This rich and provocative target article has two major components. One is a critique of “traditional” evolutionary psychology (EP) and a call for incorporating perspectives from behaviorism, cognitive science, and the social sciences and humanities in general. The second is a description of some promising applied experimental interventions to address dysfunctions in important areas of human behavior, such as clinical psychology and education. Although we agree with much that is described and proposed, we discuss two problematic areas: historical and conceptual missteps, and the proposed role of evolution in driving “intentional” interventions to improve the lives of individuals, groups, and societies.
Although the EP approach promulgated by Cosmides, Tooby, Barkow, Buss, and others has grabbed considerable attention, it also was a narrow misappropriation of the evolution label. It basically ignored individual differences (other than sex), nonhuman animals, naturalistic observation, ethology, and neuroscience (e.g., Burghardt Reference Burghardt2013; Panksepp & Panksepp Reference Panksepp and Panksepp2000). The current article, although criticizing the extreme modular and antibehaviorist inclinations of these early workers, is itself misleading, such as considering B. F. Skinner an evolutionary psychologist. The senior author was a commentator in the BBS special issue on the canonical papers of Skinner, which included two that compared natural selection and selection by consequences (Burghardt Reference Burghardt, Catania and Harnad1988). Burghardt pointed out that Skinner seemed uninterested in understanding the natural behavior of animals and that his basic comparison was anticipated by Edward L. Thorndike, who explicitly contrasted natural selection and “selection within the individual that is the great case of plasticity, and is of tremendous usefulness, in that it definitely enables the animal to modify his acts and so meet new varieties and modifications of environment” (Thorndike Reference Thorndike1900, p. 91, emphasis in the original; reprinted in Burghardt Reference Burghardt1985).
What is telling here is that Wilson et al. repeatedly invoke trial-and-error learning, what the authors term “open-ended processes of variation and selection” (target article abstract, para. 3), a process much more associated with Thorndike than Skinner, in the development and evaluation of applied interventions. In short, Thorndike and James Mark Baldwin, known for the Baldwin effect, who wanted to apply the evolution of plasticity to human social and cultural phenomena and was a pioneer of interdisciplinary efforts (e.g., Baldwin Reference Baldwin1902), are the intellectual forerunners of the approaches noted here. Furthermore, many have noted similarities between biological and cultural evolution, as Konrad Lorenz reviewed in his Nobel Prize address (Lorenz Reference Lorenz1974) using the work of Koenig (Reference Koenig1970). Certainly much progress has been made, such as in gene-culture co-evolution; and although the target article cannot be expected to be historically comprehensive, it should, given the strong criticisms made of others, not deny credit to important pioneers.
Second, although the clinical and intervention examples presented by Wilson et al. to support the inclusion of evolutionary theory and principles are of excellent and successful programs, it is unclear what is evolutionary about them. More specifically, it is unclear how evolutionary theory either guided their development or anticipated their success, other than their being a product of variation and selection. For example, the Ostrom 8 design features of effective groups are based on a “what works” analysis, and to retrospectively use them as a basis for evolutionary-derived interventions seems to claim only that functional and dysfunctional behavioral systems must be a result of evolutionary processes underlying human nature.
We agree with the authors about the great potential for developing more efficacious prevention and intervention programs by integrating principles of EP into psychological treatments. However, we are disappointed that the authors did not provide more guidance into how evolutionary principles can best be incorporated into new or existing intervention and prevention programs. Can the authors provide robust guidelines for evaluating the myriad of current intervention programs, many of which are failures and fads? We need a framework for constructing and evaluating risky, testable, falsifiable predictions for intervention and prevention programs based on the authors' innovative expansion of EP theory.
