The history of the Namibian War,Footnote 1 that is, the uprising of the Herero in German South West Africa (GSWA), present-day Namibia, has been the subject of nearly exhaustive historical research. In particular, the 2004 and 2015 anniversaries incited a flood of publications on the nature and consequences of Germany's most notorious colonial war.Footnote 2 These studies have rightly focused on the genocidal phase of the war and on the orders of the local military commander-in-chief, Lothar von Trotha.Footnote 3 However, the role of the Prussian general staff in Berlin has suffered neglect, a surprising oversight, given that it bore ultimate responsibility for the campaign. Although Trotha operated largely autonomously,Footnote 4 the Prussian general staff, the “main arbiter of Germany's modern military culture,”Footnote 5 was more than a mere advisory board during the insurrection. Crucially, Kaiser Wilhelm II had given the general staff a virtual carte blanche in hopes of winning the war.
In order to address this historiographical lacuna, the following article focuses on the general staff and the actions and views of its officers. Special emphasis falls on Alfred von Schlieffen, the chief of the general staff, because, according to an imperial order of January 21, 1904,Footnote 6 he was responsible not only for the management of operations in GSWA but also for communication with the Reichsleitung and other military authorities. What was the role of the Prussian general staff? According to one bon mot, five institutions were considered perfectly organized at the beginning of the twentieth century: the Roman Curia, the British Parliament, the Russian Ballet, the French Opera, and the Prusso-German general staff.Footnote 7 Ever since the successful German Wars of Unification, which were mainly planned and executed by Helmuth von Moltke, the general staff had been regarded as the agent of certain victory, a reputation it held until World War I. To be sure, the chief of the general staff was hardly omnipotent, but nevertheless he held a critically important portfolio.Footnote 8 Together with his officers, he was responsible for war planning and the deployment of the German army in accordance with prevailing conditions and the external political situation.Footnote 9
Additional and related tasks of the general staff were to observe foreign armies and to monitor the military policies of foreign states, especially Germany's probable opponents in any future European war, notably France and Russia. The general staff was therefore the central organ of German military intelligence. The instrument was sufficiently powerful to influence responsible German foreign policy decision-makers. Frequently, general staff analyses defined and determined the scope of action for politicians in foreign affairs.Footnote 10 Because the general staff's role was not limited to adjacent European states, the German Schutzgebiete, as well as the colonies of France and Great Britain, also enjoyed unstinting attention.
In the event of war, either in Europe or on the colonial periphery, the chief of the general staff was preeminent among all other German military authorities. “According to the provisions for mobilization, he had the power to give orders in the name of the emperor.”Footnote 11 With the help of general staff officers stationed with divisions and army corps (the so-called Truppengeneralstab), the central military organ in Berlin presided over the tactical and operational training of the entire German army aside from Bavarian troops. Consequently, Alfred von Schlieffen could with some justification boast, on his departure from office in late 1905, that he had been the “supreme official of the Reich,”Footnote 12 a position that he saw as the “most honorable in the world.”Footnote 13
That the general staff was entrusted with the management of operations in GSWA is therefore not surprising, given the institution's reputation, expertise, and wide-ranging military authority. However, the preeminence of the general staff was not a foregone conclusion. An intense jurisdictional dispute between military authorities and the civilian Reichsleitung had preceded the general staff's dominance. According to the primacy of politics, Schutztruppen in the German colonies were originally subordinate to the German chancellor and the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office.Footnote 14 Nevertheless, the general staff managed to seize command over operations in South West Africa.
Explaining how and why the general staff emerged victorious requires close examination of its views on the content and significance of the insurrection. These views illuminate the guiding military authority's responses to complex questions of jurisdiction and command relationships. These views also offer important new insights into the position of Schlieffen and his officers concerning Trotha's “annihilation orders.” Up to the present, Schlieffen's role has remained obscure in contemporary historiography.Footnote 15 Did he agree with Trotha's decision or was he against it? To what degree did the general staff and Schlieffen bear responsibility for the atrocities committed in GSWA? Could the military authorities at the center have intervened more forcefully to revoke the annihilation order? Was there an identity of opinion between the general staff's officers and Trotha? The following analysis reveals the extent to which the central military authority intervened within the larger operational context. There are also questions of contemporary analysis and outcomes. An examination of the general staff's role during the Namibian War extends to lessons drawn from the conflict. What was the framework for assessment and evaluation? Was genocide mentioned in an analytical context? With these issues in mind, the following treatment reconstructs how the general staff viewed and responded to events in GSWA, some 10,000 kilometers from the Reich.
The General Staff's Assumption of Command
The Namibian War began on January 12, 1904, with an attack of the Herero on German farms. The Herero were reacting to the increasing spread of German settlers, their own deteriorating economic and social situation, and not least, the reservation policy of the German colonial administration.Footnote 16 According to the general staff's own exculpatory account, “the great unavoidable struggle with the natives had to come sooner or later if Germany did not want to renounce economic development of the country. Anyone who wanted to colonize here had first to take up the sword and wage war—not with petty and weak means, but with strong, respectable power to effect the complete overthrow of the natives.”Footnote 17 The war began in the region around Okahandja and spread rapidly over the whole middle of the country, which was about one and a half times as large as the German Reich, more than 800,000 square kilometers. The local German administration under Governor Theodor Leutwein was completely surprised by the Herero attacks, such that initially only 2,000 soldiers and reservists of the German Schutztruppe opposed 8,000 Herero warriors.Footnote 18
The large indigenous tribes of the Herero and Nama had fought against German settlers before, and the settlers usually received only grudging support from Berlin. In January 1904, under the leadership of Samuel Maharero, the Herero easily and quickly regained control of a great part of GSWA while besieging German military stations. In addition to settlers’ farms, railways and telegraph lines were primary targets. In the first phase of the war, the Herero killed a total of 123 German soldiers, merchants, and farmers, generally sparing women, children, and missionaries.Footnote 19 Nevertheless, rumors spread that Herero had committed atrocities on German prisoners, abusing and mutilating children and women, and disfiguring corpses.Footnote 20 Even the general staff officer Ludwig von Estorff, who would emerge as a supporter of negotiations, spoke in retrospect of the Herero as a treacherous nation, full of “cruel, bloodthirsty murderers.”Footnote 21 His words echoed inflated reports of cruelties committed by the Herero—whom he denounced as African “savages.” The German public swallowed whole such hyperbole. As Merdardus Brehl has argued, the insurrection was a discursive event that preoccupied the German press and held the imagination of numerous novelists for many years.Footnote 22
In his capacity as governor, Leutwein was not only the supreme political, but also the supreme military authority of the colony. Accordingly, the initiation of counter-measures was his responsibility. Because he was located in the southern part of the colony with a large proportion of the troops at the beginning of the insurrection, Leutwein did not appear on the main battlefield until mid-February. Until then, the numerically inferior Schutztruppen were restricted to defensive operations. The few German military contingents concentrated initially on the relief of besieged settlements, suffering minor defeats against the determined Herero.Footnote 23
In distant Berlin, Kaiser Wilhelm II, together with Reichskanzler Bernhard von Bülow, the emissaries of the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office, as well as representatives of the army, turned to the question of command in GSWA. Until this point, the Schutztruppe had been subordinate to the Colonial Department and the Reichskanzler, thus comprising a militia independent of the army and navy. Given the high numbers of victims among German farmers, the Berlin military leadership sought to deprive the civilian administration of military command in the colony, remanding it instead to the general staff or the Prussian Ministry of War. In a unique event borne of the need to suppress the revolt, Wilhelm II convened a war council on January 18, 1904.Footnote 24 It was attended by Bülow, Oscar Wilhelm Stuebel (director of the Colonial Department), Alfred von Tirpitz (chief of the German Imperial Navy Office), Dietrich von Hülsen-Haeseler (chief of the military cabinet), Karl von Einem (Prussian war minister), and Schlieffen.Footnote 25 During the discussions, the two civilians insisted on carrying out operations under the direction of the Colonial Department.Footnote 26
The emperor initially agreed with their position, but was quickly brought around by the military, who had already expressed disagreement with the political leadership. Einem remarked in his memoirs, “We attendant soldiers wondered about the civilian ‘high command’ coming into force. It was again Hülsen, who, with his lusty sense of humor, gave a striking expression to the situation. In a short negotiation break, we saw the Reichskanzler with Mr. Stuebel in the garden, both preoccupied in lively debate. A gentle rain trickled from heaven; both gentlemen had opened an umbrella and wore galoshes. Hülsen said, ‘Look at that high command, in galoshes and under an umbrella!’ The situation was so aptly characterized that I had to laugh out loud despite the serious situation.”Footnote 27
Dissatisfied with Governor Leutwein's negotiation tactics, Wilhelm II on January 21, 1904, changed sides and transferred the supreme command, and thus the planning and direction of the campaign against the Herero, to Alfred von Schlieffen.Footnote 28 As early as 1903, the emperor had supported overall command for the general staff should there be an uprising in GSWA.Footnote 29 Whether this transfer involved “a problematic interpretation of the current constitutional law”Footnote 30 remained controversial, but it made sense for the German military to assume more responsibility in any colonial life and death struggle.
