“What do you do when the Supreme Court is wrong?” That question formed the title of a 1979 article in the Public Interest by the late Senator (and political scientist) Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and it resonates today across the political spectrum, as serious criticism of Supreme Court decisions can be found on both Left and Right. Of course if the Supreme Court has supreme authority over the meaning of the Constitution, then either it is incoherent to say the judges can be wrong or there is nothing anyone can do if they are. But everyone admits that erroneous constitutional decisions can evoke constitutional amendments. The question is, what can be done short of that?
Moynihan's answer—debate, litigate, legislate—is a good start. By long established custom—it is not a written constitutional requirement—justices of appellate courts publish the reasons for their decisions and thus invite scrutiny of their choices. By “debate,” Moynihan referred to both professional criticism of judicial opinions and public comment on specific rulings. By “litigate” he meant to encourage losers to try again, since in slightly different factual circumstances and with new arguments that do not so much reject as ignore earlier reasoning, they can invite the courts to change their minds. For “legislate,” the art is to read the Court's objection on the narrowest grounds and then repass the act in slightly different form, achieving the legislature's central objective while giving the Court a chance to save face when upholding it.
Only in passing does Moynihan refer to the chief political response to unacceptable Court decisions: nominating judges thought to share the nominator's political sympathies. Whether because judicial independence, especially at the top, frees individuals from political opinions that were useful to profess during their climb, or because political issues change and parties realign over the course of a generation, or because constitutional issues simply look different when viewed from the bench, justices appointed to correct the wrong opinions of their predecessors do not always fulfill expectations. Besides, to reverse an opinion requires an argument, not only a switched vote; that is why, I think, Moynihan did not consider “nominate” apart from “debate.”
My current research suggests a fifth response, firmly grounded in the American tradition, but fallen into desuetude in the last generation: When the Court is wrong, other officers of government and sometimes even ordinary citizens acting in their constitutional capacities have a right, even a duty, to resist. I have in mind not civil disobedience, the outright breaking of a law in the name of higher justice, but constitutional resistance, which Richard Morgan and I have defined as the peaceable and provisional withholding of voluntary compliance with outrageous Court decisions by aggrieved parties and those similarly situated, in an effort to test the Court's action in the wider political arena (see Stoner 2006). The classic formulation is Lincoln's: He refused to make the doctrine announced by the Court in Dred Scott—that people of African descent could never become citizens of the United States and that Congress could not ban slavery in the territories—a rule that constrained what laws legislators might pass or what actions executive authorities might take. Lincoln's party remained committed to the exclusion of slavery from the territories despite Dred Scott, and once in office, Lincoln ignored the Court's denial of African-American citizenship by issuing passports to free Blacks (see Arkes 1992). Nor was Lincoln alone in this approach: Larry Kramer (2004) has shown the actual practice of what he calls “popular constitutionalism” at the country's beginnings.
The view that each branch is judge of its own constitutional responsibilities is called “departmentalism,” and it was formulated by Jefferson and Madison; in their hands it applied not only to the departments of the federal government but to the states as well. To modern ears departmentalism seems to counsel disorder and undermine the “settlement function” of law; since the Progressive era, the project of bringing administrative efficiency to courts has typically trumped the traditional concern for getting the decision right (see Alexander and Schauer 1997). Indeed, the contemporary legal system leaves little scope for constitutional resistance: Wielding extensive powers of contempt and injunction, judges can fine reluctant officials into submission, and what they cannot do directly can be achieved by private parties through section 1983 lawsuits against officials who resist.
Restoration of a proper balance to the judicial function requires revival of the spirit of resistance. It means seeing the separation of powers not only as a system of adjusting interests and ambitions, but as a forum to insure public debate over questions of right and wrong. It means seeing the “constitutional dialogue” increasingly noticed by political scientists not as an endless game of pragmatic adjustment, but as a forge of compromise that gives constitutionalism its moral edge (e.g., Fisher 1985; Whittington 1999). It allows the courts to confidently determine rights in particular cases—it requires, please note, no constitutional amendment—while preserving to the political process authority over public policy and to the whole constitutional process authority over basic law. It is not a call to disorder, rather to insure that order be achieved through popular consent rather than elite decree. Though from a partisan standpoint it might entail political risk—at least to those who think the courts are safely in their hands—it promises in the long run greater constitutional stability as well as settled right.
Author Bio
James R. Stoner, Jr. is professor of political science at Louisiana State University. He specializes in political theory, English common law, and American constitutionalism.
