The Japanese war of aggression and atrocity during the Asia-Pacific War (1931–45) have been the subjects of intense scrutiny from the secession of hostilities in the summer of August 1945 to the present, as generations of individuals, communities, and countries that have been affected by the war, either directly or indirectly, continue to search for satisfactory explanations as to how and why this war had occurred, and who should be held accountable. What remain relatively under-studied to this day, meanwhile, are the war crimes trials that the Allied Powers held at the war's end (1945–52). War crimes trials are a logical topic of study for those who seek to expand the public's knowledge about the causes and consequences of war as well as to address the issues of responsibility. However, research of the trials has been limited to date because of the prevailing notion of “victor's justice,” which denies these trials a historical recognition as legitimate justice mechanisms, and which, in turn, has discouraged researchers from conducting a systematic inquiry into them. Moreover, the sheer volume of the trial records (tens of thousands of pages, if not more), limited access to some of the records (in the case of those kept at the Chinese, Dutch, French, and Soviet archives), and the requirement of proficiency in Japanese and English, plus one another language (in the case of analyzing the Chinese, Dutch, French, or Soviet trial records) have served as additional difficulties.

The scholarly achievements of Men to Devils, Devils to Men are fully appreciated when read against these conceptual and practical challenges that its author, Barak Kushner, had to grapple with. The erudition and multilingualism of the author are abundantly demonstrated, as he freely navigates through a wealth of primary sources and secondary literature written in Chinese, English, and Japanese, and as he skillfully weaves voluminous materials garnered from multilingual sources to present a coherent historical account. This is the first book-length study of Chinese war crimes trials in which the history of Chinese war crimes programs, their impacts on the remaking of modern China, and their enduring legacy on Sino–Japanese relations today receive comprehensive treatment. The purpose of this book is not so much to shed light on the law and jurisprudence of the 605 war crimes trials that Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang government held in the aftermath of the war (1946–49), or the 3 additional trials that the People's Republic of China (PRC) separately held in 1956. Rather, this book aims at illuminating the vital role that the trials played in re-establishing the authority of Guomindang as the legitimate face of China, and that of the Chinese Communist Party after it drove Guomindang out of the Chinese continent in 1949. Furthermore, this book aims at illuminating “the larger role the courts and the media of the time exerted in molding this memory [of the war] into firmer public opinion,” and their impacts on international relations in subsequent decades (17).

The picture of Chinese war crimes programs that this book presents is by no means flattering, as it is shown that neither the Guomindang government nor the PRC gave much regard to the fair-trial principle or to the rule of law. However, such a revelation does not lead Kushner to dismiss the significance of the trials. He instead suggests that each of the two Chinese war crimes programs had a measure of success as justice mechanisms on account of their express commitment to dispense justice not only on a punitive basis but also with compassion. Specifically, the Guomindang government declared from day one that the core principle of its war crimes program was “to repay hatred with kindness,” which resulted in putting on trial as many as 883 suspected war criminals, but which had a high acquittal rate (350 acquittals). The Chinese Communist Party, for its part, introduced an extensive re-education program that aimed at rehabilitating war criminals and helping them transition from being the “Japanese devils” (riben guizi) to restoring their humanity and their ability to confront war guilt. These war crimes initiatives brought about concrete payoffs, too. The Guomindang government was able to recruit a number of former officers of the Imperial Japanese Army, who formed the White Group (beituan) to train the Guomindang army in the fight against the Chinese Communist Party. General Okamura Yasuji, one of the senior army officers acquitted of war crimes charges, was the one to head the White Group. The PRC, for its part, implanted in Japan a significant minority of pro-PRC individuals, which included returnees from the re-education program. Can it be said that these and other sociopolitical payoffs balance out the apparently dismal quality of the Chinese judicial proceedings themselves? To reach an answer to this question, one will have to read Men to Devils, Devils to Men.