Element contents
Disinformation, Ideology, and Public Opinion in Central Europe
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 September 2026
Summary
In Central and Eastern Europe, disinformation threatens democratic stability, inflames ideological divides, and weakens Western geopolitical commitments. Drawing on cross-national analyses, as well as in-depth studies of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, this Element analyzes: the relationship between ideological polarization and disinformation supply; the challenges of building anti-disinformation efforts; individual-level demand for disinformation; and the effects of disinformation on public opinion. Ideological polarization over sociocultural issues predicts disinformation supply, and sociocultural conservatives with anti-Western views constitute a disinformation-susceptible audience that struggles to distinguish between false and true narratives. Elite-level divisions over the threat posed by disinformation exacerbate these dynamics, hampering efforts to build disinformation resilience. However, disinformation largely fails to persuade. Amongst most individuals, attitudinal backlash is more common. Disinformation does not win over hearts and minds; rather, its appeal reflects the salience of contentious issues that have emerged as a result of wider political realignments.
Keywords
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- Online ISBN: 9781009616935Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 26 November 2026
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