that those ethnic groups that were traditionally organized hierarchically, such as the Baganda, are far less likely to utilize these mechanisms. Conversely, those ethnic societies that were arranged horizontally, with a system of equal clans, like the Acholi, are more likely to continue to utilize these mechanisms. It seems that the hierarchical stratification of societies with entrenched kingdoms, whose social order was organized from top to bottom, were more likely to co-ordinate whole formalized political systems, of which justice formed one part. Certainly, this is the case in Buganda, where the kitawuliza courts, used mostly at the sub-sub-county level, were headed by the head of that particular political stratum; he, in turn, reported to muluka chiefs, and so on, up to the katikkiro [prime minister] and ultimately the kabakka [king], who had the power to reverse the decisions made.Footnote 87 This pattern seems to repeat itself in Uganda today, in that those ethnic groups with highly stratified kingdoms, including Buganda, Toro, Ankole and others, use such traditions infrequently.
There are five likely causes as to why, over time, societal organization had a role to play in the way such mechanisms are utilized. The first is that the Baganda and several of the other kingdoms were colonized first. Their first contact with the British came in the late 1800s. Britain formally declared a protectorate over the area which now comprises Buganda in 1894.Footnote 88 At that time, the country was divided into a series of indigenous kingdoms and chieftaincies, each of which had its own ruler and leadership system.Footnote 89 Britain colonized the Kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro, Ankole and Bugosa in 1896, although formal agreements between the kingdoms and the British were not signed until as late as 1933.Footnote 90 In 1900 the Buganda Agreement, a treaty between the British protectorate and the kingdom of Buganda, was signed: an attempt to establish indirect British rule in the protectorate. The system of indirect rule suited the British because it was less costly to install Buganda chiefs as agents and to create local chiefs to do their bidding.Footnote 91 By contrast, other regions of the country were not colonized until several years later. Karamoja, for example, was declared a closed district in 1911.Footnote 92 The protectorate was extended to include the “north” in 1911 (Kigezi, Lango) and 1913 (Acholi, Karamoja). West Nile, previously “leased” to the Congo, became part of Uganda in 1914.Footnote 93 As such, these districts have a shorter history with the British, and even then the “indirect” system of rule left them able to conduct their own affairs as they saw fit. In these areas, “governance was highly decentralized, and power lay in the hands of elders who practised a form of democratic government”.Footnote 94 By 1920, for example, Lango had considerably more traditional leaders in place than did most of the kingdoms located in the central region.Footnote 95
The second possible reason is that the Baganda and other kingdoms were so eager to curry the favour of the British that they whole-heartedly adopted the systems suggested and / or imposed by the British. The Kingdom of Buganda was Uganda's principal kingdom during this period, and the British counted the BagandaFootnote 96 as its main strategic ally. The Baganda became the highly favoured agents of the British Crown, acting as tax collectors and labour recruiters, and forcing Buganda culture on those from other parts of the new Protectorate of Uganda.
The third likely reason for the divide along these lines is the outlaw of the kingdoms under Obote I in 1967; many Ugandan royals, including the kabakka of Buganda, went into exile during that time.Footnote 97 The kingdoms were restored in 1993, but without any political powers.Footnote 98 The kingdoms' existence is protected under the 1995 Constitution.Footnote 99 However, those ethnic groups that were stratified horizontally, in a system of equal clans, were unaffected by this decision, as their structures of governance were allowed to remain in place. Conversely, those ethnic groups whose heads were effectively banished were stripped of their decision-making apparatus. In Buganda from 1953–55, for example, a panel recommended that proposals for local government and clan matters be put on hold until the kabakka was able to return from exile abroad.Footnote 100 Thus they were more likely to have acquiesced to the demands of the centralized government.
The fourth reason has to do with the geography of Uganda. The epicentre of power has long centred around the Kingdom of Buganda, which geographically occupies the central area of the country. The seat of government under the British was Entebbe, and since independence has been Kampala, both of which are in Buganda. For the most part, those ethnic groups which have kingdoms and are stratified vertically are located in reasonable proximity to Buganda. Those groups which are stratified horizontally tend to be located further away from the centre of government.
The fifth reason takes into consideration the ethnic dissimilarity that exists in Uganda between those of Bantu descent and those of Nilotic descent. Those of Bantu origin tend to occupy the west, south and east of the country, while the Nilotes tend to occupy the north and northeast. These groups continue to speak languages derived from either their Bantu or Nilotic roots; Bantu languages are structurally inter-related, as are the Nilotic Luo languages, which makes the transmission of ideas and culture much easier within a particular ethnic / linguistic group. Again, those ethnic groups which have kingdoms and are stratified vertically tend to be Bantu in origin.
Homogeneity
Others question the relevance of such institutions in rapidly urbanizing and globalizing societies. They worry that, “the traditional values, cultural knowledge and social institutions of everyday life are threatened”.Footnote 101 Furthermore as people move farther away from their gemeinschaft communities, the social meanings of the ceremonies that are still practised appear, in some cases, to be shifting.Footnote 102
It is the case, though, that, in urbanizing gesellschaft societies, the resulting society is not homogenous, but heterogeneous. As such, the conduct of such cultural practices becomes more difficult. In Acholi society, for example, the earliest converts to Islam became disenfranchised and “ceased to be an Acholi”.Footnote 103 Thus homogeneity seems a likely factor in whether, and whose, “traditions” are used in a given community.
The composition of Uganda's population is difficult to determine, since census data are inaccurate and out-of-date; the last official figures are from 1991. But it is estimated that 85 per cent of Uganda's population lives in rural areas.Footnote 104 The population of cities has grown rapidly in recent decades: the city of Kampala, for example, grew by 159 per cent between 1980 and 1991, and continues to grow rapidly.Footnote 105 Cities such as Njeru have experienced fantastic growth: in 1980, its population was recorded as 3,880, which had grown to 69,452 by 2005.Footnote 106 Overall, according to 2005 estimates, close to 7 per cent of Uganda's total populationFootnote 107 lives in its ten largest cities. These cities, particularly Kampala, are composed of people from many different ethnic groups, many of whom have also inter-married. In contrast, only one rural area, the district of Tororo, is identified as “multi-ethnic”.Footnote 108
Interviews with Ugandans raised, or living, in Kampala have indicated that they have less familiarity with traditional practices.Footnote 109 Some admitted that they had never seen even one of these kinds of rituals.Footnote 110 This certainly fits with the hypothesis that heterogeneity decreases a society's reliance on traditional cultural practices.
The number of IDPs in northern Uganda roughly equals the population there. As outlined above, it is estimated that, at the height of the conflict, 1.8 million people were displaced within the greater north, a figure which represents 5.7 per cent of the total population of Uganda, but nearly 80 per cent of the population of the north. These people, too, are “urbanized” after a fashion. Yet their ethnic composition is mainly homogeneous.
CONCLUSIONS
The use of traditional practices in Uganda cannot be said to be uniform throughout the country. Indeed, it is difficult to generalize. There are indications that several factors have caused their use to increase or decline. Of greatest importance are the role and scope of conflict, the consequences of which are magnified throughout the country. Yet other hypotheses seem to have greater validity when attempting to explain the marked divergence. Chief among these is the stratification of Ugandan society, as explained by a number of different factors. The results of social change and homogeneity, when added, offer a compelling explanation for this variation.
