Classical liberal philosophers in the modern period came to see that the ability to speak openly and freely in the public sphere was critical to social justice. Figures such as Kant imagined a civil society in which individuals could pursue their needs and interests, attain security, and operate within some realm of freedom, but all this required a realm of protected speech. For Hegel, however, this approach skips over a critical set of questions: who are these individuals? How did they come to be? How did they come to formulate their needs and interests?
For Hegel, the public sphere is necessary not merely to express and negotiate over individual interests, but to contrive and conceive them. Hegel’s political philosophy suggests that, within what he calls the Sphere of Right, individuals are recognized ‘rights bearers’ (Reference Hegel and Dyde2005). But there is another sphere, the Sphere of Morality, in which individuals are not merely the passive bearers of rights, but participatory subjects who engage in the collective work of interpreting, enacting, and transforming their rights. In this public realm of open, deliberative discussion, subjects develop, and transform, their ideas about their needs and interests in debate with others who enter as equal participants. Following Hegel, then, it is important to understand that our interests are formulated in the public domain of speech and deliberation, rather than simply discovered or expressed.
The social taboos that exist in many societies, including the West, against speaking publicly about rape, especially when doing so in the first person, has precluded this process, inhibiting the development of understanding for both individual survivors and the public in general. When the victims of rape, sexual assault and sexual harassment are inhibited from speaking about their experiences, either because of social taboos or preemptive discrediting, civil society is underdeveloped. What is at stake is not only the ability of survivors to articulate their experience and their demands, but their capacity to analyze their experience, rendering nascent ideas into knowledge and understanding.
Today, survivors of sexual violence are speaking around the world, inspiring and strengthening local movements and creating global echoes with cross-fertilizing effects. Often, this begins with social media, but high-profile accusations are then taken up by the mainstream media. Once it moves from the decentralized and unregulated space of social media to corporate media, the speech of survivors enters institutions that have the power to edit, interpret, curate, and spin the story. As a result, in some cases the speech of survivors is made use of for purposes that are quite contrary to their intention: to sell sensationalized celebrity stories for the purpose of media competition, or to legitimate unilateral military action or increased funding for carceral institutions. Dominant sectors also have an interest in portraying poorer nations, minority religions, or non-white communities as the primary locus of the problem. In this way, new information and analyses from survivors gets lost in the repetition of existing shibboleths. And thus, too often the response of the mainstream to anti-rape activism, even when it lets stories be heard, has little to do with achieving a greater understanding of the epidemic of sexual violence.
In this context, I will argue here that first person speech on sexual violence remains an important dimension of the movement for social change in regard to sexual violence, despite the ways it can be reinterpreted, distorted, and used for extraneous and nefarious purposes. What does this particular form of speech contribute that no other can?
1.
The political anthropologist Pierre Clastres studied the relation of power and speech in varied cultural contexts, and developed the following account:
‘To speak is above all to possess the power to speak. Or again, the exercise of power ensures the domination of speech: only the masters can speak. As for the subjects: they are bound to the silence of respect, reverence, or terror…The man of power is always not only the man who speaks, but the sole source of legitimate speech’ (Clastres, Reference Clastres1987, p. 151).
On Clastres’ view, the organization of speech in a given social context is a way to map the organization of social power. And further, speech is a weapon of power, enacting domination in itself. Such a dire view may seem inapplicable to liberal, open societies which legally protect contentious speech. Yet conventions of authority, credibility and legitimacy – sometimes implicit, sometimes institutionally enacted and protected – thwart social movements of all sorts that offer new ideas about knowledge, expertise, and truth. For Clastres as well as for Foucault, these conventions should be understood as the real stakes of social conflict.
The current #MeToo movement, in its various iterations around the world, has taken up the issue of public speech as its central motif, and in this, it is far from new. Collective efforts to point out the ubiquity of sexual violations in the lives of women, girls, children, prisoners, and other vulnerable groups have been mushrooming steadily around the world since the 1980s, from New Delhi to Cairo to New York. This social activism has involved as a central feature the practice of survivors speaking publicly in ‘Speak-Outs’ and ‘Take Back the Night’ marches and rallies. The performative spectacles of ‘Slut Walks’ as well as demonstrations initiated by the ‘Ni Una Menos’ movements in Latin America are also forms of public speech: enacting collective displays of defiance and solidarity that name the police and judicial system as collaborators in systemic sexual violence. These movements challenge existing norms about how to define sexual coercion as well as culpability.
