I. INTRODUCTION
Antonio De Viti de Marco is one of the most eminent scholars of the early Italian public finance tradition. He revolutionized public finance studies by placing collective economic activity within a theoretical framework, in contrast to the more common offering of maxims for good taxation. He aimed to explain concrete, observable facts; he was interested in what would later be labelled as the “positive approach.” To that end, his theoretical framework is intended as a sort of access key to approaching real fiscal phenomena. The main corpus of his oeuvre is contained within the treatise Principî di economia finanziaria, which dates back to his first 1888 book (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1888) and which was expanded in several versions until the end of his life.Footnote 1 In the 1930s, the treatise was received in Italy as the unquestioned work of the old master, and remained so as time passed. After paying formal homage, Italian scholars oriented their research in different directions than they had earlier, often drawing on his contribution, especially when considering specific concrete topics. On the other hand, although it had an English edition in 1936, De Viti’s Principî was virtually neglected in Anglo-Saxon literature (see Asso and Fiorito 2001, p. 122; Medema Reference Medema2005, p. 3; and, for a recent discussion, Fossati Reference Fossati2016). De Viti’s treatise conveys messages that still arouse scholarly interest (among others, see Fausto Reference Fausto and Pedone1995; Steve Reference Steve and Pedone1995; Asso and Fiorito Reference Asso and Fiorito2001; Medema Reference Medema2005; Fossati Reference Fossati2006; Eusepi and Wagner Reference Eusepi and Wagner2012 and Reference Eusepi and Wagner2013; Petretto Reference Petretto2014; Giuranno-Mosca Reference Giuranno and Mosca2015; Medema Reference Medema and Mosca2016; Fossati Reference Fossati2016; and Mosca Reference Mosca, Cardoso, Kurz and Steiner2018a and Reference Mosca2018b).
In this study, we first draw attention to the point that De Viti’s contribution relates to: i) placing collective economic activity within a theoretical or explanatory frame of reference (“theoretical framework” hereafter) to offer an economic theory of the state; and ii) explaining concrete, observable facts. Then, we note that the standard reading of De Viti brings to the forefront some inessential features of his work. We provide evidence that the core of his theoretical framework is really based on two explanatory principles: the economic principle of the minimum means, and the principle of political competition. Our reading of the Principî leads us to conclude that De Viti does not usually employ such a theoretical framework to explain the concrete facts he analyzes. Finally, we remark that marginal analysis is peripheral to the core of De Viti’s thought and he seldom employed marginal tools in his Principî.
II. A PROPOSED READING OF DE VITI’S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
De Viti’s theoretical framework did not undergo substantial changes over time.Footnote 2 According to the literature, it is characterized, first, by considering the polar cases of monopolistic and cooperative states. Second, the state is presented as a producer of goods, so that the state and taxpayers have an exchange relationship, where the tax is the price of public services. In addition, the state is also considered a factor of production in private production processes. Finally, taxpayers are voters who decide public choices through their political representatives because the state is not a sentient being.
In our opinion, this view does not sufficiently highlight the core of his thought, as some of the features listed above might, in fact, be inessential. To clarify our meaning, we begin by considering the polar cases of the state, and then we discuss the other main features.
The Political Hypotheses: The Cooperative Assumption and Political Competition
It is true that De Viti thought it necessary to assume political hypotheses on the behavior of the political class. To that end, he considered the assumptions that either politicians exert power in their exclusive interest (monopolistic state), or everybody participates, directly or through appointed agents, in their collective interests, as in a cooperative enterprise (cooperative state).Footnote 3 However, in the Principî, he mainly reasoned in terms of the cooperative assumption, at times giving a nod to the political factor, which tends to introduce features typical of the monopolistic state (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, ch. I, § 12). This is because he thought that, in the historical moment in which he was living, the modern state was becoming increasingly democratic or popular, especially to the extent that “taxpayers vote the taxes”Footnote 4 (ibid., p. 41). Therefore, in this paper, we focus mainly on the popular or cooperative state.
Apparently, both the monopolistic and the cooperative assumptions are taken “as two abstract hypotheses, or two polar cases, among which are included all the possible historical and concrete combinations” (ibid., p. 41). However, problems arise because De Viti considered the two types of states more as historical rather than abstract types. This fact, which Mauro Fasiani (1937)Footnote 5 and Luigi Einaudi (1943, pp. 24–25) stressed, seems to limit the extent of the explanation of actual phenomena, because real facts are different from the simplified frames corresponding to the polar, and historically separated, cases (see Fossati Reference Fossati2017, pp. 148–149).
