It sometimes comes up in conversation with strangers that I am a history professor, and I teach a course on fascism. My interlocutor often replies with something like, ‘How interesting … and so timely!’ Much in the world has changed since I began teaching in 2004, but one constant has been the belief that the study of fascism has particular relevance to the current moment. Back then, I usually just nodded agreeably and changed the subject. With time, however, the subject has become harder to change.
From the vantage point of 2026, it can be hard to remember what precisely made a course on fascism seem especially timely to people in 2004. Were they thinking of American neo-conservatives, those left-liberal apostates whose quest to renew the nation’s vital force precipitated an imperial war? Or was it the putative ‘Islamo-fascists’ of al-Qaeda, for whom political violence was to usher in a spiritual counter-revolution? The fascist era of interwar Europe crystallised so many modern political tendencies that its echoes and legacies could be found almost anywhere by someone squinting hard enough.
For serious students of historical fascism, the term’s application to current affairs could usually be dismissed as an ‘empty signifier’ – a vessel of variable meanings and affective associations without a clear, broadly agreed definition.Footnote 1 As a specialist in modern Spain who has worked on the Francisco Franco dictatorship (1936-1975), I am especially sensitive to the term's misuse. My mentor, the eminent Hispanist and comparatist Stanley G. Payne, had been both a leading revisionist of the standard historiography on Franco and a key figure in the rigorous theorisation of generic fascism.
I was thus primed to be sceptical of the relentless attempts to view twenty-first century America through the lens of fascism. Whether it was radio stations blacklisting a popular country music act for opposing the Iraq War in 2003 or the putative ‘deep state’ seizing control of the nation’s health care in 2010, fascist tendencies were seen lurking around every corner. Long a preoccupation of the left, the fascist menace now animated American right-wing populism and that last pre-Internet generation of radio commentators that gave it shape. One bestselling author developed an extended comparison between American liberalism and European fascism based on shared traits: radical relativism, celebrity cults, utopian promises, divisive ‘us-vs-them’ rhetoric and speech codes.Footnote 2 However facile and polemical, this kind of discourse reflected genuine and pervasive anxiety. History seemed the best guide to the problem of how we would know if fascism were upon us again, and why it would matter.
Teaching fascism in the global twenty-first century
The guiding principle of my upper-level undergraduate ‘Varieties of Fascism’ seminar at the University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, is that for fascism to have any use in contemporary discourse, it must first be understood in its native habitat: Europe in the traumatic aftermath of the Great War. Although later in the semester we cautiously explore the term’s application outside interwar Europe, students must first come to appreciate the specificities of the post-First World War conjuncture that gave rise to the fascist era. As the seminar works through the events and structures of fascism’s rise, we draw distinctions between militias, movements, parties and regimes. We compare the ideological, emotional, aesthetic and organisational characteristics among Europe’s various shirt movements. We consider how antisemitism functioned similarly and differently across fascist contexts. We ask whether fascism is best thought of as a left–right ideological synthesis, a political cult or a formula for seizing and exercising autocratic power in an age of mass politics? What factors determined whether a fascist movement broke through or withered? What made the peculiar fascist dynamics of compromise and radicalisation so dangerous?