Criminal justice institutions are arenas in which accusers can ostensibly enact their right to speak with conventional legitimacy. Yet it is important to note that the ability to make charges through judicial procedures is not the central or primary focus of the new global movement. Some very high-profile judicial cases have had a galvanizing effect, but the efforts to use public demonstrations, social media, and the anonymous circulation of lists of perpetrators bypasses conventional avenues for institutional redress. The effort at reforming court and police procedures is critically important, but the central focus has aimed to transform the broad sphere of public discourse.Footnote 1
The tactic of victims coming forward publicly is not usually about making a charge against, and seeking legal redress from, an individual perpetrator. Many survivors conceal the name of their assailant, and simply describe their experience. The point is that through the mass of such disclosures the public at large can gain an appreciation of the dimensions of the epidemic and also come to understand from the nature of the events that these should not be taken as inevitable or unavoidable. The recent movement has been particularly adept at focusing on the many institutions, from Hollywood to the Catholic Church, that not only excuse and protect but instigate and even procure victims. The problem is not simple human depravity but corrupt institutions. In this way, we may overcome the widespread fatalism about this sort of crime.
Toward this goal, first person testimony can be compelling, but more importantly, victim testimony can provide information and analysis about the patterns that reveal the nature of the problem. In speaking publicly, victims enact resistance by defying the stigma of shame and the likelihood of presumptive disbelief. Some reactions acknowledge that a crime occurred but dispute how survivor’s characterize its significance – just ‘twenty minutes of action’ as one father of an accused young man characterized it. Some of the public continue to reserve their sympathy for the accused, since he’s a ‘genius’ or ‘simply troubled’ or ‘so young with his whole life before him now about to be ruined’. So there is a gamut of common responses that have the effect of dismissing the gravity of the victim’s experience, its likely long term effects on her life, and in this way rejecting the credibility of her first person reports either about the incident or its impact. Susan Brison reports being constantly told she was ‘just too sensitive’ for having difficulties with normal life after a brutal rape and assault in which her assailant left her for dead in a ditch. There is a logic that she identifies behind such dismissive responses: ‘As a society we live with the unbearable by pressuring those who have been traumatized to forget, and by rejecting the testimony of those who are forced to remember’ (Brison, Reference Brison2002, p. 5).
And yet, victimsFootnote 2 stream forward. In the United States, after Supreme Court nominee Bret Kavanaugh was accused in riveting televised testimony, his accuser, Christine Blasey Ford was the subject of coast to coast vilification and threats, so much so that she had to move her family into a safe house as if she had threatened a Mafia crime boss. Still, sexual assault hotlines experienced an increase of 150% after Blasey Ford’s testimony, and more accusers came forward in Hollywood, bringing the number of Weinstein’s accusers to over 100.
The cost to victims who come forward and identified publicly remains quite high (Traister, Reference Traister2019). They have lost jobs, careers, personal safety, relationships, and endangered their health. A woman who worked at Ford Motor Company lost her job, then lost her housing, then lost custody of her son, and now has to drive eight hours to visit him. Others have been deported to countries in which they are not safe.
The tactic of speaking out not only has great personal costs, but it is regularly coopted and misused. Corporate media markets may choose stories that have value as a form of sensationalism, while other stories may garner attention because they lend legitimacy to the carceral state, to racism, or to military operations in foreign countries. My own country of origin – Panama – was invaded in 1989 by the U.S. military after a week of daily media coverage of an episode in which Panamanian troops harassed U.S. soldiers and their wives. The persistent repetition of this relatively small incident helped to create public support for the subsequent unilateral military action that killed thousands of mostly poor Panamanians. That is the closest I have come to experiencing war in any direct way, as I spent many hours trying to reach my family members who were crouching under their dining room table as MIG fighters strafed buildings in their neighborhood.