Indeed, by the 1930s, it was observed that modern states cannot be identified with the cooperative state because the latter is a polar case. They should be kept separate to avoid the error of attributing consequences to the modern state that can be true only under the assumption of cooperative organization (Rossi Reference Rossi1926, p. 142).
Furthermore, De Viti uses the term “cooperative state” rhetorically as a metaphor for “cooperative enterprise” with respect to the state. To this metaphor, however, De Viti also gives the ability to bring useful elements to clarify or explain the nature of the state. In other words, De Viti uses the metaphor as a tool for analysis. This use is based on five points: 1) the state produces goods (De Viti 1939, pp. 32–33); 2) a political group carries out public production (ibid., p. 40); 3) every political group can obtain power through elections, if voting mechanisms grant political competition, and the group in power may be substituted by any other (ibid., p. 40)Footnote 6 ; 4) the turnover of political groups as governing authorities is so rapid that the ruler’s group coincides with that of the ruled such that all are simultaneously producers and consumers of goods (ibid., p. 41); and 5) a cooperative enterprise is characterized by the fact that members of the cooperative are simultaneously producers and consumers of the goods produced by the cooperative enterprise (ibid., p. 41).
Point 4 seems to imply that political votings instantly and continuously follow each other. However, we do not think it possible that any useful indications to explain reality can be inferred from the unrealistic hypothesis of very frequent voting. On point 5, it is important to note that this hypothesis generally does not correspond either to the practice of cooperative enterprises or to their theoretical settings (for example, see Beatrice Webb 1891). The hypothesis that participants in a cooperative enterprise are both producers and consumers of goods corresponds only to Robert Owen’s utopia of 1813. In all ways, such a hypothesis is so far from the reality of modern states that it cannot explain the behavior of real states.
Releasing points 4 and 5 has two main consequences. First, it follows that the cooperative idea within De Viti’s work remains a mere metaphor; that is, it is not an instrument of analysis. The adjective “cooperative” applied to the state considered by De Viti is simply a label. Second, it follows that the state that De Viti really considers is characterized by only the first three points. Then, the Devitian state has the mission to produce goods “exchanged” for tax, which is their price. The corresponding decisions are taken by a group of citizens that alternates in power with other groups, chosen by voting, among all citizens-taxpayers. In other words, political competition is the essential feature of the “popular” state that De Viti considers. According to De Viti, the state tends to coincide with the modern democratic state prevailing in Western democracies, and is opposed to the “old” absolute state, just as competitive markets are the opposite of monopoly markets. Likewise, the “popular” or “cooperative” state imposes taxes that are, in effect, competitive prices, in contrast to monopoly prices (taxes) imposed by the absolute or “monopolistic” state (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, pp. 40–41).
The conclusion is that the core of De Viti’s thinking is based on an idea of the state whose essential character is political competition. The “cooperative” idea offers no explanation, and it is therefore not essential to the core of the Devitian construction.
The State as a Producer of Goods and the Principle of Minimum Means
Whatever De Viti’s idea of state was, nobody would question that he conceived of its activity as aimed exclusively at the production of goods. Thus, it is safe to maintain that his theoretical framework is directed toward explaining the activity of the state as a producer of goods. To this end, De Viti uses the concept of “public need.” In the formulation of 1888, public need was simply a premise of fact; later, De Viti probably realized that the concept of public need might have deepened. Thus, in subsequent works, De Viti singled out the idea of a conflict (or contrast) of interests amongst individuals belonging to the community as a distinctive element of public need.Footnote 7 Public needs come “from a sort of ‘contrast’ of interests which manifests itself among the components of the community”; the state intervenes to regulate the coexistence of their antagonistic activities (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, p. 36). For him, “private and public phenomena derive from individual needs and desires, with public needs arising only in consequence of people living in proximity to one another” (Eusepi and Wagner Reference Eusepi and Wagner2013, p. 100). It follows that the difference is not between public and private goods (they have the same character, according to De Viti), but between collective and private needs. This contrasts with the Samuelsonian vision of considering undifferentiated individual needs and treating public goods as having an objectively different character from that of private goods.
De Viti even provided a taxonomy of public needs: a) general needs,Footnote 8 b) needs that “undergo modification for the fact of a social cohabitation,” and c) needs relative to an economic defense against monopolistic practices (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, pp. 37–39). He maintained that, corresponding to these three types of collective needs, the state provides three types of public goods:
a. goods that satisfy community needs: like in Paul Samuelson’s setting, these goods are not rivals in consumption (ibid., p. 37);
b. goods that satisfy individual needs that imply interference with other subjects, and thus assume connotations of collective needs due to an ante litteram externality; and
c. goods that satisfy individual needs, whose collective element consists of the public interest towards the elimination of private monopoly. If it is more economical, the state can set price (or even non-price) regulations, considered as goods.
