The shared values, beliefs, and behaviors by which people interpret life events are what we call culture. More than medical science, culture determines how people react to illness and death. Science may determine which drug or surgery best treats the disease, but culture often determines how the health professional best treats a patient with the disease. Culture influences when the patient believes he is ill, which treatments he accepts, and which results he prefers.1
Kleinman A, Eisenberg L, Good B. Culture, illness, and care. Annals of Internal Medicine 1978;88:251–8; Lewis G. Cultural influences on illness behavior. In: Eisenberg L, Kleinman A, eds. The Relevance of Social Science for Medicine. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company; 1980:165–96; Good BJ, Delvecchio Good MJ. The meaning of symptoms. In: Eisenberg L, Kleinman A, eds. The Relevance of Social Science for Medicine. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company; 1980:151–62. Orr RD, Marshall PA, Osborn J. Cross-cultural considerations in clinical ethics consultations. Archives of Family Medicine 1995;4:159–64. Kleinman A. Anthropology of medicine. In: Reich WT, ed. Encyclopedia of bioethics. New York: Simon & Schuster MacMillan; 1995:1667–74. Kagawa-Singer M, Blackhall LJ. Negotiating cross-cultural issues at the end of life. JAMA 2001;286:2993–3001. Krakauer ER, Crenner C, Fox K. Barriers to optimum end-of-life care for minority patients. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 2002;50:182–90.
Carrese JA, Rhodes LA. Western bioethics on the Navajo reservation. JAMA 1995;274:826–9.
A growing literature substantiates culture's significance in medicine.3
Perez-Stable EJ, Sabogal F, Otero-Sabogal R, Hiatt RA, McPhee SJ. Misconceptions about cancer among Latinos and Anglos. JAMA 1992;268:2119–23; Caralis PV, Davis B, Wright K, Marcial E. The influence of ethnicity and race on attitudes toward advance directives, life-prolonging treatments, and euthanasia. Journal of Clinical Ethics 1993;4:155–65; Blackhall LJ, Murphy ST, Frank G, Michel V, Azen S. Ethnicity and attitudes toward patient autonomy. JAMA 1995;274:820–9. Berger JT. Culture and clinical care. Archives of Internal Medicine 1998;198:2085–90.
The Case
Mrs. Q., an elderly African American, had severe emphysema and heart failure. When lung cancer was diagnosed, poor respiratory capacity precluded curative resection. Mrs. Q. underwent palliative radiation instead. She returned home and resumed shopping and attending church, activities she enjoyed. Two years later increasing confusion and dyspnea prompted rehospitalization. Her ward physicians, all Euroamericans, diagnosed pneumonia and believed Mrs. Q. was irreversibly dying. They recommended comfort care only. The family demanded full life support. Exhaustive negotiations failed to break the impasse as Mrs. Q. slid toward respiratory failure. Needing to decide soon about life support, the physicians asked me for an ethics consultation.
Defining a Rigorous Approach to the Consultation
Credibility required a transparent and methodical consultative approach.4
Hunter KM. Narrative. In: Reich WT, ed. Encyclopedia of bioethics. New York: Simon & Schuster MacMillan; 1995:1789–94; Weiner SJ. Contextualizing medical decisions to individualize care. Journal of General Internal Medicine 2004;19:281–5.
Perkins HS. The fiduciary concept. In: Stein JH, ed. Internal Medicine. St. Louis: Mosby-Year Book, Inc.; 1994:2855–9.
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. Decisions near the end of life. JAMA 1992;267:2229–33.
Cykert S, Jones JD, Kissling G, Hansen CJ. Racial differences in patients' perceptions of debilitated health states. Journal of General Internal Medicine 1999;14:217–22.
Jecker NS, Carrese JA, Pearlman RA. Caring for patients in cross-cultural settings. Hastings Center Report 1995;25:6–14.
Kuczewski M, McCruden PJ. Informed consent: Does it take a village? Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2001;10:34–46.
Lesson 1: Racial or Ethnic Differences Do Not Constitute Cultural Differences
Mrs. Q.'s Euroamerican physicians believed African-American culture somehow compelled the family to demand life support despite Mrs. Q.'s imminent death. While professing respect for that culture, the physicians insisted the family not be allowed to dictate useless treatment. Accepting such a view without further inquiry was tempting. Yet high consultative standards required specifying the cultural differences at work.
