On 8 August 1918, the British army and its allies opened an offensive that ultimately resulted in the German army's defeat. Although the campaign, known as the “Hundred Days,” ended more than four years of conflict, historians have shown limited interest in the offensive, while instead focusing on the First World War's earlier battles. Jonathan Boff's Winning and Losing on the Western Front represents an important step toward remedying this oversight. Through a comparative analysis of the British Third Army and the German Second and Seventeenth armies it faced, Boff provides a detailed account of the First World War's final stages while challenging the view that Germany's defeat had more to do with the German army's internal collapse than with British effectiveness in the field.

Boff's study revolves around an analysis of the Third Army's ability to implement combined arms tactics and sustain operational tempo, or “the rate or rhythm of activity relative to the enemy” (6). He establishes that the German army had lost the initiative by summer 1918 and was incapable of replacing losses as it retreated. The British force came to enjoy a significant manpower advantage that it maintained due to its more effective ability to replace casualties. Both the Germans and the British, however, were dissatisfied with the quality of their replacements. According to Boff, the critical difference was that numerical superiority allowed British troops to spend shorter stretches at the front and devote more time to rest and training. German soldiers, conversely, remained at the front for lengthier shifts and returned without appropriate recuperation. Boff demonstrates that manpower advantages were pivotal in terms of the number of men available for an attack and also ensured that German soldiers were often mentally and physically exhausted and thus less formidable opponents.

Nonetheless, Boff contends that the German army remained a dangerous foe. In his chapter on Materialschlacht, Boff asserts that although the British possessed greater weaponry stockpiles, the Third Army experienced difficulties moving supplies forward and its logistical system was “on the brink of a collapse” by November 1918 (91). Furthermore, the British munitions advantage was not as decisive as some scholars have maintained. This is not to suggest that the battle of material did not play a role in the war's conclusion. Boff claims that many Germans were convinced of substantial British material superiority, and although such perceptions did not always reflect reality, the negative impact on morale was substantial.

Morale plays a central role in this book. Boff's chapter on the subject is distinguished by its consideration of British morale, an understudied topic, alongside his analysis of German morale. Despite increasing indiscipline and rates of sickness among British troops during the Hundred Days, morale in the Third Army seems to have been generally positive. More important, British morale remained better than that of the German army. Relying on underused sources such as prisoner of war statements, Boff confirms the findings of earlier studies by demonstrating that many German troops harbored defeatist attitudes by late 1918. However, he contends that if some Germans were ready to surrender, significant numbers remained willing to fight, and it is therefore simplistic to characterize the German army as already morally defeated when the Hundred Days began.

Boff devotes his final chapters to explaining how the British achieved victory. The Third Army displayed remarkable flexibility and used a combined arms approach where tanks, machine guns, air power, and, most important, artillery supported infantry attacks. British tactics continued to evolve, and Boff suggests that innovation was often “driven from the bottom up” (156). Tactical adjustments were the result of battlefield experience rather than standardized doctrinal changes from above. Boff shows that the German army proved unable to respond to British tactical flexibility. German commanders overestimated the threat presented by tanks and needlessly compromised their defensive strategy without realizing the damage they were inflicting on British heavy armor. Here again, Boff reveals the serious consequences of the German army's failure to navigate the gap between perception and reality.

Despite the Third Army's innovation, the pace of its advance presented communications problems that slowed the army's tempo. Even so, the British command structure worked well, owing to its flexibility and its willingness to learn from mistakes and to delegate assignments to subordinates. Boff stresses that the British decrease in tempo mattered little as long as it remained higher than that of the enemy. The German army attempted to keep pace, but it was “at full stretch frantically trying to maintain a tempo which was beyond it” (232). Whereas German General Erich Ludendorff frequently spoke of the need for decentralization, he actually maintained an inflexible command structure and dismissed subordinates who challenged orders. Along with manpower shortages, the German army's inflexibility and inability to adapt contributed significantly to its downfall.

Boff has written an original book that demonstrates the complex nature of operations during the Hundred Days. No single factor, but rather a combination of elements, accounted for British success. This comparative study shows that German tactics were often flawed and the Third Army indeed outperformed its German opponents by better adapting to the challenges of the modern battlefield. Boff's use of operational tempo provides a useful framework for analyzing Germany's defeat. He walks a fine line when detailing the disastrous decline of German morale yet insisting that its impact has been overstated. Nonetheless, by suggesting that poor morale should not be “mistaken for broken sprit” (245), Boff offers a constructive interpretation of the ultimate significance of morale in the German army's demise. Boff clearly states that he is concerned with operations and tactics, but many readers will be disappointed that he does not do more to show how events on the home fronts impacted life at the front, and vice versa. This well-researched book should become a standard work on the Hundred Days, and it deserves a broad readership among both students and advanced scholars.