Building on this overview, in this paper I will argue that the public speech of survivors faces at least three groups of obstacles: 1) the problem of epistemic injustice, that is, injustice in the sphere of knowledge 2) the problem of language and power, and 3) the problem of dominant discourses. I will explain and develop these points and end with a final argument, returning to Hegel, concerning the critical importance of speaking publicly on these areas of human experience.
2.
1) The problem of epistemic injustice
In the West, women have long been placed in a defensive posture about their credibility before they have uttered a word. ‘Accusations of rape,’ an eighteenth century lawyer argued, ‘regrettably… place the life of a citizen in the hands of a woman’ (E. Freedman, Reference Freedman2013, p. 17). His client, a wealthy New Yorker, was acquitted of raping a seamstress in his employ after a jury deliberation that lasted only fifteen minutes.
Ideas that correlate social identity with likely credibility have been promulgated throughout European history by some the most influential philosophers (Beard, Reference Beard2017; Shapin, Reference Shapin1995). Socrates believed women’s attention to their dress was proof of their intention to dissemble. Aristotle declaimed the tenor and pitch of women’s voices as a sign of insincerity and depravity. Rousseau advocated the educational segregation of the sexes so that boys could achieve their potential for independence of thought, while girls would remain properly deferential to the opinions of others. Kant considered darkness of skin tone a contraindication of intelligence.
These ideas remain, though perhaps only implicit, but they are too rarely challenged. Few educational curricula spend the time necessary to debunk them. As a result, they retain their influence over our mental landscapes. Still today, female news anchors, as well as candidates for political office (such as, famously, Margaret Thatcher), employ voice coaches to help them lower their tone and achieve a ‘masculine’ depth. The normal tenor of a female voice lacks authority.
Steven Shapin’s history of ideas about who could participate in the emergence of science traces the putative justifications behind some of these ideas. In early modern Europe, the illiteracy of peasants and women and the required obsequiousness of slaves were all taken to be disqualifying. Jews also lacked credibility because of their ‘cunning’, while interestingly, nobles were suspect as well since they were likely to be engaged in some court intrigue. Both of these latter groups were thought to be schooled in the arts of persuasive dissimulation. The issue for women actually combined several concerns: our purported sentimentality but also our economic dependence and subsequent need to flatter and manipulate. These ideas about the correlating criteria of credibility remain powerful today: witness the wide acquiescence to the idea that wealth enables political candidates to freely speak their mind. The common charge that female accusers have economic motives also resonates with this old history.
Achieving more epistemic justice for accusers means uncovering and critiquing these widespread ideas. What is the basis of skepticism about a given accusation, and is it a legitimate basis? Does a person’s economic condition, level of education, sexual history, profession, or social identity in any way justify skepticism or even preemptive dismissal?
As a way to avoid problematic credibility judgments, putatively objective criteria can be put forward, such as consistency. Attorneys, and jurors, rely heavily today on the consistency of accusers’ testimony as a way to assess their epistemic reliability (Lievore, Reference Lievore2004). This is an illusory solution. While consistency is certainly a legitimate part of everyday forms of judgment, it is also subject to manipulation in a way that mobilizes the sort of negative prejudices I just listed. When defense lawyers focus on irrelevant consistencies, they can then cast aspersions on an accuser’s memory, reliability, integrity, and by implication, their motivations. In the Bret Kavanaugh hearings, Blasey Ford was asked a series of questions about the distance between her home and the house where the assault took place, about the names of all of the people present in the house at the time, about her reported fear of flying and her history of airplane travel as well as the reasons for and destinations of the flights she took. None of these questions were germane to establishing the credibility of Blasey Ford’s charges, but were designed to erode her testimony through finding inconsistencies or inadequacies in her ability to report details. And it was the answers Blasey Ford gave to these questions that were used to discredit her account of what Kavanaugh had done to her at that party.
The criteria of consistency is today applied not only to statements in court, but also to informal communications by the accuser with their friends, family and co-workers through email and social media. Yet, consistency about such specifics as the exact date of an event, or the names of persons attending a house party, are not always telltale signs of faulty memory about the encounter itself. One prosecutor explains that, in her experience, ‘victims of relatively isolated offences maintain a vivid, albeit distressing, recollection of the crimes. A victim may not remember what colour shorts she was wearing when, at eight years of age some 20 years ago her uncle put his finger in her vagina, but the victim remembers that event with certainty’ (Shead, Reference Shead2014, p. 60). Research indicates that exactitude about peripheral features can waver, but not necessarily the principle features of the encounter itself.
