Although there have been numerous attempts at reforming democratic political institutions in various countries across time, successfully implemented reforms are empirically rare phenomena. Why do successful reforms occur when they do? What are the barriers to reform, and how are those barriers overcome? Or, as Gideon Rahat puts it more broadly, “how can we explain the success or failure of initiatives aimed at reforming the regime structures of established democracies?” (p. 1). Rahat's main empirical focus is electoral and institutional reforms in Israel from statehood through 1992, culminating in the parliamentary decision to adopt the direct election of the prime minister. To examine the reform process, Rahat develops a methodologically self-conscious “historical-comparative approach” (p. 2) that draws on an extensive and impressive body of primary sources, including Israeli Supreme Court decisions, media accounts, and archival documents generated during reform debates over a forty-year period. It is an ambitious project but one that is at times exhausting and difficult to read.
The author constructs two research “tools,” each of which contain multiple components. His qualitative framework for evaluating the reform process includes background factors, the actors involved in the reform process, the stages of the process, and the characteristics of the proposed reforms. The second tool, a “list of barriers” (p. 2) that impedes the reform process, includes formal procedures, political tradition, vested interests of various actors, and coalition politics. With this rather complicated and unwieldy approach in hand, the author presents a set of richly detailed, internally comparative case studies of regime-structure reform in Israel. He also places the Israeli case in a cross-national context, comparing it with cases of institutional reform in Italy, Japan, and New Zealand.
The book is divided into three parts. Part I presents three chapter-length case studies of attempted reforms of the Israeli electoral system, such as the raising of the electoral threshold for Knesset membership. The first chapter reviews the consolidation of Labor hegemony after statehood (1948–69), when Israel was a classic example of what Maurice Duverger calls a dominant-party system. The second chapter presents a case study of failed attempts at electoral reform during the period of Israel's transition from a dominant- to a competitive-party system (1969–77). This “failure to promote compromise” occurred in a political context of declining Labor dominance, which culminated in Likud's coming to power in 1977 (p. 57). The third case in Part I examines the era of “national-unity” governments (1984–90), when Labor and Likud governed (or failed to govern) together. Rahat suggests that in this period, the reform agenda shifted from simply trying to fix the electoral rules to reforming the government system, including how the prime minister was selected. Part II of the book provides a detailed case study of government-system reform in Israel from 1988 to 1992. Here Rahat looks at the process of structural change from different vantage points, including the role and impact of human agency and contingent, “catalyzing events” (p. 116). Part III of the book examines reform in the three other countries.
One of Rahat's major findings is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, skilled and effective reformers can take advantage of situations where power is highly dispersed among various actors and parties. Concentration of power in the hands of the reformers, Rahat argues, is thus not a prerequisite for successful institutional reform in established democracies. In his cross-national analysis, Rahat makes the interesting observation that Israel, Italy, and Japan all suffered from “problems of governability” (p. 233); the unique dysfunctions in their respective systems hampered their ability to address various demands and challenges. New Zealand, in contrast, suffered from a notably different problem: pressures for system reform there stemmed from the sense that it was “a hyperactive government that did too much” (p. 233).
Rahat's book fits within the body of scholarly literature on Israel, but is also more broadly a work of comparative politics. Although his analytical framework is cumbersome and the case studies are overly detailed, he presents a very extensive and useful review of the relevant literature and assesses the utility of different approaches to explaining political change, including rational choice and the new institutionalism. The ideal audience for this study would be graduate students in a comparative politics seminar on party theory or political institutions or perhaps an advanced undergraduate course in comparative or Israeli politics. Anyone seeking an exhaustive examination of the evolution of the Israeli political system might find it of interest as well. However, the book is densely written and contains more minutiae than is probably necessary. The grammatical style sometimes gets in the way of what the author is trying to say. The following is a typical example of the awkward sentence structure that confounds the reader on occasion: “Additional barriers to the previously mentioned central barriers of vested interests and coalition politics are the procedural barrier and disagreements over reform content, which were found effective in delaying reform progress” (p. 269).
Rahat's goal is to analyze “previous failed attempts to reform the electoral system” and to create “a framework in which failed attempts at reform and successful ones are analyzed using the same tools” (p. 2). Yet the author misses the opportunity to apply his theoretical and conceptual framework to one of the most striking failures and reversals of reform in the history of parliamentary democracy. Although the book was published in 2008, Rahat's case studies curiously end in 1992 with the adoption of the direct election of the prime minister. He provides a thorough and interesting account of the various proposals that were made in the Knesset prior to passage of what became Israel's most radical system reform, aimed at fixing a system that gave too much power to small parties and created too much coalition instability. Rahat details, for example, the debate among the Ministers of Knesset as to whether this major change would favor the left or the right and how ultraorthodox votes might counterbalance those of Arab citizens (p. 135). The 1992 reform, which briefly turned Israel into a “mixed system” with parliamentary and presidential traits, took effect with the 1996 election, after Rahat's case studies end. The direct election of the prime minister had severe unintended consequences: it further enhanced the power of small, ideological parties by giving Israeli voters two ballot choices. Israelis were now free to vote for small and even fringe parties at virtually no cost, knowing that their vote would not be “wasted” because they could vote separately for prime minister. The structural reform did not live up to expectations and was widely viewed as a failure by the Israeli public, its elected representatives, and the academic community. This highly unusual system reform was quickly reversed, and Israel went back to its traditional parliamentary model, with minor modifications, in 2001. It is unfortunate that Rahat addresses these critically important post-1992 developments only in a very brief epilogue (pp. 273–75). The failure of the direct election of the prime minister, and the institutional revisions made by the Knesset to erase its “mistake,” was certainly deserving of a case study in its own right.