For instance, numerous educational programs (e.g., Drug Abuse Resistance Education [D.A.R.E.]; Bureau of Justice Assistance 1988) and “therapeutic” interventions (e.g., conversion therapy or reparative therapy; Nicolosi Reference Nicolosi1991; batterer intervention programs for domestic violence) can be viewed largely as failures, in which the programs either were ineffective or caused harm to participants (e.g., Ennett et al. Reference Ennett, Tobler, Ringwalt and Flewelling1994 [D.A.R.E.]; Jenkins & Johnston Reference Jenkins and Johnston2004 [conversion/reparative therapy]; Stuart et al. Reference Stuart, Temple and Moore2007 [batterer intervention]). Other psychological interventions are extremely efficacious and have helped to alleviate enormous suffering (e.g., cognitive-behavioral Panic Control Treatment; Barlow et al. Reference Barlow, Craske, Cerny and Klosko1989). It would be helpful if the authors could present guidelines that could be used to explain how their extension of interdisciplinary evolutionary theory could explain, more universally, why some treatments are helpful and others fail. Would the authors have been able to predict, on the basis of EP theory and principles, which treatments would be efficacious and which would not? Can the authors outline specific principles for making up-front predictions regarding which newly developed psychotherapies will be successful and which will require modification or become failures? As it currently stands, one could construe that the authors are only choosing successful programs and interventions to support the incorporation of evolutionary theory, rather than undertaking the prospective analysis we need to move forward.
Perhaps the greatest need now is to provide guidance, via the provision of specific strategies, to improve existing therapeutic modalities or to develop new prevention and intervention programs, by incorporating an expanded EP theory. For example, there is some evidence to support several treatments for substance use disorders (e.g., Motivational Enhancement Therapy [MET]; Project Match Research Group 1997; Behavioral Couples Therapy; O'Farrell & Fals-Stewart Reference O'Farrell and Fals-Stewart2006). However, relapse to substance use is an immense problem (Witkiewitz & Marlatt Reference Witkiewitz and Marlatt2004). Can the authors provide guidance to intervention developers on how existing therapies that have some empirical support may be improved on the basis of evolutionary theory? Would expanded evolutionary theory provide guidance on the specific components of existing interventions that could be retained, improved, or removed, thus increasing the overall efficacy of treatment? Tensions between an integrative world view and detailed interventions are inevitable, but they need to be addressed.
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This rich and provocative target article has two major components. One is a critique of “traditional” evolutionary psychology (EP) and a call for incorporating perspectives from behaviorism, cognitive science, and the social sciences and humanities in general. The second is a description of some promising applied experimental interventions to address dysfunctions in important areas of human behavior, such as clinical psychology and education. Although we agree with much that is described and proposed, we discuss two problematic areas: historical and conceptual missteps, and the proposed role of evolution in driving “intentional” interventions to improve the lives of individuals, groups, and societies.
Although the EP approach promulgated by Cosmides, Tooby, Barkow, Buss, and others has grabbed considerable attention, it also was a narrow misappropriation of the evolution label. It basically ignored individual differences (other than sex), nonhuman animals, naturalistic observation, ethology, and neuroscience (e.g., Burghardt Reference Burghardt2013; Panksepp & Panksepp Reference Panksepp and Panksepp2000). The current article, although criticizing the extreme modular and antibehaviorist inclinations of these early workers, is itself misleading, such as considering B. F. Skinner an evolutionary psychologist. The senior author was a commentator in the BBS special issue on the canonical papers of Skinner, which included two that compared natural selection and selection by consequences (Burghardt Reference Burghardt, Catania and Harnad1988). Burghardt pointed out that Skinner seemed uninterested in understanding the natural behavior of animals and that his basic comparison was anticipated by Edward L. Thorndike, who explicitly contrasted natural selection and “selection within the individual that is the great case of plasticity, and is of tremendous usefulness, in that it definitely enables the animal to modify his acts and so meet new varieties and modifications of environment” (Thorndike Reference Thorndike1900, p. 91, emphasis in the original; reprinted in Burghardt Reference Burghardt1985).