My own prior research suggested that, unlike Euroamericans, African Americans believe that patients cannot control their care and that American medicine serves patients poorly.10
Perkins HS, Geppert CMA, Gonzales A, Cortez JD, Hazuda HP. Cross-cultural similarities and differences in attitudes about advance care planning. Journal of General Internal Medicine 2002;17:48–57. Perkins HS, Cortez JD, Hazuda HP. Advance care planning: Does patient gender make a difference? American Journal of the Medical Sciences 2004;327:25–32. Perkins HS, Shepherd KJ, Cortez JD, Hazuda HP. Exploring chronically ill seniors' attitudes about discussing death and postmortem medical procedures. Journal of the American Geriatrics Society 2005;53:895–900.
Other literature provided additional support. Commentaries accuse American medicine of “a long history of racism,”11
Gamble VN. A legacy of distrust. In: Racial differences in preterm delivery. American Journal of Preventive Medicine 1993;9:35–8. Krakauer EL. Mistrust, racism, and end-of-life treatment. Hastings Center Report 1997;27:23–4.
Dula A. African-American suspicion of the healthcare system is justified. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 1994;3:347–57.
King PA. The dangers of difference. Hastings Center Report 1992;22:35–8.
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. Black-White disparities in health care. JAMA 1990;263:2344–6; Phillip RS, Mamel MB, Teno JM, Bellamy P, Broste SK, Califf RM, et al. Race, resource use, and survival in seriously ill hospitalized adults. Journal of General Internal Medicine 1996;11:387–96.
Klessig J. The effect of values and culture on life-support decisions. Western Journal of Medicine 1992;274:316–22. Crawley LM, Marshall PA, Lo B, Koenig BA. Strategies for culturally effective end-of-life care. Annals of Internal Medicine 2002;136:673–9.
These findings suggested the working hypothesis that Mrs. Q.'s family distrusted her physicians and demanded fully aggressive life support as a result. The hypothesis needed only direct confirmation in interviews with the family.
All interviews risk social desirability bias, whereby interviewees respond as they think interviewers wish. (The risk is highest when interviewees disagree with interviewers and must rely on them for benefits.) Although no interview completely avoids the risk, two arguments supported the belief that Mrs. Q.'s family would honestly express any distrust of her physicians. First, the interviews used safeguards against social desirability bias, including interviewing family members individually, asking carefully balanced questions, and inviting interviewees to voice dissatisfactions. Second, Mrs. Q.'s outpatient physician described her daughter—the caregiver and family spokesman—as fiercely assertive in pursuing proper care for Mrs. Q. The daughter often questioned the physician's plans and proposed alternative treatments. As the interviewer, I was unlikely to daunt her.
Astonishingly, despite great effort to elicit them, no hints of distrust surfaced in the interviews. The family expressed only deep gratitude to the physicians for Mrs. Q.'s care. Her daughter said, “The doctors are … good to Mama. And they explain things to us. Besides, without … the doctors where would we be?” However common among African Americans in general, distrust of American medicine appeared irrelevant to Mrs. Q.'s case.16
Crawley L, Payne R, Bolden J, Payne T, Washington P, Williams S, et al. Palliative and end-of-life care in the African American community. JAMA 2000;284:2518–21.
Yet evidence I collected in testing that hypothesis suggested another. Testing it yielded a second lesson about culture.
Lesson 2: Not All Conflicts between People of Different Cultures Are Cultural Conflicts
The multicultural circumstances prompted Mrs. Q.'s physicians to attribute the treatment conflict to cultural differences. Yet I had to entertain other possible causes, too.
Careful reading of past records revealed a surprise: Two of Mrs. Q.'s current physicians had admitted her for a pneumonia 8 months before. These physicians had told the family then that she was irreversibly dying. They had urged comfort care only, but the family had wavered. When Mrs. Q. suffered respiratory collapse, family indecision made the physicians feel obliged to give full life support. They intubated, ventilated, and treated her with antibiotics. Against all predictions, she had survived.
