Christophe Jaffrelot has already made an important name for himself as a scholar of South Asia, and once again he has created a virtual omnibus of comprehensive fragments elucidating Pakistan's sociopolitical history since the demand for the separate country arose over a century ago. In The Pakistan Paradox, we are treated to a comprehensive analysis of Pakistan, a welcome addition to a growing field of study of that country from “the inside out”—the various dimensions of what makes Pakistan work, as opposed to many accounts that merely see it juxtaposed with the United States and other countries—and its place in the global arena. Jaffrelot has edited another book about Pakistan that was just published, Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), and one must wonder how that will add to this already comprehensive tome.

At the outset, Jaffrelot provides a fair and succinct sketch of the history of the state. He defines two major sources of instability: the alternation of phases of democratization and military rule every ten years or so, and the recurrence of armed conflict (e.g., in Bengal, Baluchistan, and Kashmir). All of this contributes to his definition of the Pakistan paradox: its cyclical shifts from one type of political regime to another, and the recurrence of ethnic (and more recently, Islamist) conflict that reflects chronic instability. He argues that the country's fear of encirclement by India—as well as Afghanistan—only partly explains the role of the Pakistan army's entry into the public sphere and the heavy centralization of the state. Indeed, it has been Pakistani politicians themselves, when in charge of the government, who have also displayed authoritarian tendencies; Jaffrelot describes how many have not shown respect for the independence of the judiciary or for a free press.

Jaffrelot argues that the history of Pakistan has been overdetermined by “multisectoral instability” manifesting as three sets of tensions, all rooted in contradictions that have been apparent since the 1940s. He uses these three contradictions that have created chronic instability as the thematic framework of the book (p. 11): First, the linguistic nationalism that resulted from the equation “Pakistan equals Islam plus Urdu” is the foundation of the first contradiction between the centralizing government and centrifugal forces. Second, the military forces and politicians have developed a concentration of power since the 1940s, resulting in a civil-military establishment primarily interested in protecting its interests and dominant status. Thus “the elitist rationale of the Pakistan idea therefore resulted in social conservatism and the persistence of huge inequalities.” And finally, competing conceptions of Islam and its appropriate role in the public sphere are the root cause of the third contradiction.

Jaffrelot argues that despite these tensions, Pakistan has shown “remarkable resilience.” In summing up the three tensions, he writes that they can be seen in “the centrifugal forces at work in Pakistan and those resisting them on behalf of Pakistani nationalism and provincial autonomy; the culture of authoritarianism and the resources of democracy; and the Islamist agenda and those who are fighting it on behalf of secularism or ‘Muslimhood’ a la Jinnah” (p. 12).

The Pakistan Paradox is divided into three parts, each of which—given their comprehensiveness, attention to detail, and length—could stand as a volume on its own. Yet each contributes to Jaffrelot's larger argument about the Pakistan paradox, so in that way they are deeply tied together. In the first part, “Nationalism Without a Nation—and Even Without a People,” he gives careful attention to the socio-ethnic origins of separatism going back to the nineteenth century, events that are mostly long forgotten by most Pakistanis. He notes the important diversity that existed among Indian Muslims during the British Raj, a diversity that continues to wrack sociopolitical conflicts to this day in Pakistan. His discussion of various ethnic and religious groups is decidedly focused on politics and economics—it is unfortunate that he did not differentiate between sociocultural orientations between communities, as the distinctions are also quite remarkable. But despite this oversight, he skillfully captures the wide varieties of Muslim communities and how their differences prevent them from unifying into one nation. He also emphasizes the social hierarchies that emerge from the caste/tribe narratives of different communities, and how the jirga culture is manifested in distinct areas.

This continues into a detailed discussion about the rifts that emerged around 1857 and the emergence of the Aligarh movement versus the more rigid Deobandis, all flowing together into how Muslims came together as an umma, a religious community, in South Asia given the elites' apprehension over future Hindu dominance. The very detailed history of what occurred in various parts of Muslim-majority India between 1906 and 1947 reveals how the Muslim League finally transformed from an elite movement to a mass one, something that Allama Iqbal had urged Jinnah to pursue for a long time. Jaffrelot argues that Muslim nationalism was “a product of a strategy of identity building that an elite group developed in order to escape the Other's domination” (p. 49). He addresses the political culture that came to dominate Pakistan, one of elites that did not think of the needs of the poor, and states that “the rejection of democracy went hand-in-hand with a culture of entitlement, a major component of the Pakistani syndrome” (p. 51).

The second part—”Neither Democracy nor Autocracy?”—traces the history of attempts at democracy and the periodic—decennial—military coups that have ended them, until the historic elections of 2013 that saw a democratic transition. Addressing the distinctiveness of the three major military regimes, Jaffrelot rightly concludes that Pervez Musharraf (1999–2007) was “a new Ayub Khan.” They shared the priorities of promoting growth and development and modernizing Pakistan, although Musharraf took the stage in an entirely other era, when “modernity” and “the West” were reviled by some constituencies in Pakistan.

The final part, “Islam: Territorial Ideology or Political Religion,” covers each seminal event in the politicization of Islam, including Zia's Islamization program and the expansion of deeni madaris (religious schools), the rise of the Taliban, the distinctive aggression of Maulana Fazlullah and the Swat Taliban, and the impact of Al Qaeda's retreat into FATA after the fall of the Taliban government in Afghanistan. When Jaffrelot questions if this is leading toward a civil war in Pakistan—and then provides numerous examples of extremist events and the military's sometimes equally violent responses—there is something being left out. Yes, there can be a litany of these extremist events, but no mention of the sentiments of the vast majority of the population in Pakistan that most certainly does not support them. While the tone of society has become more conservative in Pakistan over the years, it has not moved to be extremist.

Jaffrelot finally concurs when he writes, “Pakistan is no more doomed to break apart than it is destined to be dominated by the military” (p. 631). He argues that the prevailing inherent contradictions in Pakistan must be seen within a regional and an international context, which has played a key role in affecting its history from the outset.