Conceptualizing Alevism and Political Participation

Since there is no agreed-upon definition of Alevism or Alevi identity, examining Alevism as a social formation and identity is a difficult task (Shakman-Hurd Reference Shakman-Hurd2014). Alevism as we know it dates back to the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, finding followers primarily among the Turkmen, Kurdish, and Zaza populations. Alevis do not adhere to orthodox Sunni Islamic practices, such as veiling of women, fasting during Ramadan, and gender-segregated worshipping in mosques. Alevi mystical poetry and music rituals performed in cemevis (Alevi houses of worship) form key elements of the Alevi collective identity.

Alevis share in common with mainstream Shi’a an attachment to the Twelve Imams, including Ali, the first imam and the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad (Karakaya-Stump Reference Karakaya-Stump2018). Yet Alevism differs from Shi’a Islam in the sense that it has also been influenced by Central Asian shamanistic beliefs, Sufism, and local and regional religions of Anatolia (Melikoff Reference Melikoff1998). It is this distinctiveness that separates them from Alawites in Syria, whom Hafez al-Assad declared as Shi’a Muslims in the 1970s under the auspices of an influential Lebanese-based Iranian cleric named Ayatollah Musa as-Sadr. In doing so, al-Assad sought to “forge common political interests between the Alawis and the regime on one hand and Syria’s small Shi’a minority on the other and laid groundwork for a strategic alliance with Iran” (Robinson et al. Reference Robinson, Connable, Thaler and Scotten2018, 78).

While the existing literature often views Alevism as a syncretism of Islamic and pre-Islamic traditions originating in Anatolia, Dressler warns that the differentiation between orthodox and heterodox traditions of Islam is often historically contingent, top-down, and guised in the rhetoric of objectivity (Reference Dressler2015, 448). He cautions “against the assumption of clearly defined and bounded traditions as presented by major religious traditions themselves, and reinforced by modernist and historicist discourses on religion” and rather suggests “understanding Alevism within a framework of overlapping and porous religious traditions” (Reference Dressler2015, 446). Drawing on Asad’s work (Reference Asad1993, Reference Asad2003), he points to the changing public meaning of religion against the backdrop of the dynamics and transformations arising from the modern nation-state, given that the ascription of heterodoxy to Alevis is closely linked to the project of Turkish secularism and nation-building (Reference Dressler2015, 446).

It is also important to distinguish Alevism from Bektashism. The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature since both groups share a similar belief system. As Kaya concludes (Reference Ayhan2016, 277), “Bektashism is the name of a Sufi order dating back to the thirteenth century, which is an order open to outsiders, while Alevism is an ethno-religious term based on lineage.” In other words, unlike Bektashis, Alevis are both a religious community and an ethnic group.

In Alevi studies scholarship, some scholars also differentiate between the terms “Aleviness” and “Alevism.” Shankland (Reference Shankland2003, 21) and Massicard (Reference Massicard2003, 1), for example, use the term “Aleviness” to refer to the Alevi identity itself and “Alevism” to address the political movement in the name of Aleviness. Çamuroğlu (Reference Çamuroğlu, Olsson, Özdalga and Raudvere1998, 79), on the other hand, prefers to use the Turkish term “Alevilik” instead of “Alevism” in order to address both the identity-related and sociopolitical aspects of the phenomenon. Throughout the article the term “Alevism” will be used for the sake of consistency.

Another key concept used in the article is “political participation,” which is defined as “taking part in the processes of formulation, passing and implementation of public policies” (Grigoriadis Reference Grigoriadis2006, 446). Others have defined the term as “every voluntary activity a person performs in their role as a citizen to influence authoritative regulations and decisions of the political system or political processes” (van Deth Reference Van Deth2014, 351). Acts of political participation may include voting in elections and assemblies; participation or membership in councils and parliaments; and active participation in political parties, pressure groups, demonstrations, and community work (Grigoriadis Reference Grigoriadis2006; Nielsen Reference Nielsen2013). Political participation by itself does not lead to inclusion, however, “it is the necessary first step in the long process towards bringing in the voices of communities and improving their capabilities” (Cottrel-Ghai Reference Cottrel-Ghai, Ghai, Sing’Oei and Wanyoike2013, 1). This article focuses on the Alevi Opening and the German Islam Conference—two platforms that have specified the improvement of Alevis’ political participation as one of their key goal—and examines why Alevis have been more satisfied with the outcome of the German Islam Conference than with that of the Alevi Opening.

The Limits of the EU’s Normative Power and Transnational Advocacy Networks in Promoting the Political Participation of Minorities

Particularly since its 2004 enlargement, the EU has called for better minority rights protection measures. Through a variety of instruments, ranging from traditional diplomacy and partnership agreements to the provision of subsidies, the EU has sought to raise awareness about minority political participation and inclusion in both member and candidate states (Börzel and Risse Reference Börzel, Risse, Jørgensen, Pollack and Rosamond2006; Tocci et al. Reference Tocci, Hakim, Emerson, Fernandes, Hanau-Santini, Noutcheva and Portela2008). While equality and non-discrimination are recognized as two of the key principles of minority rights at the EU level (Wiener and Schwellnus Reference Wiener and Schwellnus2004), the absence of universal criteria for the identification of minorities and minority right standards complicates the matter (Jackson-Preece Reference Jackson-Preece2005, 10). Hence, the role of the EU in transferring norms and shaping state policies in this area has remained limited. EU authorities’ superficial monitoring of candidate states have also called the EU’s influence into question (Rechel Reference Rechel2008; Barten Reference Barten2015; Agarin and Cordell Reference Agarin and Cordell2016).