The relevance of that hospitalization to the current impasse had escaped the physicians. Their prior inaccurate predictions in nearly identical circumstances would make most families, regardless of culture, doubt those same predictions now. Perhaps that past experience had prompted Mrs. Q.'s family to reject the physicians' current advice. This hypothesis needed testing.
When questioned again, the family recalled the physicians' past inaccurate predictions but were unperturbed by them. The family still respected the physicians' judgment but firmly intended to follow Mrs. Q.'s wishes. The daughter said, “[The doctors] explain … every time. That's pretty good, putting your cards on the table…. [Before Mama] went on the ventilator, the doctors said, ‘The odds [are] nil or none [for her to live].’ Most people would say DNR, but Mama's a survivor. She wants every [treatment]…. We listen to the doctors, but we also listen to her….” However understandable skepticism about the physicians' predictions would be, the family expressed none of it. My second hypothesis had also failed its test.
With key differences in perspectives still unexplained, I returned to culture-based hypotheses. The next one succeeded and yielded a third lesson about culture.
Lesson 3: Some Cultural Differences Are Not Obvious
Suddenly an insight17
Hawkins AH. Epiphanic knowledge and medicine. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2005;14:40–6.
Pachter LM. Culture and clinical care. JAMA 1994;271:690–4.
See note 1, Kleinman et al. 1978; see note 1, Good, Delvecchio Good 1980; see note 1, Lewis 1980; Hahn RA, Gaines AD. Among the physicians. In: Hahn RA, Gaines AD, eds. Physicians of Western Medicine. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company; 1985:3–22.
The Framework for Understanding Medical Events: Science versus Religion
Culture provides a framework for understanding events. Mrs. Q.'s physicians used medical science as their framework. For example, they characterized Mrs. Q.'s prior pneumonia by the bacterium in her sputum and attributed her recovery to timely antibiotics. In contrast, Mrs. Q.'s family used religion as their framework.20
Snow LF. Traditional health beliefs and practices among lower class Black Americans. The Western Journal of Medicine 1983;139:820–8.
Language: Technical versus Colloquial
Different languages reflect different conceptual realities. The physicians understood Mrs. Q.'s situation in terms such as “cardiac output” or “cancer survival rates,” a technical language reflecting one conceptual reality. The family understood her situation in different terms such as not wanting her “to be cut on” and having an inner “flicker of hope,” a colloquial language reflecting another reality. Sometimes the two languages meshed enough to provide a common understanding. For example, all understood why Mrs. Q. had received radiotherapy rather than surgery for her initial cancer treatment. As the daughter said, “[Mama] had an enlarged heart and bad lungs, and [the surgeons] decided she couldn't survive the operation.” But at other times the languages reflected vastly different conceptual realities and hindered communication. Even the same words understood differently in the two languages caused problems. For example, Mrs. Q. refused the hospital's “heart failure diet,” believing the name means it causes, rather than treats, heart failure. Sadly, both sides rarely recognized such miscommunications.
The Focus of Medical Care: Disease, Diagnosis, and Treatment versus Illness, Relief of Symptoms, and Improvement in Function
Disease is objective organ pathology; illness is the symptoms and disabilities a patient experiences. From admission, debate over the disease causing Mrs. Q.'s immediate deterioration consumed her physicians. Wet crackles in the lungs suggested congestive heart failure; masses on her chest X-ray suggested progressive lung cancer. Each diagnosis required a different treatment. The debate often hamstrung the physicians. To the family it missed the point. They believed Mrs. Q.'s disease lay inscrutable inside her, but her illness was obvious. Caring less about identifying disease than relieving illness, the family campaigned consistently for measures to ease symptoms and improve function.
Proper Grounds for Medical Decisions: Technical Knowledge versus Patient Wishes
The two sides cited different grounds to justify their different views about life support for Mrs. Q. To justify withholding it, the physicians cited technical knowledge. The pulmonary intensivist said, “[Mrs. Q has] lived two years with her cancer. The two-year survival … is only about 10%. Furthermore, Mrs. Q.'s chest scan shows progression…. She can't live much longer.” To justify giving life support, the family cited Mrs. Q.'s wishes. “If [Mama] goes on a respirator, she does not mean to be on it for the rest of her life. Whatever helps her [quality of life], that's what she wants,” the daughter explained. “Mama always said she didn't want the DNR … [Mama's] a fighter and a survivor, … so full of life…. Everyone has the right to decide. It [comes] to that—her wishes.”
