The elderly and older racial/ethnic minorities may often receive inferior healthcare even if they have good access to evidence-based interventions. Premature death and preventable losses of quality of life are probable outcomes. Elderly individuals may be less frequently provided the best data-supported healthcare simply because they are old. Bias or prejudice against the aged may be a significant cause. Underrepresentation of the elderly in biomedical research is another factor. The problem is international.
In their account of social justice, Madison Powers and Ruth Faden have plausibly argued that society should especially ensure the health of the young, because failures of early childhood development are often irreversible.Footnote 1 Hence, withholding some effective healthcare from the elderly could be ethically justified in an overall fair allocation system. Major bioethical attention has deservedly been given to such macro age-group issues.
It is quite different to withhold effective healthcare to specific individuals merely because they are old and not because of decisions reached by a fair process and sound ethical considerations.Footnote 2 Christine Cassel calls this “implicit rationing” that has “no legitimacy.”Footnote 3 Such inequitable care requires much greater attention. This article aims to help meet the need.
Elder Ageism, Healthcare, and Bioethics: An International Issue
In this article, “healthcare” means delivery of services to individuals by health professionals and their institutions that aim to improve health. I assume that “race” and “ethnicity” are socially constructed categories but that related experiences can affect biology. “Older” and “elderly” here mean people age 65 or older.
“Ageism” literally means negative attitudes or actions toward any age group merely because of their age.Footnote 4 Examples are patterns of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. “Elder ageism” targets the elderly. In the United States and globally, elder ageism is apparently pervasive.Footnote 5 Cassel finds evidence for healthcare elder ageism in the United States and the United Kingdom.Footnote 6 The following examples support her conclusions:
• U.S. rheumatologists more frequently chose more “aggressive” and effective therapy for younger male patients compared to the elderly.Footnote 7
• Irish elderly with presumed ischemic heart disease (and also women in general) were less often given secondary prevention drugs than younger men.Footnote 8
• Rehabilitation professionals showed significant elderly age bias when patients were not “ideal” (i.e., cooperative, pleasant, compliant, and not depressed).Footnote 9
• The elderly less often received an effective drug for chronic myeloid leukemia.Footnote 10
• Older patients and racial/ethnic minorities less often receive the newest approved therapy for colorectal cancer.Footnote 11
• African American men age 65 or older with prostate cancer were less often afforded “aggressive” treatment than whites in a southern state.Footnote 12
• After breast-conserving surgery, older African American women are significantly less likely than white women to receive radiotherapy for breast cancer.Footnote 13
• The elderly and racial/ethnic minorities are significantly underrepresented in biomedical research. Adverse consequences include uncertain efficacy and unpredictable harms of therapies, potentially preventable health decline during ineffective care, wasted healthcare resources, and unnecessary costs.Footnote 14
In contrast to thousands of articles addressing racial/ethnic healthcare disparities in the past decade, studies of potential elder ageism in healthcare and related research are meager. However, data such as is presented in the preceding list suggest significant inequities exist, and elderly racial/ethnic minorities may face double injustices in healthcare. Also, some elderly racial/ethnic minorities in the United States live significantly shorter lives beyond age 65 than do whites.Footnote 15 I did not find analyses of what healthcare inequalities may contribute to these mortality data.
Although social factors predominantly influence health, these mortality gaps (and presumably gaps in related quality of life) in the United States between elderly whites and elderly racial/ethnic minorities make it all the more urgent to eliminate inequitable disparities in the latters' healthcare.Footnote 16 After almost a decade of tracking and interventions, and despite some improvements, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality finds that race/ethnicity is still associated with significant disparities in healthcare.Footnote 17
Clearly elimination of racial/ethnic healthcare disparities is a complex enterprise, which is also presumably the case for elderly disparities in general. But quality improvement (QI) is one important mechanism. In QI, care delivery is assessed and remediation is designed and implemented where needed. Hospitals have been particularly involved in QI for some decades. But expanding the focus of quality improvement to the elderly will require not only greater deployment of financial and personnel resources but also promotion of cultural changes that support more attention to the elderly and racial/ethnic minorities. The extent and content of these measures are ultimately ethical choices in light of practical aspects. But just what should be the moral bases of these decisions? I address this question in detail before returning to practical QI considerations.
