Change through Politics and Institutional Rigidity

The different studies present several explanations for how social/individual religiosity levels influence policy. Minkenberg (Reference Minkenberg2002) claims that high social religiosity strengthens church involvement in the political sphere. Karpov (Reference Karpov2010) emphasizes the role of agency in de-secularization processes (specifically in Russia) and argues that the process could begin from below due to the mobilization of religious grassroots organizations and their impact on policymakers. Zehavi (Reference Zehavi2012) argues that social religious change — whether secularization or religionization — is likely to diminish/increase religious politicians and confessional parties' power and this in turn would influence policy. These processes of religious change in the public sphere share an emphasis on politics as a mediating factor between social/individual religious levels and official policy.

Clearly, the “social religious change” → “politics” → “policy/institutions” causal chain is far from straightforward or exhaustive of all explanations of religiously-associated policy change. Political elites, for instance, might instigate such change regardless of religious social trends (see Lisovskaya and Karpov Reference Lisovskaya and Karpov2010). Religionization of public institutions could also result from non-political paths. Indeed, as will be argued below, under circumstances in which formal institutional change is difficult, non-political change processes are central to understanding institutional change.

Public organizations are not impervious to change, but a well-established body of work suggests that institutional stability is the norm. Historical institutionalist studies argue that public organizations are set in specific paths and leaving these paths often involves overcoming high legal hurdles (e.g., constitutional separation of Church and State), the resistance of entrenched interests, and economic costs that make dramatic change unlikely (Thelen Reference Thelen1999; Pierson Reference Pierson2000). Given that church-state relations are historically contentious it is unsurprising that once relations crystalized into status-quo arrangements, these are not easily transformed. In Europe, despite considerable social/individual level secularization — i.e., a decline in levels of religious observance and its significance at a personal level (Bruce Reference Bruce2013) — state-level institutional arrangements governing church-state relations have proven to be remarkably durable (Fox Reference Fox2006; Reference Fox2008). Conversely, in the comparatively religiously observant American society, religious involvement in public services is restricted by a strict interpretation of the First Amendment (Hays Reference Hays2012).

Low Visibility Change: Workers and Consumers

This might suggest that public institutions change little in spite of social religious change. Nevertheless, I argue that considerable change could occur, but it is not detectable in investigations of organizations’ legal framework and official policy. A critical key for successful change is its relatively low visibility. One process of change linking social religious levels to organizational religious practices was developed by Karel Dobbelaere (Reference Dobbelaere1979) who studied secularization in Belgium. Dobbeleare argued that while Catholic schools, rarely changed their nominal religious status, school practices were gradually becoming less religious (e.g., subjects were increasingly taught from a secular perspective). This internal secularization of schools occurred on the backdrop of a society that was steadily becoming less religiously observant. Catholic school teachers, who were increasingly likely to be lay persons, were straying from Catholic doctrine and nudging school practices away from religion. Religious change among an organization's workers was driving change in organizational behavior.

In a study of changes in public practices heavily regulated by religious dictums (e.g., commerce on the Sabbath), Ben-Porat (Reference Ben-Porat2013) notes a path by which a change in the religious composition of consumers brings about a corresponding change in public practices (also see Ben-Porat and Shamir Reference Ben-Porat and Shamir2012). In Israel, the massive 1990s' immigration from the Former Soviet Union created demand for products (e.g., pork) and services (e.g., non-religious burial), which were previously proscribed by the State. Ben Porat stresses that a frontal assault on the “status-quo” arrangements generally encounters the status-quo defenders and fails. Secularization instigators were successful to the extent that they pursued change through informal channels: primarily by taking advantage of legal loopholes and gray areas.

While the Dobbeleare and Ben Porat studies explain how changes in the religious composition of workers or consumers could ultimately lead to institutional secularization, a study by Zehavi (Reference Zehavi2012) investigates how these changes might lead to religionization. Zehavi in an exploration of how social level religious change affects the religious character of welfare state services (specifically personal social services and hospitals) argued that demographic changes that shift the balance between religious and non-religious in society are likely to exert an effect on welfare organizations. This occurs via three different actor-based causal paths. First, Zehavi shows that the religious composition of an organization's workforce is likely to affect the religious character of its work. Second, in similar vein to Ben-Porat, service consumers could influence the nature of services, and changes in the religious composition of service consumers Footnote ³ are likely to move the religious character of social services in a direction parallel to social/individual change. A third process that links social/individual level religious change to welfare services works through the political domain: an increase/decline in religious observance is likely to affect the relative power of religious politicians and parties. This, in turn, is related to the degree of political pressure on welfare services to conform to specific religious/secular worldviews. Zehavi finds that these three causal paths help explain how and why welfare services in the Netherlands and Belgium experienced secularization in recent decades where a general secularization trend on the social/individual level religious transpired. Conversely, in Israel, in which the social share of the religious grew, welfare services became more religious. Based on this theory, religionization effects are likely to be strongest in instances in which the public organization is situated in a locale that has undergone considerable religionization on the social/individual level, and as a result, the composition of workers, clients, and voters changed accordingly (which is likely, but not necessarily the case).