The findings of such research are intuitively plausible. Sexual violations, whether of a violent nature or of the more manipulative sort, tax the victims’ mental capacities. She, or he, is sometimes trying to assess the danger and calibrate effective options while maintaining a conversation and a neutral facial expression. It’s like taking a math test while swimming in the open sea. One’s faculties are engaged in high-stakes multi-tasking. This can explain why our peripheral perceptions remain fuzzy even as we retain with crystal clarity the memory of the physical violation and the identity of the perpetrator. Such memories are reinforced after the fact by the need for survival, since we need to remember who to avoid.
I was assaulted as a child, stayed silent for many years out of fear, and as an adult endeavored to establish the period of time in which my assaults occurred. I had to look at old pictures, recall related school events, and gather up the courage to direct some questions to my mother. Some details continue to elude me, but, unfortunately, I have never forgotten the central events themselves.
Diverse conversational contexts that take place afterward will inevitably affect the precision and detail called for. In fact, some contexts may call for intentional misdirection, if we fear that the person we are speaking to about the event may try to pursue revenge against our perpetrator, for example.
The social identity of accusers should be irrelevant to how their credibility is judged, but it continues to play a role. Emphasizing apparently objective criteria such as consistency may be taken to be a corrective measure, but even this sort of criteria is subject to manipulation and misuse. The manipulation takes intentional advantage, I’d suggest, of the legacy of gender prejudice, which can be easily animated all the while concealed behind an alibi of unbiased judgment.
2) The problem of language and power
Clastres spent many years studying the conventions of speaking that operated in different types of societies. He concluded that speech and power are constitutively related, but in different ways in different societies. In societies with strong state-based institutional organization, such as our own, power is ‘the sole source of legitimate speech’ and the power of speech is ‘detached from society as a whole’ rather than held universally (1987, pp. 151–52). An accuser or defender may be allowed to speak in court and yet the ultimate epistemic assessment of their words is held exclusively by a judge or jury whose task is circumscribed by legal rules.
Of course, modes of allowing speech and distributing credibility change over time. As Michel Foucault reminds us, hundreds of years ago in Europe the mad were considered more reliable than most because they did not hesitate to speak their minds. Hence, the value of their role as court jesters was the ability to give tactless but truthful testimony (Reference Foucault1988). Unlike those engaged in court intrigue, the mad were free of strategic agendas and foolish enough to speak the truth to kings. Because of this, the mad were epistemically useful, and credible.
Foucault suggests that, in more modern societies, the operations of power are not so centralized. Judicial courts increasingly rely on expert testimony from conventionally accredited authorities drawn from the social sciences, the academy, medicine, psychiatry and the police. Relations of compatibility between these diverse structures of authorization help shore up their acceptance: they need not be organized in pyramid form. Thus Foucault argues that the norms of credibility and expertise operate within a decentralized structure of institutions that resonate with one another. This too can be very difficult to dislodge or transform.
The confessional practices of the Catholic Church produced a structure of speaking relationships that today resonate in secular domains, creating a certain familiarity. A penitent confesses to his confessor, not merely about his actions, but also, and perhaps more importantly, about his dreams, desires, and thoughts. The priest passes judgment and gives absolution by instructing the recitation of a certain number of rosaries or other practices. In this speaking relation, the penitent provides the raw data, without analysis or judgment: the latter are provided exclusively by the priest. The penitent has first person privilege: they and they alone can report their innermost thoughts and feelings, but they have no privilege over the analysis of the level of venality, motivation, or cure. Talk therapy generally operates with the same form: the client details their experiences and thoughts, while the therapist provides the analysis, diagnosis, and behavioral advice.
