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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2005
Zones of Conflict is rich in arguments encompassing U.S. foreign policy, the European Union as an international political actor, the dynamics of globalization and European integration, a critique of former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's Realpolitik prescriptions for U.S. policymakers in the post–Cold-War era, as well as many others. However, it is difficult to identify the principal argument of the book from the introduction, the conclusion, or other chapters.
The author states two main objectives for the book. The first is to “present the ways in which the U.S. has attempted to hold sway in Western Eurasia since the collapse of the USSR and its satellite states” (p. 2). The second is to “examine the potential of the EU to become an independent political actor in world affairs” (p. 3).
The first objective has turned the text into a long narrative that is rich on the historical-descriptive side but thin on theoretical analysis. The author's description of the text as “selective and, at times, discursive” (p. 5) is something of an understatement, since both selectivity and discursiveness have resulted in a weakening of the structure and consequently the clarity of the main argument of the book as well as each chapter. Furthermore, the author's explanation that it would have been impossible to discuss in detail the foreign policy of the United States toward every Balkan or Middle Eastern state because it is “beyond the real and ideal capacities of any one individual,” although acceptable, does not hold. First, one could draw attention to those aspects of U.S. policy that are common for all the states in a given region. For instance, as far as the Middle East is concerned, most U.S. foreign-policy experts identify four pillars of American foreign policy in that region since World War II: protecting of the state of Israel, ensuring the flow of oil at reasonable prices to the United States and its allies, working toward an Arab–Israeli peace settlement that serves U.S. interests in the region, and containing the influence of other great powers in the Middle East (the USSR during the Cold War). Second, the author in general spends considerable time describing the historical background surrounding many of the states in question but fails in most cases to create a dynamic relationship between the various arguments he offers. The space allocated to description leaves little room for elaborating on the theoretical-ontological underpinnings of the arguments involved. In addition to these structural weaknesses, certain stylistic habits further undermine the clarity of argument—for instance, using terms such as “the West,” “NATO,” and “the US” interchangeably, and failing to distinguish between the descriptive and the prescriptive (using “is” and “should be” interchangeably [p. 116]).
The second objective of the book—that is, the potential of the European Union as an international political actor—further complicates the matter by diverting attention away from analysis of U.S. foreign policy to issues surrounding the evolution of Pan-European integration and its impact on E.U.–U.S. relations. Much space is devoted to countries such as Cyprus, Germany, Greece, and Turkey, while other important international actors such as Russia and China, which arguably could have more impact on the making of U.S. policy toward Eurasia, are not given enough coverage. Most important, the way the E.U. argument unfolds brings into question the suitability of the book's title. The title hints at the zones of conflict created and maintained as a result of the pursuit of American interests abroad. The reader therefore expects the main argument of the book to focus on analysis of American policy in the regions mentioned. However, in reality the book deals more with the dynamics of U.S.–E.U. relations than the making and implementation of U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East and the Balkans.
Finally, the author's preoccupation with Brzezinski's The Grand Chessboard introduces an unnecessary twist in the explanation of U.S. foreign policy. If Zones of Conflict is intended as a “counterblast” to Brzezinski's vision for post–Cold-War U.S. foreign policy, then its title should have been amended to address this objective. Otherwise, as the author surely appreciates, the making of American foreign policy toward any single state, group of countries, or region is the product of a complex interaction of the historical, domestic, international, and institutional context of that given entity. Brzezinski's views do inform the U.S. foreign-policy community but do not necessarily determine policy direction or outcome.
In short, although there is no doubting the author's research skills, his style and organization of the material are not effective in the presentation of the main thesis. Moreover, the author's reliance on literature mainly on Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, with some on Germany and the European Union and a little on U.S. foreign policy and policymaking in the post–Cold-War era, further explains the theoretical shortcomings of this intellectual endeavor. Naturally, this limits the book's contribution to knowledge in the field of American foreign policy.
The book's descriptive style and its limited theoretical content should make it more appealing to the general public than to academics, and more appealing to historians than to political scientists. I would not recommend the book to undergraduate students in particular since its weak structure and the insufficient clarity of the main argument make it a difficult read. Research students, however, could benefit from the rich collection of arguments as well as the structural and analytical weaknesses that they should learn not to repeat.