What is telling here is that Wilson et al. repeatedly invoke trial-and-error learning, what the authors term “open-ended processes of variation and selection” (target article abstract, para. 3), a process much more associated with Thorndike than Skinner, in the development and evaluation of applied interventions. In short, Thorndike and James Mark Baldwin, known for the Baldwin effect, who wanted to apply the evolution of plasticity to human social and cultural phenomena and was a pioneer of interdisciplinary efforts (e.g., Baldwin Reference Baldwin1902), are the intellectual forerunners of the approaches noted here. Furthermore, many have noted similarities between biological and cultural evolution, as Konrad Lorenz reviewed in his Nobel Prize address (Lorenz Reference Lorenz1974) using the work of Koenig (Reference Koenig1970). Certainly much progress has been made, such as in gene-culture co-evolution; and although the target article cannot be expected to be historically comprehensive, it should, given the strong criticisms made of others, not deny credit to important pioneers.
Second, although the clinical and intervention examples presented by Wilson et al. to support the inclusion of evolutionary theory and principles are of excellent and successful programs, it is unclear what is evolutionary about them. More specifically, it is unclear how evolutionary theory either guided their development or anticipated their success, other than their being a product of variation and selection. For example, the Ostrom 8 design features of effective groups are based on a “what works” analysis, and to retrospectively use them as a basis for evolutionary-derived interventions seems to claim only that functional and dysfunctional behavioral systems must be a result of evolutionary processes underlying human nature.
We agree with the authors about the great potential for developing more efficacious prevention and intervention programs by integrating principles of EP into psychological treatments. However, we are disappointed that the authors did not provide more guidance into how evolutionary principles can best be incorporated into new or existing intervention and prevention programs. Can the authors provide robust guidelines for evaluating the myriad of current intervention programs, many of which are failures and fads? We need a framework for constructing and evaluating risky, testable, falsifiable predictions for intervention and prevention programs based on the authors' innovative expansion of EP theory.
For instance, numerous educational programs (e.g., Drug Abuse Resistance Education [D.A.R.E.]; Bureau of Justice Assistance 1988) and “therapeutic” interventions (e.g., conversion therapy or reparative therapy; Nicolosi Reference Nicolosi1991; batterer intervention programs for domestic violence) can be viewed largely as failures, in which the programs either were ineffective or caused harm to participants (e.g., Ennett et al. Reference Ennett, Tobler, Ringwalt and Flewelling1994 [D.A.R.E.]; Jenkins & Johnston Reference Jenkins and Johnston2004 [conversion/reparative therapy]; Stuart et al. Reference Stuart, Temple and Moore2007 [batterer intervention]). Other psychological interventions are extremely efficacious and have helped to alleviate enormous suffering (e.g., cognitive-behavioral Panic Control Treatment; Barlow et al. Reference Barlow, Craske, Cerny and Klosko1989). It would be helpful if the authors could present guidelines that could be used to explain how their extension of interdisciplinary evolutionary theory could explain, more universally, why some treatments are helpful and others fail. Would the authors have been able to predict, on the basis of EP theory and principles, which treatments would be efficacious and which would not? Can the authors outline specific principles for making up-front predictions regarding which newly developed psychotherapies will be successful and which will require modification or become failures? As it currently stands, one could construe that the authors are only choosing successful programs and interventions to support the incorporation of evolutionary theory, rather than undertaking the prospective analysis we need to move forward.
Perhaps the greatest need now is to provide guidance, via the provision of specific strategies, to improve existing therapeutic modalities or to develop new prevention and intervention programs, by incorporating an expanded EP theory. For example, there is some evidence to support several treatments for substance use disorders (e.g., Motivational Enhancement Therapy [MET]; Project Match Research Group 1997; Behavioral Couples Therapy; O'Farrell & Fals-Stewart Reference O'Farrell and Fals-Stewart2006). However, relapse to substance use is an immense problem (Witkiewitz & Marlatt Reference Witkiewitz and Marlatt2004). Can the authors provide guidance to intervention developers on how existing therapies that have some empirical support may be improved on the basis of evolutionary theory? Would expanded evolutionary theory provide guidance on the specific components of existing interventions that could be retained, improved, or removed, thus increasing the overall efficacy of treatment? Tensions between an integrative world view and detailed interventions are inevitable, but they need to be addressed.