In Zehavi's tri-path explanation of how religious change at the social level affects religious behavior at the institutional level, only the political path corresponds to change explanations that focus on formal policy at the macro level (e.g., Minkenberg Reference Minkenberg2002). The worker' and consumer' paths, quite differently, affect informal organizational change. Zehavi finds that religious change in welfare state services often goes undetected because it occurs absent a notable change in the legal-institutional framework.

Formal Institutional Change, Layering, and Conversion

Different agents are at work in each of the three change processes — workers, consumers, and voters/politicians — but clearly institutions matter as well. What actors are able to do hinges on the institutional structure within which they operate. “Religionization from below” would move via the worker and consumer paths (the political path even if it begins from below ultimately moves through formal political channels) and is likely to garner little attention and provoke scant opposition because it is “off the radar.”

Organizational change from below can take different institutional forms. More specifically, two distinct institutional change mechanismsFootnote ⁴ are pertinent in the context of low-visibility change: “institutional conversion” and “institutional layering” (Hacker Reference Hacker2004; Streeck and Thelen Reference Streeck and Thelen2005). Institutional layering takes place when new institutional arrangements emerge alongside established ones: For instance, the emergence of publicly funded religious shelters for at-risk youth are added to a system dominated by non-religious shelters. Institutional conversion occurs in instances in which organizational structure and its nominal status (religious or non-religious) do not change, but its internal practices are transformed. For instance, Catholic schools that dedicate little time to religious studies without changing their formal Catholic status. As shown in Figure 1, the bottom-up change processes move through layering and conversion while the political pathway operates primarily through formal institutional change. Both bottom-up processes, precisely because they do not involve a frontal assault on well-established formal arrangements, offer relatively low-resistance paths to change.

Figure 1.

From social/individual to institutional religionization.

However, the literature that discusses these two processes is silent on possible differences between the two. This work could serve not only as an investigation into mechanisms of religious change at the institutional level, but also as an exploratory comparative study of institutional layering and conversion. The exploratory nature of this work implies that its goal is to generate valuable theoretical insights based on case studies, but it does not formally test them.

The Military

Since its establishment in 1948 amid war, Israel's military played a critical role in Israeli public life. The military budget is considerably larger than any other public organization's budget (and largest as share of government budget among organization for economic co-operation and development countries) and its workforce also surpasses by far that of any other organization. Given near-universal Jewish conscription and the central role that the military plays in Israel's war-checkered history, it is of little surprise that the military strongly influences Israeli society and culture.

The demographic growth in the share of the ultra-orthodox in society has little direct effect on the military. The main reason for this is that the ultra-orthodox are mostly exempt from military' service, and although two ultra-orthodox units were established since 2002, their share is still too small to have much of a general effect. Social/individual religionization, however, did have a major effect on the military workforce, especially among combat units. Modern orthodox men, unlike the ultra-orthodox, serve in the military. This group has undergone two concomitant trends that combine to produce a strong religionization effect. First, modern orthodox soldiers are far more likely than in the past to join combat divisions and to enlist as officers. The share of modern orthodox infantry officer cadets increased by one order of magnitude — from 2.5 to 26%— in less than 20 years since the early 1990s (B' 2010). It should be stressed that the infantry is considered the backbone of the Israeli military: almost all Israeli Chief of Staffs served in the infantry. This impressive increase could be explained ideologically: the modern orthodox have become more nationalistic and so the appeal of the military increased. It is also associated with an institutional change: the creation in 1987 of religious pre-military academies that motivate and channel large cohorts of modern orthodox to enlist in combat units and pursue a military career (B' 2010). These academies stress the importance of having their graduates integrate into regular military units and not into separate units for the modern orthodox. This drove the military toward institutional conversion and not layering.

Second, the modern orthodox have undergone an internal religionization process by which they have become stricter in their adherence to religious rules (Cohen and Susser Reference Cohen and Susser2012). Combined these two trends entail that the share of religiously strict officers and soldiers in what are considered to be the military's core units has increased substantially.Footnote ⁶

In terms of consumers of the military product, given that national security is a pure public good, whatever change occurred in consumer composition should simply reflect the general religionization trend in society.