Leutwein was informed of this decision on February 9, but remained the local commander for the present.Footnote 31 It was only a matter of time before the general staff assumed command in the German colonies.Footnote 32 From then on, Wilhelm II would demand nothing less than the rapid “prostration of insurrection”Footnote 33 by his military, while the Colonial Department would argue more circumspectly for disarming the Herero and “pacifying the country.”Footnote 34 The fact that the highest authorities of the empire devoted attention to events in GSWA made it clear that the issue was no longer a question of the mere suppression of an insurrection, but the conduct of a “veritable war,”Footnote 35 as historian Susanne Kuß emphasizes. After the transfer of the high command to the general staff, the uprising would be treated like a war on the European continent, in which the security of the empire was endangered.Footnote 36
Even though Schlieffen was not willing to “give instructions to the commander-in-chief over a distance of 10,000 km,”Footnote 37 the general staff remained a hive of activity. On February 5, Schlieffen ordered the establishment of a Nachrichtenbüro für die Südwestafrikanischen Angelegenheiten (News Office for Southwest African Affairs). It was subordinated to the general staff's Third Department, and therefore composed of officers from the same department usually responsible for the observation of France and Great Britain. Hauptmann von Raumer assumed leadership. All telegrams and reports from the theater of war were to be immediately forwarded to the newly established section, where they were deciphered and evaluated.Footnote 38 Related activities soon enveloped other elements of the Große Bude (great booth),Footnote 39 as the general staff building was nicknamed. Even the chief of the Third Department, Hans von Flatow, did not hesitate to get involved in analyzing reports of the war.Footnote 40
As the evaluation apparatus took shape, Leutwein was specifically ordered to send all missives directly to the general staff. Copies of dispatches were passed on to the Colonial Department of the Foreign Office.Footnote 41 It was also the task of the general staff to keep the German naval leadership up to date.Footnote 42 In urgent cases, crucial communications could be routed directly to Schlieffen outside office hours. “He was always up for Southwest,” Raumer wrote retrospectively about Schlieffen's interest in the colonial war. “Apart from regular briefings, in crucial times he personally appeared at the bureau in the evenings at a late hour. Even on the occasion of his daughter's wedding, he made no exception. The slightest thing was important to him, and if the officer on duty knew little about the small battles of the last few weeks, including losses, or if he misidentified chieftains, the chief became displeased. … As chief of the bureau, I always had access to him. My briefings took place at various points of time, and I was received by him at midnight.”Footnote 43
Schlieffen's interest in GSWA was not diminished by the Russo-Japanese War, which began in February 1904 and had far-reaching consequences for the European balance of power and German military policy.Footnote 44 Even though the general staff kept an eye on the conflict in the Far East,Footnote 45 the Herero insurrection did not decline in importance for the Berlin military authority. This is all the more surprising in light of Schlieffen's lack of interest in imperial overseas ambitions. His main object was to ensure that no German troops were withdrawn from their primary task: the conduct of a possible two-front war against Russia and France.Footnote 46 Kirsten Zirkel attributes Schlieffen's surprising colonial interest to the fact that it was the only military conflict during his tenure in office in which the general staff could decisively determine the action.Footnote 47 Consequently, the soldier Schlieffen was very much in charge of the suppression of the insurrection.
The work of suppressing the insurrection was not, however, the sole domain of the general staff. Ultimately, a total of five institutions contributed to the effort: while the Colonial Department was responsible for financial affairs, the Imperial Navy Office was responsible for the naval brigade. The Prussian Ministry of War managed supply. Schlieffen and his general staff, meanwhile, took over the management of military operations.Footnote 48 In the face of this proliferation of responsibilities, problems soon arose, displaying once again the German Ressortpartikularismus (sectionalism of portfolios).Footnote 49
Schlieffen's Faith in the Continuous Offensive
Burning for action, general staff officers in Berlin went to work. Most of the organization's officers had little experience in the conduct of a colonial war, not to mention knowledge about conditions in GSWA. There was little understanding of a “small war” on the colonial periphery, in which tactics for European conditions would not be effective.Footnote 50 As Kirsten Zirkel attests, the Totalitätsanspruch (totalitarian claims) for colonial wars by both sides were evinced through “imperial power assertion at any price on the German side and an unconditional struggle for existence on the indigenous side.” Furthermore, she points to the “diametrical contrast” between German and African warfare: European military strategy and technology collided with local guerrilla tactics “under extreme geographical and climatic conditions, which placed highly unusual demands on troops of the Reich.” It soon became clear that the tactical and operational views of the general staff were not adequate to the task.Footnote 51
Officers in Berlin initially had little idea of the difficulties involved in supplying troops over a distance of several thousand kilometers. The suppression of the Boxer War in China was the only similar model, but it had unfolded in a completely different theater of war. Added to the logistical challenges were an undeveloped infrastructure and the harsh environment of GSWA, both of which the general staff consistently underestimated, as Isabel V. Hull has shown.Footnote 52 Only a few railway lines connected the main cities.Footnote 53 Water shortage, starkly differing temperatures, and tropical diseases all complicated German troops’ operations. Meanwhile, the Herero were intimately familiar with their environment, its terrain and climate, a familiarity that enabled them to strike unexpectedly and surprisingly without risking open field battles.Footnote 54
Schlieffen spoke out immediately for an increase in the numbers of Schutztruppen.Footnote 55 As first reinforcements, naval infantry units were sent to GSWA because they were the fastest to deploy.Footnote 56 On February 9, the first 639 men under the leadership of Franz Georg von Glasenapp arrived in Swakopmund. As an “extended arm,”Footnote 57 the general staff assigned to the theater two staff officers who had volunteered: Hauptmann Salzer and Maximilian Bayer.Footnote 58 This deployment was intended to increase the influence of the Berlin military authority on operations. Later, parts of regular units also entered the picture. For political reasons, an official mobilization was avoided.Footnote 59 It is noteworthy that the suppression of the Namibian War stands out for this large-scale deployment of troops almost exclusively from Germany, while other German colonial struggles were fought with regionally recruited men. Such was the case, for example, in the simultaneously occurring “Maji Maji war” in German East Africa.Footnote 60 This fact alone demonstrates that German military authorities considered the war in GSWA to be a special case. By contrast, because most of the troops in German East Africa consisted of African auxiliary forces, because the terrain did not favor elaborate maneuver, and because East Africa was not a settler colony, the German general staff had no great interest in assuming supreme command there.Footnote 61
In the spring of 1904, the situation in GSWA did not favor the German Schutztruppen. The reinforced units suffered some notable losses against a clever opponent. Apart from an underestimation of the Herero, who were despised as “savages,” the Germans’ inexperience with asymmetric warfare in unfamiliar areas produced suboptimal results. Frequently, the Schutztruppen proceeded according to schemes drawn up by Schlieffen for launching concentric attacks in pursuit of encirclement. Such tactics, however, rarely troubled the enterprising Herero. The repeated losses elicited malice and mockery from the German public, which had expected a quick victory.Footnote 62 The German general staff did not limit its criticism to Leutwein's command, but also critiqued the behavior of “old Africans,” officers of the Schutztruppe with African experience. They were accused of not having acted with sufficient vigor in the campaign and to have become preoccupied with colonial concerns, such as the protection of the Herero for labor or the welfare of cattle, rather than a rapid victory.Footnote 63 At the same time, the general staff successfully forbade Leutwein from initiating negotiations with the Herero.Footnote 64 It was already apparent at this early stage that the general staff intended to pursue a war of annihilation against the colonial enemy.
