Since the early twentieth century, the United States has actively participated in world affairs. However, American leaders on opposing sides of the political spectrum have provided different justifications for such involvement. In Hard Line, Colin Dueck sketches the foreign-policy stances of several notable Republicans – including Robert Taft, Dwight Eisenhower, Barry Goldwater, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and George W. Bush. Moreover, he covers how foreign policy has contributed to the rightward trajectory of the Republican Party since the 1940s. Ultimately, Dueck hopes his primer will provide some direction for the GOP in the future, as it looks to respond to international developments as well as redefine its appeal to the American electorate.
Dueck begins his study by describing the different characteristics of conservative foreign policy. Then, in subsequent chapters, he examines in more detail the views of the Republicans he chose to focus on. Anti-interventionists like Robert Taft prefer to focus on domestic rather than international problems and hope to avoid foreign entanglements. Realists like Richard Nixon and George Bush view foreign policy as one means by which to advance narrowly defined national interests. Hawks like Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan equate foreign policy with the use of military power to further either idealistic or geopolitical ends. Nationalists like George W. Bush stress unilateralism when it comes to diplomacy and military action. Dueck demonstrates how each of these party leaders generally fell into one category. Simultaneously, he illustrates how, in adjusting to various international situations, they sometimes blurred the lines between the models. Still, Dueck maintains that “there … has been one overarching constant in conservative and Republican foreign policies for several decades now … a hawkish, intense American nationalism” even with the “oscillations between internationalism and isolationism” (2). In other words, the right has consistently supported a hard-line approach.
Providing an overview of postwar Republican foreign policy clearly seems to be the main purpose of this study. However, Dueck emphasizes a second, related theme – the importance of presidential leadership in shaping foreign-policy tendencies. Political scientists and historians use several explanations why different approaches have emerged at different times. The role of economic interests, partisan politics, international pressures and policy ideas independently or in tandem can influence decision-makers. For example, during the Cold War the threat posed by the Soviets, coupled with the expectations of American allies, put pressure on the United States to act to deter the spread of communism. Dueck sees the merits of each of these reasons for explaining policy decisions. Nevertheless, he believes that Presidents play a more crucial role in steering foreign policy. Generally, political parties and Congress give the President a fair amount of leeway in shaping policy, “so their particular beliefs, personalities, and choices make a difference” (37). The role of presidential leadership, according to Dueck, explains why Richard Nixon pursed détente in the 1970s. The policy ran counter to his own record as an ardent anticommunist and counter to the views of the growing number of conservatives in the GOP. It also accounts for why George W. Bush led the nation into the Iraq War. The conflict seemed to contradict Bush's previous position on nation building specifically and American foreign interventions generally. In both instances, Dueck argues that given the same circumstances another leader might have acted differently.
Overall, Hard Line provides a solid overview of Republican foreign policy since World War II. Its author synthesizes numerous well-known sources into a readable narrative. While his sympathies clearly lie with the conservatives in the GOP, Dueck managed to look at this topic with a critical eye. In the end, he argues that Republican Presidents “have been most successful … when they have implemented a conservative, hawkish nationalism with practical discretion, prudence, and care” (301). He closes his study by suggesting that in the future the GOP should place “a greater emphasis on conservative realism in international affairs” (308).