Some years back a colleague and I analyzed the way in which victims of sexual violence were represented on television, during the period when this topic became a commonplace focal point in daytime talk shows (Alcoff and Gray, Reference Alcoff and Gray1993). Inevitably, the shows began with riveting, emotional, first person testimony of victims to garner viewer attention. Since this topic was relatively new, it did garner viewer attention. Victims were prompted by a series of questions posed by the show’s host, generally sympathetic (at least initially) but also sometimes asking the skeptical questions they believed their viewers might want answered. In this way the host positioned themselves as the representative of the public, just as the priests were representatives of the Church or of God. After a period of such questioning, a third figure almost inevitably appeared: a psychiatrist or psychologist, portrayed as dispassionate and objective, who could interpret what the victims said for the audience and offer their expert analysis. This analytical capacity was not accorded the victims themselves. Here, the confessional structure of the Church was replicated in a secular, public space where authorization was given by educational credentials rather than religious ones. Once again, the person giving first person testimony had limited epistemic privilege: they were put on the stand to be interpreted, judged and analyzed by others.
Clastres and Foucault both suggest that the organization of speaking roles manifest in such scenarios gain their credence more from historical legacy and cultural convention than considered epistemic judgment. To understand such scenarios, we need an analysis of language and power. How are the two related in our society, in our common conventions? Why do we assume that certain configurations of power ensure truthfulness and reliability? Why do first person experiential reports from individuals with lower status (generally because of their group identity) have to be judged by credentialed experts and authorities? How does this method restrict speech? For a very long time such methods have preempted speech by victims who accuse husbands, fathers, mothers, the rich, the Church, and the psychiatric establishment. As Clastres pointed out, the power of speech is not distributed universally across the population, with predictable effects on the distributions of power as well as the recalcitrance of these distributions to change.
3) The problem of dominant discourses
This problem connects to concerns just discussed about the supportive relations between existing organizations of power and the current conventions of speech, yet it involves the content of speech more than the structure of speaking relations or roles. The idea of a discourse is that our speech enters into a swirl of already existing and familiar beliefs, ideas, concepts, and framing assumptions by which they are interpreted and in some cases reshaped. In this way even new and original ideas can be domesticated, sometimes without intention on anyone’s part. Discourses cannot determine truth: they cannot make it true that the moon is made of green cheese. But discourses can determine whether a claim is understood as meaningful enough to be pursued (Hacking, Reference Hacking2004). At one time the question of whether human beings could travel to the moon would have engendered puzzled stares. This was beyond the realm of meaningful plausibility, but so was the claim, much more easily investigated, one might think, that a husband raped his wife. Because dominant discourses affect which claims are taken to be intelligible and plausible enough to generate the search for evidence, they can have a determinate effect on new claims and new concepts.
In this context, consider the widely used concept of consent. Rape, sexual assault and sexual coercion are legally defined in relation to consent, in the sense that consent has become the key criterion used to distinguish morally blameworthy versus morally blameless sex. Given that bondage has become a popular practice, bruises and even injuries cannot suffice. What we want to know is whether all parties consented. Consent has not always been the principle focal point, but in the age of decreased religiosity, and an acceptance of sexual pluralism, the question has shifted from what the participants of a sexual encounter are doing, and whether it conforms to the religious dictum, for example, to simply whether they are all consenting. This concept has become hegemonic in everyday thinking about sexual practises well beyond the legal arena.
Its history is instructive. A century ago, laws in the United States as well as other countries referenced ‘seduction’ rather than consent (Freedman, Reference Freedman2013). Seduction roughly equaled breach of promise, as when a woman was pregnant out of wedlock. If she had engaged in sex under the promise of lawful marriage, yet found herself alone and bereft, she could bring legal charges. Pregnancy was indeed a crisis for unmarried women, since they could be legally fired and turned out of their housing. Thus, her crisis was a social crisis which seduction laws were designed to solve: if a marriage could be forced, society was off the hook. Interestingly, seduction law put the onus on men to explain themselves: trials centered on establishing the man’s words as well as his actions. Women’s own desire, will, and consent were beside the point.
The movement to replace seduction with consent laws was supported by a lot of men, some of whom may have been motivated by less than feminist concerns. Seduction laws put all men in danger of an accusation that could land them in prison if they had sex out of wedlock. Needless to say, these laws were far from foolproof: a man could marry a woman to avoid prison and then, shortly thereafter, leave town. Perhaps more importantly, these laws ignored the physical, economic, or emotional coercion women experienced. They were designed simply to force men to marry and provide economic support for pregnant women.