Views of Time: Foe versus Friend
Mrs. Q.'s physicians and family viewed time differently. To the physicians, it was a foe. The heavy clinical workload infixed them with a constant sense of urgency. As a result, they fought time and prized efficiency and decisiveness. Characteristically, having concluded Mrs. Q. was dying, the physicians pressed the family for an immediate DNR decision. These persistent requests annoyed the family and eventually raised doubts about the physicians' willingness to treat Mrs. Q. To the family, time was more a friend. It reassured them of life's orderliness, that everything happens in its “right” time. Events should not be rushed but accepted as they unfold in proper sequence. The daughter explained, “Until Mama feels it's her time [to die], she wants everything to live. Some people have an aura before they die. [Mama] has never had the aura saying, ‘This is it.’ ” Without that aura Mrs. Q. and her family could not believe it was her “right” time to die.
Control over Medical Events: The Physicians Alone versus God Ultimately21 Connors RB, Smith ML. Religious insistence on medical treatment. Hastings Center Report 1996;26:23–30. Brett AS, Jersild P. “Inappropriate” treatment near the end of life: Conflict between religious convictions and clinical judgment. Archives of Internal Medicine 2003;163:1645–9.
Connors RB, Smith ML. Religious insistence on medical treatment. Hastings Center Report 1996;26:23–30. Brett AS, Jersild P. “Inappropriate” treatment near the end of life: Conflict between religious convictions and clinical judgment. Archives of Internal Medicine 2003;163:1645–9.
Mrs. Q.'s physicians believed that, if she could be saved, they alone could do it. For example, the oncologist, who thought Mrs. Q. had reversible congestive heart failure, urged the other physicians to treat aggressively. “It is up to the [internal] medicine doctors,” he said, “to save her life.” Other physicians, who thought she was dying from inexorable lung cancer, reasoned that, because all therapies for it were exhausted, no one could save her. In contrast, the family recognized the physicians' important role in medical matters but ascribed ultimate control to God. He “is on the doctors' side,” Mrs. Q.'s daughter said. “[They] are a tool of God's handiwork. [But] when the doctors give up, God takes you in His hands. There are miracle cases, and our belief is strong.”
Management Recommendations
The issue prompting consultation involved only treatment. Yet implementing effective treatment required good communication, and that deserved first consideration.
Good cross-cultural communication clarifies values and beliefs all around. Respectful, perceptive listening is key.22
See note 1, Kleinman et al. 1978.
I encouraged a thoughtful, patient approach with the family. The physicians should use everyday language, acknowledge their uncertainties, and elicit the family's views. They should also offer to include the family's minister in treatment discussions. Above all, the physicians should speak with one voice. Different physicians giving different assessments had confused the family. Ward physicians and consultants needed to coordinate communications. They should discuss treatment together, iron out differences, and agree on a plan. Then one physician, acting as primary spokesman, should present it to the family.
The treatment recommendation presented two important pitfalls. Ethnocentrism—the blind belief in the superiority of one's own culture—automatically discounts other cultures. Ethnocentrism tempted me here to accept uncritically the physicians' views and to dismiss too readily the family's. In contrast, cultural relativism—the uncritical acceptance of any culture's views as valid within that culture—risks abandoning the substantive values of one's own culture. Siding with the family just to show tolerance risked ignoring important professional values.23
Macklin R. Ethical relativism in a multicultural society. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1998;8:1–22. Carter MA, Klugman CM. Cultural engagement in clinical ethics. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2001;10:16–33. Carrese JA, Perkins HS. Ethics consultation in a culturally diverse society. Public Affairs Quarterly 2003;17:97–120.