Norm diffusion is considered an effective factor in pushing states toward policy change (Diez et al. Reference Diez, Stetter and Albert2006; Tocci et al. Reference Tocci, Hakim, Emerson, Fernandes, Hanau-Santini, Noutcheva and Portela2008). For example, the EU’s 1993 Copenhagen Criteria target candidate states, which are expected to adopt the shared norms of the EU in exchange for promises of future membership (Börzel and Risse Reference Börzel, Risse, Jørgensen, Pollack and Rosamond2006; Grabbe Reference Grabbe2006). The EU stipulates that states seeking EU membership must establish institutions that safeguard democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and protection of minorities; these rules underpin claims that the EU is a “normative power” (Manners Reference Manners2002).

An important body of research foregrounds the role of the EU as a norm promoter without overlooking the role of domestic actors and constraints (Sedelmeier Reference Sedelmeier2011; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier Reference Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier2004; Checkel Reference Checkel2005). Scholars taking this approach have advanced a distinction between the quest for institutional adjustment to EU structures, policies, and legal frameworks, with the EU itself as the prime driver of reforms (i.e. EU-ization), and a multi-dimensional and non-linear process whereby European norms, policies and institutions (broadly defined) are continuously negotiated between domestic and regional actors (i.e. Europeanization) (Buller and Gamble Reference Buller and Gamble2002; Kaliber Reference Kaliber2014; Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber Reference Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber2016).

Another branch of the literature has emphasized the impact of transnational advocacy networks on domestic policy in parallel to the growth of empirical studies documenting cross-country variation in norm diffusion (Keck and Sikkink Reference Keck and Sikkink1998; Khagram et al. Reference Sanjeev, Riker and Sikkink2002; Carpenter Reference Carpenter2007). Transnational advocacy networks, created by like-minded activists and organizations, establish ties between various actors and allow domestic groups that are excluded from decision-making processes to press their case before the state. Knowledge exchange on the status of minority groups allows these networks to raise consciousness on minorities and pressure states to improve their rights. As Keck and Sikkink (Reference Keck and Sikkink1998) demonstrate, this can be done by attracting media and policy-makers’ attention or by “naming” and “shaming” the targeted states and gaining support from “ally” states and international organizations.

However, states may have few incentives to comply with external pressure if such appeals do not overlap with their domestic interests. Risse-Kappen (Reference Risse-Kappen1995) has shown that the capacity of transnational actors to promote norms and to influence state policy depends on the domestic context and the extent of institutional and legal impediments.

While the EU’s norm diffusion and the mobilization of Alevi advocacy networks in Turkey and Germany have played a key role in raising awareness regarding the political participation of Alevis (Gurcan Reference Gurcan2015), the Alevi Opening and the German Islam Conference have been undertaken mainly because they have been compatible with the “national interests” of Turkey and Germany. In addition, Alevi leaders in both countries reached a consensus on the framing of their demands. Yet the Alevi Opening has had only limited impact on the political participation of Alevis compared with the German Islam Conference due to Turkey’s restrictive political and legal climate and the AKP’s framing of the Alevi Opening through a Hanafi Sunni prism. The following sections will detail the Alevi Opening and the German Islam Conference to demonstrate how domestic opportunities and constraints have shaped the initiation and success of these political platforms.

Shattered Hopes: The Turkish Alevi Opening

The contemporary minority regime in Turkey evolved out of the Ottoman millet system and the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. Millet has its roots in early Islam and the Ottomans used it to grant religious minorities limited autonomy that enabled them to regulate their own affairs. Minorities enjoyed their autonomy as long as they paid their taxes and ensured the maintenance of internal security (Aviv Reference Aviv2016).

The millet system divided the population into two categories: the non-Muslim population (millet), such as Jewish, Armenian Gregorian, and Greek Orthodox groups, and the Muslim population (ümmet), which was treated as a unity with no legal recognition of ethnic or sectarian diversity. Under the millet system, the Ottoman Empire aimed to exert power over its non-Muslim populations by settling these communities’ civil concerns through ecclesiastical authorities appointed by the Ottoman sultans (Mardin Reference Mardin, Ali and Ozbudun1981, 192–196). Although Alevis were treated as ümmet in administrative matters and subjected to Sunni Islam, they were labeled as “heretics” and viewed as “infidels” by the ulama (Kehl-Bedrogi Reference Kehl-Bodrogi, White and Jongerden2003). Alevis’ marginalization under the Ottoman Empire deepened after the 1514 Battle of Çaldıran between the Sunni Ottoman Sultan Selim I and the Shi’a Shah Ismail I of the Safavid Empire. Following the defeat of the Safavids, Alevis’ resistance to being assimilated into Sunni Islam increased (Çelik Reference Çelik and Issa2017).

Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, in order to neutralize the resilient cultural elements of the Ottoman era, the newborn Turkish republic emphasized “Turkishness” over the predominantly Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire and strived to incorporate Alevis into the republican commonality (Shankland Reference Shankland2003, 14). However, as Kaya (Reference Ayhan2016) notes, “throughout the nation-building process, the state elite followed the Ottoman heritage of the millet system, imposing the dominance of Sunni Islam on the rest of the population” (282). The ruling Turkish elite has systematically asserted that Alevis are principally Muslim even though their Islam is labeled as “heterodox” in order to integrate Alevis into a nation with a Turkish and Sunni-Muslim identity (Dressler Reference Dressler2015, 446). For centuries, the Alevi community’s relationship with the state has been marked by distrust and occasional violent conflict because Alevis’ search for collective rights has always been perceived as a “threat” to the unity and authority of the state (İçduygu and Soner Reference İçduygu and Soner2006; Toktaş and Aras Reference Toktaş and Aras2009).

Articles 37–45 of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty form the basis for the legal recognition of non-Muslim citizenship rights to this day. The Treaty grants full citizenship rights only to non-Muslims belonging to the Jewish, Armenian Gregorian, and Greek Orthodox groupings inherited from the Ottoman millet system. In other words, neither the millet system nor the Lausanne framework that succeeded it legally recognizes Alevis as a minority group (Oran Reference Oran2018).

Following the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923, new laws threatened Alevis’ cultural and religious institutions. In 1925, Law No. 677 brought about the closure and prohibition of lodges, shrines and other similar religious sites. Law No. 677 presented the most direct challenge to the Alevi community, the creation of the Diyanet in 1924, which only serves the followers of the Hanafi Sunni sect of Islam in Turkey (Bayır Reference Bayır2013; Mutluer Reference Mutluer2014).

Rejection of differences as a marker of identity and biased treatment of Sunni Muslims continued throughout the 1950s. In the period after the 1960–61 military intervention, new institutional arrangements promoted and expanded pluralism, clarifying and expanding the rights and liberties of individuals while continuing to reduce the principle of equality to “uniform treatment” in terms of language and legal rights (İçduygu and Soner Reference İçduygu and Soner2006). Although formal institutions remained blind to variation within the Muslim population, ideological disputes combined with major attacks targeting Alevi groups in Malatya (April 17, 1978), Sivas (September 3, 1978), Kahramanmaraş (December 19, 1978), and Çorum (May-July 1980) showed that the status of the non-Sunni population had long been problematic (Sinclair-Webb Reference Sinclair-Webb, White and Jongerden2003).

Additionally, the aftermath of the 1980 military coup and the promotion of a new policy of “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” revived state favoritism of Sunni Islam in formal institutions and civil society (Çarkoğlu and Bilgili Reference Çarkoğlu and Bilgili2011, 354). By the mid-1980s, the political constraints enshrined in the military-authored 1982 Constitution had loosened through a series of amendments. Accordingly, non-Sunni communities gained more freedom to discuss and promote their identity in the public sphere. However, an arson attack that caused the death of thirty-three Alevi individuals in Sivas on July 3, 1993 rekindled fear and trauma within the community (Kaya Reference Kaya1998). Alevis’ trust in the Turkish state was further shaken in the 1995 Gazi quarter riots that took place after a gunned attack at multiple cafés and restaurants and resulted in the death of many local Alevi community leaders. It was in this political context that the Alevi community institutionalized its demands in the form of voluntary associations and organizations (Soner and Toktaş Reference Soner and Toktaş2011; Sökefeld Reference Sökefeld2008). In the 1990s, Alevi actors in Germany also served as the drivers of the institutionalization of the Alevi movement in Turkey (Avcı Reference Avcı2005).

The challenge to Alevis’ political participation comes not only from the narrow Turkish minority regime rooted in the Treaty of Lausanne but also from the limited capacity of the EU and transnational advocacy networks to pressure the Turkish state. The beginning of Turkey’s accession talks with the EU following its official recognition as a candidate for EU membership at the 1999 Helsinki Summit paved the way for the emergence of new networking and mobilization channels for Alevis in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Tekdemir Reference Tekdemir2018). The ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as part of Turkey’s EU accession process strengthened “the impact of the ECtHR jurisprudence on the protection of human rights in Turkey” and encouraged Alevis to make claims before the Court (Kurban Reference Kurban, Anagnostou and Psychogiopoulou2010, 169). Furthermore, the impact of the Alevi interest groups in Germany on the Alevi movement in Turkey grew as Turkey’s EU bid progressed (Özyürek Reference Özyürek2009; Borovalı and Boyraz Reference Borovalı and Boyraz2014).

Even though the EU lacks legally-binding jurisprudence on minority rights or specific guidelines for the inclusion of religious minorities in its acquis, its annual progress reports on Turkey have focused attention on Alevi demands (Gurcan Reference Gurcan2013). The Regular Report on Turkey in 1998 was the first EU report to cover the “Alevi question” in the country. Following the 1999 Helsinki Summit, Alevis were granted even more coverage. For instance, as Massicard (Reference Massicard2003) and Özyürek (Reference Özyürek2009) have noted of the EU’s Progress Report (2000), it states that “the official approach toward Alevis seems to remain unchanged. Alevi complaints notably concern compulsory religious instruction in schools and textbooks, which does not recognize the Alevi identity” (18). By 2002, a number of policies affecting the Alevi community, such the status of cemevis, the relationship of the community with the Diyanet, the Hanafi Sunni bias in compulsory religious education in Turkish public schools, the restrictions on the freedom of association and founding of Alevi organizations, and ongoing lawsuits in Turkish courts and the ECtHR had been addressed in the progress reports.

