In the last two generations, historical perspectives on the Holy Roman Empire have undergone fundamental change. Earlier dominant narratives contrasted the empire unfavorably with seemingly forward-looking or idealized states and constitutional orders. More recent social-historical and cultural approaches have brought the empire's early modern quality with its own value systems into view. Its functionality is more easily observable in the soft light of informal social and personal relations than under the glare of the modern bureaucratic spotlight. The ceremonial questions that were of immanent importance to contemporaries, but usually dismissed by later commentators as irrelevant tinsel, are now understood to offer insight into the empire's basic constitutional workings.

This excellent monograph, originally a dissertation submitted to the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität in Münster, is firmly located within the current field of study in terms of theoretical approach. Empirically, it advances our knowledge in a widely researched, clearly structured, and concisely argued way. The history of the empire's legal system has played a key role in rethinking the Holy Roman Empire. In singling out the Wetzlar-based Imperial Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht), the author successfully identified an institution that has been neglected in relation to the empire's other high court, the Vienna-based Imperial Aulic Council (Reichshofrat). The focus is on the office of the head of the Imperial Chamber Court—the so-called Kammerrichter, whose title is perhaps better left in the original German. Whereas twenty-seven Kammerrichter held office over some 300 years, this study concentrates on the last nine incumbents, covering roughly a century (1711 to 1806). Several factors, including the court's removal to Wetzlar and the destruction of important archival holdings relative to the earlier period, plausibly justify the chosen timeframe. The author consulted sources in no fewer than ten public and private archives.

Methodologically, this study divides into two discrete parts. Through the lens of cultural practice, the first part examines the constitutional position of the Kammerrichter as it derived not only from written law and custom, but also the ongoing struggle for influence among the emperor, the imperial estates (Reichsstände), and the court itself, which was composed of assessors nominated by the imperial estates. As the court's overlord, the emperor chose the Kammerrichter, whose office was nonetheless “detached from the emperor's person” (69). The Kammerrichter remained in office even during an interregnum, distinguishing him from all other imperial representatives, including his counterpart at the Imperial Aulic Council. In the absence of his wand of authority (the so-called Kammerrichterstab), the court was not in a position to pronounce judgment, as its withdrawal during one period of conflict drastically illustrated. The distance between emperor and Kammerrichter allowed the imperial estates and the court itself to advance their own claims to authority that, generally speaking, were no less inherent to the court's nature than the emperor's rights. To underscore its autonomy, the court submitted the imperial nominee to formal “questioning” (51) on the issue of possible conflicts of interest that would inhibit the independent dispensation of justice. In its capacity as a representative of the empire, the court insisted on its autonomous right of ceremonial installation of the Kammerrichter in office. The question of the so-called votum decisivum for the Kammerrichter spoke to the fundamental issue of the ultimate judicial authority within the empire, one that was controversial particularly because of confessional divisions.

The second part embeds the Kammerrichter in the empire's society of orders, applies Pierre Bourdieu's concept of capital to explore the desirability of the office to noble families, and sheds new light from a social-historical perspective on the relationship between the emperor and his clientele in the wider empire. The Kammerrichter was “a judge in the medieval sense” (90), possessing predominantly supervisory and organizational powers. High social rank remained a sine qua non for appointment. At the same time, the profile of the holders changed distinctly, as the author shows. The ruling ecclesiastical princes, whom the emperors had long favored to head the court, gave way in the eighteenth century largely to lesser imperial counts and knights, who, though still Catholic, were secular in rank. Membership in one of the corporations of the free imperial nobility (reichsunmittelbarer Adel) remained essential for holding office, a circumstance that might have been brought out more clearly, especially in reference to Count Franz Joseph Spaur (in office 1763–1797), whom the author at one point (150) assigns simply to the Austrian territorial (landständischer) nobility. As a rule, material profit did not actuate candidates to seek office. Wealth was in fact a “prerequisite” (151) for upholding the office's dignity. The expected compensation for aspirants and their lineages consisted in the honor and prestige so crucial within early modern noble society.

The Kammerrichter acted not just as the emperor's representative but also exercised supreme jurisdiction within the empire. The opportunities to exercise influence both within the court and at the empire's highest levels on behalf of family and friends were another important motivating factor. If through service on the court the lesser imperial nobility secured its threatened status, the emperor was able, with the support of that group, to uphold his judicial authority within the empire. But the “competing systems of norms” (206) uncovered by the impressive research underlying this monograph placed strains even on that close relationship. Time and again, the emperor made demands on the Kammerrichter that ran contrary to the written rules that governed the court.