He points out the conflicts of interest for each type of good, but his basic idea is that state intervention occurs only because the state’s provision is more economical than the private one. This is an application of the economic principle of minimum means (principio del minimo mezzo) Footnote 9, which applies even to the state.
Thus, regarding the first type of public goods, the principle of minimum means “arises from the nature of the conflicts that divide the members of society” (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, p. 44) and the cost “is discussed … only in order to keep the expenditure … at the level of that which a private enterprise might make” (ibid., p. 45). Originally, De Viti spoke of the “consumption economy … when a single unit of good produced is able to satisfy at the same time the identical need of many people,” (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1890, p. 289) and used, as an example, a good that is both non rival and excludable.Footnote 10
The other two types of public goods relate to the “production economy,” in which the principle of minimum means operates “through a more economic use of the factors of production” (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1890, p. 289). For such goods, in confronting public and private enterprise, it is necessary to weigh the quality of the service and its cost between public and private enterprise: “the result decides whether it is better”—the private enterprise or the state (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, p. 45).
De Viti’s interest was especially captured by the third type of collective goods, those arising from the struggle against monopolies. For him, the modern economy is characterized by big private monopolies, which, due to their decreasing costs, can offer lower prices to eliminate competitors. The existence of monopoly pricing “is the first economic foundation of state intervention in the interests of all consumers. ... The purpose of the interference is to ensure [to the consumers] ... those benefits acquired with the formation of a private monopoly” (De Viti 1890, p. 289). Moreover, “it is not necessary that the state substitutes private business completely. It is sufficient that it intervenes to regulate the functioning in some way” (De Viti 1939, p. 43). Perhaps De Viti’s interest in this third type of public goods depended on the faith in liberalism he retained throughout his life, as he fought to attain democracy and liberalism.Footnote 11 This is related not only to his political struggle as a Member of Parliament, but also to his activity as a writer and publisher. Since 1890, as a co-director and co-owner of the Giornale degli economisti, he contributed in a determinant way to the new editorial line that defended free trade and liberalism. In his role at the Giornale, he, Ugo Mazzola, and Maffeo Pantaleoni were Italy’s “most forceful and articulate advocates for liberty in economic and political matters” (McLure Reference McLure2006, p. 2).
The role of the principle of minimum means ensures that the state provides the goods that it (the appointed agents) can provide to the public at a lower cost than private enterprises can, and the remaining goods are private goods. Thus, in the state De Viti considers, there are few problems of public choice regarding the public goods that the state produces; the appointed (or political) agents have no degrees of freedom.
In conclusion, the principle of minimum means stands out as an essential characteristic of the Devitan theoretical framework. First, it is true that the state is a producer of goods that have the same nature as those that private businesses produce. Public enterprise (the state) depends only on the fact that it produces more economically than private businesses. It is sufficient that public costs are lower than private prices, which include private profits. Second, the principle of minimum means plays an essential role, even in political competition, as we mentioned above. Every political group can obtain power through elections; however, if competition is granted by the voting mechanisms, a political group may be substituted by any other. However, per the principle of minimum means—albeit applied to politics—the group that produces public goods more efficiently will prevail and exert power for as long as it will be able to supply public services at the minimum cost (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, p. 41).
Thus, our analysis suggests that the Devitian theoretical framework is essentially based on the principle of minimum means and on political competition, while the idea of the cooperative plays the role of a stimulating metaphor.
Proportional Taxation
We singled out the principles of minimum means and political competition as two essential elements of De Viti’s positive theory to explain state activity that aims to provide public services. However, the problem remains that the state’s economic activity has a cost that must be distributed among the components of the community. Thus, De Viti involves taxes: he even opens his treatise by mentioning, in the very first line, the phenomenon of taxation (ibid., p. 31). In chapter VII of the Principî, titled “Theory of the Tax,”Footnote 12 he considers the tax—the price of general public services—as a share of the income, “which each citizen pays to the State to cover his share of the cost of the general public services” (ibid., p. 114).
It may be useful to recall that De Viti considers public services as “the goods that the State produces in order to satisfy the needs of the community” (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, p. 42). A public service can be special or general, whether or not it is “possible to divide the total demand and total supply for these services among individuals” (ibid. p. 80). They are provided at cost; the “price” is the fee for the special services, and the tax is for the general ones. Special public services present rivalry in consumption; consequently, the state is confronted with individual demands. Regarding the quantity of special services, the public supply is determined by the following mechanism: “the citizens enter as a force of posthumous control of the productivity of special public services just as they would in front of any private producer” (ibid., p. 88; italics added). For the general public services, however, such control is lacking. For these services, according to De Viti, supply is ensured by a previous control exercised through a complex procedure, as we shall see below.
