Treason was a commonly used word in the Austro-Hungarian Empire throughout World War I. It implies betrayal and active opposition to the legitimate authorities and is a far heavier charge than mere cowardice, incompetence, or failure. During the war, Austro-Hungarian officers and officials from Conrad von Hotzendorf down constantly accused Czechs, Italians, Ruthenians, and others of treachery, stemming from disloyalty, anti-imperial sentiment, and irredentism. This conveniently explained the many failures of the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1914 and 1915, but as Christian E. Reiter shows in Zur Problematik des tschechischen “Verrates” im Ersten Weltkrieg, nationalistic resentments within the Austro-Hungarian Empire were often the result of military mismanagement and defeat, not the cause. Reiter examines the wartime experience of the predominantly Czech 10th Infantry Troop Division (ITD), long used as proof of Czech untrustworthiness, antimilitarism, and Pan-Slavism. The 10th ITD contained one of the most problematic Czech units, the 36th Infantry Regiment (IR), which surrendered en masse on three separate occasions, and was finally disbanded in 1915. While there were certainly long-term political and cultural factors in the division, Reiter shows that most instances of surrender within the 10th ITD are satisfactorily explained by poor tactical positioning, heavy losses, lack of food and other supplies, sickness, barriers between officers and men, insufficient artillery support, and other combat factors.

Reiter's account is primarily a military history, and he does a good job of explaining the complicated tactical situation behind the three main mass surrenders of the 36th IR. The instance at the Battle of the San in October 1914 is illustrative. Before collapsing, the regiment had gone through weeks of hard marching, a precarious at best logistical system, and heavy losses from a series of costly offensives. Throughout the entire IX Corps, responsible for supplying and providing artillery for the 36th IR, around 70 percent of the horses were debilitated from disease, exhaustion, and other causes, resulting in minimal artillery support and food. In the end, it was only after the regiment was bloodily repulsed from a frontal attack against superior Russian forces that a Russian nighttime attack captured more than a thousand men. While longer-term forces like nationalism, skepticism about the war, and Pan-Slavism likely contributed, the regiment's ordeal adequately explains its collapse.

After this first “treachery,” the 10th ITD underwent the torturous Carpathian Winter War, at one point declining to a mere 620 men. By March, a somewhat reconstituted 36th IR collapsed in the face of a nighttime snowstorm in the Carpathian foothills, and in May, the regiment collapsed again after being placed in an exposed position on an unsupported bridgehead. Both instances involved mass surrender, but any reluctance to fight on the part of the soldiers was clearly exacerbated by simple bad leadership and tactical mismanagement.

While the battlefield is the central driver of surrender, Reiter explores antimilitaristic agitation and actions in the 10th ITD's recruitment areas. These range from simple expressions of Czech identity, to rioting between Czech and German-speaking soldiers. Naturally, the 10th ITD's commanders latched onto this civilian agitation to explain the poor performance of their units. The division's commander in 1915, General Mecenseffy, was quick to blame nationalism, disloyalty, and treachery for his division's failures.

Reiter's work illustrates many unflattering trends within the Austro-Hungarian Army, ranging from the weak ties between officers and men, a willingness to blame subordinates for tactical and operational mistakes, and suspicion of entire ethnic groups. Reiter also notes that the 10th ID and its subordinate units illustrate how isolated active duty officers were from civilian politics and society. This is at least partially due to their position in garrisons and military posts, combined with their imperial outlook. Officers also were quick to label antiwar sentiment, or even criticism of incompetence and waste, as treachery and nationalism.

Reiter's work has many implications for the study of nationalism within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the army, and the course of World War I. Zur Problematik des tschechischen “Verrates” im Ersten Weltkrieg contains excellent information on the 10th ITD and suggests avenues for further research. A similar, tactical approach would illuminate other famous instances of Czech “treachery,” such as the surrender of the 28th IR during the Carpathian Mountain campaign, the collapse of the 19th Division, or Russian use of Czech legions during the Kerensky Offensive. Surrender is a complicated event, and while national sentiment and attitudes toward war are important, the immediate events around surrender are often the deciding factors.