Josiah Ober's book is a remarkable contribution to classical Greek history, social theory, and political philosophy. It advances understandings within each field and shows why these disciplines should be in more conversation with one another. This is the third part of a trilogy focusing on intersecting dimensions of classical Athenian political culture. Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1989) argued for the continuing role of democratic ideology in Athenian political rhetoric of the fifth and fourth centuries. Political Dissent in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1998) interpreted the significance of historical, philosophical, and rhetorical critiques of democratic political hegemony. Democracy and Knowledge focuses on the resources that Athenian democracy used to get things done (5) or “the epistemic functions of democratic institutions” (17).
In the period 600–300 BC, more than one thousand dispersed Greek poleis, varying in size, structure, and ambition, interacted hypercompetitively (80). The historical hypothesis is that “[d]emocratic Athens was able to take advantage of its size and resources, and therefore competed successfully over time against hierarchical rivals, because the costs of participatory political practices were overbalanced by superior returns to social cooperation resulting from useful knowledge as it was organized and deployed in the simultaneously innovation-promoting and learning-based context of democratic institutions and culture” (37–38). Success means “a given polis' actual and potential economic and military performance when compared to rival poleis and its ability to accumulate resources, ensure security and influence other states in a competitive environment” (22).
Ober's approach in testing and supporting this hypothesis is synoptic and meticulous, employing resources of both quantitative and interpretive social science. Through measures that draw on extensive material and literary evidence, Ober establishes (chapter 2) that classical Athens outstripped the achievements of even its most powerful political competitors (democratic or otherwise). Furthermore, its periods of greatest flourishing coincided with those times during which the city was governed most democratically (70–71). The possibility that Athens's pragmatic success enabled its democratic politics is convincingly rejected by Ober on historical grounds (72). Absent plausible exogenous influences, the city's democratic institutions must have contributed significantly to its flourishing. How? Ober answers by offering narratives of Athenian political institutions and practices as responses to collective action problems (chapter 3)—notably, the challenges of aggregating dispersed forms of knowledge (chapter 4), of coordinating cooperation in the execution of policy (chapter 5), and of managing transaction costs (chapter 6).
Informed by analyses of modern business firms in competitive environments (80–84, 146, 157–58, 216, 227), Ober skillfully and lucidly reconstructs a series of military (124–33), judicial (183–94), and economic (220–40) decisions showing Athens's successful balancing of learning with innovation and its effective integration of technical with social knowledge (97). The principal focus is on the impacts of organizational (demes, tribes, polis), cultural (shared rituals and public inscriptions), and architectural (inward-facing buildings allowing intervisibilty) conditions, all of which developed the “productive epistemic processes” (117) supportive of Athens's political success.
Ober's historical conclusions are broadly significant (chapter 7) for several reasons. First, they suggest that Athens's democratic regime must be assessed over an extended time horizon and examined more in normal periods than in conditions of external (the Peloponnesian War) or internal (the oligarchic seizures of power of 411 and 404) stress. Second, this framework explains Athens's status as a paradeigma for other cities in a way that refines the Periclean funeral oration's reference to the city's power in Thucydides' History (2. 37, 41). Athens was exemplary because it demonstrated how political success might be achieved in a hypercompetitive environment. This influence can account for “the impressive aggregate performance of the thousand-plus Greek city-state culture” (25–26, 277). Finally, the epistemic strengths of democratic Athens support an internal critique of disturbing aspects of its political culture, its exclusion of women from public deliberation, and its support for slaveholding. Such practices were not only morally objectionable but also practically counterproductive, for they diminished the capacity of Athens to exploit all of its potential knowledge resources (24, 259–60).
As social theorist, Ober moves beyond his rejection (in Mass and Elite) of the relevance of Robert Michels's iron law of oligarchy for Athenian politics to the development of a generalized argument that participatory democracy is more effective at marshalling useful knowledge than command-and-control structures (26, 270). While scale problems within modern societies prevent simple replication of Athenian participatory structures, such “institutions . . . might offer a valuable supplement to existing forms of representative government, especially at the local level” (38). Here, Ober's work can intersect with contemporary explorations of the institutional infrastructure of participatory democracy offered by Jürgen Habermas, Henry Richardson, and Mark Warren. At the same time, Ober's analysis counters the claim made by Habermas, among others, that the experiences of premodern cultures are too removed from those of modern differentiated societies to provide positive resources for current thinking. As Ober wisely notes, his historical investigation also “permits the radical thought that our own modernity may not be in every sense unparalleled” (279).
Within political philosophy, Ober's historical work clearly reinforces the more analytically normative projects of Habermas, Richardson, Warren, and Iris Marion Young. For Ober, participatory democracy is the good society not only because of its moral commitments but also because of its enhanced capacity to respond to social change (12). Perhaps Ober's work can encourage even more complex investigations into Athens's political experience that can also inform modern democratic political philosophy. I will glancingly sketch three.
First, Ober's analysis leads us to consider the differences as well as the similarities between Athens's (and indeed all) political choices and the priorities and challenges faced by business firms. Ober notes that “organizational failure” for political communities can be far more disastrous than losing in business (82). Additionally, however, firms are normally in greater agreement than political communities about measures of success, and their choices seem guided by more consistent preference orderings. Consequently, their problem solving concentrates more on designing strategies than on considering purposes. To this extent, the firm analogy may only reveal part of what it means to be engaged in political discourse. Second, this book invites us to interrogate conceptions of political success more fully. The standards used here parallel Gorgias's claim (in Plato's Gorgias 452 d) that the greatest political goods are freedom and rule. One of the functions of political discourse must be a critical consideration of the limits and dangers of that standard, in part because success in contexts of hypercompetition can sometimes be as dangerous as failure. Third, the picture of Athenian democracy that emerges out of both this book and the entire trilogy is one of remarkable cultural and, within historical limits, moral consistency (30, 267). Problematics can be interpreted as exogeneities (the empire, 73), deviations (the late-fifth-century oligarchies, 182) or distortions (the exclusion of women and slavery, 26). This assessment is consistent with much of modern democratic theory that sees democracy's advantages as intrinsic and its hazards as intrusions. Yet Athens's complex political history may also suggest ways in which some political hazards were more intrinsic. Did the Sicilian disaster in the Peloponnesian War stem simply from “the failure to collect and attend to the right kind of information” (120)? Why did the “ghost of empire” (260) persist? Was political freedom valorized in part through a comparison with those who were not free? To the extent that Ober's achievement extends to a consideration of this remarkable democracy's vulnerabilities as well as its moral and epistemic strengths, one may hope that the trilogy will become a quartet.
