The decline in militant violence in the Niger Delta, Nigeria's oil producing region, masks an unfortunate reality. Abidde's new book exposes the shallowness of the peace and the massive scope of the government's failures. The amnesty programme launched by President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua ‘did not in any way directly address many of the problems and challenges associated with the region’ (28) and the payment for peace (to former militants) cannot continue forever. Abidde estimates that out of $2.5 billion dollars spent between 2010 and 2015, 30% was stolen and 40% was spent on bribes. More importantly, the government ‘should not have to bribe its way to peace’ just as it ‘should not have to bomb its way to peace’ (174). The latter is noteworthy: ‘The Nigerian government has a long history of violence against her citizens. Be it under a military or civilian regime’ he reminds us (138).

These views remain relatively controversial in Nigeria, since the voices who condemned President Obasanjo's human rights abuses in the Niger Delta (briefly but helpfully outlined in a chapter) have only recently begun holding the military to the same standard when it comes to Boko Haram, religious minorities in Kaduna, or numerous other security challenges. The author's positions thus take some courage, though the organisation of the evidence sometimes weakens the book's persuasiveness. Abidde often resorts to loosely edited lists of information, and much of the material documenting the region's underdevelopment for example comes from a well-known United Nations Development Programme report from 2006, even though many organisations have continued to document the human and environmental crimes that inspired the rebellions.

His most valuable evidence, which includes interviews with two of the most important militant leaders, suffers from similar editorial defects. We learn from Jomo Gbomo, the mythmaker and spokesperson for the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, that MEND ‘refused to accept an amnesty without dialogue’ (119). This accounts for the government promptly labelling them a terrorist organisation, says Gbomo, a clumsy rhetorical effort by the Jonathan administration that I witnessed first-hand in Washington. MEND refuses to renounce militancy, but also believes in violence to show force rather than to propagate terror. Another militant leader, Henry Okah, bombastically brags about a ten-fold increase in militant camps since 2009 (as of when?) and complains that the demobilisation programme was ‘a massive fraud on Nigerians’ that ignored the underlying factors responsible for militancy, and that paid many non-militants (90). The chapter profiles several militant leaders, but readers are ultimately left with a limited analysis of their comparative importance. There is useful information but at times an awkward introduction to the personalities that held Nigeria's economy (and many foreign workers) hostage. Nevertheless, I am genuinely hopeful that Abidde's next project will build on this volume's strengths and his privileged access.