To that end, De Viti introduces the proportional taxation of individual income by assuming that: 1) every citizen consumes general public services, and 2) individual income is a proxy for individual consumption of a general public service (ibid., p. 115). He then argues that these two hypotheses are reasonable and sufficiently close to reality. Nonetheless, De Viti considers this only as a “necessary premise for the construction of pure tax theory” (ibid., p. 117). De Viti’s idea is that the political group in power takes, for general public service, the decision regarding the quantity to produce and, based on the total cost of such services, the tax rate on individual incomes, which is the same for everyone.
The problem is that the decisions taken by the group in power must correspond to the needs of single citizens, so that the supply may match the virtual demand. To overcome this problem, De Viti first discusses the “value to the community” and then the “value to the individual.” The value to the community is the problem of “tax productivity” and depends on the fact that if the virtual demand differs from the public supply, the production of the public service “is not economical.” Therefore, the problem of “tax productivity” is linked to the problem of identifying all the quantities of public services matching the corresponding virtual demands. On the other hand, tax revenue must cover the sum of the costs of all public services. To that end, the political group fixes a tax rate on individual incomes that can cover such costs. If the political group’s estimates coincide with the virtual demand for each public service, the process would end. However, since this is unlikely, the tax is “unproductive” (not economical), and De Viti proposes the following procedure to approach “productivity”: the consumer-taxpayers “participate in the initial formulation of the hedonistic calculus in which each one judges the economic advisability of paying a given tax to obtain in exchange a given public service, and … this calculation is reviewed annually, and is open to criticism and continuous public discussion by the press, the political parties and parliament” (ibid., p. 119).
Thus clarified, with the notion of “value to the community,” De Viti completes his theory of tax, addressing the problem of “value to the individual”: namely, the problem of “distributing the burden of taxation among the consuming citizens” (ibid., pp. 125–126). This discussion might seem to contradict the previous discussion of the value to the community, because the two issues are the two faces of the same coin. In fact, De Viti notes that “only in pure theory” is the problem of distributing the burden of taxation settled jointly with the solution to the problem of determining the correct quantities of public services. De Viti deals with the problem of distribution pragmatically, and thus creates a separate issue: “as soon as we pass from the process of making the decision to that of carrying it out … the problem of distributing the tax-burden becomes independent of the problem of the productivity” (ibid., p. 126).
De Viti’s complex procedure implies that the political group in power modifies, from time to time, the supply of each public service in order to match the new estimates of demand. It is an intriguing mix of political proceedings, learning by doing, and marginalism, which deserves some discussion because it presents some critical points. First, it is not reasonable to assume that every citizen gives an assessment for every public service. It is already difficult to think that each one attaches a significant benefit to each public service, but there seems to be a real logical impossibility for citizens to attach a cost for each service. In fact, they contribute to the total cost of public services with a percentage of their income. The citizen has no criterion for distributing each service in line with his or her total tax charge. Second, it does not seem clear with which mechanism citizens can participate in the initial formulation of the hedonistic calculus and communicate it to the political group.
Therefore, it seems appropriate to look for a reasonable way to interpret De Viti’s procedure. The interpretation of De Viti’s theory of tax that we propose is that the political group in power individuates the quantities to produce, starting from the quantities produced previously, adjusting them by accounting for the reactions of voters, even outside voting (discussion by the press, political parties, etc.). Simultaneously, the rate of personal income tax is adjusted correspondingly.
The State as a Factor of Production
De Viti assumes in chapter XV (“Theory of Net Income”) only the hypothesis of the state as a “factor of production,” so we may conclude that this hypothesis is redundant with respect to his theory of tax.
