Noting that the tension between politics and religion remains “a central fact of our time” (1) despite the promise of modern liberal Enlightenment to loosen it once and for all, Peter J. Ahrensdorf, in Greek Tragedy and Political Philosophy, calls for a reinvigorated interest in the premodern treatment of religion and political enlightenment. He has, furthermore, answered his call by writing a carefully argued and remarkably comprehensive study of Sophocles' Theban plays. Yet Ahrensdorf's explicit discussion of the politics “of our time” goes no farther than the first paragraph. As is quickly revealed, his real ambition is to challenge and perhaps to supplant the interpretation of Sophocles as a fierce opponent of rationalism, a view that he traces back to the criticism of Friedrich Nietzsche (1–6, 14, 82–83; see 153–56). While Nietzsche offers a “brilliant, richly provocative, and deeply influential” reading of Sophocles (4), leading twentieth-century critics like Bernard Knox and Charles Segal to characterize the poet as a “religious enemy of rationalism” (5), Ahrensdorf questions whether this interpretation is warranted by the texts. The overarching objective of the book, we learn, is to make the case for Sophocles' own commitment to theoretical rationalism, contrary to the claims of not just Nietzsche but also J. Peter Euben and Arlene Saxonhouse (6–7), and, it may be added, H. D. F. Kitto. Ahrensdorf's version of the tragic poet is deeply committed to the life of human reason, the life best exemplified by Socrates (7, 46–47, 83–84, 150, 178; see 40–41, 77). In a word, Sophocles is a philosopher.
Ahrensdorf's ambitions are, in other words and quite plainly, grand. Yet it is a testament to his interpretive skill and intellectual rigor that they are largely fulfilled. The three chapters comprising the core of this book are each devoted to a single Theban play and present the fruits of a line-by-line textual analysis that is sensitive to the subtleties of Sophocles' Greek. The burden of the first chapter, on Oedipus the Tyrant, is to demonstrate that the downfall of the seemingly wise Oedipus, whose rule of Thebes is best viewed as a thoroughgoing “experiment in political rationalism” (19; see 73–82), is precipitated not by the cruelty of the gods or the world external to him, but by his own foolishness. Motivated by a “zealous dedication to nobility” (27; see 10–13, 25–26), Oedipus errs in abandoning his use of reason and turning to the gods for help in ending the plague in Thebes. Not only does Ahrensdorf show that Oedipus's nobility is itself riddled with problems, because driven fundamentally by a desire for self-benefit (29–34); he also suggests that the horrific events with which the play concludes are caused by Oedipus's inability to come to terms with his own mortal nature. Greater candor about his hopes for immortality may have prevented the tyrant from blinding himself, which would have been a more “humane” outcome insofar as a healthy Oedipus would have been more beneficial to his family and himself (44–47; see 150).
In his chapter on Oedipus at Colonus, Ahrensdorf deepens his interpretation of Sophocles' critique of nobility and piety in the name of philosophic rationalism. Whereas in the first play, Oedipus begins as a proponent of unaided reason as a guide for human life, in the second, he shows himself as a devotee of antirationalist piety, seen most clearly in his faith in divine justice. Ahrensdorf's treatment of the reasons underlying Oedipus's certainty that he deserves the gods' favor (58ff.), which is the most penetrating analysis of this book, repays careful study. Not only does Oedipus believe that he has been willfully wronged by evil men (64–66); he also sees himself as free from responsibility for the crimes of patricide and incest. He believes, first, that his crimes were involuntarily committed (60–61), but, second, that he was led into wrongdoing by self-love, a compulsion natural to human beings that cannot freely be opposed (61–64). The first of these has been appreciated by many commentators, most notably David Grene. No commentator other than Ahrensdorf, however, has so clearly brought to light the second as an aspect of Oedipus's self-understanding. The broader argument of this chapter is that Oedipus's position, which for Ahrensdorf is the position of piety itself, is “self-contradictory” (82): if Oedipus is correct that he bears no responsibility for his crimes, for the reasons stated, then neither do his enemies for theirs, for the same (66–67, 82–84). The poet teaches that Oedipus's hopes for divine justice are unfounded.
The chapter on Antigone is Ahrensdorf's longest, and while this drama is surely worthy of generous consideration, its disproportionate length in the overall economy of the book is not sufficiently justified. The chapter suffers specifically from an overabundance of drawn-out direct quotations, which might have been edited for brevity. Nevertheless, Ahrensdorf's treatment of Antigone persuasively clarifies the conflict between Antigone and Creon, which is shown to be at base a disagreement over two different conceptions of justice, each vigorously defended as correct. For Antigone, justice is devotion to the family, which enjoys the eternal support of the gods and is therefore the natural community (96–97, 100–1, 110–12). For Creon, justice is devotion to the city (115–16, 119–20). Sophocles, on Ahrensdorf's reading, indicates that Antigone's version, while the more beautiful of the two, appears to be less rationally defensible than Creon's, even if the latter is based on a cold appeal to fear (124–26). Still, both characters are brought to ruin in the play because they lose confidence in their particular conceptions of justice, each on account of powerful challenges from the other's conception. Sophocles encourages readers of this drama to “think through the ultimate consequences of their beliefs in justice and piety” (150). Antigone, then, reads much like the drama of Plato's Republic Book I, in which Socrates shows the deficiencies of several definitions of justice, prompting the dialogue's characters, but especially its readers, to think more deeply about the nature of justice.
Ahrensdorf makes no direct claim that Antigone should be viewed as analogous to Plato's Republic. Yet this inference from his analysis points to what will be the charge most frequently levied against this book: Ahrensdorf takes Sophocles too far down rationalism's road, rendering the tragic poet too much of a Socratic philosopher. My one reservation about this study is that it could have addressed such an objection more clearly—for it does indeed address this objection. Ahrensdorf holds that Sophocles' rationalism “differs from Socrates and even from Thucydides … in its somber reserve” (7; see 8, 178). But what exactly is this “somber reserve”? How does it distinguish one rationalism from another? It is not entirely evident what Ahrensdorf means here. Furthermore, the distinction appears to be retracted as the book's argument proceeds. In his impressively substantial concluding chapter on Nietzsche, Socrates, and Aristotle, Ahrensdorf maintains that classical philosophic analysis of tragedy shows that the insights available to us through philosophy and through tragedy are complementary (esp. 156–78; see 7–8). He also shows that his interpretation of Sophocles, contra Nietzsche, is best understood as a powerful affirmation of Aristotle's own in the Poetics (152–53, 176–78). But, again, what is the essential difference between Sophocles and Aristotle, if there is one? In any case, Ahrensdorf has written an exceptional study of Sophoclean drama that will challenge the way we think about this poet, in particular, and the purposes of tragic poetry, in general.
