The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has accelerated – often forcefully – nation-building in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The expansion of Mandarin-medium education in states schools, the tightest restrictions on pious expression since the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), mandatory government “homestays,” and mass incarceration seek to radically transform Uyghur culture – hollow its Central Asian and Islamic core and fill it with norms more common to the Chinese (i.e., Han) mainstream. Despite international condemnation for its violent treatment of Uyghurs (and other Turkic groups), even accusations of genocide, the CCP is claiming success: officials often take to state media to pronounce that Xinjiang's multi-ethnic residents now enjoy a fuller, happier and more “secure” life than ever before. Yet, by describing these lived experiences as secure, the CCP provides illuminating insight into its anxieties about the region and its (non-Han) peoples: they need to be clearly mapped into the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu) and tightly bound by borders that embrace insiders and expel “threats.”

In his timely book, Securing China's Northwest Frontier: Identity and Insecurity in Xinjiang, David Tobin, a research fellow in China's political economy at the University of Manchester, traces the deep historical roots of Chinese securitization in its northwest borderlands and examines its implications. His central argument is clear and compelling: the CCP's simplistic treatment of the region and its inhabitants as security matters undermines genuine social stability and exacerbates ethnic tensions, especially between Uyghurs and Han. This thesis is informed by theories in IR and anthropology positing that national “groupness” is formed through the demarcation and reproduction of boundaries that separate “safe insiders” from “dangerous outsiders” (p. 12). As a result, the performance of collective identities perpetuates these “insecure” bifurcated categories.

Securing China's Northwest Frontier examines this dynamic interplay using two main analytical methods: textual analysis and ethnographic inquiry. After providing a thorough history of nation-building by China-based polities in chapter one, Tobin devotes chapters two and three to introducing the discourses of ethnic unity (minzu tuanjie jiaoyu) and patriotic education (aiguozhuyi jiaoyu) in Xinjiang as they are presented in two key state-produced texts published for mass audiences: The Xinjiang Cultural Knowledge Study Guide and The 50 Whys: Protecting National Unification, Opposing Ethnic Separatism, Strengthening Ethnic Unity Study Book. These texts privilege Han-centric retellings of an “unbroken” Chinese history, identify a distinct (and superior) Han culture as the adhesive agent binding the “Chinese nation,” and trace the teleological progression of ethnic minority identities from backwards cultural markers towards (eventual) full-fledged Chinese subjects (pp. 61–62). Consequently, official discourse, according to the author, contributes to the construction of a social hierarchy that marginalizes non-Han peoples.

Although the utility of education in projecting state authority is undeniable, this particular discussion may have benefited from direct engagement with the literature on the politics of textbooks, especially the growing list of publications on PRC textbooks. To be sure, Tobin correctly considers these texts in broader, often contradictory processes of nation building and highlights the CCP's limitations in meeting its goals; indeed, later chapters highlight individual agency. Yet, by not explicitly acknowledging the limitations of textbooks as hegemonic tools, this presentation may – unintentionally – overestimate the structuring potential of state education.

Nevertheless, the CCP deliberately maintains a rigid insider–outsider minzu dichotomy and extends it into ethno-regional spaces and their corresponding identities. More specifically, Tobin demonstrates that the CCP opportunistically conflates Uyghur embracement of Turkic language and Islam with East Turkestan – the name preferred by proponents of independence – and therefore “resistance to the Zhonghua Minzu identity” (p. 105) and separatism. As a result, the CCP treats a Uyghur identity built on a foundation of Central Asian and Islamic cultural norms as intimately connected to “hostile” foreign actors (both “Western” – intent on stopping China's rise – and “Islamic” – who are prone to engaging in “terrorism”) and needing eradication.

Using the theoretical scaffolding developed in the first half of the book, chapters four to seven build a case for how the CCP's security practices deepen ethnic tensions between Han and Uyghurs. Shifting from textual analysis to rich ethnographic description, Tobin first illustrates how Uyghurs are incorporated yet marginalized in the Zhonghua minzu. For example, the CCP promotes festivals common to Han people – such as the Spring and Mid-Autumn festivals – as national celebrations (bayram in Uyghur) yet does little to promote religio-cultural feasts (heyt in Uyghur) shared by Uyghurs and other Muslims (pp. 152–54). The official elevation of “Han” celebrations to civic holidays in Uyghur communities while Islamic feast days are largely ignored by the state reproduces social inequalities.

These officialized identities are ostensibly internalized and performed by Han and Uyghurs. Tobin arrived in Ürümchi in September 2009, a time when the city's Han and Uyghur residents were still gripped by fear, uncertainty and state violence following the 5 July uprising. In this volatile environment, many of Tobin's Han interlocutors held disparaging opinions towards Uyghurs believing them to be backward and prone to violence (p. 180). Meanwhile, Uyghurs continued to define themselves as Turkic speakers indigenous to the Tarim Basin (present-day Xinjiang) and considered Han migrants to be colonizers. These ethnic expressions expose the shortcomings of the Zhonghua minzu identity: it is built upon a Han-centric core that requires Uyghurs to shed their most important ethnic markers. Therefore, Uyghurs respond by “securitizing” their identity, by rejecting China and its nation-building project that requires assimilation. Tobin concludes, “Chinese nation-building is failing in Xinjiang because it means assimilation for Uyghurs and made [sic] people of all ethnicities feel increasingly insecure that their identities are under threat from each other and the state” (p. 230).

Tobin's argumentation is theoretically grounded, carefully crafted and eloquently presented. Securing China's Northwest Frontier provides an important contribution to the fields of China/Xinjiang studies, ethnicity and Chinese ethnic politics. It is essential reading for all Xinjiang/Uyghur studies specialists, policy makers, and graduate students interested in Chinese nation-building.