In The Minority Body, Elizabeth Barnes provides a compelling argument that being disabled “is not something that by itself or intrinsically makes you worse off” (6). More pointedly, Barnes suggests that, while disability may very well be a difference that results in different experiences from the majority, the difference associated with disability is not by itself, bad—people with disabilities have minority bodies, which are neither broken nor defective. Barnes proceeds to this end by breaking the argument down into six chapters.
In Chapter 1, “Constructing Disability,” Barnes set out to establish precisely who we are speaking about when we talk about people with disabilities. She identifies criteria of success associated with establishing such a definition, and holds dominant accounts up for scrutiny against these criteria. Before advancing her own position, Barnes deconstructs dominant attempts to articulate a definition. First, she explores naturalistic accounts of disability. She rejects Norman Daniels’ notion of species typical functioning (13-16) before engaging with both the WHO’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health as well as Shakespearian accounts. Her primary objection to interactional accounts of disability rests on her denial of the disability/impairment distinction (21). She swiftly rejects versions of the so-called ‘social model’ and lands on what she calls “moderate social constructionism” (38).
In Chapter 2, “Bad-Difference and Mere-Difference,” the heart of Barnes’ argument begins to clearly take shape. Here she advances the novel and somewhat contentious conclusion that “disability is neutral with respect to well-being” (54). In other words, one becomes non-standard with a disability, but not automatically worse off (55). Barnes contends that the mere-difference view is, amongst other things, associated with the view that “disability is analogous to features like sexuality, gender, ethnicity, and race” (69).
In my opinion, too much of her position relies on the strength of this claim. I contend that what matters in terms of justice and well-being is the nature of disadvantage caused by various states of being, or failures to secure adequate means to secure valuable ends. Footnote 1 I also suggest, following Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit, Footnote 2 that corrosive disadvantage ought to be regarded as especially important.
The primary point of departure between disability and sexuality, gender, ethnicity, and race, therefore, rests on the nature of disadvantage associated with living in any of these states. The important distinction to make is that, while disability is not always a bad difference, as Barnes wishes to conclude (76), when it is a bad difference, the disadvantage associated with it is necessarily corrosive in nature—it is prone to negatively impacting one’s ability to secure other aspects associated with well-being. If there is a bad difference associated with sexuality, gender, ethnicity, and race (after social barriers have been removed), then that bad difference need not result in corrosive disadvantage. This point allows one to retain the belief that disability is something that ought to be avoided because of the potential negative impacts associated with being disabled, whilst acknowledging that disability need not always be a bad difference. To suggest, however, that it is a mere difference is to ignore the above point concerning the nature of disadvantage associated with disability. While an attempt is made later, in Chapter 3, to acknowledge the negative impacts of difference, I am unconvinced by her attempt to address this concern.
This difference aside, Barnes proceeds in the next chapter, “The Value-Neutral Model,” to present what she calls a “particular way of holding a mere-difference view” (7). Here she refines her previous articulation of the mere-difference view of disability to ensure common pitfalls are avoided. More pointedly, she attempts to express how her view is compatible with there being both positive and negative effects on well-being associated with disability (79).
Chapter 4, “Taking Their Word for It,” is a defence of the reliance on first-person testimony in Chapters 2 and 3. She addresses, quite convincingly, common rebuttals to such testimony like those focused on adaptive preferences (129), and ultimately concludes that to dismiss people with disabilities and their lived experiences because of adaptive preferences is a form of “testimonial injustice” (135).
Barnes continues in the next chapter to offer another defensive posture. In “Causing Disability,” she addresses a second potential rebuttal suggesting that, if the mere-difference view of disability is correct, it would be permissible to cause disability (because, after all, it is not a bad difference), and that it would be impermissible to remove disability (144). In Chapter 5, Barnes addresses these concerns as presented by John Harris, Peter Singer, and others. She suggests that simply because something is a mere difference does not grant another the right to cause it.
Finally, Barnes presents a somewhat distinct argument in her final chapter, “Disability Pride.” Understandably, the conclusion of whether disability is a mere difference, a bad difference, or a good difference, should not impact whether people could or should feel proud of themselves. Pride is perhaps obviously something more easily adopted if people are not told that they are different, and their difference is, in fact, bad. That said, the discussion of hermeneutical injustice that follows in Chapter 6 is only very loosely related to the argument advanced throughout the text.
That said, Barnes’ The Minority Body is rigorously argued and thoroughly researched, as well as accessible, enjoyable, and a pleasure to read. She advances the discussion of the definition of disability beyond the current stalemate between sociologists and bioethicists and offers a unique, plausible, position of her own. Barnes does well to transcend many subfields of philosophy, so it is hard to narrow down an audience to a particular area of specialization. Therefore, I can recommend this book wholeheartedly to all with an interest in philosophy and disability.