Meanwhile, public criticism of the Schutztruppen’s cruel style of warfare grew, spread especially by invalided and returning soldiers. Although most of the political parties represented in the Reichstag were still behind the official government line, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), in particular, criticized the nature of German actions against the Herero. In March 1904, the SPD chairman, August Bebel, read soldiers’ letters at the plenum of the Reichstag, revealing the brutalities German soldiers committed.Footnote 65 Leutwein, who knew of these events at home and had repeatedly been warned by Bülow against “humane” warfare, was pressured to proceed ruthlessly, which resulted in a tougher command.Footnote 66 The Herero who had participated in the plundering of German farms were sentenced to death immediately upon capture—a measure to which Schlieffen explicitly agreed.Footnote 67 For his part, the chief of staff endeavored to pass on mostly optimistic news to the press, writing in a letter to the Colonial Department exclusively of military successes.Footnote 68 Leutwein's telegrams, which outlined his immediate intentions, were not to be published at Schlieffen's behest in order to preserve secrecy.Footnote 69 This practice continued even after the governor's replacement, when Schlieffen allowed his disinformation policy to be blessed by Wilhelm II.Footnote 70
Leutwein's efforts remained focused on a quick end to the insurrection. A clear victory was needed in order to restore German prestige and to bring the Herero to heel. The deployment of Glasenapp's weak detachment, “undoubtedly overhastily carried out under pressure of public opinion,”Footnote 71 as general staff officer Salzer noted, almost ended in disaster in April 1904. At Oviumbo the Schutztruppe barely escaped total catastrophe, breaking out of an encirclement under the cover of night. Leutwein admitted frankly that the Germans had underestimated Herero resistance and demanded further reinforcements.Footnote 72 Salzer did not highly rate the offensive power of Glasenapp's troops and approved the governor's request. In addition, the general staff officer felt that his influence on the operations had so far been minimal.Footnote 73 The general staff particularly criticized Leutwein because he had ordered a retreat, going against the offensive mindset of military authorities, especially Schlieffen.Footnote 74 Thus, the first efforts of the general staff to exercise a significant influence on operations failed, but the governor refused to be blamed. “Accusation of failure hits me hard,” he cabled to Berlin. “Believe to have saved troops in Oviu[m]bo by night march from catastrophe. Asking for replacement by a high officer, who enjoys full confidence of the general staff, because it is the only possible way for further successful cooperation.”Footnote 75 While Leutwein was planning a decisive battle at Waterberg after the arrival of reinforcements,Footnote 76 the general staff in Berlin had lost confidence in the governor and in his methods.Footnote 77 Withdrawals were seen as defeats in the eyes of leading general staff officers, and consequences must follow.Footnote 78 The cult of the offensive dominated much of European and German military thinking and doctrine. Offensive-mindedness applied both to the continent and to the colonies.Footnote 79 Schlieffen expected a purely military victory rather than a negotiated settlement. For this outcome Leutwein seemed to be the wrong man in the wrong place.
Leutwein's Replacement and Trotha's Style of Warfare
On the basis of these developments, Schlieffen abandoned passive interference in favor of direct influence. He began issuing more offensively oriented orders than the hesitant Leutwein, even though reinforcements from the German Reich had not yet arrived.Footnote 80 Next, the general staff decided to replace the governor as local military commander. Secretly, a behind-the-scenes search for a successor had begun some weeks earlier.Footnote 81 Candidates included Georg von Gayl, who as quartermaster was head of the general staff's military intelligence departments and had already participated in a colonial expedition during the Boxer campaign, and Lothar von Trotha, probably at the behest of Hülsen-Haeseler, chief of the military cabinet.Footnote 82 As the Bavarian military plenipotentiary, Karl Ritter von Endres, reported to Munich on May 10, 1904, “the appointment of Lieutenant General von Trotha as the leader of the expeditionary forces was announced by His Majesty over the opposition of the chancellor, the minister of war, the chief of general staff, and the colonial director.”Footnote 83 That the choice fell on Trotha was, therefore, solely the decision of the emperor.
What were Schlieffen's objections to Trotha? Why did he prefer Gayl? The historiography is silent about his motives.Footnote 84 Schlieffen knew Gayl personally because he had ascended to the general staff already in 1879. Although sources about Gayl's military career are scarce, it is likely that he shared Schlieffen's views. Otherwise, Gayl would not have been elevated to the position of quartermaster.Footnote 85 With few exceptions, only military officers who enjoyed the full confidence of the chief received appointment to quartermaster. By contrast, Lieutenant General von Trotha was a dark horse, having never served either at the military academy or on the general staff.Footnote 86 This lack of familiarity may have bred the chief's lack of trust.
Another reason for Schlieffen's antipathy might have been Trotha's character traits, which contradicted the chief's sense of an ideal officer. The lieutenant general was described as an “ignoble, selfish, and cold-hearted man,”Footnote 87 who liked to be at the center of attention. In Estorff's eyes, Trotha was “a bad leader, a bad Afrikaner and a bad comrade! General von Trotha was a beautiful, handsome soldier, and through his confident demeanor made the impression that he could do a great deal. He was, however, a superficial person.”Footnote 88 Like the elder Moltke, Schlieffen's motto was “to be rather than to seem” (from the Latin “Esse quam videri”). As General Hermann von Kuhl remarked after World War I, Schlieffen was alien to the words self and the me.Footnote 89 In a speech, Schlieffen once highlighted his preferred characteristics for subordinates: “To be much and to seem little, to achieve much but to put on little show—this is the task of a general staff officer!”Footnote 90 Probably, the chief of staff would have applied the same standards to Trotha and found him wanting.
