The absence of a geographical understanding of international relations leads, so the author of this volume contends, to a failure on the part of scholars to appreciate some key aspects of the strategy of great powers, and, hence, also to a lack of appropriate explanation of state behavior. To make the case, this book looks back to history and to three cases that might not at first glance appear to be obvious candidates for analysis. Specifically, Jakub Grygiel examines Venice, the Ottoman Empire, and Ming Dynasty China in search of evidence to support his case about the importance of geopolitics in understanding international relations and the rise and decline of great powers.
The first two chapters deal with the abandonment of the geographical dimension in American international relations in the middle of the twentieth century. Realism with its systemwide concerns for power became predominant, and geostrategic formulations were then judged to be less important. As the natural science perspective declined in favor of social explanations, power overcame distance, so to speak, rather than the other way round. To rectify the neglect of concerns with distance and location in international relations, the author wants to bring geographical factors back into the analysis of foreign policy making, not because they determine a state's success or failure but rather, he argues, because the failure on the part of foreign-policy makers to take this matter seriously and to analyze it carefully has led to dissipated energies on nonessential tasks. The result has been the eclipse and eventual collapse of weakened states.
More specifically, the author wants to focus attention on three key concepts: first, geography understood as physical attributes of the state's environment; second, geopolitics in terms of the human factor within these attributes including the important matters of resources and their location as well as the technological dimensions of societies using those resources; and third, geostrategy, which refers to the direction in which a state focuses its major foreign policy efforts in terms of diplomatic activity and the projection of military power. Mountains, deserts, and the productive qualities of land, the location of food and fuel, and crucially the sources of wealth in trade routes, provide options for states. Ignoring these factors is, in short, folly. However, understanding them incorrectly is still poor geostrategy.
The bulk of the book then looks to world history in the aftermath of the Portuguese naval and trading expeditions, which effectively bypassed the overland Eurasian trade routes. In part, the rise of the West in the following centuries was a result of the dynamics set in motion by the shift of trade. The shift in world trade patterns beginning in the sixteenth century puts this fact into sharp relief because politicians had important geostrategic decisions to make to adapt to the new circumstances. The detailed argument spelled out in the three case study chapters suggests that in each case when state makers ceased to focus on the most essential economic matters at the heart of their power and became embroiled in political and military campaigns elsewhere that power declined.
Venice's options were certainly curtailed once her dominance over the spice and silk trade was ended by new Portuguese trade routes to the East. Nonetheless, her great mistake was to become embroiled in the political struggles on the mainland of the Italian peninsula. Shifting energy away from the essential trading source of her power to land struggles was, so Grygiel suggests, a major error in policy. Likewise, so long as the Ottomans remained focused on the wealthy lands of Southeast Europe, and not on adventures elsewhere, they were relatively successful. But the dangers of distraction, including attempts to challenge European trading power in the Indian Ocean, eventually aided their demise, too. Though obviously more complicated, the key argument in this volume is about such geostrategic choices.
In the Chinese case, the geographical argument is perhaps the most simple. Once the decision was taken to move the capital north to Beijing and concentrate on defense against the Mongols—though not on a major military campaign to eliminate the threat permanently—resources were diverted from overseas trading, exploration, and from mounting a naval challenge to the growing power of the Portuguese and the Dutch. Effectively, the Chinese handed dominance of the global trade routes to powers the other side of the planet without a fight. China then went into long-term decline.
The concluding chapter attempts to draw lessons for the conduct of American foreign policy from this historical analysis. In doing so, it follows a long tradition of geopolitical thinking in providing advice to the prince in preference to concluding with more scholarly matters. Despite the introduction of the geographical theme, the discussion of geopolitics and geostrategy is not linked back to the larger study of international relations. Consequently, an opportunity to think systematically about how the insights of classical realism might be once again integrated into the discussion of international relations is missed.
The policy prescription is straightforward and conventional in warning American geostrategists of the apparent necessity to rebuild American forces to focus on a rising China. The fighter planes and army formations designed to fight the Soviet Union in Europe are not what is now needed in the oceanic realms of the Asian Pacific. In a book about trade routes and rising and falling powers, the omission of any consideration of the rise of the other potential great power, India, is odd and leaves the concluding discussion strangely incomplete. Likewise, the fact that so much American overseas trade is with China, the putative rival gets less attention than the current geography of the global economy would seem to merit.
While selectivity is essential in such analyses, the book is also strangely incomplete in its treatment, or rather complete lack of treatment, of matters of geography in terms of the academic discipline of the same name. Economic geography, which would seem to be essential to this analysis, is mentioned only to refer to a few relatively unsophisticated publications by writers who are not geographers. The focus is not at all on the thriving discipline that deals with economic development, world trade, regional growth patterns, and other germane themes. Likewise, none of the current literature on geopolitics is cited; Saul Cohen's work from the 1960s is, but there is no mention of his recent major work that updates and challenges some of the earlier formulations.
This matters, not because of disciplinary conceit or because geographical scholarship has a monopoly of wisdom on any of these matters, but because the conclusion of Grygiel's book implies that the lessons of history and geography apply equally to current circumstances. But the assumption that the American dominance and immanent rivalry with China are inevitable might be effectively challenged by a recognition of the complexity of current international economics and the greater importance of numerous trade patterns and wealth generation that is not easily constrained within a geographical imagination limited to great power rivalry. The author would no doubt disagree, but the case in his book would be much stronger if it anticipated this counter argument in some detail and linked it to his early considerations of the benefits of thinking carefully about the taken-for-granted geographical categories in political thought.