Ethical Foundations
Respect for Persons, Justice, Beneficence, and Nonmaleficence
In looking for ethical benchmarks, it is good to begin with accounts of justice in health and healthcare that have drawn on fair equality of opportunity,Footnote 18 capabilities,Footnote 19 or well-being.Footnote 20 As noted, one theme has been how to allocate health resources fairly among age groups at the macro societal level.Footnote 21 Central in all of these accounts is the idea of every person’s equal human worth, which supports a core principle of equal and substantial respect for persons.
In agreement with others, I have argued that respect for persons should be elaborated as equal and substantial respect for persons, because everyone could be respected equally and poorly. Equal and substantial respect for persons includes notions of promoting empowerment, expressing regard, honoring personal dignity, and providing recognition.Footnote 22 Of course, most prominent among these concepts in American bioethics has been respect for autonomy, a component of respect for persons.Footnote 23 But respect for persons means much more.
Widely accepted, this respect principle establishes that providing unequal healthcare merely because of age, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, culture, language, and comparable factors is unjust. This conclusion follows from the core tenet that everyone has equal moral worth. Thus decisions that reflect elder ageism (or any age bias) are morally unacceptable.
Justice as a principle functions in light of respect for persons and thus demands fair application of healthcare regardless of race, ethnicity, and age per se and remediation where inequities are found.Footnote 24 But unjust inequalities in healthcare can only be detected and eliminated if that care is assessed. Thus justice supports QI.
The principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence (or do no harm) are widely accepted as core ethical principles in biomedicine that call for promoting the health-related good of individuals, including palliating suffering, and for avoiding harm when possible.Footnote 25 I presume that respect for persons and justice are generally more fundamental than beneficence and nonmaleficence. Neither respect for persons nor justice should usually be violated to serve either beneficence or nonmaleficence. However I allow that there could be a case in which the latter principles could have priority.
The default priority of respect and justice is relevant because beneficence and nonmaleficence can apply to both populations and individuals. The aim could be (1) the health good of either an individual or a group or (2) that of either one group or another. Hence, beneficence and nonmaleficence could justify putting an unjustly low priority on care for any group or individual according to a consequentialist calculus. Respect for persons flowing through justice is a check against such good maximizing that would promote unfair inattention to one group. More specifically, this guidance of respect and justice, if followed, would prevent shortchanging QI efforts regarding the elderly.
Clearly QI efforts should be built on the aforementioned ethical foundations. And my summary account should be rather uncontroversial. But I argue that the ethical foundations are incomplete. Specifically, such QI efforts should also be based on moral conceptions of care and solidarity.
Care and Solidarity: General Considerations
An extensive literature addresses what theories of care should bring to biomedicine, and the concept of solidarity has much play in Europe. To show why care and solidarity are important, I will first consider some deficiencies of the prevailing U.S. “four-principle” mantra.
Respect for autonomy (part of respect for persons), justice, beneficence, and nonmaleficence are widely promulgated in the United States. But these concepts include aridity, impersonality, disconnectedness, and emotional neutrality, which renders them insufficient moral guides for healthcare.Footnote 26 For example, actions of beneficence and nonmaleficence are compatible with emotional disengagement. But without empathic attunement to patients’ health problems, clinical judgment and healing actions may be quite deficient.Footnote 27 And such omissions can apply not only to individuals presenting for care but also to groups such as the elderly and racial/ethnic minorities.
An objection to the aridity-disconnection point is that best practices for advancing people’s health-related good and avoiding related harms require diagnostic and treatment approaches that employ holistic meanings of illness. Thus, for example, beneficence and nonmaleficence actually demand healthcare that includes emotional attunement and humanistic practices. So specification of these two principles solves the problem. I have no trouble with such specification; the point is what it uses: a notion of care. Hence the objection actually establishes the significance of care. However, this does not show that a concept or principle of care is logically derivable from beneficence and nonmaleficence, nor that care has subsidiary status.