Against this backdrop, consent seemed to be a better approach. Consent focused on what is most morally blameworthy, coercion, rather than whether there was a lawful marriage. And yet consent has shifted the focus of trials to the question of what women said and did, even the way they dressed, in order to establish whether or not they consented. Hence, throughout the twentieth century, trials focused on women’s attire, sexual past, and demeanor as the basis upon which juries and judges could pass judgement.
If we consider the way in which the concept of consent entered into dominant, gender-laden discourses, we can more clearly discern why it has proven to have such limitations and generated so much feminist critique (Pateman, Reference Pateman1980; Gauthier, Reference Gauthier and Burgess-Jackson1999; Cahill, Reference Cahill2001). The idea of consent resonates with the contract tradition in western market societies, in which we make promises to deliver goods and services, as Carole Pateman has argued. To consent is to make a sort of contract, legally binding, in which ones promises to deliver a service over a specified time frame. This may give the person who receives the consent the dangerous idea that they are ‘owed sex’, as Ann Cahill has pointed out, and have been cheated if it was not delivered.
The language of contracts is phenomenologically inadequate for sexual encounters. Desire and arousal are not the kind of things that one can guarantee will be sustained. When the focal point is the consent of the woman in the encounter, this replicates, and resonates with, still prevalent ideas that men ask and women answer, that males are sexual aggressors and females are receptive, and in this way the focus on consent serves to reinforce heterosexual norms in which femininity is associated with receptivity and caring, while masculinity is associated with sexual needs and dominance (Gavey, Reference Gavey2005).
Most importantly, we know there are structural conditions that can predetermine consent, from economic dependence at work or at home, to status and ranking differences that produce what Jeffrey Gauthier calls ‘the choice situation of the oppressed class’ (Gauthier, Reference Gauthier and Burgess-Jackson1999, p. 16). Choose this low paying job or that one, this abusive situation or an end to your career. In research by Nicola Gavey, women report that they consent in order not to be raped, as a way to reduce physical harm and trauma.
From this we can see how the concept of consent becomes capable of maintaining existing relations of power. Dropped into societies in which transactional relations are normalized, contractual relations are familiar and intuitive, and gender involves dominance, consent becomes domesticated, familiar, unobjectionable. Women’s desire, will, and sexual pleasure may continue to remain off the map of consideration when consent is subtly coerced or chosen as the best of bad alternatives. Foucault notes that discourses are not simply collections of statements, but also involve practices, forms of subjectivity, and ways in which institutions are organized.
Consent is not unimportant, and I am not arguing it has no utility. But its position in our discourse as the obvious unassailable determinant of what is morally blameless sex needs to be understood as limited by the discursive context into which it has entered. Consent has served as the readily available cornerstone of many defense strategies, including Harvey Weinstein’s: his solicitors have claimed that his accusers were actually consenting, as indicated by their friendly emails and relations after the assault. In this way consent is wielded as a weapon by which to remove the structural power relations from the frame of analysis. This problem is not determined by the meaning of the concept on its own, but by its discursive relations to ideas and framing assumptions still in dominance about sex, about women, and about men.
3.
Liberal societies that protect the rights of free and open speech have for too long ignored the ways in which the speech of the disempowered is in reality policed, disciplined, and restricted. Certain sorts of speech from disempowered groups, carefully chosen and curated, may be taken up and given circulation, but it is too often co-opted by those higher up in the chain of institutional power in ways that limit and distort its meanings and effects.
The sequestering of topics concerning sexual violence, especially institutionalized sexual violence, has meant that many women and other victims have not been able to enact their subjectivity in civil society. When survivors speak, their speech must often pass through media or legal domains in which it is interpreted, judged, and edited by others who have other interests besides addressing the problem. Informal conventions of assessing credibility have a similar ability to preempt discussion about the epidemic of sexual violence. We must begin to think past these stumbling blocks, and reconsider what would really be required to free up the speech of the subordinate.