Curiously, Trotha's appointment did not meet vigorous resistance from the general staff, though it had favored one of its own as Leutwein's successor. This reveals another attribute of Schlieffen's nature: loyalty to the Prussian king and German emperor and his strict acceptance of the chain of command. For example, Schlieffen allowed the monarch to participate in the annual Kaisermanöver, in which Wilhelm II always left the field as a winner, after ritually initiating a dashing but totally outmoded cavalry charge. “If the emperor plays, he must win,” said Schlieffen.Footnote 91 He was “too much of a monarchist to oppose the kaiser, even on the issue of cavalry attacks, although he, too, was aware of their redundancy.”Footnote 92 Kuhl argued, “As indefatigably and unflinchingly as Count Schlieffen fought for his thoughts, he was not a reckless, vehement fighter against internal resistance.”Footnote 93 This shows that Schlieffen rarely contradicted the emperor, even if he did not share the same views. Perhaps an energetic objection by the chief of the general staff would have prevented Trotha's appointment, but Schlieffen's character made such resistance unlikely. Last-minute attempts by Stuebel, who saw the influence of the Colonial Department dwindling with the appointment of someone “military from head to toe,”Footnote 94 to remand supreme command to Leutwein failed dismally.Footnote 95 Meanwhile, the general staff tried to prevent Leutwein from carrying out further operations before Trotha's arrival, thus cutting off the political leadership from command.Footnote 96 Political responsibility now took backseat to military Erfolgsdiktat (success dictate).Footnote 97
Lothar von Trotha had already made a name for himself as a colonial warrior in the suppression of the Wahehe insurrection in German East AfricaFootnote 98 and the Boxer movement in China. Given his “energetic” role in the brutal war in East Africa, he seemed to guarantee a more active style of warfare for military leaders in Berlin.Footnote 99 Despite the loss of his military mandate, Leutwein remained as civilian governor of the colony. Deeply disappointed by demotion, he retreated to Windhuk.Footnote 100 From then on, the war more decidedly lost its original aim of conflict resolution. It developed “according to the directives of the Great General Staff in Berlin … for the purpose of an end in itself, aiming at annihilation, to which even the interests of the settlers were subordinated,”Footnote 101 as the historian Wolfgang Petter put it. The German settlers had already voted in 1903 for tougher treatment of the Herero, so when Trotha, the man suited for this task arrived, he was able to act much more independently than his predecessor.
Freed from “disturbing” interventions from the Colonial Department, the lieutenant general was directly subordinated to the emperor and received his orders only from the chief of the general staff.Footnote 102 As the Saxon military plenipotentiary in Berlin, Hermann von Salza and Lichtenau reported to Dresden, the general staff, however, confined itself to giving “its directives with great reservation.”Footnote 103 This statement weakens Petter's assessment. Furthermore, Trotha would repeatedly disregard Schlieffen's orders in the further course of the conflict because the local commander often held different views from the general staff in Berlin.Footnote 104 He also failed to keep the Berlin military authority informed of the latest developments.Footnote 105 Consequently, with the arrival of Trotha, the direct influence of the general staff on operations might have diminished.
The general staff, however, foresaw the possibility of Trotha's high-handedness and took countermeasures. It appointed an old Schlieffen confidant, Martin Chales de Beaulieu, to head the general staff of the German troops at Trotha's side. Beaulieu had served as Schlieffen's adjutant from 1892 to 1894 and again from 1902 to 1904; then he had served as head of the central department (the staff's personnel department). Therefore, he might be judged reasonably cognizant of his former superior's ideas.Footnote 106 In addition to three other general staff officers, Beaulieu was accompanied by Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, a promising officer yet to make a name for himself during World War I. In effect, the Schutztruppe now received its own Truppengeneralstab.Footnote 107 Beaulieu's appointment made it more than clear that strategic issues were now coming to the fore and that the general staff sought to retain influence over the campaign.Footnote 108
This relationship between the center and the periphery was not, however, supported by all of the Reich's leading authorities. Salza wrote to the Saxon ministry of war that the general staff's oversight of operations “was a source of great concern, since the distance was too great and constant connection was dependent on too many vicissitudes, quite apart from the fact that the staff here in Berlin cannot be as well informed as men on the spot even if the circumstances are quite favorable.” Salza went further, alleging that even the failure of German troops could be attributed to this fact.Footnote 109 It remains unclear who originally raised objections to the general staff's lead. Perhaps Salza talked with officers from the Prussian ministry of war, which had been fighting for years with the general staff over responsibilities and spheres of influence.Footnote 110 But it is also possible that Salza heard opposition from the Colonial Department, which for informational purposes he had recently visited. Given the fact that the political leadership's role was significantly diminished, it would not be surprising that criticism might arise from this quarter.
Dissonant voices notwithstanding, the general staff was not deterred from intervening in political matters pertaining to the war. When the question of negotiations with the Herero was again raised, the general staff claimed its right to speak came directly from the emperor. Decision-making power over this important issue no longer belonged solely to the chancellor and the Colonial Department, but also to the general staff.Footnote 111 Finally, on May 19, 1904, the impulse to intensify military engagement was clearly evident with the proclamation of a state of war for the entire colony.Footnote 112 Previous colonial revolts had always been described as “uprisings.” The term war explicitly acknowledged that the conflict was about more than a defeat of smaller tribes. The intervention of the general staff in a “war” thus seemed much more justifiable than interference in a “simple” colonial uprising.Footnote 113 In addition, after the declaration of war, according to the constitution, the military received absolute executive power in the colony.Footnote 114 Because Leutwein had now been neutralized, Trotha functioned as the head of a military dictatorship in GSWA.Footnote 115
Without exact instructions, but with the emperor's expectation of crushing the insurrection “by all means,”Footnote 116 Trotha arrived at GSWA on June 11.Footnote 117 He quickly made it clear that he wanted to break completely with the policy of his predecessor. Unlike Leutwein, he did not have accommodation with the Herero in mind, but regarded the war from the very beginning as a “racial war,” which must be pursued “with crass terrorism and even cruelty.”Footnote 118 Salza also reported to Dresden that it was necessary “to act energetically and to make a tabula rasa,”Footnote 119 as he summarized the views in Berlin after a visit to the Colonial Department. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that Trotha did not yet seek the physical destruction of the Herero. For example, large quantities of barbed wire were available to accommodate the expected large numbers of prisoners of war.Footnote 120
Trotha's new chief of staff, Chales de Beaulieu, initially sought insight into the military situation, while his subordinate officers assessed the terrain and Herero dispositions.Footnote 121 Trotha was still waiting for the announced troop reinforcements from the German Reich before ordering his soldiers to attack. As is well known, he planned an encirclement of the area around Waterberg to annihilate the Herero in a single decisive battle.Footnote 122 On the southeastern flank, Trotha deployed only weak forces because a Herero breakthrough was regarded as unlikely in that sector, an area opening onto the waterless Omaheke desert. “If, however, the Herero were to try to break through here, such an outcome would have to be all the more desirable because the enemy would then run voluntarily to its own doom. For in the waterless sand field he had to die of thirst,”Footnote 123 noted the official general staff report.
On August 11, 1904, operations commenced. Following the example of Sedan in 1870, when German troops had surrounded the French Châlons army, the Herero were to be encircled and annihilated.Footnote 124 Chief of the General Staff Schlieffen himself had never tired of emphasizing the advantages of the complete destruction of opposing forces by military means.Footnote 125 The historian Jehuda Wallach has called him “the prophet of the war of annihilation.”Footnote 126 For Schlieffen, the earlier rolling back of the Herero was merely an “ordinary victory,” that is, a victory without annihilation.Footnote 127 Such victories were worth little because in Schlieffen's view only the complete elimination of the enemy's military potential could quickly end wars. Trotha initially seems to have subscribed to the same view. The pressure to succeed was enormous, and the prestige of the general staff was at stake. This was the institution that held the golden key to unlocking the gates to victory.Footnote 128
During the event, the Herero offered little resistance to the Schutztruppe, with their machine guns and artillery. However, the German encirclement failed. A large proportion of the Herero—men, women, and children—escaped eastward through lightly held defenses into the Omaheke desert. Trotha thus failed to effect the military destruction of the enemy in a decisive battle, the cherished general staff objective in the conduct of operations.Footnote 129 The official military historiography in hindsight voiced blatant criticism of the attack's execution. A “closer look at the number of men and the distance to cover” had made it clear that it was impossible “to encircle the Herero completely. On a periphery of forty kilometers, 1500 men cannot form such a wall that one could not break through in one place or another.”Footnote 130 Retroactive criticism notwithstanding, Berlin issued no countermanding orders. Schlieffen remained silent. In any case, given the distance between Waterberg and Berlin, it was scarcely possible from afar to alter individual troop dispositions and movements in the heat of battle. Much would also have depended on whether, and how far in advance, Trotha had submitted his operational design to the general staff. Chales de Beaulieu admitted that the directives for the subsequent prosecution were “more or less calculated for Berlin only.”Footnote 131 Whatever the case, the chief of the general staff could not have been well informed of all the details. It was in part for this reason that general staff officers served as surrogates for the center with troops in the field.
