John Jackson bestrode the world of international trade law like a Colossus. His Reference Jackson1969 treatise on World Trade and the Law of GATT was called the bible of GATT law. His Reference Jackson1977 casebook on Legal Problems of International Economic Relations created a new law school course and introduced thousands of students around the globe to international trade law. It was the leading international trade law casebook for decades, and his students went on to positions of responsibility throughout the world in governments, international organizations, and private practice. His analysis of GATT infirmities convinced certain influential governments to push for a new international trade organization, which eventually saw life as the World Trade Organization. It was a great honor for me to have been associated with John for over thirty years. Indeed, his 1985 invitation to join as a co-author of the casebook after my first year in law teaching undoubtedly saved me many years of drudgery as a corporate/securities law scholar. Thus, I am pleased to offer some thoughts on John's influence on dispute settlement under GATT and the WTO.

The history of GATT/WTO dispute settlement has been one of increasing judicialization and respect for the rule of law. John was instrumental in pushing the system in this direction. For example, in his 1978 article on ‘The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System’, he contrasted the differences between a power-oriented approach to diplomacy and international relations and a rule-oriented approach. In this regard he argued:

In particular, he noted the advantage of reducing reliance on raw power in an area such as trade that can quickly lead to retaliation and counter-retaliation, as well as the desirable promotion of balance, fairness, and democratic values.

In terms of how a more rule-oriented approach could be applied through strengthened dispute settlement procedures, John cataloged the shortcomings of the then current GATT system and in 1979 made a number of concrete proposals, which I recall was at the end of the Tokyo Round and years before the Uruguay Round had even begun. Specifically, the changes John proposed were (i) if consultations or mediation failed to resolve a dispute, the Director of dispute settlement (a GATT official) would establish a panel on request; (ii) the Director would propose seven panelists from a standing Panel List and the parties could reject two each, leaving at least three who would be available to serve on the three-person panel; (iii) normally the parties would be required to accept the panel's decisions (absent, for example, the grant of a waiver); and (iv) a surveillance procedure. John also noted that panels should pursue ‘a restrictive method of interpretation and application’ of the rules, rather than an ‘expansive’ method. The key thing to note is that John was proposing in 1979 a system that resembled what was agreed upon in 1994 in the Uruguay Round negotiations in that it would have created a rules-based system with compulsory jurisdiction. For the time, this was revolutionary. It is useful to recall that then GATT Director-General Olivier Long would shortly author a book on his view of the limitations of law in the GATT system. Of course, the ultimate result of the Uruguay Round went further in some ways towards judicialization than John was proposing in 1979, but that result was achieved only because the groundwork had been laid by John at a time when such proposals were viewed as utopian.

John heartily defended and promoted the new WTO dispute settlement system, especially against those who attempted to argue that the new system did not really change anything and that the WTO, like the GATT before it, was, in their view, not a body of rules, but only a commitment to negotiate in good faith solutions to international trade problems. In a noteworthy article in the American Journal of International Law, John carefully analyzed the new WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and conclusively demonstrated that numerous of its provisions made sense only if it was understood that WTO rules were binding obligations. The fact that the WTO, unlike a government with police power, ultimately could not impose its will on a sovereign state did not change the reality of obligation.

Given that the WTO dispute settlement is viewed as the jewel in the crown of the WTO, it stands as a tribute to John's vision as to how the multilateral trading system should function – a rules-based system with a strong dispute settlement system.