On the assumption of the state “factor of production,” we think it is useful to recall that, historically, the state was considered as an entity that destroys wealth. This is in contrast with the more modern approach, for which state activity is beneficial to private production and consumption. In this case, the state can be understood as a “generic” factor of production; for example, this is Einaudi’s point of view. However, De Viti does not imply in this manner the concept of state “production factor.” The literature does not have any doubt: for De Viti, public services are real production factors, which enter private production processes just like the other productive factors, labor and capital (see Fasiani 1951–52, II, p. 293). Really, De Viti maintains, “the position of the state does not differ … from that of the worker or any other agent of production” (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, p. 232); “the tax is the cost like the wage is the payment of the work provided by the workers” (ibid., p. 222); and “almost all general public services take on the character of goods which are instrumental in the production” (ibid., p. 117).Footnote 13
In fact, De Viti assumes the hypothesis of the state “factor of production” to solve the problem of defining net income, which he considered as the tax base for the proportional tax on individual incomes. To that end, De Viti needed to reconcile individual incomes with the income of the whole community. He correctly identifies the sum of individual incomes as the national income, which is identical to national product, which is in turn given by the value of all the consumption and investment goods. It can be said that De Viti anticipated modern systems of national accounting. His specific contribution is that he realized that the national product is determined by subtracting the value of intermediate goods from the value of all the goods produced, where intermediate goods are the goods used as productive factors. He discusses the process of “purging” the value of each of the goods produced of the value of the intermediate goods. He highlights that such a process also includes purging the value of the public services consumed in the productive process, and states that these computations regarding public services are the counterfactuals of the procedures used to assess individual taxable incomes. Thus, his system differs from modern national accounting systems because public services are not considered final goods, but intermediate goods. De Viti’s rationale is that the state is a real factor of production because public services are goods that enter all productive processes as a real factor of production. Each unit of produced income can contain only its share of the cost of public services, just as with the other factors of production, such as labor or land. Taxation is the counterpart of the cost of public services in the same way that salary is the counterpart of work: that is, tax is still the price of the factor of production “public services.”
In conclusion, from De Viti’s perspective, it was perhaps necessary to justify net income as the base of individual taxable income; however, based on the early twentieth century’s discussion of taxing consumed/produced income, one may doubt that De Viti had a real need to assume the “state factor of production” hypothesis, which remains basically inessential to the core of his theory of tax.Footnote 14
In conclusion, our simplified view of De Viti’s theoretical framework can still explain why the state is interested in providing public goods, how they are selected, and how their cost is distributed among citizens. That is, it explains the state’s public activity founded on only the principles of minimum means and political competition, and on the assumptions that every citizen consumes public services and that every individual income is a proxy for the individual consumption of general public services.
III. EXPLANATION OF FISCAL FACTS IN THE PRINCIPÎ
So far, we have dealt with De Viti’s theory of the state, which he presented as a tool to approach and explain financial phenomena, because “public finance is a concrete science, namely, it must end in real phenomena” (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, p. 34; italics in the original). In other terms, De Viti’s theoretical framework should help explain the observable facts with respect to the activity carried out by the state. Nonetheless, however important his contributions may be, in this section, we consider whether those contributions are truly based on his theoretical framework.
In short, we note that in some chapters of the Principî, the general theory of the state (the theoretical framework) is presented, and in other chapters, a number of concrete issues are discussed. The point is whether such discussions are dependent on the theory. The literature on De Viti tends to ignore this division, even though Einaudi raised it in the 1930s, albeit in another context.Footnote 15 At the time, Einaudi’s observation did not attract much attention and, since then, it has been largely overlooked. Einaudi, who is regarded as one of the most prominent admirers of De Viti, strongly opposed De Viti’s theoretical framework. In fact, he maintained that the types of state (monopolistic and cooperative) De Viti considered were historical types,Footnote 16 which, according to him, permitted De Viti to receive merit only for “giving fiscal science a structure compact and logical and orderly” from the didactic angle (Einaudi Reference Einaudi1943, pp. 24–25). However, historical types could not have scientific relevance; De Viti’s success was due to the “extremely cautious use that he made [of the two types of state] ... in setting the specific problems” (ibid., p. 25).
This is tantamount to stating that Einaudi believed that De Viti did not use his theoretical framework when he discussed concrete problems. In fact, Einaudi maintained that De Viti treated “single topics from time to time in the manner that seemed [to him] most befitting, according to his specific objectives. Thus, the link between the assumption of the two types of state and the discussion on the types of taxes and their effects disappeared easily” (Einaudi Reference Einaudi1942, p. 30).Footnote 17
De Viti’s reasoning on concrete issues generally appears detached from his theoretical framework. In fact, the discussions on revenues from the state’s property, the state’s railroads, and forests, and discussions on arranging fees for special public services and the corresponding scheduling of such fees are clearly independent from the theoretical scheme of the monopolistic/cooperative state. The “modern state” and the “price of cooperation” are cursorily mentioned only once in the chapters concerning such discussions (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, p. 81).
Even in the building of the theory of taxation, as we reported above, it is difficult to perceive the dependence on the monopolistic/cooperative state; indeed, De Viti stated that his treatment of taxation “is not an abstract economic construction, it derives from the history and explains a fundamental provision which can be found in the constitutions of all countries with representative government—namely, that no tax may be determined upon or collected unless it is approved by the representatives of the nation” (ibid., p. 121).