Next, let us consider justice and respect before turning to care in detail. In its implications for canvassing whether different people and groups are treated fairly, justice can be quite objectifying. Moreover, in emphasizing autonomous choice, respect for persons more or less stresses the rather technical, although important, features of voluntariness, sufficient understanding, and adequate reasoning. Further, empowering, recognizing, and showing regard for others—other features of respect for persons—are still compatible with emotional distance and lack of strong human-to-human bond.
On the other hand, some accounts of respect (not just respect for autonomy) consider it very humanizing in operation. Examples are Sarah Lawrence-Lightfoot’s narratives of mutual engagement, profound empathy, thoughtful caring, and feeling of oneness between professionals and those they serve.Footnote 28 But I suggest that although these actions and attributes are compatible with respect, they are better understood or elaborated as elements of care and solidarity, for reasons I will explain. Furthermore, I suggest that widespread devaluing of the elderly constitutes a collective disconnection with them and undermines caring responses. And the long history in the United States of devaluing racial/ethnic minorities enhances the risk that their elderly face an even greater lack of care and connection.
The Principle of Care
The principle of care I envision here emphasizes both caring about and caring for people. It draws from theoretical considerations of “ethics of care” or “care ethics.” As Alisa L. Carse and Hilde Lindemann Nelson wrote, “a care ethic . . . focuses on the particularistic and the personal.”Footnote 29 And, as Virginia Held explains, “the central focus of the ethics of care is on the salience of attending to and meeting the needs of particular others for whom we take responsibility.”Footnote 30 But this individual focus of care does not preclude review of how groups are cared for and about. Rather, care calls for such scrutiny one by one.
The “caring for” aspect in such theories of care and in the principle of care includes action guided by empathic understanding and human connection. “Caring about” means putting a priority on addressing people’s needs, particularly those whose needs are met insufficiently. Thus, in the present context, care requires attention to whether different groups—including the elderly and racial/ethnic minorities—receive an equivalently high quality of health services. And care requires attention to whether those services are delivered in thoughtful and considerate ways.
Thus it should be evident how a principle of care could inform QI measures. An example would be a study of how much time health professionals spend talking with the elderly versus with younger individuals and how dialogic the conversations are. Assessments might also target the level of nuance of the guidance regarding drug interactions, a serious potential problem because the elderly on average take more drugs than do younger people.
Objections to Care as a Principle
An important challenge is that ethics of care or care ethics are typically cast in opposition to the distanced or emotionally disconnected justice perspective.Footnote 31 So drawing a principle of care from theories of care seems to violate the core conceptions of these theories. On the other hand, Carse and Nelson write that what it means to care about people in our immediate vicinity can also inform us about what sensitivities we should have regarding distant others in considerations of justice.Footnote 32 I agree.
The present account highlights the idea that features of care are ethically required in delivery of healthcare services. And given the default foundation of respect for persons and justice, care should not generally violate those principles. On the other hand, care can provide a nuanced view of what justice should consider.
The Principle of Solidarity
Whereas care involves empathic connection, especially with people with whom one has tangible connections, Carol Gould notes that solidarity includes empathy toward persons more distant.Footnote 33 In a related account, Jean Harvey argues for a concept of “moral solidarity” that involves “empathetic understanding” involving remote others.Footnote 34 Solidarity can particularly include concern for oppressed others and, as Tuija Takala stresses, concern for the needs of the most disadvantaged.Footnote 35
It can now be seen how justice based on respect, solidarity, and care can interact. Solidarity’s focus on the most disadvantaged reinforces the egalitarian perspective that addressing the needs of the worst off should prima facie be the first priority of justice. Also, the empathic connection to the worst off associated with solidarity can help us further understand what justice should demand as remediation. And care helps us understand how people should be treated.
In light of these analyses, the principle of solidarity advanced here includes the assertion that we should feel what Harvey terms “a kind of alignment or unity or fellowship” with others, although Harvey notes that what such language means is debated.Footnote 36 A corollary is the idea that solidarity should be felt with the elderly and racial/ethnic minorities. A typical justification is our shared humanity.