Finally, politics could also affect organizational change. As mentioned in the previous section, the share of religious political parties in the Knesset increased in recent decades. Much of this increase is attributable to the growing strength of the ultra-orthodox parties. These parties are generally silent on military affairs, in part because their constituents rarely serve, and in part because security issues are relatively low on their agenda.

Has religionization advanced on an organizational level in the military? Several publications in the field of state-military relations attest that this indeed is the case. This change was reported in a collection of essays dedicated specifically to this issue (Gal and Libel Reference Gal and Libel2012) and a recent book (Levy Reference Levy2015). Religionization is manifested in several different ways such as an increased adherence in military bases to Jewish dietary (Kosher) laws and an expanded role for the military rabbinate (a unit in charge of religious services) in the task of educating and motivating soldiers. While the growing strictness in enforcing Kosher laws (e.g., soldiers that bring non-Kosher food into a military base are thrown into detention) is interesting, the growing role of the military rabbinate has even drawn the critical attention of the State Comptroller who voiced concern that the Rabbinate has overstepped its authority by taking upon itself to educate soldiers — including non-religious ones (The State Comptroller 2012). The former Chief Rabbi of the military who led this transformation was unapologetic: as far as he was concerned, religion enhanced soldier's motivation to engage in combat and demand for it followed naturally from the increase in the share of modern orthodox soldiers, and especially officers, in combat units (Levy Reference Levy2010). This form of religionization has not gone uncontested. Recently, the military's Manpower Directorate has proposed to close a branch of the military rabbinate whose activities focus on boosting motivation, in order to keep in check the Rabbinate's influence. This move appears to be supported by the Chief of Staff (Cohen Reference Cohen2015).

The military manifestation of religionization that received the most public attention involved the separation of female and male soldiers. One event in particular in which officer cadets walked out of a military ceremony because it featured female singers provoked public ire (Cohen and Susser Reference Cohen and Susser2012).Footnote ⁷ This incident is indicative of a far more serious problem of accommodating simultaneously religious soldiers and women — especially given the military's internal religionization trend. Following the voicing of religious concerns that male religious soldiers are being over-exposed to women, in 2002, the military issued “the appropriate integration” guidelines. These were intended to help govern female-male interactions in the military in a way that would limit the exposure of religious soldiers to women. The guidelines included measures which guaranteed that religious soldiers would not be required to serve under female officers and that in training courses in which the units were of mixed sex, religious soldiers would be guaranteed a separate single-sex unit. However, given the large and growing share of religious soldiers in the military's core units, questions arise about the extent to which these arrangements impede women's advancement (Levy Reference Levy2015). In 2011, Gila Kalifi-Amir, the Women's Affairs Advisor to the Chief of Staff, argued that the growing insistence of many religious soldiers to minimize interaction with women is effectively marginalizing women in the military. She wrote:

The “appropriate integration” measures, given religious influence within the military, are interpreted in such a way that in effect often prevents women from serving in units in which there is a large share of religious soldiers — and these are the most important units in terms of long-term promotion.

What has led to this form of religionization in the military? There is little to indicate that social/individual religionization trends exerted much of an effect either through the consumer' or the political' paths. As claimed before, neither did the modern orthodox' share in society — i.e., the consumers of the military public good — change, nor did the political power of their representative party strengthen. The one clear change was by way of the worker' path. The dramatic rise in the religious share among infantry soldiers and officers coupled with an increasingly strict interpretation of religion affected a significant change in the military.

Although the military allowed for some layeringFootnote ⁸ formal separation was limited. The Israeli military, for both organizational and ideological reasons, is less than keen to create distinct religious units at all levels. Hence, religionization often takes the form of institutional conversion: the entire military must adhere more than in the past to the laws governing Kosher food and all soldiers are subjected to religious messages delivered by military rabbis. The fact that religionization affects all — primarily women soldiers but also non-religious men — increases the likelihood of opposition to religionization. Indeed, as demonstrated by the frank and public criticism of female marginalization by senior military officers, it is clear that an internal struggle is taking place against religionization.Footnote ⁹

Schools

The Israeli education system, from its very beginning, was divided along religious lines. Beyond separate school systems for Jews and Arabs, the Jewish school system was divided into three streams: the non-religious stream (the largest), modern orthodox, and the non-public ultra-orthodox.

