Perhaps the greatest puzzle in contemporary international relations is the seeming correlation between economic integration in East Asia and increasing power competition in the region. These contradictory trends provide a smorgasbord of empirical evidence for competing theoretical approaches. Liberal institutionalists point to the growing patterns of intraregional trade (now over half of all trade in Asia) and a burgeoning array of regional multilateral institutions to argue that Asia is on a steady Kantian trajectory toward a more peaceful order, even as relative American decline threatens to weaken the traditional postwar underpinnings of stability. In contrast, structural realists can identify inherent sources of conflict as China is tempted to supplant flagging American and Japanese strategic leadership, or—if the observer is a defensive realist—as China responds negatively to US and Japanese efforts to retain a favorable balance of power in the region through tighter alliance cooperation and networking with other powers around China's periphery. Meanwhile, constructivists scrutinize a new pan-Asian discourse in search of a shared cultural identity that might underpin regional order. Finally, democratic peace theorists highlight the stabilizing effect on interstate relations of democratization in Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia.
Most Asian states inhabit a world defined by a mix of all these realities. There is broad consensus that there should be an East Asia Community, but the region is too economically, politically, and geographically diverse to allow consensus on what membership, rules, and norms would actually govern that community. The unfinished business of the Cold War also blocks the emergence of a common vision of Asia's future, since unification of the Korean peninsula or across the Taiwan Strait would inevitably entail the defeat of one of the region's political regime types in favor of another. Until a shock to the system (American withdrawal, international financial catastrophe, or war) forces clearer choices, the regional powers will maintain an eclectic mix of balancing, bandwagoning, multilateralism, and unilateralism in their playbook to contend with rising Chinese power and uncertainties about American staying power. Meanwhile, conflicting theories of international relations will continue their peaceful coexistence.
Two new books by prominent Asia scholars attempt to cut through these contradictions in contemporary Asian statecraft to define what a stable regional order might look like after the end of American primacy. Both books argue against the realist perspective, articulated by Aaron Friedberg, that Asia is “ripe for rivalry,” highlighting the historical or contemporary factors that will bring coherence to regional order even without the United States as the main stabilizer. Both make original contributions to the debate about East Asian security, though neither will leave the informed reader convinced that rivalry has become stale or that America's role is obsolete.
David C. Kang's East Asia Before the West seeks clues about the future regional order in East Asia by turning to the historical precedents. Kang's previous book, China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia (2007), created a stir in the world of Asian security studies with the assertion that Chinese power has historically been benign for the rest of Asia and may well be viewed that way by the region in the future. The book took some criticism in terms of historiography and inattention to drivers of contemporary conflict, but it drew intense interest from scholars searching for new purchase on the problem of forecasting Asian regional order. Kang acknowledges in the preface to East Asia Before the West that when he wrote China Rising, he was himself an amateur historian seeking to use the past to inform his interpretation of the present. His new book is less provocative but far more rigorous and compelling. He describes it as a sequel, but it reads more like a response to the critics and a thoughtful recasting of the original thesis.
Kang begins by explaining why East Asia under the Chinese tributary system can be considered a system of states governed by diplomacy, trade, and norms and thus a potentially relevant historical model for today (critics of China Rising had dismissed the relevance of the tributary system to the Westphalian modern nation-states of contemporary East Asia). He then systematically describes how the diplomacy of the tributary system reinforced Chinese hegemony in an essentially Confucian world order that accepted natural hierarchy and defined prestige in terms of the state's relative position within that hierarchical order. In response to those who argue that China engaged in numerous wars of aggression against its neighbors under the tributary system—in other words, that coercion mattered more than benign trade or Confucian norms—Kang demonstrates that only a small number of the conflicts were actually between established states in the system, with the vast majority of wars aimed at nomadic barbarians where the frontier between states was not well defined. He also draws on recent historiography to explain why trade under the tributary system went far beyond superficial ritualism to create an interdependent economic order far beyond what historians once assumed. These are all important insights that resonate even today.
Kang does not aspire to break new historical ground but makes an important contribution by synthesizing the historical debate through the more rigorous prism of international relations theory. Historians value archival and textual innovation, which can cause them to lose sight of the larger systemic implications of their work. Political scientists value theoretical innovation, which can tempt them toward selection bias when they boil complex international behavior down to two interacting variables. Bridging the disciplines is increasingly challenging, but Kang does it well. In the conclusion, his growing inner historian prevents him from engaging in prediction, but his unspoken assumption is evident. He continues to see in Asia's past the framework for a model that could lead to a post-American hegemonic stability in the region, despite all the differences across the centuries. His emphasis on hierarchy, status, and hegemony will resonate with realists and astute observers of the region today. Yet it may also leave the reader no more reassured about the prospects for peace. For even if China retained a reasonably stable hegemonic order when at the top of the hierarchy in the past, the power transitions necessary to get there were incredibly violent. Perhaps a stable Sino-centric order lies in somewhere Asia's future, but history would suggest the path to it would not be peaceful.
In The Making of Northeast Asia, Kent Calder and Min Ye focus on contemporary relations among China, Japan, and Korea, pointing out correctly that it is these major powers that will ultimately define whether there is coherence or entropy in Asian regional order as a whole. The authors argue that we are now at the third “critical juncture” of Asian regionalism. The first was the “unexpected” Korean War, which thrust upon Asia the American-led hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances tied to Washington. The second was the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, which energized Asia to begin building regional institutions that could stand independent of the hub and spokes in a reflection of the new reality of international economic power. According to Calder and Min, we may now be at the third critical juncture, in which the major powers of Northeast Asia overcome the deficiencies of the American-dominated system and their own historical rivalries to define an enduring order based not on Sino-centrism (the focus of Kang's books), but on mutual respect and accommodation.