Over the years, Alevi interest groups in both Turkey and Germany have continued to highlight the difference between Alevis and Sunnis in their claims-making by depicting themselves as an excluded religious community in Turkey (Zırh Reference Zırh, Salzbrunn, Anghel, Gerharz and Rescher2008). Since 2004, these groups have submitted numerous cases to the ECtHR, which recognizes Alevis as a non-Sunni Muslim minority sect in need of legal protection (Shakman-Hurd Reference Shakman-Hurd2014). In doing so, they have sought to pressure the Turkish state to recognize this difference by seeking the support of EU institutions and by exploiting “the resources offered by new arenas for their cause, especially via the emergence of a new international regime of human rights” (Massicard Reference Massicard and Raillard2014, 82, 94). Among the cases communicated, those of Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey and Sinan Işık v. Turkey stand out as they set the precedents regarding exemption from compulsory religious courses and from specifying Islam as one’s religious identity on Turkish identity cards. The ECtHR has played a key role in the judicialization of the Alevi issue, gaining Alevis’ trust as an objective and reliable ally by ruling in favor of the Alevi plaintiffs in all cases brought before it, including these two cases. Meanwhile, while Alevis have been successful in their appeals to the ECtHR, legal appeals in Turkey have made little progress (Massicard Reference Massicard and Raillard2014, 92, 95). This situation demonstrates the critical significance of domestic factors in the process of negotiating Alevi minority rights.

The early 2000s marked the emergence of a new political actor willing to challenge the prevailing institutional structures and state-society relations. The sweeping electoral victory of the AKP in 2002 served as a catalyst for Turkey’s evolving minority protection regime. Once it assumed power, the incumbent party operationalized a series of economic and political reforms drafted by the previous coalition-government (Müftüler-Baç Reference Müftüler-Baç2005; Özbudun Reference Özbudun2007; Öniş Reference Öniş2008). With the inclusion of “pluralism” into the state discourse in the mid-2000s, the AKP government began to take Alevis’ demands more seriously (Tambar Reference Tambar2014).

The second term of the AKP government (2007–2011) was particularly critical for Alevis as it coincided with the election of three Alevi MPs—Reha Çamuroğlu, İbrahim Yiğit, and Hüseyin Tuğcu—and the beginning of a historical series of initiatives and symbolic gestures toward the Alevi community (Bardakçı Reference Bardakçı2015; Özkul Reference Özkul2015). Fast-breaking dinners (iftar) organized during the Alevi holy month of Muharram in 2008 were pivotal in signalling the government’s new intentions. Other goodwill gestures, such as increased broadcasting of Alevi-focused programming on the Turkish national public broadcaster were praised in the EU’s progress reports (European Commission 2009, 21).

Furthermore, between June 2009 and January 2010, the AKP government initiated the Alevi Opening with the aim of remedying the problems faced by the Alevi community (Bardakçı Reference Bardakçı2015). State officials organized seven workshops aimed at creating a bridge between the Turkish state and Alevi leaders and easing the acceptance of Alevism by all segments of society (Subaşı Reference Subaşı2010, 165). An official from the Diyanet, who also served as the Alevi Opening’s moderator and convener, pointed out that the Alevi Opening reflected two emerging conditions of religion and politics in Turkey: a process of rapprochement that started in the early 2000s between the Turkish government and different religious voices, and the Diyanet’s decision to gather all Turkish citizens under its own roof and thus depart from its earlier role as the guardian of strict Turkish secularism (interview, Ankara, July 24, 2013). Another official from the Diyanet added that the Diyanet has diversified its issue areas over the past two decades, showing more interest in the empowerment of all Turkish citizen at home and abroad as well as in the preservation of their language, culture, and identity (interview, Ankara, July 26, 2013). According to another Diyanet representative, this transformation resulted in the establishment of closer relations between the Turkish state and Alevis, as evidenced by the Diyanet’s offer to send dedes to Alevi organizations in Europe during Muharram (interview, Ankara, July 26, 2013).

An official from the Directorate for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB) similarly emphasized that the Turkish government has vowed to support Alevi organizations since the early 2000s by inviting them to official meetings and by facilitating the travel of Alevi dedes to Europe for special ceremonies (interview, Ankara, 26 June 2019). Another YTB official compared the AKP’s Alevi Opening to the German Islam Conference, concluding that while the former is pluralist and inclusive, the latter is a provocative and divisive platform that relegates Alevis to a passive role (interview, Ankara, July 29, 2013).

Even though the Alevi Opening was a positive step for the improvement of communication between Alevis and the Turkish state, critics, such as Ali Balkız, former leader of the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association, believe that it was crafted to attract Alevi votes with promises and empty rhetoric (Selçuk Reference Selçuk2014). The Alevi Opening came to a halt when the AKP government failed to take concrete steps to respond to Alevi demands. As the first workshop of the Alevi Opening shows (Subaşı Reference Subaşı2009), Alevi leaders participating in the platform reached consensus on major requests, including the provision of legal status to cemevis as places of worship, an official apology for the Sivas massacre of 1993, the abolition of compulsory religious classes in public schools, and the transformation of the Diyanet. These demands, however, have not been met by the government despite Alevis’ requests and the Final Report’s suggestions (Subaşı Reference Subaşı2010).