Meanwhile, within the Colonial Department in Berlin, as well as within Trotha's staff, calls for negotiations were emerging. Trotha rejected these appeals and demanded pursuit of the enemy into the waterless steppe.Footnote 132 According to a general staff report, Trotha saw “in the insurrection the first sign of a racial war, with which all the European Powers possessing African territory would have to reckon. In this situation, every indulgence on the German side would promote the idea that Africa belonged to its black inhabitants—the so-called Ethiopian movement.” In light of this rationale, “the struggle had to be continued, until there was no possibility for a resurgence in Herero resistance.”Footnote 133 There was, however, an important factor absent from the analysis: the general staff lacked sufficient information about the true extent of failure in the field, in large part because Trotha skillfully wove his story to transform his lack of success into a supposed victory.Footnote 134 Nonetheless, it was the failure to produce a battlefield victory (which might have resulted in annihilation) at the end of August 1904 that motivated Trotha to seek physical annihilation as an end in itself, and not just as a function of the main battle.Footnote 135
The General Staff and Trotha's Policy of Annihilation
In the following days, the German troops took up the pursuit and scoured the escape routes from the Omaheke desert.Footnote 136 “The scenes that took place in the pursuit before our eyes will always be unforgettable to me,” Chales de Beaulieu wrote to the general staff. “The wounded, the sick, and the dying awaited their fate somewhere in a corner of a Kraal. There were many cattle left behind in a hurry, as a sign of the foolish, heedless haste in which the foe had fled. . . . The whole national property of the Herero people lay there on the highway, completely exposed to us.”Footnote 137 Escape from the waterless barren land had now become impossible for the Herero.Footnote 138 According to most historians, this was the beginning of the genocidal phase of the war, to which the Battle of Waterberg had been only an important prelude. Now the German military leadership understood that “the actual annihilation could be left to the Omaheke.”Footnote 139 Herero who approached the few sources of water were shot by German soldiers or driven back into the desert.Footnote 140
The general staff's official account, prepared after the insurrection by the First Department for War History, emphasized, “This bold enterprise reveals in the most brilliant light the ruthless energy of the German command in pursuing their beaten enemy. No pains, no sacrifices were spared in eliminating the last remnants of enemy resistance. Like a wounded beast the enemy was tracked down from one water-hole to the next, until finally he became the victim of his own environment. The arid Omaheke was to complete what the German army had begun: the extermination of the Herero nation.”Footnote 141 After the battle and relentless pursuit, Schlieffen cabled to the high command of the Schutztruppe that “here everybody is full of admiration for the extraordinarily energetic and successful prosecution under such difficult circumstances.”Footnote 142 The chief of staff emphasized the achievements of the German soldiers and compared them with those of the Japanese,Footnote 143 who at the same time were having great success in the war against Russia.
Tanja Bührer notes, “Due to its constitutionally isolated and detached social position, the tendency to homogenize opinions and attitudes in the general staff was particularly strong.”Footnote 144 Even a common understanding of the limits of law in war affirms this assertion. The bulk of the general staff was opposed to “excessive humanitarian views.”Footnote 145 As the general staff note Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege of 1902 stated, a vigorously led war “can not only be directed against the combatants of the enemy state and its fortifications but must seek to destroy all its intellectual and material resources. Humanitarian claims, i.e., the protection of people and goods, can come into question only to the extent that the nature and the purpose of the war permit.”Footnote 146 Even if these postulates were valid only for a European war, the underlying premise in combat against the Herero might well have been used to justify measures that contradicted humanitarian views.Footnote 147In situ, frustration from failed or imperfect operations, together with the hardships suffered by German soldiers in the inhospitable steppe, probably abetted the increased violence of the Schutztruppler.Footnote 148
Not all officers at field headquarters agreed with Trotha's actions. Chales de Beaulieu, who, as Schlieffen's confidant, was supposed to secure the influence of the general staff in GSWA, clashed with the local commander, who even issued him a precautionary warning to desist. Already at the beginning of September 1904, an exasperated Beaulieu quit his post as chief of the general staff of the Schutztruppe.Footnote 149 Trotha now had a free hand. On September 30, when he had to halt pursuit of the Herero due to the exhaustion of his soldiers, only physical annihilation abetted by the elements seemed to make victory possible.Footnote 150 The unexpected failure at Waterberg and the failure of a battle for annihilation, which was so important in Schlieffen's eyes, convinced Trotha that he could not reach the Herero militarily any longer. His objective of physical, not purely military, annihilation of the adversary was formalized on October 2 in a proclamation now regarded as a key document demonstrating his genocidal intent. “The Herero are German subjects no longer. They have killed, stolen, cut off the ears and other parts of the body of wounded soldiers, and now are too cowardly to want to fight any longer. . . . Any Herero found inside the German frontier, with or without a gun or cattle, will be executed. I shall spare neither women nor children. I shall give the order to drive them away and fire on them.”Footnote 151 The lieutenant general stated in an additional order for the Schutztruppe, that “shooting at women and children is to be understood as shooting above their heads, so as to force them to run [away],”Footnote 152 to drive them back into the desert. The choice was to die either by shooting or of thirst.
Two days later, Trotha sent a detailed letter to Schlieffen, in which he rejected a negotiated settlement in the vein of Leutwein and other “old Africans.” Trotha was emphatic in his assertion: “I believe that the nation as such should be annihilated…. My intimate knowledge of many central African nations (Bantu and others) has everywhere convinced me that the Negro does not respect treaties but only brute force.” In such a “racial war,” no consideration could be given to women and children because they risked transmitting infectious diseases to the German Schutztruppen. Mildness would be considered a weakness.Footnote 153 He attached the corresponding proclamation to this end in his communication to Schlieffen. Thus, the general staff became the first institution in Berlin to learn of Trotha's infamous proclamation.