The modern orthodox school system is clearly influenced by the growing religious fundamentalist trends, something that is manifested in religious schools embracing strict separation of boys and girls from an early age. Between 2001 and 2010, the share of students studying in mixed-gender public religious primary schools dropped from 50 to 37%. Gender segregation usually leads to smaller classes something that requires higher per-student public outlays than would otherwise be the case (Shir Reference Shir2014).

In terms of consumers, the non-religious school system caters almost exclusively to the non-religious. The vast majority of its personnel are non-religious, but precise figures are unavailable. Politically, beyond the general strengthening of religious parties over time, it should also be noted that two former education ministers belonged to the main modern orthodox party as is true of the current (circa 2017) minister. So were non-religious schools affected by social/individual religionization trends?

Despite some parental complaints about creeping religionization, the short answer is “no.” In Israel there is no strict separation of Church and State. Given that Zionism, Israel's nationalist movement, is inherently associated with Judaism it is unsurprising that bible lessons are taught in non-religious schools. Since Israel's establishment all students are required to pass a bible matriculation exam. Nevertheless, the weight of bible studies in non-religious schools has diminished over time. There has been a clear decline in weekly school hours dedicated to the bible/heritage/civics subjects across different age groups. For example, fifth and sixth grade students studied nine weekly hours in 1988, six in 1998, and only five in 2004. In contrast, the required total weekly hours — for all subjects — moderately increased from 30 to 32 during the corresponding period (Blass, Zussman, and Tsur Reference Blass, Zussman and Tsur2012). In 1991, the Ministry of Education convened the Shenhar Committee to study and make recommendations regarding instruction of Jewish studies in non-religious schools. The Committee found that the number of hours dedicated to Jewish studies declined considerably over the years, fewer students chose to specialize in Jewish studies, and there was a need to strengthen this subject and re-orient it in a direction that would be more appealing to non-religious youth (Shenhar Committee 1994). The Committee, however, did not envision in its recommendations any type of religious awakening. Its report stressed that Jewish subjects were to be taught from a distinctly humanistic, non-religious, and even critical, perspective.

In 2010, a parliamentary investigative report concluded that the status of the Jewish subjects was not improving in the public non-religious schools. In some schools, principals decided that certain grades would “skip” one year of bible studies: a move that is at odds with official policy. In general, Jewish studies were considered as low priority by both principals and students: only 11% of students chose to specialize in a Jewish subject in their matriculation exams (beyond the compulsory bible exam). Ministry of Education officials argued that the sorry state of the three Jewish studies subjects is, in part, the result of budgetary cuts targeted at the instruction of these subjects in recent years. The report also mentioned the growing polarization between religious and non-religious in Israeli society as a major reason for the deterioration in the stature of Jewish studies in non-religious schools (Valler Reference Valler and Kreisel2006; Fiedelman Reference Fiedelman2010).

In a set of five in-depth interviews conducted with teachers in different Jerusalem (a city chosen because of its rapid pace of social/individual religionization) non-religious secondary schools, the general sense among teachers was that there were no significant signs of religionization in their schools. The interviewees did not sense a rising tide of religion in their schools — either as part of the regular instruction hours or in extracurricular activities.

An explanation of the continued marginality of religion in non-religious Jewish schools should begin with the obvious: these schools are non-religious and they constitute a distinct layer separate from religious schools. Religious presence, either as parents or as workers, in non-religious schools is marginal. Non-religious parents care little about religious subjects and, accordingly, school principals view these subjects as low priority. The growing share of the religious in the general public implies that a growing share of students will attend religious schools — as is indeed the case — and not that the character of non-religious schools would transform. Moreover, religious political leadership finds little interest in schools that are not attended by their constituency. Finally, as noted in the parliamentary report, social polarization also plays a role. Some non-religious Jews are estranged from religion and are averse to its manifestations in the public school system. For example, in a Knesset committee meeting that discussed the state of the Jewish subjects in non-religious schools, several legislators noted that suggestions to strengthen Jewish subjects are regularly met with a vocal opposition objecting to religious involvement in schools (Knesset 2010). Indeed, in interviews, a couple of teachers argued that some parents opposed any teaching of religion-related studies: perhaps as a response to Jerusalem's general religionization, which the parents found threatening.

Undoubtedly, in a country in which the specter of religion looms large there will always be some who fret over a possible religious takeover of schools. For the time being, such a trend cannot be detected in non-religious public schools.

Healthcare

Institutionally, the Israeli healthcare system is comprised of a nationwide network of publicly funded local clinics managed by four different health funds. In addition, the vast majority of hospitals are publicly funded, if not publicly-owned. Both hospitals and local health clinics do not have a formally defined religious character apart from three religious hospitals that serve a small minority of the religious public. The Department of Health is responsible for regulating all healthcare facilities.