In chapter IX, the issue of tax incidence is discussed, and chapter X briefly reports on basic technical notions such as possible definitions of “progressivity.” Nowhere does he mention the concept of the different types of states, and neither is this required to follow the discussion. Importantly, De Viti’s seminal contribution to the incidence of taxation—the proposition that it is necessary to consider the general equilibrium setting and the expenditure of the tax income to establish the incidence—does not depend on his theoretical framework. The same remark may be raised in relation to other contributions, such as the theorem of the double taxation of savings (John Stuart Mill, Irving Fisher, Einaudi),Footnote 18 where De Viti argued that no double taxation occurs because the new tax is the counterpart of new public services.
In chapter XI, he supplies the economic theory of proportionality and progressivity in taxation, and in chapter XII, he supplies their political theory, still with no links to his theoretical framework. There, De Viti never mentions the monopolistic or the cooperative state, but, instead, refers to a historical framework that describes the evolution of states and modern economies. Moreover, the “modern” state is mentioned only in a footnote (ibid., p. 181) on the idea of subsidiarity in the functions of the state and the family. The discussion shows that there are no economic reasons to suggest either proportionality or progressivity in taxation, even assuming 1) individual consumption of public goods is proportional to individual income, 2) horizontal equity (equality before the law), and 3) “decreasing intensity of needs” (ibid., p. 172).Footnote 19 The discussion on the political reasons for taxation is specifically based on the historical evolution of institutions. The French Revolution reacted to the old personal privileges, and thus favored “objective” proportional taxation, which continued because productive problems were prevalent at that time. Progressivity came to the forefront as soon as problems concerning the distribution of income became prominent: namely, when, according to common opinion, the popular classes needed special benefits (ibid., p. 189). Chapter XIV, which still considers historical developments, discusses the idea of income as the natural basis of income taxation. The monopolistic state is mentioned only once (ibid., p. 212), where it is said that the tax is paid from individual income, but in the monopolistic state, it might be that the tax is paid by selling capital. In chapter XV, De Viti develops the concept of net income, discussing the idea of a national accounting system, in which he introduces the concept of the state factor of production, as previously mentioned.
Finally, the last two chapters are devoted to extraordinary finance: that is, to the public debt and to issuing paper money, respectively. In the latter chapter, the theoretical setting of the monopolistic-cooperative state is never involved and, in fact, De Viti mentions only a generic state. In the chapter on the different effects of debt and extraordinary taxation, in contrast to David Ricardo, he concludes that public debt is more efficient than an extraordinary tax. There, De Viti mentions the “modern” state and, consequently, regards the cooperative state only as far as the two states identify with each other. However, the relevant feature is that the state he considers “is intermediary between borrower and lender” (ibid., p. 394). Clearly, within the cooperative framework, the state would organize activities of positive value for all; within the monopolistic framework, the state would use its power of intermediation to give advantages to some people at the expense of others, but these different effects are due only to the expenditure of tax revenue. In De Viti’s discussion, what is important is that “regardless of whether the state is treated as cooperative or monopolistic, the state is a type of intermediary” (Eusepi and Wagner Reference Eusepi and Wagner2012, p. 201). Therefore, we can maintain that, even in these two chapters, De Viti’s arguments do not depend on his theoretical framework. His discussion is characterized by the virtual independence of his dialectic of the arguments from his theoretical framework, specifically the type of states theorized.
IV. DE VITI AND MARGINAL ANALYSIS
De Viti’s contribution is usually associated with the foundation of the Italian tradition of public finance, understood as a coherent and comprehensive structure based on marginal utility (Buchanan Reference Buchanan and Buchanan1960, p. 220).Footnote 20 In 1888, De Viti prefigured Samuelson’s efficiency condition for public goods (Da Empoli 1995, p. 52; Fossati Reference Fossati2006, p. 429). Moreover, he is associated with the spread of Italian marginalism (Barucci Reference Barucci1972), and undoubtedly played a very important role to this end as a co-director and co-owner of the Giornale degli economisti (McLure Reference McLure2006).
However, our reading raises some misgivings regarding the use of marginal analysis in the Principî, as we shall see below. We do not argue that he is not a marginalist, but rather, we suggest that marginal analysis is not essential to the core of his theoretical framework. This statement is perhaps at odds with much of the literature, but has isolated antecedents, such as Sergio Steve (1995, p. 47), who states that “more generally, De Viti does not take into account the attempts to base the distribution of taxes on marginal utility theory.”