What follows is an intricate and often fascinating description of the explosion of linkages among Japan, China, and Korea in recent years. The authors detail trade and investment patterns with numerous examples of mergers and acquisitions and foreign direct investment deals that are creating an integrated economic picture across the region. They explain the process of “cultural confidence building” as the “Korean Wave” (hanryu), Japanese animation, and Chinese music spread across borders together with unprecedented numbers of tourists, exchange students, and business representatives. They quantify the burgeoning number of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic exchanges in Northeast Asia, demonstrating why hapless American officials forced to fly thirteen hours in economy class are at such a disadvantage trying to keep up with the hundreds of meetings on everything from climate change to pandemics that take place just a few hours' travel time away for Japanese, Korean, and Chinese participants. Calder and Min also demonstrate how regional forums such as the Changmai Initiative, established for mutual protection after the 1997–98 financial crisis (the second critical juncture), have steadily migrated toward Northeast Asia and have become more institutionalized across borders and within each countries' bureaucracies.
And yet, Asia is fascinating today not only because of this growing interaction and interdependence, which Calder and Min detail well, but also because these trends coexist with intensifying power competition. One cannot judge the relevance of the Kantian trends without weighing them fairly against the Hobbesian counterfactuals. For example, why was the 1997–98 financial crisis a “critical juncture,” but not China's decision to bracket Taiwan with ballistic missiles in 1995–96, which alarmed the entire region and led to a rejuvenation of the hubs-and-spokes alliance system, particularly with Japan and Australia? One might also ask whether the quantity of diplomatic interactions amounts to real quality. Hundreds (perhaps thousands) of meetings later, the Changmai Initiative remains a marginal debt-swapping hedge to the International Monetary Fund, but hardly a rival. Nor is it likely to become one as long as Japan and China continue colliding over leadership in the initiative (back to Kang's point on hierarchy and prestige), and the major regional financial powers cling to the IMF to avoid their own moral hazard vis-à-vis the weaker economies in the region.
In fact, a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) survey of Asian elites in 2008, later published as Strategic Views on Asian Regionalism (2009), found that despite enthusiasm for creating an “East Asian Community,” very few respondents actually thought they would be able to rely on regional institutions to deal with financial crises, pandemics, proliferation, or other challenges—even a decade from now. The CSIS survey found that skepticism about the efficacy of regional institutions was highest in Northeast Asia, where Japanese and Korea respondents were far more likely to point to global institutions or alliance with the United States as the answer to problems, and Chinese respondents pointed overwhelmingly to their own unilateral capabilities when asked how best to respond to regional security challenges. If anything, Japanese and Korean confidence in their ability to bind China through East Asian regionalism has diminished even further in the wake of recent Chinese collisions with Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands and Beijing's de facto support for Pyongyang after North Korean attacks on the South led to dozens of military and civilian casualties. Beijing may be ready to hold numerous meetings with Japan and Korea, but China's recent behavior hardly suggests a country that is “ready to lead” on Northeast Asian regionalism.
Calder and Min suggest that a structure of international relations is emerging in Northeast Asia in which increasing economic, cultural, and diplomatic interaction among peoples will eventually trump historical animosities. However, the shrine visits, textbooks, and nationalism that the authors point to as problems are only the manifestations of deeper structural factors that are no less significant for the region's future than the positive trends analyzed in The Making of Northeast Asia. If the United States and the major powers in East Asia fail to preserve a stable strategic equilibrium or peacefully manage power transitions, the Hobbesian counterpoints to Calder and Min's optimistic thesis could easily become the dominant melody.
And that is why realists focused on power should also have more room for optimism about Asia's future order without having to rely entirely on historical precedents or patterns of economic integration. The premise implicit in both East Asia Before the West and The Making of Northeast Asia is hardly certain. China is not supplanting the United States in terms of regional primacy. Chinese growth rates and military spending make for a striking contrast to sluggish American growth and looming fiscal troubles, but Beijing also faces enormous obstacles to sustaining that growth, let alone establishing a new hegemonic order in Asia. If Beijing reforms politically, accepts a convertible exchange rate, allows freedom of expression, protects intellectual property rights, and turns from export-driven development to domestic demand, then China may have a shot at a more hegemonic position in Asia. Those would not necessarily be bad outcomes for the United States or for the region either. But as long as those factors are in doubt, the major powers of East Asia will continue hedging against China's rise by strengthening strategic linkages with the United States and one another. This is precisely what Japan, Korea, Australia, India, and most of Southeast Asia have done in the wake of Beijing's recent spurt of assertiveness. Meanwhile, all available survey data (including the CSIS survey and a 2008 regional survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, published as Soft Power in Asia: Results of a Multinational Public Opinion Survey) suggest that the so-called “Beijing consensus” of authoritarian development does not challenge American soft power or universal norms in East Asia, with the exceptions of troubled smaller states like Cambodia, Laos, or East Timor.
Power is clearly shifting toward Asia overall, but the United States will likely have the national power and the strategic relationships necessary to continue shaping the strategic environment in the region for some time to come. However, there will be less room for complacency or error in American policy than in the past. It will therefore be important to understand the drivers for both coherence and anarchy in East Asian regional order. These two new volumes add to that knowledge in important areas, but leave more work to be done.
