There is a huge variety of influences – acknowledged and unacknowledged – on Balthasar's massive theology. One of the hardest things to do when interpreting him is to identify which of these are the key ones: the ones which help him structure his thought as a whole, and give him resources for the evaluation and marshalling of other (for him) less seminal thinkers and texts.
Kevin Mongrain takes the bold step of identifying Irenaeus as just this sort of key thinker for Balthasar, and aims to show (through his ‘Irenaean retrieval’) that, with this key debt properly recognised, Balthasar's thought can be shown to be genuinely systematic in its organisation of vast amounts of material: classical, patristic, medieval and modern. This is an original thesis, and an energetically defended one. It is also, perhaps, a little quixotic in that Balthasar himself does not take pains to flag up Irenaeus as the central (as opposed to the merely important) influence that Mongrain claims he is. More obvious, and more often rehearsed, candidates for the role are Ignatius, the twentieth-century Silesian priest Erich Przywara and Henri de Lubac. To be fair, Mongrain does fulsomely acknowledge the latter two (especially de Lubac), but then allows them to fade almost entirely from view; Ignatius, on the other hand, is almost completely absent – most bizarrely and misleadingly in the book's discussion of Balthasar's use of the category of ‘mission’ (p. 192). My sense is that Mongrain protests Irenaeus's organising importance a little too much. Nonetheless, the exercise proves helpful in bringing to light Balthasar's continuities with a patristic world of thought, helping us to understand his critique of narrowly rationalist theological approaches, and pointing up some genuine theological commitments that characterise his thought.
The core of the Irenaean legacy in Balthasar's thought, according to Mongrain, is as follows:
First, it is anti-Gnostic. This has both methodological and metaphysical implications. Methodologically it indicates Balthasar's rejection of ‘a theoretical and speculative theological disposition’, in favour of a ‘contemplative and sacramental one’. As Mongrain puts it: ‘[t]o “see” the glory of God in Christ. . . is to actively live out – not simply to think through in abstract concepts – one's unique role in God's plan’ (p. 59). In other words, the orthodox Christian theologian's ‘method’ must be self-involving – and more specifically, perhaps, worshipping. ‘True gnosis’ centres on doxology; ‘false gnosis’ rejects it (p. 29). Perhaps more important, Balthasar's anti-Gnostic attitude takes up a metaphysical stance (as Irenaeus did before him) in opposition to any quasi-Gnostic denial of biblical monotheism (p. 232). He refuses to ‘lapse into an explanatory theory that puts God and world on the same ontological plane’ (p. 35). The benefits of this refusal are that God's independence and freedom from any assimilation to world-process are affirmed. Balthasar's stance also, though, allows him a ground for defending the genuinely unique, personal identities of the created recipients of revelation – they are not mere epiphenomena of the divine life. As distinct from their Creator, they have their own integrity (even though always dependent for their being on the divine giver).
Second, Mongrain contends, Irenaeus gives Balthasar a notion of the incarnation as a corpus triforme. The corpus triforme is ‘the one Word of God in three continuous, overlapping sacramental incarnations’ (p. 37), or the incarnation as a three-phase process. The Jewish community is the first of these; the second is the incarnate earthly life of Jesus himself; and the third is the Christian community, the church. ‘All three ‘phases’ are the human ‘form’ of God in history’ (p. 38). The effect of this sensitivity to the fact of the incarnation as a cumulative process, Mongrain argues, is that Balthasar is a highly historically minded theologian. He is interested in ‘the full historical determinacy of faith’ (p. 137), and insists that history is necessarily the place of its appropriation by the believer.
The corpus triforme approach believes that revelation is always historically particular, and believes in the irreducible uniqueness of historical events. It emphasises that revelation is material and embodied. It insists that you cannot separate Christ from the church, and that to perceive and relate to Christ properly you must also perceive and relate to the church. It insists that you cannot separate the Old from the New Testament, and that you cannot stress the new dispensation in Christ in such a way that nature and grace are set in opposition to one another. It gives a central place to pedagogy (the learned practices of relation to Christ's truth being time-taking practices). All of this is authentically Balthasarian, for Balthasar is absolutely committed to the concreteness of the particular forms of revelation. It may indeed also be Irenaean, and one of the things Balthasar most appreciates in Irenaeaus. But it is a commitment to be found in so many of his other sources too that it is hard to claim Irenaeus as their exclusive source.
Moreover, the robustness of the book's defence of the historical sensitivity of Balthasar's theology, though impressive and intriguing, is not finally persuasive. Mongrain links it to Balthasar's ‘epistemic humility’ – which is all very well – but Balthasar remains an inveterate typologiser, especially in his ecclesiology (which identifies Marian, Petrine and other ‘essences’ or ‘principles’ of the church). These are precisely timeless or idealised forms and as such anti-historical in character.
Likewise, the book does not convince in its claim for the deeply social/political character and impetus of Balthasar's thought – though it is very good to have the best possible case made for this. (There is very little else Mongrain could throw into his argument beyond what he already has.) But Balthasar's theology fails to engage with much praxis beyond ecclesial praxis, even though his anti-speculative tendencies want to celebrate the fact that ‘praxis in the concrete realm of history must be the starting point of theological reflection’ (p. 193). This leaves untouched whole areas of human social life where a sharp critique of (or a constructive contribution to) discussion would be valuable: economics, political order, the administration of justice and so on. Balthasar's political theology always remains at the ‘meta-’ level.
Mongrain's book is perhaps better as an explication of central features of Christian orthodoxy than as an explication of Balthasar. It is, for example, powerful when stressing monotheism as the means by which Christian theology can understand the central Christian difference (that between God and creation), and when persuading us that it is only by being transcendently other that God can be genuinely and mutually related to everything. It is less good at giving us the ‘full Balthasar’ (and maybe that's too big a challenge for any single book) – despite its confidence in mapping all the thinkers it deals with in bold categories of error and truth, and despite the comprehensiveness promised by its title (The Systematic Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar). All in all, the book leaves the impression of a certain partiality – presenting a Balthasar somewhat constrained by the categories he is expected to fit, rather than evoking the eclectic, often frustrating brilliance of the man.