An important point of our arguments is the principle of the minimum means.Footnote 21 De Viti considers it “the principle of value,” transported “from the private economy in the field of the public economy” (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, pp. 33–34), and we suggested that the core of his theoretical framework is grounded on that principle. The question is how marginal theory is defined. It seems to us that it is characterized by the determination of equilibriums (exchanged quantities of goods and production factors) based on demand and supply forces, starting with an initial allocation of factors to the agents from a given preference structure and from a given technology. The possibility of substitution among commodities and production factors leads to decreasing relationships between price and quantity (demand curves). In short, marginal theory is characterized by: 1) rational behavior towards maximization (which is tantamount to the principle of minimum means), 2) given preference structures and technologies, 3) presence of constraints, and 4) logical reasoning that leads to the definition of equilibrium characterized by the equality of marginal substitution rates.
The principle of minimum means (point 1) is really a concept employed in marginal analysis, but we think that its only use is not sufficient to characterize an approach as marginalist, because other points should also be present. The principle of the minimum means precedes the marginal approach by far because it goes back at least to Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis (1746) and it is already present in the pre-marginalist writings. For example, we recall Pietro Verri, Giammaria Ortes, Cesare Beccaria, Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, among others, but also Adam Smith and Ricardo up to Nassau William Senior and John Stuart Mill.
In what follows, we consider the three previous subsections on the core of De Viti’s theoretical framework from the view of De Viti’s use of marginal analysis. We concluded that the state considered by De Viti is characterized by the production of goods and that the correspondent decisions are taken by a group of citizens that alternates in power with other groups chosen by citizen-taxpayers via voting. No marginal analysis is necessarily involved. Our analysis suggests that the Devitian theoretical framework is essentially based on the principle of minimum means. While this principle is implicit in marginal analysis, as we just indicated, it is an idea that pre-dates marginalism. We also suggested that De Viti’s assumption of the state factor of production is inessential to the core of his thought, and that, at any rate, it would be incompatible with marginal analysis.Footnote 22 Moreover, we recalled that the political group in power takes its decisions on the basis of a complex procedure, according to which the group estimates the quantities demanded by the citizens, and, for each public service, constantly modifies the supply of each public service to match the virtual demand as long as it perceives a mismatch between demand and supply. It is true that De Viti would also include in that procedure individuals’ evaluation in terms of utility, but that clearly is superfluous.
Subsequently, in section III, it emerged that he seldom employed marginal tools throughout his treatise; marginal analysis is mentioned only in a few pages of the Principî. The specific issues are: 1) public services, 2) tax incidence, and 3) tax progressivity. We now briefly discuss how De Viti used marginal analysis in such issues.
As for public services, in 1888, he did consider marginal analysis when discussing general public services: “the share-part of the overall cost must be adapted to the final degree of utility, which effectively benefits each consumer/taxpayer in his sharing of consumption … [this] principle, as an operating force, will tend to regulate the distribution of taxes” (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1888, p. 132). As we recall, however, he did not make use of this proposition, because he immediately recognized that it could not explain the actual behavior of the political class. In fact, that quote ends with: “in order to be operative, it is indispensable … for the public authority to know the hedonistic calculation of each consumer,” which would imply a state with the unrealistic character of omniscience.
A case for the use of marginal analysis might perhaps be argued regarding special public services. According to De Viti, for each service, the relevant characteristic is that the sum of the fees must equal the total costs, even though the fee might not necessarily be equal for everybody. In any case, the state confronts individual demands, and citizens regard special services “just as they would in front of any private producer” (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, p. 88). Thus, judging through today’s lens, we might conclude that marginal analysis is implicit, and yet it is true that only the idea of demand and supply is directly involved, which was present even before the marginalist revolution.
As for general public services, however, De Viti seems certainly concerned with marginal analysis when he stated, “On the abstract hypothesis that all taxpayers are called upon to give their judgment in advance on the advisability of a specific public expenditure, each one of them will, in his individual budget, make a comparison between the marginal utility of the general public service and the marginal utility of the tax” (ibid., pp. 125–126; italics added). However, De Viti’s complex procedure to identify the quantities of each service to produce and the distributing criterion for the corresponding cost mentioned above raises some concerns about the use of marginal analysis. The first problem is that marginality is tied only to an “abstract hypothesis,” which is distant from the reality that De Viti wanted to explain. In fact, he could not help but acknowledge that in the routine of the state, the problem of distributing the tax burden is “independent” of the problem of identifying the quantities of public services (ibid., p. 126). In other words, De Viti acknowledges that the marginal approach is not really capable of explaining the tax distribution mechanism. The second problem stems from the fact that the decisions of the group in power—for each service—regard the quantities to produce and the total estimated demand. Simultaneously, citizens react to the total amount offered. Additionally, this does not seem sufficient to characterize a marginal approach. A third problem relates to the unrealistic assumption that every citizen evaluates every single public service. The very idea that every citizen estimates the marginal utility of each public service is far from reality; moreover, it does not seem possible that a citizen is able to split the total amount of his income tax to obtain his marginal costs for every public service.
