In recent years the period of American neutrality has received renewed attention, with scholars highlighting the myriad ways Americans involved themselves in the European war long before the United States ever entered it officially. To this growing literature Chad Fulwider's study on German Propaganda and U.S. Neutrality in World War I is a welcome addition. In this first book-length study on German propaganda efforts in the neutral United States, Fulwider concentrates on the Anglo German competition for American public sympathy and support, which he characterizes as the “most decisive battle of World War I” (3). Trying to draw the United States to their side—or at least to keep it from joining the opposing camp—both countries devised elaborate propaganda campaigns to champion their cause and malign that of the enemy. Given Great Britain's control over much of the transatlantic information flow (having severed German transatlantic cables on August 4) and the Anglophile sentiment of American elites, Germany felt itself at a pronounced disadvantage from the very beginning. Partly as a consequence, its propaganda would come to focus on the large group of Americans of German birth or descent.
Indeed, it was German Americans who first rose to publicly defend the old fatherland. Though they constituted a highly heterogeneous, and generally well-assimilated, group, the outbreak of the European war at first inspired an “outpouring of patriotic pride” (20) among many of the eight million first- and second-generation German Americans. In petitions, editorials and large rallies, they sought to challenge the pro-Allied positions advanced by much of the American press and Northeastern elites and called for an even-handed American neutrality, especially with regard to transatlantic munitions shipments. Once German officials began to build a formal propaganda campaign in late September 1914, they tried to harness this independent ethnic self-mobilization to official agendas by subsidizing, encouraging, or even outright organizing of ethnic neutrality endeavors. Overestimating their unity, political strength, and patriotism, they saw German Americans as a potential political pressure group able to maintain American neutrality.
Though Fulwider concludes that German agitation for a fairer assessment in the U.S. press was more successful than previously assumed (67), the larger attempt to turn ethnic attachment into political leverage—and ultimately to maintain American neutrality—failed. A politically united “Germandom” never materialized in the United States and even the campaign for an arms embargo, the single most forceful endeavor, did not find sufficient popular and congressional support. On the contrary, the brashness and psychological deficiencies of German (and some German American) propaganda cast increasing suspicion on German Americans. And even as German Americans grew silent or adopted a decidedly pro-American rhetoric after the sinking of the Lusitania, acts of sabotage on American soil undertaken by German naval and military attaches continued to implicate German Americans as a potential “enemy within.” Once America entered the war, even determined declarations of ethnic loyalty could not avert a wave of suspicion and discrimination, leading ultimately to a profound weakening of ethnic identity and associational life.
Much of Fulwider's story is familiar to the student of transatlantic relations. Reinhard Doerries, Jörg Nagler, and Johannes Reiling, to name but a few, have all provided meticulous research on German propaganda in the United States: its very structures, major protagonists, modes of operation and failures have long been clear. So, too (following studies by Frank Trommler, Frederick C. Luebke, Niel M. Johnson, and Katja Wüstenbecker) have German American actions and responses during the period of neutrality. Still, Fulwider ably synthesizes and builds on existing scholarship, making it accessible to an English-language audience. It is in delineating the assumptions of German officials that Fulwider makes his most original contribution. As he convincingly shows, Berlin bureaucrats systematically overestimated the unity, ethnic loyalty, and political influence of what was actually a deeply divided ethnic group. “The German perception of a large body of well-organized Germans in America who could rise up in support of the goals of the Fatherland and maintain American neutrality was a creation of German officials’ imagination,” he contends (88). But this misconception, as Fulwider shows, was only part of a larger “cultural divide” (52) between Germans and Americans, which undermined the overall effectiveness of German propaganda. Berlin's insistence, for example, on sending propaganda pamphlets carrying the “imperial seal” (intended to increase their moral authority), fundamentally misjudged U.S. attitudes toward state power. Ultimately, German propagandists failed to understand the tenets of American public sentiments as well as the distinct sensitivities of a multiethnic society.
But Fulwider also succeeds in restoring the agency of German Americans. While it is all too tempting to imagine them mere pawns of German Imperial designs, he reveals a quite different dynamic. It was indeed the profound, and independent, ethnic self-mobilization during August 1914 that drew German official attention to German Americans and provided initial direction to a nascent German propaganda campaign. In this respect, the study might have benefited from an engagement with the growing literature on the global history of ethnic Germans and German propaganda during the Great War to reveal the distinct similarities and differences of the American case. In its American setting, however, the study is yet another reminder of how deeply Americans had already become involved in the war long before they ever entered it militarily. At no time after 1914 was the United States only a neutral observer. Rather it was, “pulled into the conflict almost immediately through the propaganda campaigns” … “and by providing much-needed capital and arms.” (171). Ultimately, the very intensity of this involvement rendered German, and German American, efforts to raise American sympathies futile. Moreover, as Fulwider acknowledges, even the most skillful German propaganda could not have offset the disastrous impression left by the Imperial government's political and military decisions.