An official from the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association complained that the Alevi Opening failed to grant Alevis their main demand—equal citizenship—and that the workshops did not have enough Alevi participants: “There were no real Alevis present in the workshops. All the participants were AKP Alevis,” stated this leader (interview, Ankara, July 31, 2013). Other Alevi leaders in Europe, including those from the AABF, the Federation of Alevi Unions in France, and the Paris Alevi Cultural Centers reproached the workshops for promoting only cosmetic changes. They claimed that the workshops supported Alevi organizations close to the government, such as the Cem Foundation (Cem Vakfı) and the World Ahlal Bayt Foundation (Dünya Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı)—organizations that reject the definition of Alevism as a religion in its own right and insist that Alevism should be situated within Islam (Arkilic Reference Arkilic2016; Arkilic Reference Arkilic, Markussen, Özkul and Boyrazforthcoming). As the Final Report and several studies demonstrate, other reasons for the failure of the Alevi Opening are the articulation of the issue from the Sunni majority perspective, psychological mistrust between the AKP and Alevis, the conservative AKP ideology’s reluctance to grant full religious freedom to Alevis to protect their Sunni voting base, the lack of attention paid to the political dimension of the Alevi issue, and the Turkish state’s discriminatory practices (Bardakçı Reference Bardakçı2015; Özkul Reference Özkul2015; Çarkoğlu and Elçi Reference Çarkoğlu, Elçi and Lowe2019). The central role played by Sunni academics and Diyanet officials in administering the workshops also contributed to the collapse of the process.

Reconciliation efforts failed in 2010 and 2011 when anti-Alevism became a dominant theme in Turkish politics. During his election rallies in these years, AKP leader and the former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan constantly questioned opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s Alevi identity. The AKP’s political scapegoating targeting Alevis worsened as part of the former’s efforts to consolidate political power once the Syrian Civil War broke out in 2011. The AKP government’s focus on bringing down the Bashar al-Assad regime highlighted Turkey’s Hanafi Sunni identity and alienated Alevis further. The attempt to connect Alevis in Turkey to Syrian Alawites, the sect-kin of al-Assad and his regime, became evident when Erdoğan asked Kılıçdaroğlu whether he supported al-Assad because of their sectarian affinity. The project of constructing Syrian refugee camps close to Alevi settlements in Kahramanmaraş and Sivas continued to disturb the local Alevi communities (Çarkoğlu and Elçi Reference Çarkoğlu, Elçi and Lowe2019, 220–221). State officials’ insensitive and denigrating initiatives, such as the 2013 naming of the third bridge over the Bosporus after Yavuz Sultan Selim, who is accused of executing 40,000 Alevis in 1513, also incited feelings of victimhood and marginalization amongst Alevis (Hürriyet 2013).

Dedes sent by the Diyanet have triggered a backlash as well. The Cem Foundation-linked organizations have joined forces with the Diyanet to send Alevi dedes to Europe to deliver talks on Islam, Alevi faith, and the Prophet Mohammad’s life (Hürriyet 2014). An AABF leader argued that this decision was aimed at balkanizing Alevis rather than helping them since dedes were sent to the pro-AKP Alevi organizations abroad. Questions have also been raised regarding the selection criteria of dedes after it has been revealed that one of the dedes sent to Europe by the AKP was only sixteen years old (interview, Berlin, February 25, 2019).

Even though the AKP embarked upon a number of reform initiatives in various policy areas between 2011 and 2014, Turkey’s EU bid was not the main driver and the decision-making processes did not involve dialogue or collaboration with other domestic stakeholders in politics, the economy, and civil society (Yılmaz Reference Yılmaz2016; Yaka Reference Yaka2016). As de-Europeanization, what Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (Reference Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber2016, 6) call “the distancing of society and politics in Turkey from the European system of norms, values and policy expectations,” became a dominant trend in the Turkish political arena in this period, domestic concerns and actors became the main driver in the policy-making process and the limits of the EU as a transformative power were thrown into sharp relief. Turkey’s decision to retreat from its EU path has led to a stalemate in the process (Turhan and Seufert Reference Turhan and Seufert2015).

Increasing dissatisfaction of the Alevi community with prevailing discriminatory laws and practices reached a peak in 2013 with the Gezi Park protests. These protests emerged as a response to the government’s controversial plan to demolish a public park in Istanbul’s historic Taksim Square and became a medium to show dissatisfaction with the government’s increasing Sunni nationalism and unilateral initiatives. Even though the country-wide demonstrations cannot be labeled as solely Alevi protests, all those killed in the protests and most of the detainees were Alevis (Hürriyet Daily News 2013 ). An official from the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association likened the Gezi Park protests’ death toll to the massacres targeting Alevis in Sivas and Kahramanmaraş (interview, Ankara, July 31, 2013). The high rate of Alevi involvement in protests was a manifestation of deep Alevi frustration under the AKP government (Karakaya-Stump Reference Karakaya-Stump2014; Bardakçı et al. Reference Bardakçı, Freyberg-Inan, Christoph and Leisse2017). The Gezi Park revolt increased the frequency of Alevi political rallies and campaigns launched in Turkey and abroad. Despite the increasing demands of Alevi actors, no substantial policy changes followed the 2013 protests and the rupture between the AKP and Alevis has deepened. An official from the German Embassy in Istanbul and a parliamentarian from the Social Democratic Party in Germany also argued that the Gezi Park protests brought additional tensions to the Turkish transnational space, exacerbating the acrimony between AKP supporters and Alevi groups in the diaspora (interview, Ankara, June 28, 2019; interview, Berlin, February 14, 2019).