The second issue in the treatise where De Viti might recall marginal analysis is tax incidence. However, in the discussion of tax incidence, marginal schedules are never mentioned, and he never uses any diagram. Specifically, to illustrate the equilibrium of the monopolist, he provides tables in which the tax modifies unitary prices ad hoc (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, pp. 156–159). Indeed, his important contributions—namely, the idea of considering interconnections with the other markets and the expenditure of tax revenue—are discussed using only literary arguments, which do not require marginal analysis. The sole occasion on which his reasoning might recall marginal analysis because it is based on the idea of decreasing needs is a suggestion in a footnote—in line with the well-known statement of the marginalist Maffeo Pantaleoni—that a tax on labor income would induce little extra effort: “If you draw a curve of the decreasing needs according to their degree of urgency, referring to the initial moment of their subsequent satisfaction, the curve should all move up, if the degree of urgency was referred at the time in which the needs became habitual and are threatened by contraction, for effect of tax” (De Viti Reference De Viti de Marco1939, p. 144n).
The third issue that might involve marginal analysis is tax progressivity. In the previous section, we reported some of De Viti’s propositions on tax progressivity. We added that he used marginal concepts only to criticize the current doctrine and not as a foundation for his own analysis. Specifically, in criticizing the doctrine of sacrifice, his entire argument is based on the “decreasing scale of needs and on the consequent predisposition of the taxpayer to pay tax rates uniformly increasing” (ibid, p. 174). Henry Simons heavily criticized this line of argument: “His discussion, however, reveals little acquaintance with the doctrines criticized; one never knows what brand of ‘sacrifice theory’ he is attacking” (Simons Reference Simons1937, p. 714). Certainly, Simons was an unfair critic, but the idea of the diminishing marginal utility of income existed well before marginalism; moreover, De Viti is using outdated wording similar to the pre-marginalist setting.
V. FINAL REMARKS
In the last years of the nineteenth century, De Viti revolutionized public finance studies by placing collective economic activity within a theoretical or explanatory frame of reference, which he intended as a tool to explain fiscal phenomena, because his real target was to explain concrete, observable facts, such as tax incidence or public debt. On this issue, we observe that, in general, De Viti did not really use his theoretical framework in his important contributions to the explanation of concrete fiscal phenomena.
Next, we present evidence suggesting that the traditional view of De Viti’s framework can be summarized in a much more simplified form, because the core of his theory of the state is essentially grounded on the principles of minimum means and political competition, and on the assumption that citizens consume public services in proportion to their incomes. Therefore, it follows that some concepts that De Viti put forward are, in large measure, inessential. While maintaining their charm, his concepts are also stimulating and point to the modernity of De Viti’s thought. In fact, they are still a source of inspiration for scholars, though each uses specific De Viti propositions. Some current theoretical developments are taking their cue from the political principle; for instance, Manuela Mosca (Reference Mosca, Cardoso, Kurz and Steiner2018a) considers the single issue of competition and uses it as a key to interpreting De Viti’s thought. She also concludes that, for De Viti, the political value of competition is more important than the analytical side (2018a, p. 186). Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard Wagner (Reference Eusepi and Wagner2013) believe that, with the assumption of the state productive factor, De Viti introduced the state directly into the production process, and therefore did not conceive a market equilibrium, which the state later enters. Thus, they argue that, with the rejection of a sequential style of theorizing, De Viti took a path that is an alternative to the new political economy.Footnote 23 Conversely, Alessandro Petretto (Reference Petretto2014) analyzes the cooperative state configuration referring to the game-theoretic notion of cooperative game, and believes that the new political economyFootnote 24 has its origin in De Viti’s work. Accordingly, he devotes his efforts to formalizing propositions that he thinks he can draw from De Viti into the new political economy.
The final issue we raised in our analysis, however, concerns the question of the extent to which De Viti embraced marginalist theory. He did consider marginal analysis in discussing public goods in 1888, but did not follow that path because he realized that it could not explain reality. We find that, even if his role in spreading marginalism in Italy remains unquestioned, he seldom employed marginal tools in his Principî, and that his wording was perhaps more closely related with the pre-marginalist setting than with the marginalist one.