These questions animate our study of the classic fascist era. Additionally, they supply an analytical vocabulary for the latter part of the semester, when we pursue meaningful connections with politics in the postwar world, including in our own time. Students generally agree that it is futile to insist on a strict definition, but precise language nonetheless helps to avoid the ‘empty signifier’ trap. The key feature of an empty signifier is that its conceptual limits are porous and indeterminate (unlike a ‘floating signifier’, a concept that simply means different things to different people). A political movement may thus resemble fascism in only minor ways, but the word’s emotive power can cause these to overwhelm more significant features of that movement, until differences ‘collapse into equivalential chains’.Footnote 3
I encourage students to think about postwar fascist legacies less in terms of minimum categorical criteria, but more in terms of kinship, lineage and influence. When dealing with postwar European parties with direct lineal connections to historical fascism, a key question is whether fascism can be ‘democratised’ in the way socialism was. We know that such groups engaged in violent direct action during the long 1960s, but at what point has it become possible to accept parties like France’s National Rally and the Brothers of Italy as convincing, good-faith participants in twenty-first-century European democracies? The German Nazi lineage was officially suppressed more thoroughly than other fascist legacies, but my students have taught me how algorithmic pocket media has facilitated its resurgence. Many have seen first-hand how a teenage boy with his first smartphone is systematically offered enticing onramps into Hitlerian mythology and semiology. Today’s undergraduates therefore have a privileged window on the vernacular of cultural rebellion for young men in Europe and America and, by extension, the ecosystem of today’s fringe right. They tend to view this as a movement of alienated online nihilism, and they are astonished to imagine Hitler’s first followers as fanatical street-fighting idealists.
By contrast, Putin’s Russia claims an anti-fascist lineage even as it betrays a certain kinship with historical fascism. Timothy Snyder’s essay on the Putin regime’s rehabilitation of the Orthodox-Christian fascist-adjacent mystic Ivan Ilyan, who died in exile and obscurity in 1954, left a deep impression on students in the 2025 rendition of my seminar.Footnote 4 In class, I emphasised how Russia’s road to authoritarianism did not feature a fascist-style insurgency but rather was a consummately insider operation. In fact, after a humiliating imperial collapse and a decade of economic chaos, Putin’s presidentialism might have appeared to foreclose the prospect of something more radical, in the manner of a Horthy or Pilsudski. What is the regime trying to accomplish with this kind of fascist messaging?
Kinship among fascist and non-fascist regimes is explored in Wolfgang Schivelbusch’s Three New Deals: Reflections on Roosevelt's America, Mussolini's Italy, and Hitler's Germany, 1933–1939.Footnote 5 The analysis centres on formal and structural comparisons – mass communications, political economy, public works – irrespective of the regime’s ideological goals. Though Schivelbusch recognises the obvious fundamental differences, he nevertheless insists that his comparison reveals something meaningful about modern America. He summons the conservative isolationist John T. Flynn’s observation that the New Deal ‘lives on crises … and must create for itself, if it is to continue, fresh crises from year to year’, and darkly evokes a Schmittian politics of enmity that Schivelbusch believed endured in twenty-first century American political life.Footnote 6 Lively and friendly to undergraduate readers, Three New Deals has reliably generated good discussion and constructive disagreement between those who find merit in Schivelbusch’s argument and those who find it irresponsible – even offensive – to compare bloodthirsty tyrants with the president who saved liberal democracy.
The ‘fascist effect’, a concept developed by Reto Hoffman in reference to Imperial Japan, can be another helpful way to encourage students to think about the legacies of fascism in regimes and movements that do not fit the classic fascist paradigm but nonetheless betray its deep ideological influence.Footnote 7 Japan may be the paradigmatic case, but students can consider the ‘fascist effect’ elsewhere. In politically charged topics where students may tread cautiously, this approach can even inject a healthy dose of analytical objectivity. For example, several anti-colonial movements from Africa and Asia were incubated in Berlin’s wartime expatriate community.Footnote 8 Arab Socialism, or Ba’athism, mirrored aspects not only of fascist ideology but also the practice of tactical compromise and the movement-party-regime progression. In Poland and Palestine, Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s Revisionist Zionism experienced a ‘fascist effect’ in the 1930s, its militias and youth organisations increasingly pursuing the dual strategy of violent direct action and political participation. Rather than underscoring the uniqueness of Zionism, this approach positions it within a constellation of twentieth-century political movements that drew on the revolutionary nationalist élan of interwar Europe. In India, the Hindutva movement drew from European fascism’s ideas of mystical ethnonationalism, even though its approach to political power was more methodical and indirect. Neither Hindutva nor Revisionist Zionism would ever stage a fascist seizure of power, but both came to form the backbone of their respective countries’ dominant political parties of the twenty-first century. By identifying fascist legacies in contemporary conflicts, I do not seek to change anyone’s mind, but I do hope that this perspective, like all good history, can help students attain a more sophisticated understanding of our world.