Following the 2014 presidential elections—where Erdoğan was elected President—the new AKP government led by the then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu launched another attempt to improve state-Alevi relations. Yet the initiatives once again consisted of only a handful of symbolic gestures. While Davutoğlu emphasized equal citizenship rights in his speeches and paid visits to Alevi associations, no substantial policy changes were introduced. By the end of 2014, two more ECtHR cases made the headlines, putting pressure on the Turkish government to adhere to ECtHR rulings. While Mansur Yavaş v. Turkey highlighted the continuing breach of Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR, Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfi v. Turkey underlined the denial of official status to cemevis and ruled that Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and freedom) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the ECHR had been violated.

Over time it became clear that the Alevi Opening was used by the AKP as a tool to reframe Alevi identity in line with an orthodox interpretation of Sunni Islam (Massicard Reference Massicard2013) and that “the issue was not managed with a perspective based on equal citizenship rights but with a discussion on the authenticity and originality of the Alevi demands” (Boyraz Reference Boyraz2019, 765). The AKP’s reframing of Alevism within a Turkish-Islamic framework became evident in several other instances, indexing an increasingly sectarian turn or “Sunnification” of domestic and foreign policy that projects Turkey as a homogenously Sunni state and subdues expressions of Alevi religious identity (Tank Reference Tank2015; Lord Reference Lord2017; Karakaya-Stump Reference Karakaya-Stump2018). A telling example of the incumbent government’s intervention in Alevi actors’ framing process came in 2014 when AKP leader and Turkey’s then Prime Minister Erdoğan concluded that “Alevism in Germany does not include Ali (Ali’siz Alevilik). This is an atheist mentality.” According to Erdoğan, Alevis who agree to go to the mosque are “Alevis with Ali,” in other words good Alevis. Echoing Erdoğan’s words, the then Deputy Prime Minister asserted, “We cannot recognize cemevis as houses of worship because we consider Alevism inside Islam. Since the majority of Alevis consider themselves to be Muslims, Islam’s house of worship is the masjid, the mosque” (Arkilic, Reference Arkilic, Markussen, Özkul and Boyrazforthcoming).

Scholars have shown that particularly after 2015, the incumbent AKP has succumbed to competitive authoritarianism as the fairness of elections has been called into question and as civil liberties have systematically been curtailed. The party’s desire to impose its policies on Alevi groups instead of engaging in deliberation has also weakened the party’s alleged commitment to liberal democratic values and the protection of minorities (Esen and Gümüsçü Reference Esen and Gümüsçü2015). Extant studies have also drawn attention to the Diyanet’s transformation from being “the protector of the Turkish state’s understanding of secularism and Islam” into “a promoter with the task of spreading Turkish nationalism and Islamic moral values both inside and outside Turkish borders” (Öztürk Reference Öztürk2016, 622-633), which bodes ill for the protection of Alevis’ rights in Turkey and abroad.

While minority rights have been at the heart of Turkey’s Europeanization process (Kassimeris and Tsoumpanou Reference Kassimeris and Tsoumpanou2008; Ahmed Reference Ahmed2011; Kanner-Arias and Gürses Reference Kanner-Arias and Gürses2012), the impact of the EU’s non-binding progress reports was limited to agenda setting. The normative pressure brought to bear by Alevi interest groups has also been insufficient overall. The Alevi Opening process has mostly been driven by domestic incentives; arguably the issues addressed in the Alevi Opening reflected a party strategy to attract votes from the Alevi electorate. Once the AKP and President Erdoğan entrenched their political position, their relations with EU bodies and Alevis deteriorated. It is not surprising that Alevi relations with the Turkish state have attenuated noticeably in the third AKP term (2011–present), as the party has largely locked in majority support from other segments of the Turkish electorate.

Incremental Progress: The German Islam Conference

EU member states, especially strong ones like Germany, are generally immune to external pressures for change. The EU has had limited leverage in influencing the scope and content of legislation on immigrant rights in the German political system. As in Turkey, the EU’s liberal norms have had some impact on German integration policy starting from the late 1980s (Kaya Reference Kaya1998, 34). Nevertheless, domestic factors have been the key drivers of the German state’s relationship with the local Alevi community.

Only Danes, Frisians, Sorbs, German Sinti, and Roma have official minority status in Germany. However, mass migration after World War II has placed the German minority regime under increasing pressure as new immigrant communities have challenged Germany’s de facto mono-ethnic regime (Aktürk Reference Aktürk2012). With the signing of the bilateral guest-worker (Gastarbeiter) agreement between the Turkish and German governments in 1961, Germany became the primary destination for emigrating Turks (Akgündüz Reference Akgündüz2008). Family reunifications in the 1970s and an influx of Turkish asylum-seekers in the 1970s and the 1980s saw the expatriate Turkish-speaking community become the largest non-German minority in the country. Today Germany is home to the largest Turkish diaspora in Europe, estimated at 3.4 million people (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020). However, from the early days of the guest-worker system to the adoption of the Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) in 2005, Germany’s policies have overlooked the long-term effects of Turkish immigration (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou Reference Klusmeyer and Papademetriou2013).

Although not recognized as an official national minority group, Alevis of Germany have transformed themselves into a de facto religious minority through their struggle for equal citizenship rights. Put differently, Alevism has become a religion in its own right in Germany as its followers can clearly define and distinguish it from other minority religions (Dressler Reference Dressler2008). Since Germany is a country with a lively associational life, where numerous occupational, socioeconomic, religious, and cultural associations can access, lobby, and influence policy-making, the immigrant organizations founded by Alevis have gradually become powerful actors. The favorable political opportunity structures in Germany have enabled the Alevi community to frame and communicate its interests and claims through the mechanisms of the system. Transnational linkages between Turkey and Germany have further stimulated the standardization of demands, and eventually transformed the Alevi experience into a successful integration story (Sökefeld Reference Sökefeld2008; Massicard Reference Massicard2013).

