Having been out of power in the House since 1994 and in the Senate for 10 of those 12 years as well,1
Democrats and Republicans traded control of the Senate four times in the 107th Congress: Democrats controlled the Senate until Vice President Dick Cheney replaced Al Gore as the 50-50 Senate's tie-breaking vote on January 20, 2001; Republicans controlled until Jim Jeffords (VT) announced that he would become an independent and help the Democrats organize the Senate which he did until the 2002 elections returned Republicans to majority status in the Senate; see “Party Division in the Senate,” www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm, accessed November 19, 2007.
If change was in the offing with new majorities in the House and Senate, there was a great deal of change within the parties as well. Maintaining some existing leaders, promoting successful lower-level leaders, and, in some cases, choosing amidst fiercely competitive intra-party campaigns, all four legislative parties (Democratic and Republican, House and Senate) elected several new individual leaders seeking to cast the right actors to meet their parties' new circumstances and to promote individual and collective party goals. There was, of course, a new speaker of the House: Democratic leader Nancy Pelosi became the first woman (and the first Californian) to hold that post; outgoing Republican Speaker Dennis Hastert (IL) decided not to seek a party leadership post in the minority. And, of the remaining House Democratic and Republican leadership positions (floor leaders, whips, and caucus and conference chairs), only one leader in the 110th Congress—Republican Whip Roy Blunt of Missouri—had held the same post in the 109th.2
And, even this was not by choice. Blunt only stayed as whip after his failed attempt to succeed Tom DeLay as Republican floor leader early in 2006 (see Green and Harris 2007).
If they did not produce a “revolution” of the magnitude of the Republican takeover in 1994, the 2006 elections did produce dramatic and, potentially, ground-breaking changes in American national politics. There were new House and Senate majorities, many new faces in both chambers' most influential party leadership positions (not to mention a full slate of new Democratic committee chairs in both chambers), as well as new limits and possibilities for the legislative agenda and for any political actors interested in influencing public policy.
One year into the new Democratic Congress, the articles in this symposium recount the strategic contexts and choices the four legislative parties faced in the fall of 2006 as they prepared to organize the 110th Congress and the effects of these party and committee leadership choices on the workings of Congress in 2007. The theme uniting the articles in this symposium is that legislative party leaders “matter”—both to the individual legislators who select them and to overall congressional outcomes. How did Democrats and Republicans adjust to their newfound majority and minority statuses, respectively? How did the selection of leaders (including the selection of the first woman speaker of the House) affect the organization, agenda, and legislative product of the first session of the 110th Congress? How, given these new strategic contexts and, indeed, these new leaders, has the 110th Congress performed?
Legislative Parties and Leadership Choice
Contemporary Congress scholars pay little attention to the selection of legislative leaders. Indeed, for some time after the classic studies of legislative leadership choice (Peabody 1967; 1976; Polsby 1969; Nelson 1977) first came out, there was very little follow-up in the literature (but see Canon 1989; Brown and Peabody 1992; Kelly 1995). Perhaps Polsby and Peabody's findings that leadership races often turned on personal rather than political factors convinced some scholars that each leadership race is sui generis, a result of random, idiosyncratic factors and thus unpromising and inappropriate for theory-building. Moreover, because intra-party leadership races are determined by secret ballot, scholars lacked individual-level data to analyze, seemingly closing the door to deeper political analysis.
Finally and more fundamentally, many theories of legislative parties cast doubt on the importance of individual leaders. Indeed, not all Congress scholars would agree with a focus on parties much less on elected party leaders. Whereas there are those who question the analytical utility of party for understanding the legislative process (Krehbiel 1991), even some of the staunchest adherents to the “parties matter” school of thought treat leaders as “agents” who function primarily to advance the individual and collective goals of their parties (i.e., their “principal”). Although these principal-agent studies differ as to the degree of autonomy individual leaders have (some emphasizing the controlling, if not determinative, influence of levels of follower agreement [Rohde 1991] while others explore the “leeway” leaders [as agents] enjoy and exploit within the principal-agent relationship [Sinclair 1999]), few have explicitly made the case that who exactly the individual leaders are matters all that much (but see Strahan and Palazzolo 2004).
Nevertheless, new directions in party leadership theory, especially those that redirect the focus of principal-agent theory to better account for the (to a degree) autonomous contributions of individual leaders provide firmer theoretical grounding for intensive study of individual leaders and the choices legislators make in casting the right agent to build a favorable party image (Cox and McCubbins 1993), innovate leadership tactics (Sinclair 1999), and negotiate better bargains for the party (King and Zeckhauser 2002).3
For an extended discussion of this topic, see Harris 2006.
