The author presents a timely and promising study. Responding to the decision by President George W. Bush on November 13, 2001, to authorize the creation of military commissions to try those associated with the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Peter Judson Richards examines tribunals in four modern conflicts: the American Civil War, the British experience in the Boer War, the French tribunals of the “Great War,” and allied practices during the World War II. The author brings important credentials to the task. He served on active duty in Europe and America in the U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps and has taught in the Departments of Law and Political Science at the USAF Academy.
The dust jacket explains that Richards's study “seeks to fill an important gap in our understanding of what military tribunals are, how they function, and their relative successfulness in rendering justice in the extreme conditions occasioned by war, by placing them in comparative and historical context.” The book presents, in fact, two separate parts: the first on the four comparative studies and the second on the Bush tribunals. The reader discovers that the first part has little to do with the second. Whatever lessons might be gained from the comparative studies are rarely applied to the Bush administration.
Richards correctly objects to the platitudes that greeted the Bush experiment: “star chambers,” “juntas,” “rubber truncheons,” and “kangaroo courts” (ix). Critics resorted to clichés instead of informed and reasoned analysis. Richards adds that his experience as a judge advocate in the military courts “led me to believe that such images frequently carry little or no connection to actual experience” (ix). The problem, as he knows, is that there is little relationship between courts-martial, with their established rules and appeal processes to federal courts, and the procedures attempted for the Bush tribunals. One system is professional, credible, and protective of a defendant's rights; the other is a work in progress that remains highly controversial because classified information prejudicial to a detainee may not be available to the detainee or even his attorney.
The four comparative studies are insufficiently detailed to conclude very much about the success or failure of military tribunals. A few examples are explored, but not enough to build any generalizations confidently. Regarding the American experience, Richards states that “the War of Independence witnessed the use of military tribunals as an extraordinary response to the exigencies of war. The trial of enemy violators of the laws of war in these forums was recognized as an established practice under the law of nations” (12). This assertion is incorrect for America. Military tribunals were established in advance by resolutions adopted by the Continental Congress. No claim of independent executive authority could be made. The tribunals functioned on the basis of legislative authority.
Richards describes the 1780 trial of Major John André, who was convicted and executed for his collaboration with General Benedict Arnold. The tribunal concluded that André “ought to be considered as a spy and that agreeably to the laws and usages of nations he ought to suffer death” (13). The tribunal did not operate on the basis of abstract principles drawn from the law of nations. It functioned on express authority adopted by the Continental Congress. As Richards notes: “General Washington was acting under the auspices of the Articles of War passed by the Continental Congress” (14). This point is crucial. After September 11, the Bush administration repeatedly argued in court that the president could create military tribunals on the basis of “inherent” executive power and that he needed no authority from Congress. The Supreme Court, in the 2006 Hamdan case, rejected that argument. It insisted that the constitutional authority for tribunals was properly governed by statutory language adopted by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice and that the administration needed to obtain authority from Congress, which it proceeded to do with the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
The author states that during the American Civil War, “extraordinary conditions demanded an extraordinary response” (27). Quite so. However, an extraordinary response need not operate outside the law and rely solely on dubious claims of inherent presidential power. After taking the extraordinary actions he did in April 1861 at the start of the Civil War, President Lincoln turned to Congress to receive retroactive authority and worked jointly with Congress in such areas as the habeas statute of March 1863. President George W. Bush, in the case of military tribunals, decided to operate on claimed independent and exclusive authority. The argument by the Bush administration on November 13, 2001, was that military tribunals, created unilaterally by the president, offered the advantage of expeditious action. Six years after September 11, there has yet to be a completed trial in Guantánamo.
After spending half of the book on the four cases, Richards puts that material to the side and begins to offer supportive judgments about the Bush tribunals. He is largely critical of federal courts for raising objections, concluding that “the characteristic judicial focus on private, individual claims of right ill suits members of the judiciary to levels of oversight that have direct bearing on the tactical and strategic dimensions of military decision-making in war and on international relations in time of peace” (160). Federal courts were not uniformly wise and informed about their decisions, but neither was the Bush administration, and whatever the courts were doing in placing limits had nothing to do with making tactical and strategic decisions about the war. The Court was asked in Rasul: May the administration hold detainees outside the United States at a U.S. naval base without any access to federal courts? A 6-3 majority refused to treat a 1950 decision (Eisentrager) as an automatic bar on detainee access to a habeas petition. Justice Stevens pointed to the marked differences between the individuals in the 1950 case and the detainees at Guantánamo.
Later Richards writes: “Little is gained by setting in abstraction the discrete category labeled ‘military tribunals’ as a subject for analysis across national, historical, and cultural boundaries” (165). But that, the reader was told, defined the original purpose of the book. He also says it “is naive to expect civilians untutored in the laws of war, unfamiliar with and immune from the unique stresses and vicissitudes of the military life, and foreign to the practices of warfare nevertheless somehow to exercise sound judgment in assessing transgressions of these customs and practices” (175). Again: “No showing has yet been advanced to indicate that law-trained civilian judges are especially well suited for making determinations of this order [military tribunals]” (186). There is some truth to this, but civilian judges from an independent judiciary have long provided a check on executive power, in both wartime and peacetime. Moreover, the principle that Richards articulates could have been (but was not) profitably applied to the civilian policymakers in the White House, the Justice Department, and the Defense Department who regularly considered their untutored judgments superior to that of the military lawyers who work in the offices of the judge general advocate.