Schlieffen failed to countermand the order, although he could have done so by telegraphic means within a day. Instead, he remained largely passive, unwilling to chastise or disavow Trotha.Footnote 154 Failure to react immediately implied that the general staff agreed with the orders of the lieutenant general in the fieldFootnote 155—a supposition that Trotha shared. He reported to Bülow in January 1905 that he had asked Schlieffen whether he agreed with this hard line, but received no reply: “Qui tacet, consentire videtur.”Footnote 156 It is, however, unclear when Trotha's letter arrived in Berlin or whether he wrote an identical telegram. In view of the letter's length, it was probably sent by surface mail—a journey that could take up to six weeks.Footnote 157 Trotha wrote in his letter that he had initiated the annihilation policy on his own responsibility, that is, without recourse to the general staff.Footnote 158 “Thus, there is some evidence that—taking into account the delay caused by the long communication routes—Schlieffen backed Trotha not for two months, but only for a few days,” as Kreienbaum notes.Footnote 159
Regardless of when Schlieffen learned of Trotha‘s proclamation, it seems clear that the chief of the general staff was in agreement. The general staff naturally followed Schlieffen's lead, attempting to counter Leutwein's efforts through the German foreign office to revive negotiations. Thanks also to general staff pressure, the governor was finally granted leave and did not return to GSWA.Footnote 160 It is certain that general staff officers were informed of the local situation. Schlieffen knew from the commander on the ground of water scarcity in the Omaheke.Footnote 161 So it had to be clear to Schlieffen that cordoning off the Omaheke meant certain death for thousands of people. Although he was a man of deep Christian faith,Footnote 162 his moral scruples appeared to go only so far, in this case, to the desert's edge. The chief of the general staff remained inert. Orders putting a stop to the blockade are nowhere to be found among available sources. Because the general staff agreed with Trotha's measures, its official historical account would later and not surprisingly praise “the devoted and self-sacrificing activity” of the lieutenant general “in the service of emperor and Reich.”Footnote 163
However, even Trotha's relentless annihilation-style warfare failed to end the war. Numerous Herero continued resisting, even from outside the borders of GSWA. Some had managed to escape to British colonial territory. Schlieffen supported his general, revealing a social Darwinist bent. He saw the world as a stage on which nations struggled for their existence.Footnote 164 He wrote to Chancellor Bülow, “One must agree with General von Trotha's efforts to annihilate the whole Herero nation or to drive them out of the country. After what has occurred, the coexistence of blacks and whites will be extremely difficult, unless the former are kept in a permanent status of forced labor, a kind of slavery. The racial war which has erupted can only be concluded with the annihilation or the total enslavement of the one party. The latter method, however, could not be carried through successfully in the long run. The intention of General v. Trotha can therefore be approved.”Footnote 165 It was through this letter from Schlieffen that Bülow first learned of Trotha's “annihilation order.”Footnote 166 Nonetheless, after this revelation, Schlieffen agreed to rescind Trotha's proclamation and to stem the “racial war.” Two factors led to Schlieffen's abrupt about-face: growing public criticism of the German style of warfareFootnote 167 and the horrors of a typhoid epidemic among German troops.Footnote 168 In the final analysis, the chief of general staff also admitted that Trotha did not have the power to carry out his intentions. “There will be thus little else left but to try to get the Herero to surrender. This is made more difficult by the proclamation of General v. Trotha, who wants every Herero to be shot. If, by a new proclamation, the life of the Herero, who capitulate before our troops, is declared saved, they will scarcely trust the new promise. But it must be tried.”Footnote 169
Shocked by the wording and effect of the proclamation, Bülow lobbied Wilhelm II for its revocation. The complete annihilation of the Herero contradicted the principles of Christianity and humanity, the chancellor argued on November 24 to the emperor. Bülow highlighted economic and purely practical issues. He also warned against the devastating effect of Trotha's action abroad.Footnote 170 Wilhelm II, who had lost interest in the events in GSWA because of the inefficacy of the German campaign,Footnote 171 agreed a few days later and ordered Bülow to work out a telegram together with Schlieffen. To this end, Trotha was to be instructed that he should “grant mercy to the surrendering Herero, and let them know this in a suitable manner.”Footnote 172 But the order was not sufficiently comprehensive in the eyes of the chancellor. It was deliberately imprecise on the advice of the general staff in order to permit the commander some leeway for interpretation. The fact that Schlieffen did not strive energetically for a repeal of the proclamation, and that instead he artificially dragged out Bülow's efforts, shows once again the basic harmony of views between him and Trotha. In addition, Schlieffen endeavored to limit the influence of politics on events, just as he had been trying to do since the beginning of the war. A reprimand for a high-ranking military officer by the chancellor would be an affront for the German military leadership. At the expense of genuine military concerns, policy over how a war should be waged simply could not be dictated to the army and the Schutztruppe. The Battle of Waterberg, which had amounted to a declaration of the bankruptcy of Schlieffen's annihilation strategy in one small place, may also have contributed here to an element of general staff defensiveness.
Bülow addressed the emperor againFootnote 173 and also made contact with Schlieffen. The latter, however, was not inclined to modify the “very evasive design of the counter-proclamation.”Footnote 174 As Bülow observed, the chief of staff “dropped the remark that it was very unpleasant for him that the order given to him had not yet been executed.” After tough negotiations, however, Schlieffen finally relented to less ambiguous wording so that the key passage “His Majesty is inclined” was transformed to “His Majesty wants.”Footnote 175 Thus, the decisive text of the telegram was “His Majesty the Emperor and King wants to treat mercifully those Herero who voluntarily surrender and to spare their lives, except for those directly guilty and their leaders.”Footnote 176
Despite the authoritative nature of the refined imperative, Trotha was greatly annoyed by the rescinding of his proclamation. Becoming angry, he idiosyncratically interpreted the imperial telegram, informing the general staff that he would not begin any negotiations with the Herero. Instead, Leutwein should take up this task.Footnote 177 The Berlin military authority immediately cabled that there was “no talk about negotiations. Advise to act according to the text of the Highest Order.”Footnote 178 At another time, an enraged Trotha telegraphed Berlin to determine whether he had to tell the Herero that they would no longer be fired upon.Footnote 179 So the general staff had to issue another correction: “His Majesty has not forbidden you to shoot the Herero; rather, the planned offensive is to be carried out after the advent of the rainy season. Only then will the path of mercy, which was completely closed by the proclamation of October 2, be opened again.”Footnote 180 In its first telegram, the general staff had instructed the lieutenant general to make use of the “good services” of the Rhenish Missionary Society, which sounded like a rebuke to Trotha. Subsequently, he defied several orders from Berlin in order to continue his policy.Footnote 181
Meanwhile, public criticism over the conduct of the war continued to grow, prompting Bülow to ask Schlieffen whether the Reichstag's accusations and public rumors were true.Footnote 182 In his reply, the chief initially denied all allegations, but then conceded, “If, in one or another exceptional case, women have been shot, then one must remember that women have not only participated in the fighting, but they have also been the main originators of the cruel and horrible martyrdom that our wounded have often been subjected to, and that the sight of these victims, who were displayed with bestial intention, provoked the comrades to forgivable fury.”Footnote 183 Besides offering an admission that German troops had committed violations of international law, Schlieffen attempted to trivialize the effects of Trotha's proclamation.Footnote 184 The lieutenant general's intent was only to intimidate the Herero. The Herero, Schlieffen maintained, had been safe from the Germans in the Omaheke. Trotha had always campaigned against cruelties. If threats were reduced to pleas, the Germans would be presumed to be weak. Finally, Schlieffen pointed out that a leading officer, Ludwig von Estorff, from the outset had devoted himself to sparing as many Herero as possible.Footnote 185
Significantly, Schlieffen made no mention of water scarcity and the thousands suffering and dying from thirst. When Bülow dug deeper and more vigorously, demanding that women and children no longer be shot at,Footnote 186 Schlieffen assured him that Trotha had expressly and repeatedly prohibited troops from shooting at women and children. Schlieffen remained certain that the order to rescind the “annihilation proclamation” would be implemented.Footnote 187 In fact, on January 5, 1905, the general staff was able to report to the chancellor that Trotha's “annihilation order” had been rescinded.Footnote 188 The abolition of the proclamation did not, however, mean an end to the closure of the Omaheke Desert; it remained in force. On January 16, the general staff informed the Reichstag that German troops would have to wait until the rainy season before they could enter the wasteland. “Then it will be decided whether a considerable number of the people have been able to survive in the sand.”Footnote 189 Even then Schlieffen worked late into the night personally to revise the memorandum for the German parliament. Action once again underscored his interest in the war in GSWA.Footnote 190
With the defeat of the Herero at Waterberg and their subsequent tribulations in the Omaheke, their insurrectionary tide finally subsided. The last survivors continued their resistance, but they were no longer able to seriously endanger the existence of German rule in South West Africa. The following struggles were led by different Nama tribes, while the bulk of the Herero stopped their fight against German rule. Lothar von Trotha remained on the spot until November 1905, prolonging his relentless policy toward the indigenous population of GSWA, even after the emperor's precautionary instructions. Meanwhile, the general staff expected a continuation of the military offensive until total victory. It is for this reason that, despite Trotha's arbitrariness, Schlieffen backed his man in GSWA. The appointment had been Wilhelm's, and therefore the emperor's prestige was at stake, a circumstance that made Trotha's removal more difficult.Footnote 191 If one considers Schlieffen's allegiance to the emperor as mentioned earlier, one could expect little resistance from the chief of the general staff against Trotha's continued tenure, let alone a call for his dismissal. Then, too, at least the chief's partial agreement with Trotha's annihilation policy probably explains why such an inconvenient commander was able to remain in office so long. Indeed, there is no evidence that Schlieffen ever chastised this difficult lieutenant general. He was relieved of command only when Schlieffen's resignation as chief of the general staff was confirmed.Footnote 192 In the end, between 40,000 and 80,000 Herero died as a result of the war, while the German Schutztruppe lost 1,500 soldiers in the fighting and through disease.Footnote 193 The surviving Herero, between 14,000 and 16,000, were placed in concentration camps.Footnote 194 “The judgment had come to an end. The Herero had ceased to be an independent tribe,”Footnote 195 concluded the general staff on the outcome of the German “extermination campaign.”