Several of the contributions to this symposium extend this trend to the leadership races associated with the organization of the 110th Congress: the article I wrote with Garrison Nelson re-visits some of the questions regarding ideological positioning and patterns of conflict and competition in intra-party leadership races across the four congressional parties; Cindy Simon Rosenthal and Ronald M. Peters' contribution examines the gender politics that conditioned Nancy Pelosi's rise within Democratic leadership ranks and, in important ways, define her speakership; and, for their part, both Matthew Green's analysis of the Democrats' 2006 race for majority leader and Scott Frisch and Sean Kelly's look at the Senate Republicans' whip race leverage individual-level data to examine patterns of member support for one leadership candidate over another.4
Although they do not use archival evidence per se (whatever documents might exist are as of yet unavailable), both the Green and the Frisch and Kelly contributions leverage data from members' public commitments of support.
Leadership Change and Party Performance
To the extent that legislative leaders are representative of their parties, it is nevertheless also true that they are influential in the legislative process and consequential for legislative outcomes. As John Bibby and Roger Davidson (1967) wrote, “Who the party leaders are and how they manage the party's machinery in the House are important determinants of what the party's record will be and to what extent individual members will achieve their legislative career objectives” (113). Even more broadly, the displacement of Republican majorities by Democratic majorities in the House and Senate unleashed a whole set of political forces likely to have reverberating impacts on Congress, American politics, and public policy.
Applying an “expectation-performance” lens to the newly-selected leadership teams and the Democratic takeover more generally, several articles in this symposium provide a timely first-cut scholarly evaluation of the performance of the 110th Congress and its likely impact on policy debates in committees and the public, the prospects for success for key interest groups, and the legislative agenda overall. The impetus for this symposium and its focus on the legislative parties, their elected leaders, and the Democratic takeover of the 110th Congress was the belief that not only are congressional party leaders embedded in, representative of, and thus illustrative of broader contextual forces but also that legislative parties and leaders are consequential for congressional policymaking and politics. In this sense, the Frisch and Kelly piece straddles the two themes, its first half exemplifying the embedded nature of Senate Republicans' choice of Trent Lott (MS) over Lamar Alexander (TN) while its second half portrays several of the most prominent determinants of Senate leadership and, perhaps most notably, how the arguments advanced by Senate leaders not only reflected public, partisan debates but also sharpened partisan divides by modeling messages and frames for dealing with key issues, particularly the war in Iraq.
Beyond shaping press and public debates, the Democratic takeover has had significant effects on the internal operations of the House and Senate and, as a result, the prospects for policy change. The Democratic takeover of the House and Senate committees meant that a whole new set of chairs were at the helm of these key venues for legislative work and administrative oversight; and, as Becker and Moscardelli demonstrate, new patterns of electoral security and resulting new patterns of seniority—much more than party leadership influence per se—have produced committee chairs drawn increasingly from the ideological extreme of the Democratic Party. These new committee chairs along with new party leaders at the top have reverberating effects on interest groups particularly, as Tracy Roof points out, in an era in which the interest group universe itself is increasingly polarized along party lines (a partial result of congressional Republicans' K-Street Project). In this partisan-group environment, it seems much clearer that the groups that were “in” during Republican rule (like the NRA, the National Federation of Independent Business, etc.) are now “out” and the “out” groups (like labor, environmentalists, etc.) are now “in”; the Democratic takeover constrains the possibilities for success of the former set of groups and unleashes the potential of the latter. Along with their new committee chairs and new outside allies, majority party Democrats brought with them new issue agendas well. Barbara Sinclair's contribution to this symposium focuses on the agenda-setting and coalition-building roles House and Senate leaders perform, the new Democratic agendas, and the difficulties of achieving policy gains especially given narrow majorities in both chambers, Senate rules, and administration opposition. Still, as Sinclair asserts, this is a Congress where representatives and senators appreciate these difficulties and thus far at least seem to approve of their leaders even if the public, the media, and key elements of the party base may not.
Taken together, these articles examine several ways that the choices the parties made in 2006 affected legislative politics and performance in 2007 all the while extending, testing, and refining theories of legislative (and interest group) politics. This is not to say that the authors (or, for that fact, members and leaders) are insensitive to the limits and overall tendencies against policy change inherent in the American national system. Indeed, such “limits” are a repeated theme in these articles. Coping with administration opposition and Senate rules, as well as balancing the external needs to at once appeal to activist groups in the party's “base” and polish the party's public image with the internal needs to deliver liberal policy victories for Democrats but also not endanger the more moderate “majority-making” freshmen members, House and Senate Democratic leaders face a range of roadblocks, difficult choices, and dilemmas. And, to be sure, many have been frustrated with the 110th Congress. Liberal activists who contributed, campaigned, and voted (many specifically to end the war) in the 2006 elections continue to express their frustrations and disapproval—from the left—with the Democratic Congress, adding their voices to those on the right who would likely disapprove of any Democratic Congress. The net results are extraordinarily low congressional approval numbers as both parties work to shape public perceptions: Republicans are likely to point to the gap between Democrats' 2006 hopes and promises and their performance in the 110th Congress, while Democrats will point up congressional Republicans' efforts to slow or stall progress and generally campaign to offer a clean break from Republican administration. For majority party Democrats, the ability to lower expectations for congressional outcomes and performance is key to navigating this difficult terrain. Indeed, as Tracy Roof points out, the sophisticated professionals like those in organized labor and even environmental groups realize that policy making and policy success is a “marathon” rather than a “sprint.”5
The quotation Roof cites is from the Sierra Club's Carl Pope and is quoted in Margaret Kriz, “Cover Story—Changed Climate,” National Journal, January 27, 2007.