Perhaps the richest case study on the power and limits of religious fascism is Franco’s Spain, sometimes referred to as ‘fascist Spain’. Spain’s genuinely fascist movements – those exalting violence in the name of a national–social revolution – were small, marginal and fragmented until Franco consolidated and elevated them in 1936 as the political arm of his war effort, then progressively curtailed their influence after 1942. Yet the ‘fascist effect’ on Catholic and military nationalists engendered a discourse of crusade, extolling manly virtues of asceticism and sacrifice while girding followers for mass slaughter. The striking visual representation of the nationalist-Catholic synthesis at the Valley of the Fallen, the massive basilica built in the 1940s largely by political prisoners, forms Europe’s greatest surviving monument to fascism. Statues of sword-wielding warrior-monks adorn the main interior hall. A modernist Pietà sits atop the front gate overlooking the Albert Speer-inspired main esplanade. I show students a selfie avant-la-lettre that I snapped in 2002 with the tombs of Franco, the victorious general, and José Antonio Primo de Rivera, martyred founder of the Falange party, that sat side by side in the central nave until their removal in 2019.
Some students are shocked that such a site continues to stand at all, while others believe that to raze it would be to erase a part of Spain’s collective past. It is important, however, that students understand the limited explanatory value of symbols and aesthetics. The Valley of the Fallen is a snapshot, frozen in the post-Civil War moment, whereas the ‘fascist effect’ on Spain’s military and civilian right during the bloody revolutionary moment diminished markedly from the 1940s down to Franco’s death in 1975. I have students canvas the writings of Falangists of the war years as well as a range of other conservative Catholic, military and other right-wing writers and politicians throughout the long dictatorship opining on topics such as violence, labour, the education of women and architecture.Footnote 9 Rather than the last outpost of a revolutionary nationalist ideology defeated elsewhere, my students perceive a regime struggling to articulate a model of a conservative Catholic society compatible with a postwar international community predicated on the anti-fascist consensus.
The golden escalator and the return of history
With the breakthrough of the new right in Europe and the Americas in the mid-2010s, I, like many others, began to sense that studying historical fascism now really did have a special immediacy to it. Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign presented obvious structural parallels from the start. In a fragmented and polarised field, he built a motley, somewhat incoherent, but deeply committed coalition around appeals to palingenesis, anti-elitism, ethnic grievance and his own idiosyncratic magnetism. Trump blended legalism with pugilism; he worked within the Republican Party structure while he trolled biker rallies for paramilitary allies. A red ballcap itself became a provocation, its mere presence offensive in certain public settings, much as Falangist blue shirts were sometimes described during the Spanish Popular Front era. At the same time, many general-election voters of 2016 perceived in Trump the ideological flexibility of a pragmatic problem-solver – his potential excesses bound hand and foot by the Republican establishment.
In the end, however, 2017 saw no seizure of power, just a mostly normal presidential transition followed by an administration long on Trumpian dramatics but short on revolutionary élan. The New MAGA Man and New MAGA Woman were to be forged not through racial struggle but through Botox and dubious supplements. The habit of seeing a Hitlerian stroke in every Trumpian twist became a pathology known as Trump Derangement Syndrome (TDS). History teachers had administered the anti-fascist vaccine to generations of note-taking masses, and TDS signalled the antibodies were working. Fortunately, thanks to the timely appearance of Michael Seidman’s Transatlantic Antifascisms, it was now possible to explore the notion that anti-fascism was its own form of politics with its own history.Footnote 10 This concept has now inspired a few good research papers among my students, including one particularly strong paper applying Seidman’s distinction between (fascist) synthesis and (anti-fascist) coalition to the politics of Vichy France.