Consequences
A few months after the Herero uprising, different tribes of the Nama and Orlam people (especially Witbooi, Fransman-Nama, the so-called Red Nation, Bondelzwarts, and Veldschoendrager) in the south of GSWA also rose up against German colonial rule. Even more than the Herero, they relied on guerrilla warfare.Footnote 196 Trotha's hardline policy proved ineffective against the Nama's flexible leadership under their chiefs Hendrik Witbooi and Jakobus Morenga. Once again, German troops suffered unexpectedly great losses.Footnote 197 For a time, up to 15,000 German troops were involved in battles against only 2,000 Nama.Footnote 198 Trotha took over the supreme command in the south on April 21, 1905, and a day later issued a second proclamation, which explicitly referred to the fate of the Herero and which, in contrast to the earlier “annihilation proclamation,” was also printed in a book published by the general staff.Footnote 199 However, this order was not directed at the total physical annihilation of the Nama.Footnote 200 In contrast to the proclamation of October 2, 1904, the publication of Trotha's second order was possible.
Unlike its actions at the outset of the fighting against the Herero, the general staff held back from interference in the face of failure, instead according local military commanders significant latitude. This was partly because in January 1906 Schlieffen, who had dogmatically insisted on the military destruction of opponents, had been replaced by the less rigid Helmuth von Moltke.Footnote 201 In addition, there were now sufficient troops in GSWA to deal with the situation, and Trotha kept things firmly in his hands before leaving the African continent forever. He was succeeded by Berthold von Deimling,Footnote 202 who quickly adapted the techniques of German troops to the art of war of the Nama. Instead of concentric operations à la Schlieffen, he relied on “flying columns,” which harried the enemy to exhaustion.Footnote 203 The end might have been the same, but the technique was more flexible, with hammer-and-anvil supplanting encirclement and annihilation.
In fact, the irregular guerrilla warfare of the Nama, reviled by the Germans as “Hottentots,”Footnote 204 preyed on the mind of the German public. The result was that a majority in the Reichstag hesitated to vote for additional funds for the war efforts, and the so-called “Hottentot” election took place in January 1907.Footnote 205 After a grueling, three-and-a-half-year-long campaign, the last Nama chief, Simon Cooper, renounced armed struggle in March 1908. The state of war for GSWA had already been annulled a year earlier,Footnote 206 and the general staff dissolved the Nachrichtenbüro für die Südwestafrikanischen Angelegenheiten at the same time.Footnote 207 The general staff's restraint from pursuing a complete military extermination of the insurgents probably dated from the accession of the new chief of the general staff in early 1906. Schlieffen, according to Kirsten Zirkel, “would have sent a further 14,000 men to South West Africa rather than accept a ‘rotten peace.’”Footnote 208 Either way, even if the chief of the general staff had opted for negotiations, he would have met Trotha's resistance.
There remained the issue of legacy. Even as the flames of insurrection still flickered and occasionally flared, the general staff, together with the other pertinent German authorities, devoted themselves to an evaluation of what had transpired. Before leaving office, Schlieffen personally invited officers returning home from GSWA to debriefings over breakfast in order to be informed about events in detail.Footnote 209 The focus was on tactical and weapon-related issues. In particular, the first use of machine guns, the use of modern artillery, and the use of new transport means brought fresh insights. The soldiers’ experiences with machine guns led in 1906 to more extensive military experiments with machine gun companies.Footnote 210 On the basis of prototypes employed against the Herero, Schlieffen also successfully proposed the construction of additional armored trains in preparation for a possible European war.Footnote 211 Moreover, the chief of the general staff highlighted the importance of the evaluation of battles in the staff's organ, the Vierteljahrshefte für Truppenführung und Heereskunde. In addition, he advocated the publication of Schutztruppe soldiers' notes and experiences.Footnote 212 These had already been received in Berlin, and the First Department for War History had already begun their dissemination in 1906. These accounts, though quietly critical of the campaign's conduct, ultimately sought to justify the events in GSWA.Footnote 213
On November 14, 1908, Wilhelm II ordered the convocation of a commission to evaluate and analyze the war.Footnote 214 This action was prompted not by military authorities, but by the new secretary of the Reichskolonialamt, Friedrich von Lindequist. The quartermaster of the general staff, Erich von Gündell,Footnote 215 nonetheless held the lead, a fact demonstrating the importance of his office and the ongoing central role of the general staff. Over the course of thirty-five meetings between December 15, 1908, and March 22, 1909, this “South West Africa Commission” reviewed the results and experiences of the previous colonial war. The main subjects for discussion included personnel, organization, mobilization, equipment of the troops, supply, and medical service.Footnote 216 The military's evisceration of civilian colonial authority was neglected in favor of logistics, management, and administrative organization.Footnote 217 It is not clear which authority focused the discussion on these technical issues. It is, however, clear that neither genocidal warfare against the Herero nor Trotha's extermination order was on the agenda. The representatives of the Prussian Ministry of War, the Colonial Department, the general staff, the Imperial Navy Office, and the “old Africans” also debated the question of how colonial wars could be suppressed more quickly and cost-effectively.Footnote 218 For this purpose, deployment of a dedicated unit was advised. Its primary mission would be suppression of colonial uprisings in tropical or subtropical areas.
Hermann von Kuhl, the new chief of the general staff's Third Department, also took part in the assessment process, prompting renewal of the earlier struggle for jurisdiction among the various ministries. Kuhl, together with the former general staff officer and “old African” Ludwig von Estorff, argued for improved military education of the Schutztruppe. The object was to place more emphasis on field exercises and less on drill.Footnote 219 Voices from the general staff called for the establishment of a “real” colonial army.Footnote 220 Meanwhile, the Prussian Ministry of War complained that troop deployments had taken too long and that almagamated units lacked cohesion. Repeatedly, the envoys of the various authorities spoke in favor of a colonial army, but without agreement over funding for such a venture.Footnote 221 While the Prussian War Ministry gradually assumed the upper hand over the nature and scope of the discussion, representatives of the general staff and subsequently even Chief of Staff Moltke receded into the background. There are no sources on the general staff's role in subsequent discussions; even statements from general staff officers present at the meetings are nowhere to be found.