The first independent Alevi organization, the Union of Patriots (Yurtsevenler Birliği)—later renamed the Federation of the Union of Patriots (Yurtsevenler Birliği Federasyonu, YBF)—was founded in the late 1970s. This organization embraced a discourse highlighting “the right to be equal” rather than “the right to be different.” The establishment of this organization lent itself to a wider discussion on the meaning of Alevi identity within the Alevi diaspora in Germany (Zırh Reference Zırh, Salzbrunn, Anghel, Gerharz and Rescher2008, 115). The Alevi movement gained momentum in the late 1980s with the implementation of the Foreigners’ Law (Ausländergesetz), which emphasized the distinct characteristics of German culture and identity and German multiculturalism (Kaya Reference Kaya1998, 34). This political shift in Germany laid the ground for the mushrooming of myriad Alevi political and cultural organizations. These developments encouraged Alevis to become more conscious about their unique religious identity. Compared with Alevis in Turkey, Alevis in Germany were more visible and outspoken, so much so that a public performance of Alevi religious rituals—something almost unheard of in Turkey—was celebrated in the mid-1980s (Sökefeld Reference Sökefeld2008, 271).

In 1989, the AABF was formed as an umbrella organization. The same year, a ground-breaking meeting organized by the former leaders of the YBF raised questions regarding Alevi identity in the diaspora. This meeting culminated in the publication of a declaration that defined Alevism as a distinct faith and culture. It also called for the recognition of Alevi identity and equal opportunities for Alevis, and prompted the founding of the Alevi Cultural Groups. In the 1990s, the institutionalization of the Alevi diaspora was consolidated, and Alevis in Germany began to express their religious identity more explicitly (Kaya Reference Kaya1998, 37–39). These organizations contributed to the integration of the Alevi community into German social, political, and economic life by mediating between the Alevi community and German institutions.

As the population and significance of Turks in Germany grew, German officials began to hold unofficial meetings with Turkish leaders in the 1990s. These meetings, however, were ad hoc and lacked a clear roadmap. In 1999, an early initiative sought a more structured dialogue between the German state and Turks living in Germany, when the Christian Democrats invited chairmen of several Sunni Islamic umbrella organizations, including the Turkish–Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği, DİTİB), the Islam Council for the Federal Republic of Germany (Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, IRD), and the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD) to a hearing at the German Parliament (Arkilic Reference Arkilic2015). During this meeting, pressing issues pertaining to Muslim life in Germany—such as the introduction of religious education in public schools—were discussed with Turkish Sunni Muslim leaders (Rosenow-Williams Reference Rosenow-Williams2012, 146). A year after 9/11, a similar forum at the ministerial level was created by the then Federal Minister of the Interior, Otto Schilly, to exchange views with major Sunni Islamic umbrella organizations on Muslim religious practices, yet it failed due to the German state’s prejudice against certain organizations. Around this time other Islamic forums were held at the local and federal level to discuss the training of Muslim religious personnel, the depiction of Muslims in the German media, and the headscarf issue (Arkilic Reference Arkilic2015).

Since the mid-1990s, Turkish Muslims in Germany have also built inter-organizational institutions to take joint action in the issues of religious education, training of imams and mosque construction. The Islamic Religious Community of Hesse (Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft Hessen) and the Council of Islamic Communities in Hamburg (Rat der Islamischen Gemeinschaften Hamburg, SCHURA), both founded in the late 1990s, are two forums of cooperation established by Muslim leaders from different backgrounds. In a similar yet more serious attempt, in 2007, the DİTİB, the IRD, the ZMD, and the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers formed the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland, KRM) as an umbrella organization that would speak with one voice when negotiating with policy-makers (Rosenow-Williams Reference Rosenow-Williams2012; Arkilic Reference Arkilic2015, Reference Arkilic2016).

The exclusion of the Alevi-formed AABF from these inter-organizational forums is a clear indicator of persistent disagreements between Alevi and Sunni Turkish representatives in Germany. While the AABF did not partake in inter-organizational forums convened by Muslim leaders, the organization attended local and federal Islamic forums initiated by German governments prior to the German Islam Conference. In 2003, however, the AABF resigned from these conventions due to their organizational and representational shortcomings (Micksch and Süssmuth Reference Micksch and Süssmuth2005).

Following these limited steps, the German Islam Conference was formed in September 2006 under the leadership of the former Federal Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble. Established a few months after the launch of first National Integration Summit (Integrationsgipfel der Bundesregierung), the German Islam Conference sought to institutionalize dialogue between the German state, Sunnis, and Alevis at a national level. At the German Islam Conference, the Turkish Muslim community is represented by the DİTİB, the Union of Islamic Cultural Centers, the secular Turkish Community in Germany (Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland, TGD), and the AABF as well as by key individual actors and other Muslim organizations (Haug et al. Reference Haug, Mussig and Stichs2009).

