T.V. Paul offers a thoughtful read of my Rising Titans, Falling Giants (RTFG). In this response, I address Paul’s critiques while offering some thoughts on where research on power shifts may go in the future.

Paul’s points can be briefly summarized. First, he observes that RTFG may understate the role of economics and, more broadly, contemporary forms of international exchange in shaping rising state incentives to prey on or support declining powers. Relatedly, he questions whether the power shift underway between the United States and China will parallel earlier rising state–declining state interactions. Finally, Paul asks how a declining power’s decisions factor into a rising state’s strategy.

All three points are well taken. In RTFG, I developed a theory based on core realist propositions and tested it against competing arguments—including claims regarding economic interdependence—using the record of rising-state strategy since 1945. Ultimately, I found that economic interdependence explained less variation in rising-state strategy than factors relating to military power and national security discussed in the book. This finding does not mean, however, that economics and the other contextual changes in contemporary world politics that Paul notes are irrelevant. Instead, the logic developed in RTFG suggests that interdependence, norms against conquest, institutions, and so on may act as a drag on incentives for predation and reinforce incentives for support—with the incentives themselves stemming from concerns over hard power and national security. Put differently, Paul is right that additional variables matter to rising states, but they are primarily conditional rather than causal; on their own, interdependence and the like cannot create reasons for cooperation or stop competition when power and security concerns dictate otherwise.

The preceding also helps address trends in US-Chinese relations. Paul suggests that the absence of overt Chinese balancing against the United States (elaborated further in his book) is puzzling, begging the question of whether rising-state strategy today parallels that of earlier periods. Viewed in light of RTFG, however, China’s behavior is less puzzling than might first appear. Weaker than the United States and vulnerable to US punishment, China has understandably embraced a limited predation strategy—what I call “weakening” in the book—to gradually shift the distribution of power against the United States without running large short-term risks. Hence, as Paul notes, it has largely settled conflicts of interest with the United States in the face of US pressure, while still working to adumbrate US advantages. This behavior is not only consistent with past rising states, but makes sense given, as I describe in the volume, China’s incentive to undermine US military dominance in what may appear to be a bipolar system.

What of the declining state’s strategy? Paul is right that this issue is largely omitted from the volume. Still, RTFG provides a foundation on which others may build. In particular, in detailing how a declining state’s military posture affects rising-state strategy, the theoretical core of the book suggests conditions under which more or less coercive declining-state strategies may interact with rising-state behavior and, in turn, prime the international system for rivalry or a peaceful handoff of power. Especially noteworthy is the possibility that, unless a declining state retrenches in situations when rising states have incentives to support or stands firm in conditions when rising states have incentives to prey, changing power dynamics may put rising and declining states on a collision course for rivalry or worse.

Ultimately, as Paul observes, research on rising-state strategy has been oddly neglected by the field, and I certainly never intended to have the final word. His points are generous and insightful, and I hope they point the way toward greater engagement on the course and conduct of rising-state strategy.