In his final report to Wilhelm II, Gündell stated that the number of authorities involved in the suppression was clearly too great and should be reduced in the event of future uprisings. The quartermaster also stressed that the general staff's military command was useful only for the suppression of great insurrections, whereas minor revolts should remain under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Department and the Schutztruppe. Leutwein's command tenure was thus vindicated to an extent. Ultimately, Gündell demanded improvements in almost all areas, including the number and quality of troops provided for African enterprises,Footnote 222 thus implicitly criticizing Schlieffen's and Trotha's command decisions. The results of the commission were summarized in a 122-page memorandum, passed on to civilian and military authorities of the Reich but kept secret from the public.Footnote 223 The memorandum repeated in a more comprehensive manner the points that Gündell had summarized for Wilhelm II, but recommendations were not translated into action. The talks, held until March 1909, terminated largely without practical implications.Footnote 224 This result was hardly surprising, given that the general staff, as early as 1907, had doubted that the experiences of the German soldiers in GSWA held any lessons for the conduct of war in Europe.Footnote 225 In the eyes of the general staff, a future European war was the only thing that mattered.
Conclusion
As the preceding discussion has shown, the general staff's role was far from peripheral during the Herero insurrection. On the contrary, the Berlin military authority attempted to take control over operations, even intervening directly on occasion. On January 18, 1904, military leaders, among them Chief of the General Staff Schlieffen, successfully enjoined Wilhelm II to transfer command from the Colonial Department to the general staff. The general staff quickly set up a special bureau to collect and analyze incoming information from GSWA. Until March 1907, officers in this bureau and sometimes from the organization at large worked daily for the defeat of the Herero and later also the Nama.Footnote 226 Chief of Staff Schlieffen attentively tracked the events in Africa, often down to the smallest details. One might, therefore, agree with Kirsten Zirkel that Schlieffen showed so much interest because the insurrection was the first and only chance during his term to command operations in a real war.
As noted earlier, historians disagree about Schlieffen's convictions and how he might have applied them in the field. The historian Heiner Raulff has written that the “Herero genocide in DSWA, which Schlieffen led, illustrates a certain technocratic militarism carried through to its logical conclusion. Functioning under the assumption that Blacks were inferior, [this militarism] allowed for the ‘knightly’ rules of European warfare to be set aside, and for all humanitarian and moral categories to be bypassed. [This technocratic form of militarism] oriented itself solely toward efficiency, i.e. the rapid and complete annihilation of the opponent.”Footnote 227 Raulff's judgment suggests that the general staff ordered and planned the genocide from the outset. As this article demonstrates, this was not the case.
By contrast, the historian Gunter Spraul has criticized equating the extermination of the Herero with the Holocaust, asking, “Was Schlieffen really the predecessor of Adolf Eichmann?” Other than alerting Bülow about the slaughter in GSWA, the general staff did little to halt the actions of Trotha, Spraul contends. Thus, the general staff bears a great part of the blame for the genocide in GSWA. Spraul also argues that Schlieffen and the general staff only tried to cover up Trotha's actions in order to maintain the prestige of the German military, not because they agreed with his measures. Finally, Spraul contends that Berlin did not order the measures.Footnote 228 Most recently, Schlieffen biographer Wilhelm H. Pantenius argues in favor of an ambivalent balance sheet for the chief of the general staff; on the one hand, he recognized and tolerated Trotha's extermination policy, and, on the other hand, he suggested to Bülow that they work for the abolition of the orders.Footnote 229
As the report of the Saxon military plenipotentiary in Berlin of June 10, 1904, shows, the general staff's management of operations was tenuous because the great distance between the German Reich and South West Africa proved insurmountable. In addition, the general staff failed to rein in Trotha, who refused the authority's requests. Schlieffen initially agreed with Trotha's plan to end the war in a decisive battle for annihilation. But after the battle of Waterberg, the lieutenant general increasingly ignored the operational orders of the chief of the general staff. Ultimately, Trotha fought his own war, while the Berlin military authority left the field. This suggests the limits of Schlieffen's leadership: Although his followers after World War I always emphasized that the battle of the Marne would not have been lost in September 1914 if Schlieffen had remained chief of staff, the events in South West Africa suggest a more nuanced interaction between the center and the periphery. The fact that the general staff did not persevere more energetically in the implementation of its orders was due to more than the distance between Berlin and GSWA and the resignation of Chales de Beaulieu as Trotha's chief of staff. There was also the military embarrassment of two successive failures. Schlieffen had assumed command to demonstrate that his officers could cope with an uprising of “African savages” much better than the civilian Leutwein and the “old Africans.” At Waterberg, Schlieffen and his minions failed. Escalation occurred when Trotha's style of warfare became an embarrassment for which the Berlin authority had to make excuses and obfuscate. German military credibility in general and belief in the general staff's invincibility, in particular, were at stake. There was more than one reason for the general staff's support for Trotha's questionable style of warfare.
Another explanation for Schlieffen's inaction and tolerance of Trotha's annihilation policy was a basic harmony of views on the means of suppressing the insurrection. Historians must consider Schlieffen's definition of victory, his unalterable faith in the continuous offensive, his pressure to use brutal methods to achieve purely military ends, his reluctance to let civilians set the overall framework for operations, and his clear desire for a purely military victory rather than a negotiated settlement in order to understand his unwillingness to chastise Trotha or disavow him, let alone to replace the general on the spot. All these factors suggest a greater level of command and personal responsibility. Despite the great distances, the chief of the general staff was well informed of hostile conditions in the Omaheke; yet he accepted the death of thousands approvingly—even after the revocation of Trotha's proclamation. The desert remained sealed off until March 1905.
At first, the general staff saw the colonial war as a welcome testing ground for German troops after the long peace that followed the Franco-Prussian War. Like the emperor, Schlieffen was above all concerned with a quick and complete defeat of the Herero, including their military destruction. The massive push for a military figure to replace Leutwein suggests that the general staff expected a rapid and successful military campaign that would not necessitate a negotiated settlement. The military failure at Waterberg in August 1904 fundamentally challenged this expectation. Now the meaning of the word annihilation shifted from destruction during military defeat to physical extermination pure and simple.Footnote 230
Schlieffen and his general staff not only made no objection to Trotha's orders, but approved them, informed by a crude understanding of social Darwinism and of “racial war,” as the report from Schlieffen to Bülow from November 23 testifies. In the same report, the chief of the general staff conceded that the tactic of extermination was useless and that Trotha needed to be told to seek a peace settlement.Footnote 231 This was a grudging admission of military failure by the Reich's preeminent military strategist. Trotha's failure at applying the “Cannae Principle” at Waterberg endangered Schlieffen's legacy. His life's work could be called into question by an African tribe in the microcosm of GSWA. Under these circumstances Schlieffen was willing to defend Trotha, even if halfheartedly, for the two did not agree on many things. Not surprisingly, the general staff played an important role in shielding Trotha from civilian authorities.
Gündell's final report correctly stated that authority in future colonial wars should largely remain with those who knew what they were doing—local colonial authorities with local colonial troops. It was easy to skip over issues of jurisdiction and neutered civilian authority in favor of military-technical issues. It was also easy not to mention the genocidal warfare in GSWA. The general staff might also permit the Ministry of War to broach the possibility of creating a colonial army, with scant prospects for funding. It was even easy to gloss over lessons learned because the GSWA experience seemed to offer little of potential benefit for the conduct of a general European war. In violation of Schlieffen's maxim, the general staff might for a time safely retreat into its shell “to be less than it seemed.”
Accordingly, the general staff's postwar account of the GSWA ignored Trotha's “annihilation order” of October 2, 1904, while reprinting his second proclamation against the Nama.Footnote 232 Such circumspection reveals an awareness not only of the possible criminal implications of Trotha's actions, but also of their effects on German and international public opinion. All the while, a series of important considerations, including Schlieffen's choice to remain inert at key junctures, his tacit acceptance of Trotha's shift from annihilation via open battle to annihilation via desert starvation, his harmony of views with Trotha, his rejection of civilian jurisdiction and oversight, and his unwillingness to pursue negotiated settlement made the general staff and its chief ambivalent—but all the same major—accessories to the first German genocide of the twentieth century.