In his statement after the first plenary meeting, Schäuble noted that Germany desires “an ongoing dialogue as stated in the coalition treaty, for Muslims are no longer a foreign population group in Germany but have become an integral part of our society” (Deutsche Islam Konferenz Reference Konferenz 2020a). He also declared that the main duty of the German Islam Conference is to debate how Islam can meet the organizational requirements of German religious constitutional law. In his words, “Islam is … for Germany, a comparatively new religion. Muslim associations want to have the same rights as the Christian churches in this country. They must, however, create the organizational conditions to achieve this” (Deutsche Islam Konferenz Reference Konferenz2020a).

The Conference has met at two levels since 2006. At the local level, three working groups on “the German social system and German values,” “religious issues in the German constitutional context,” and “the economy and the media as bridge-builders,” respectively, as well as a discussion group, meet every two months (Deutsche Islam Konferenz Reference Konferenz 2008 ). The discussion group covers additional topics, such as security and Islamism. At the plenary level, meetings are convened annually to respond to suggestions generated at the working and discussion groups. The first four plenary meetings addressed key issues, including the construction of mosques, the introduction of religious courses in public schools, the training of imams, the establishment of Islamic theology university institutes, and media reporting (Deutsche Islam Konferenz Reference Konferenz 2020b).

Following the formation of the Christian Democrat–Liberal Coalition in 2009, Germany’s incoming Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziére commenced the second phase of the German Islam Conference (2010–2013). He announced three major areas of focus: promotion of institutionalized cooperation between the state and Muslims; gender equality as a common value; and the prevention of extremism, radicalization, and social polarization (Deutsche Islam Konferenz Reference Konferenz 2020c). The third legislative period (2013–present) emphasizes new areas, including pastoral care in public facilities, Islamic welfare provision, and the training and networking of Muslim and Alevi clerics (Deutsche Islam Konferenz Reference Konferenz 2020d).

Some scholars argue that the German Islam Conference as well as similar initiatives established by other European states, including France, the UK, the Netherlands, and Italy have two main goals: to deal with the “Muslim issue” and to limit origin countries’ influence over their diaspora communities (Laurence Reference Laurence2012). Others criticize the German Islam Conference for controlling, defining, and domesticating Islam; for securitizing the immigration and integration debates; and for dividing Muslims as “good” and “bad” (Hernandez Aguilar Reference Aguilar and Luis2018). Yet our interviews with Alevi representatives and German bureaucrats show that overall the conference has led to deeper political participation of Alevis in Germany by contributing to the development of mutual trust and rapprochement between the Alevi community and German political elites.

AABF leaders in Germany see the conference as a more legitimate and inclusive forum than earlier initiatives (interview, Berlin, November 26, 2013). Alevi representatives from the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Association in Ankara also praised the German Islam Conference’s positive and inclusive approach toward Alevis (interview, Ankara, July 31, 2013). According to interviews conducted with two officials from the Federal Ministry of the Interior (Berlin, November 7, 2013 and February 20, 2019), Alevis’ participation in the German Islam Conference has consolidated their image as legitimate interlocutors with the government as opposed to Sunni Muslims. The rise of Sunni religious extremism in Europe and recent studies suggesting that Alevis are less likely to hold fundamentalist attitudes compared to Sunni Muslims (Koopmans Reference Koopmans2015) have also perpetuated Alevis’ advantaged status vis-à-vis other Turkish-origin immigrant groups in Germany.

Another recent development contributing to the development of positive interactions between the German state and Alevis has been the AABF’s recognition as a religious community (Religionsgemeinschaft) in various Länder (German states), including North-Rhine Westphalia, Hesse, Berlin, Bavaria, and Hamburg following the formation of the German Islam Conference. The recognition of the status of “religious community’ grants Alevis the right to provide Alevi religious education in these states. Moreover, the extension of the “religious community” status in the form of state contracts (Staatsvertrag) crafted between German policy-makers and Alevi representatives allows for the recognition of cemevis as places of worship and the Alevi community as a “non-Sunni Muslim minority.” Prior to this, the content of religious courses was designed by the Protestant Church. The change has allowed the Alevi community to be in control of its own religious education (interview with an AABF official, Berlin, November 26, 2013). The commencement of an academic chair in Alevism at the University of Hamburg in January 2015 marked another watershed event for the expansion of Alevi rights in Germany (Hürriyet 2015). According to an AABF official:

Another representative from the AABF agrees that the state contracts signed between different German states and Alevis demonstrate that, unlike their fellow Alevis in Turkey, Alevis enjoy equal citizenship status in Germany. This leader believes that the extension of Alevi rights in Europe will eventually spill over to Turkey and trigger the recognition of Alevism as a distinct faith in the homeland (Alevi Haber Ağı Reference Ağı 2019 ).

The AABF’s emphasis on gender equality and conformity to the German legal structure has also resonated well with German policy-makers. As our interviews with other AABF officials and German parliamentarians demonstrate, Alevis’ deepening connections with the German state following the initiation of the German Islam Conference can be seen in the inflow of financial assistance from federal and local authorities to the AABF, joint projects organized with AABF officials, the significant number of Alevi deputies serving in the German Parliament, and visits by top German politicians, such as Joachim Gauck, the former German President, to the AABF (interview with an official from the AABF, Berlin, February 25, 2019; interview with a Green Party parliamentarian, Berlin, January 27, 2019). In sum, while one might argue that Alevis are used by the German state as a counterweight to AKP influence on Sunni Muslims in Germany and right-wing narratives on “bad Muslims,” as our data shows, AABF officials believe that the German state’s rapprochement efforts are genuine and aim at enhancing Alevi political participation in Germany.