To the extent it was possible to draw limited parallels to the fascist era, the populist backlash to globalism was the place to begin. The 2010s saw no mass trauma akin to the First World War, but, after a post-Cold War era of rising expectations, the accumulating economic, cultural and social dislocations of liberal empire generated cascading anxieties. The new generation of undergraduates were coming of age amid uncertainty in the labour market, extreme social fragmentation and predatory vice masquerading as libertarianism – trends accelerated by unrelenting waves of new technology. Europe’s disorienting experience of global industrial modernity in the late nineteenth century was relatable to students in ways I had not previously perceived, and the anti-global turn of the interwar period that incubated fascism formed an instructive parallel to our time.Footnote 11 In this context, students have found it especially bracing to read excerpts from fin-de-siècle writers like Maurice Barrès who turned Jews into the source of modern disorientation and alienation.
Trump’s first term ended with a dramatic reminder that the fascism paradigm still had a good deal to teach. The 6 January 2021 revolt made believers out of many who had been sceptical of this proposition.Footnote 12 Though personally disgusted by that event, I felt a certain exhilaration when, after years favouring topics like identity and representation, students became interested in scrutinising the narrative sequence of major political turns – and not only because it would be on the test. Stories of fascist attempts to seize power resonated powerfully among undergraduates more than before. Students became eager for deep dives into mythologised events – the March on Rome, the Sixth of February, the Night of the Long Knives. It was entirely unnecessary to utter the current American president’s name. Students do not need my prodding to apply lessons to contemporary politics if they so choose. Historians do not yet have a name for our era, but study of the fascist era provides important tools to interpret it.
It is one thing to examine the machinations of an insurgent vanguard, quite another to understand how significant numbers of young people become swept up. This topic is of particular interest to students and presents a natural opportunity to follow George Mosse’s advice to historians on cultivating empathy for one’s subject.Footnote 13 My most recent iteration of the fascism seminar took a more subjective approach, emphasising the experiences and perceptions of ordinary participants in the fascist era. I gave students the option to read Junger’s Storm of Steel (most did) to explore the dichotomy of revulsion and idealism that confronted the young men of 1914. Inviting students to read and meditate on nearly 300 pages of Junger’s raw account of the trenches gave a very different result from the well-known excerpts of Junger that I’d previously used. It is said that students can no longer read entire books, but they will with the right encouragement. Another fine candidate is Laurence Rees's The Nazi Mind, which explores the social psychology of conspiracy theories, youth indoctrination, personality cults, paranoia and other relevant topics.Footnote 14 Texts like these underpinned our first in-class writing exercise, which asked students to write a sketch of a hypothetical person of their age in 1919 who becomes active in fascist politics.
My classrooms have been fortunate not to experience the polarisation and incivility we are told plagues modern American discourse. I suspect these tendencies are reserved for contexts, like the Internet, where one never has to look others in the eye. I figure that my typical classroom includes a lot of liberals and progressives, a few conservatives and probably one or two who could muster kind words about Hitler in certain company. What should bind us, I remind them, is our shared commitment to studying the past in good faith. History helps us not to predict the future, but to imagine multiple possible futures. The universal lesson of historical study is that nothing is predetermined, and developments that in retrospect seem inevitable could have turned out differently. I have found Timothy Snyder’s concept of the ‘politics of inevitability’ to be a welcome antidote to our epochal fatalism.Footnote 15 If our democratic republic should survive the current decade of political, technological and ecological disruption, it will be thanks in no small measure to the work of historians in analysing, debating and teaching the cautionary tale of the fascist era.
Sasha D. Pack is Professor of History at the University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, where he has taught European and Mediterranean history since 2004. He has published widely on topics centred on modern Spain, including his most recent monograph, The Deepest Border: The Strait of Gibraltar and the Making of the Modern Hispano-African Borderland (Stanford University Press, 2019).