In application, solidarity helps cut through our socioeconomic and racial/ethnic conditioning that keeps us from appreciating that ostensibly distant or different people are simply some others of us (my phrase). Solidarity directs that we should have such feelings of connection, alignment, fellow feeling, and the like for others far and near. And notice that the “far” could also include those far in age from us. Also, solidarity’s focus on the worst off promotes special attunement to outcomes for disadvantaged racial/ethnic minorities as well as the poor.
In short, solidarity provides another strong moral reason to give sufficient attention to the quality of healthcare services provided to the elderly and older racial/ethnic minorities. Enunciation of solidarity can be a check against the subtle devaluing that can promote ethically insufficient attention to their needs.
Gould reasons that the combination of justice, care, and solidarity generates sensitivity to the suffering and oppression of distant others and motivation to eliminate these adverse circumstances.Footnote 37 I agree. If we add respect for persons, we can plausibly hope for an interaction in which attitudes of care and solidarity motivate efforts to ensure that respect and justice are fulfilled.
Objections to Solidarity
Virginia Held argues that “in the ethics of care, the values of trust, solidarity, mutual concern, and empathetic responsiveness have priority” and interact with justice.Footnote 38 Thus it might be objected that solidarity is subsidiary to, or a component of, ethics of care.
A theory of an ethics of care might explain and encompass solidarity and show its importance. That would be all to the good, as I am not advancing an overarching theory of solidarity. But, I am also not advancing an ethics of care. Rather I propose a principle of care that has a narrower focus. Although Carse and Nelson note some broader scope for care as a general conception, solidarity especially emphasizes connection to those conceptually and geographically distant.
A practical objection is that many people simply do not feel solidarity with the elderly or racial/ethnic minorities. Moreover, this lack of oneness may be more unconscious than overt. So solidarity can be touted, but it won’t matter. But this objection assumes that subjective disconnection cannot be reversed or reduced. I cannot review the relevant literature, but I do assert that dispositions are often malleable and that such transformation is possible. A related example is seen in discussions around “cultural humility.”Footnote 39 That is, there is a moral space for educating people that they should feel solidarity with different groups, and related experiential exercises can be developed. This practical objection about solidarity has merit. But the response should be to develop systematic efforts to change attitudes.
Quality Improvement
It is one thing to elaborate moral foundations for ethical healthcare for the elderly and racial/ethnic minorities. It is quite another to ensure that the relevant quality of care is delivered after people have equitable access—the goal of QI.
QI is a widely employed mechanism and a significant assessment factor in the U.S. Joint Commission’s criteria for accreditation of hospitals and other healthcare entities. Evidence-based care is the benchmark. Extensive information is available through the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.Footnote 40 QI has also received major attention in the United Kingdom and more broadly.Footnote 41
An example of QI assessment is whether cardiac patients receive a beta-blocker drug after acute myocardial infarction (a heart attack, or heart muscle damage usually due to sudden coronary artery occlusion). The necessity of this medicine, except in the case of known contraindications, is evidence based. Hospital records are then reviewed to determine whether beta-blockers were prescribed. If not, remedial efforts—such as education for health professionals, electronic reminders, discharge sheet checklists, and so forth—would be designed. Then another QI assessment is done after a reasonable amount of time. And so it goes iteratively. Determination of how to apply QI regarding the healthcare of the elderly and older racial/ethnic minorities can then build on the standard QI model. A prerequisite is evidence-based guidelines. Two quite different challenges then emerge.
QI and Race/Ethnicity
The idea that race/ethnicity per se should not influence the quality of healthcare is widely accepted. The ethical considerations in this article demand such equitable services. However, major forces may oppose QI attention to the issue.Footnote 42 Health professionals and institutions may be very sensitive to the possibility that they might be labeled racist or ethnically biased. Risk managers may be very worried about adverse publicity. Staff must be trained to ascertain patients’ self-ascribed race/ethnicity respectfully and to be comfortable with the exercise. However, a very comprehensive and promising model is available for addressing these challenges.