Primary care clinics, hospitals, and other healthcare services are generally public — both in terms of funding streams and consumers. Nevertheless, given that both clinics and hospitals could be situated in areas with a high share of religious consumers, there is a distinct possibility of religionization occurring in some facilities located in religious areas and much less so in others.

Figures that break down the medical workforce by religiosity are unavailable due to privacy issues. However, based on interviews with hospital managers across the country, the clear majority of doctors are non-religious and ultra-orthodox physicians are rare: in part, because the ultra-orthodox infrequently pursue higher education. Even in a Jerusalem public hospital with a distinct (and uncommon) Jewish character, according to the hospital manager, the majority of physicians are non-religious (Interview, February 26, 2015).

In political terms, unlike the case of the Ministry of Education, religious parties do not appear to have any special affinity to the Ministry of Health. Nevertheless, two former health ministers belonged to an ultra-orthodox party as is true of the current minister (circa 2017). Is the healthcare system undergoing religionization and, if so, what form does it take?

On the formal policy level, there is little change. Most medical issues are not subject to religious contention.Footnote ¹⁰ In hospitals, however, religionization is manifested in various ways, albeit the extent of religionization depends on whether the hospital is situated in a locale with a high share of ultra-orthodox. Zehavi (Reference Zehavi2012) reports that hospitals that cater to a public that is increasingly religious have progressively embraced various practices favored by this demographic: a high level of strictness in enforcing Kosher dietary laws on their premises; the use of special equipment on the Sabbath so as not to violate the holy day; synagogues have been opened and renovated on hospital grounds; and ultra-orthodox — are sometimes separated from other patients and offered de-facto religious person-only rooms in which they would not be exposed to practices and speech that they find offensive. The latter religionization manifestation is especially pronounced in the case of maternity wards in which religious mothers deliver a very high share of births and hospitals consider government compensation lucrative. Although there is no legal basis for setting separate rooms aside for the religious, some hospitals adopt this practice to attract customers (Zehavi Reference Zehavi2012).

Separation for religious reasons could also exact a price, not just attract more customers. In a parliamentary hearing that dealt with the practice of gender-based separation in a psychiatric hospital, the hospital's deputy manager testified that the ultra-orthodox conditioned hospitalization on sex separation. Hence, the increasing share of ultra-orthodox patients in the hospital led to the creation of sex-separate wards. Such separation, however, increased the workforce required for serving each ward by 50%: a significant additional expense (Shelfman Reference Shelfman2009).

One important religionization incident related to an Emergency Room's (E.R.) location offers some insight in regard to the limits of religionization. An ancient burial ground was found during excavations on a site designated for the construction of a new E.R. Ultra-orthodox Jews were concerned that the burial ground was Jewish and in a rare case of political intervention, the ultra-orthodox deputy minister in charge of the Department of Health pushed the government to move the E.R.: this despite the fact that such a relocation was expected to create logistic problems for the hospital and significantly increase building costs. Ultimately, critical media coverage and popular protests led to a reversal of this government decision. Opposition to this relocation was anchored by leading physicians and the Israeli Medical Association (Sofer Reference Sofer2010).

Religionization effects are hardly limited to hospitals. In 2012, Magen David Adom (the Israeli equivalent of the Red Cross) established a supervisory rabbinical committee for the organization after pressure from non-political religious ultra-orthodox leadership. The main problem was in Jerusalem in which the growing demographic share of the ultra-orthodox was expressed in growing numbers of religious female and ultra-orthodox men volunteers — primarily as paramedics. Following ultra-orthodox criticism, Magen David Adom established the committee to govern gender relations and other issues associated with religion (Levinson Reference Levinson2012).

To conclude, in healthcare, some religionization took place. In hospitals, religionization is manifested in multiple ways; mostly in issues that are not directly medical (e.g., Kosher food). The driving force behind such religionization is clearly the growing share of religious patients concentrated in specific areas. There is no distinct change in the religious makeup of medical personnel — especially physicians — and hospital managers interviewed were generally in agreement that political intervention was not significant. In Magen David Adom, however, religious leadership, and especially the workforce, brought about the establishment of the supervisory rabbinical committee. The organization could not ignore the demands of religious leaders given its considerable reliance on religious volunteers. The healthcare study also provides an example of politically driven religionization, and its failure. A highly visible government decision to relocate an E.R. for religious reasons was overturned due to protests led by physicians and their representative body.