My recommendation had to reflect a balanced respect for both cultures. I urged implementation of family suggestions that did not violate the physicians' core values. Greater flexibility might be justified than the physicians thought. Yet the main issue, life support, permitted no accommodation fully satisfactory to both sides. I favored a decision based on likely benefits to Mrs. Q. Her wishes should define (within broad bounds of reasonableness) which outcomes would be benefits and the minimum acceptable likelihood for achieving them. With Mrs. Q. increasingly stuporous, how could the physicians know her wishes? Her family, prior professional caregivers, and medical records provided clues. When well, Mrs. Q. enjoyed living at home with her family, attending church, and shopping. She had also consistently elected arduous treatments in the past for small chances at longer life. Furthermore, her durability had repeatedly confounded the physicians' predictions. She had lived years with serious diseases and survived life-threatening complications. Of course, the family had some rightful authority over treatment, but within limits. The family could opine about Mrs. Q.'s wishes but not demand useless or harmful treatments for her. The physicians had to enforce such limits for Mrs. Q.'s own protection.24
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association. Guidelines for the appropriate use of do-not-resuscitate orders. JAMA 1991;265:1868–71; Peterson MW, Geist LJ, Schwartz DA, Konicek S, Moseley PL. Outcome after cardiopulmonary resuscitation in a medical intensive care unit. Chest 1991;100:168–74; Cohn EB, Lefevre F, Yarnold PR, Arron MJ, Martin GJ. Predicting survival from in-hospital CPR. Journal of General Internal Medicine 1993;8:347–53; Ebell MH, Becker LA, Barry HC, Hagen M. Survival after in-hospital cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Journal of General Internal Medicine 1998;13:805–16.
After weighing such considerations I concluded that Mrs. Q. deserved nearly full life support. Only CPR in a cardiac arrest offered no possible benefit. Mrs. Q.'s advanced age, cancer, congestive heart failure, chronic lung disease, and recurrent pneumonias all predicted failure of CPR.25
Jecker NS. Medical futility and care of dying patients. The Western Journal of Medicine 1995;163:287–91.
See note 24, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 1991. Tomlinson T, Brody H. Futility and the ethics of resuscitation. JAMA 1990;264:1276–80. American Thoracic Society. Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining therapy. Annals of Internal Medicine 1991;115:478–85. Hackler C, Hiller FC. Family consent to orders not to resuscitate. JAMA 1990;264:1281–3.
To avoid crossing the family, some ethicists would offer transfer to another physician or hospital so that the patient could receive treatment the family wanted. I disagreed with that approach. I believed the physicians must not allow Mrs. Q.'s family a treatment choice that could only hurt her. The physician–spokesman should politely inform the family about the DNR order and its rationale. The spokesman might even use the family's own terms to explain the situation, perhaps by casting Mrs. Q.'s fate in a cardiac arrest as lying solely with God. Yet the family deserved no veto over the order.
Epilogue
I assembled Mrs. Q.'s physicians and presented my conclusions. The physicians admitted misgivings about either giving or withholding life support. After much debate they chose not to cross the family and opted for full life support. I summarized in the medical record my conclusions, the physicians' discussion, and their final decision.
Mrs. Q. suffered respiratory failure almost immediately. The physicians intubated, ventilated, and diuresed her aggressively over the next 10 days. Her symptoms cleared, and she returned home. Still, ambivalence over future life support plagued the physicians. The intern wrote on discharge, Mrs. Q. “has an unrealistic notion of [her] prognosis [and] desires to be full code…. Given this, … the patient and her family [decided] that, if the patient decompensates [again, that she will] be reintubated despite [her] debilitating disease…. [But we feel she will] not benefit from full CPR.”
Mrs. Q. lived normally for another 6 months. Then recurrent pneumonias prompted three hospitalizations in 9 months. During the first hospitalization the physicians wrote, “[Mrs. Q. likes her] quality of life and wishes this to be preserved.” They resuscitated her three times. The intensivist finally secured family agreement to a DNR order. During the next two hospitalizations Mrs. Q. and her daughter insisted again on full life support (though it was not needed). During a fourth hospitalization, this time for high calcium, the physicians resuscitated Mrs. Q. four times. Miraculously, she survived to discharge but in poor condition. She died a month later in another hospital.
Conclusion
Culture—the shared values, beliefs, and behaviors by which a people interpret life events—proved key in managing Mrs. Q.'s case. The narrow view of culture, limited to race or ethnic group, provided no solution to the impasse over life support between her physicians and family. Yet a broader view, based directly on the definition above of culture, revealed physicians and laity as distinct cultures, explained the disagreement in Mrs. Q.'s case, suggested management steps, and taught important lessons about culture. This broad concept can be a useful tool in ethics consultations.