Documents available at the Disparities Solution Center of Massachusetts General HospitalFootnote 43 explain the need for such programs and how they fit with standard QI efforts; suggest strategies; stress the need and methods for organizational and community involvement—including organizational transformation; and describe iterative implementation approaches.Footnote 44
Robin Weinick and colleagues note that “regardless of what the report shows, it can be used to increase transparency regarding quality of care for racial and ethnic minority patients and as a tool for collaboration with community groups.”Footnote 45 Thus, these so-called equity reports can be mechanisms for building trust with previously distrustful communities. For example, the health system of the University of Wisconsin–Madison vitally involves community members so as “to ensure that initiatives and programs are developed with community input.”Footnote 46 I argue that such community involvement and related quality improvement programs show communities that the institution genuinely cares about them.Footnote 47 Such actions will also increase community-institutional/organizational solidarity. These features together will build trust that fosters further collaborative work. However, as Robin Weinick and Romana Hasnain-Wynia have recently emphasized, how QI is implemented is important for ensuring that it reduces disparities.Footnote 48
QI and the Elderly
Healthcare organizations might be as, or more, apprehensive about demonstrating inferior care of the elderly as they are of racial/ethnic minorities. After all, the elderly are generally a major patient group, and often they could go elsewhere. I suggest that comparable strategies of including the elderly community in the QI effort would be very helpful.
Another challenge is that the evidence basis for QI in the elderly is less substantial because of their underrepresentation in research. Also, the assessments will be complex, because the elderly usually have more health conditions and take more medications. Thus it will often be more difficult to discern whether a given course of action is appropriate for an older patient compared to a younger individual. On the other hand, the QI evaluation can begin with established guidelines that are based on the best evidence. The list can then be gradually expanded.
QI, the Elderly, and Transparent Reasoning
I earlier noted Cassel’s point that elder ageism causes implicit rationing—withholding effective care by practitioners merely because people are older. As a counter, she advises that QI should promote transparency and accountability by assessing whether reasons are given for clinical recommendations. “One goal is to make these implicit decisions more explicit by including and informing patients about treatment options.” Her plausible view is that what she terms “social prejudices,” including age, “would be hard to justify aloud.”Footnote 49 I agree, but this may be a complex and difficult assessment goal for QI. However, it is worth considering.
Integrating QI and Ethics
I have argued that respect for persons, justice, care, and solidarity, coupled with beneficence and nonmaleficence, are ethical foundations for QI efforts that would address potential elderly and older racial/ethnic disparities in healthcare. But how should these general principles and interpretations be applied?
Decisions about how to develop, what to target, and how to employ QI regarding the elderly involve several stakeholder groups: the elderly generally, older racial/ethnic minorities, health professionals, and leaders and boards of institutions. These groups’ priorities and perspectives will and should depend on local history and knowledge. Thus just what strategies would be best may vary strikingly among communities.
The upshot is that how to apply the ethical framework must be determined by the actors in a dialogic process that respectfully supports everyone’s fair opportunity to express their views and explain their reasons. The most promising model is deliberative democracy, which Leonard Fleck has recently discussed in detail, although many have given the method considerable attention.Footnote 50 However, another key element is that discussions will typically involve profound cross-cultural elements that include biomedical and lay perspectives. Also, showing respect depends on cultural knowledge and related attributes.Footnote 51 Thus, for interlocutors, an educational interweaving of formal deliberative and cultural features will be needed. And finally, these deliberative processes should iteratively review the implications of the ethical principles. At least in the United States, consideration of care and solidarity may be particularly new. There, major attention should especially be paid to what these latter two moral benchmarks mean.
Conclusion
International evidence suggests that the elderly and older racial/ethnic minorities may often not receive evidence-based quality healthcare, even if they have good access to such services. These groups' underrepresentation in biomedical research compounds the problem. The putative outcome is preventable mortality and loss of quality of life. Among other strategies, these disparities should receive serious attention through the quality-improvement mechanism. These efforts should be ethically grounded not only in widely accepted principles of respect for persons and justice (with some elaborations), and beneficence and nonmaleficence, but also in care and solidarity. The latter two moral concepts have overlapping implications for near and far populations. Enhancing quality-improvement efforts generally will require institutional transformation and effective collaboration with affected communities. How to apply the ethical foundations is a local matter, but deliberative democracy approaches are advised. A promising model for addressing racial/ethnic outcomes in quality improvement can also be applied to the elderly.