If the 2006 Democratic takeover of Congress was historic and consequential, its implications were, I think, under-appreciated and, perhaps, strategically under-sold. It could be that the importance of the Democratic takeover was underestimated by academic and journalistic observers because of its comparison to the 1994 Republican takeover, which, more unexpected and, indeed, 40 years in the coming in the House, was of greater historic proportions. By the same token, House and Senate Democrats did not quite take the public relations “victory lap” that congressional Republicans had from November 1994 to January 1995; there was, to be sure, media planning to influence public expectations and, especially noteworthy, some deft image management of Speaker Nancy Pelosi and her election as the first female speaker of the House in American history, but there was little to no talk of “revolution.” If Democrats were celebrating publicly, they were playing down the implications of the takeover, perhaps strategically, for fear of raising expectations well beyond that which they could deliver given their reliance on moderates to make their small majorities, the sufficiency of Republican strength (especially given Senate rules) to obstruct Democratic policies, and the continued Republican control of the executive branch. Democrats understood, to paraphrase Bill Clinton's famous post-1994 Republican takeover observation, that the president, not to mention the filibuster, was still relevant in American politics.
As total a victory as Republicans had in 2002 and 2004 or the Democrats had in 2006 reminds us that there are, in reality, almost no total victories in American politics and we are frequently (perhaps perpetually) left to wait for the next election for a definitive decision. Indeed, several of the articles in this symposium end on the note that we will have to wait for 2008—with a new Democratic or Republican president and perhaps firmer legislative majorities (and even an outside chance at a filibuster-proof majority for Senate Democrats)—to break gridlock on most domestic and foreign policy fronts. In the meantime, it is hoped that this symposium is a good first start at appreciating the embedded and consequential nature of contemporary congressional leadership and the early performance of the 110th Congress.
Author Bios
Lawrence Becker is associate professor of political science at California State University, Northridge. His book, Doing the Right Thing: Collective Action and Procedural Choice in the New Legislative Process, was published by the Ohio State University Press in 2005. His current research focuses on the tension between science and democracy in regulatory politics.
Scott A. Frisch is professor and chair of political science at California State University Channel Islands. He is the author of Committee Assignment Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives (With Sean Q Kelly) and The Politics of Pork: A Study of Congressional Appropriations Earmarks.
Matthew N. Green is an assistant professor of politics at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. His recent research has examined leadership selection in Congress, the use of floor procedure in the House of Representatives, and the role of the speaker of the House in influencing legislative outcomes. He can be reached at: greenm@cua.edu.
Douglas B. Harris is associate professor of political science at Loyola College. His work on Congress, political parties, and media politics has been published in Political Science Quarterly, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Political Research Quarterly, American Politics Research, Congress & the Presidency, Presidential Studies Quarterly, and Extension of Remarks as well as in edited collections on congressional elections and public trust in government.
Sean Q Kelly is associate professor in the political science program at California State University Channel Islands. As an APSA Congressional Fellow (1993–1994) he served as a policy analyst for the Senate Democratic Policy Committee. Frisch and Kelly are co-authors of Committee Assignment Politics in the U.S. House of Representatives (Oklahoma Press 2006) and Jimmy Carter and the Water Wars (forthcoming, Cambria Press).
Vincent G. Moscardelli is assistant professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. His work on legislative politics, political leadership, and public policy appears in The Journal of Politics, Polity, State Politics and Policy Quarterly, Congress and the Presidency, and American Politics Research. In 2003–04, he served as an American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow.
Garrison Nelson, professor at the University of Vermont, is the author of more than 100 articles and professional papers on the U.S. Congress and elections in Vermont. He is editor-in-chief of the two-volume work, Committees in the U.S. Congress, 1947–1992 (CQ Press, 1993–94); co-editor of the four-volume work, Committees in the U.S. Congress, 1789–1946 (CQ Press 2002); and associate editor of the Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System (Scribners 1994). He was also president of the New England Political Science Association (1991–1992) and president (1995–1996) and executive director (1997–2000) of the Northeastern Political Science Association.
Ronald M. Peters, Jr. is Regents' Professor of Political Science at the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at the University of Oklahoma. His research focuses on the speakership of the U.S. House of Representatives.
Tracy Roof is an assistant professor in the department of political science at the University of Richmond. Her current research is focused on the role of political institutions in shaping the power of organized labor in the United States. She can be reached at troof@richmond.edu.
Cindy Simon Rosenthal is the director of the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at the University of Oklahoma, and an associate professor of political science with a joint appointment to the women's studies faculty. She is the author of When Women Lead and editor of Women Transforming Congress.
Barbara Sinclair is professor of political science at UCLA. Her most recent publications include Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making (2006) and Unorthodox Lawmaking: New Legislative Processes in the U.S. Congress 3rd ed. (2007).
